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ABSTRACT 
 
MUSLIM TATAR WOMEN’S PIETY STORIES: 
A QUEST FOR PERSONAL AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN TATARSTAN 
(RUSSIA) 
 
SEPTEMBER 2013 
 
LILIYA V. KARIMOVA 
 
DIPLOMA OF SPECIALIST, KAZAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY  
 
M.A., PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY  
 
PH.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Benjamin Bailey 
 
This dissertation introduces and analyzes piety stories, the stories that Muslim 
Tatar women in Tatarstan, Russia, share about their paths to becoming observant 
Muslims. It examines the ways women use these stories to create and represent moral 
worlds that diverge from those of the mostly secular, historically Christian, society that 
surrounds them. This study is based on ethnographic research and recordings of stories in 
Tatarstan’s capital city of Kazan and its suburbs over a total period of thirteen months 
(from 2006 through 2010).  
While outsiders often see Islam as oppressing women, these women experience 
Muslim piety as a source of agency and a resource for personal and social transformation 
in post-Soviet Russia. Piety stories allow Muslim Tatar women to (re)experience their 
commitment to Islam at the discursive level and to invite others to step onto a path to 
Muslim piety, thus serving as a form of da’wah, a Muslim’s moral duty to invite others to 
	   viii 
Islam. Through these stories, women perform identities, negotiate group memberships, 
and contribute to building both local and global Muslim communities.  
Piety stories serve as a window onto the personal politics of the post-Soviet 
Muslim revival. Older women, for example, use stories to create coherent narratives of 
their piety, despite their relative lack of religious practice during the state-endorsed 
atheism of the Soviet period. Expressions of gender are also intertwined with this 
political and economic history. Both Soviet policies and the immediate post-Soviet 
economic collapse required women to work outside the home in addition to caring for 
their families, and many Muslim Tatar women find the clear delineation of traditional 
gender roles and rights in Islam liberating. In global and local contexts where Muslim 
piety is often conflated with political Islam and terrorism, women use piety stories to deal 
with stereotypical perceptions of Muslims by showing their religious identities and the 
forms of Islam they practice to be moral. Ultimately, practicing Muslim Tatar women use 
piety stories as one way—a discursive one—to challenge, re-produce, or legitimize their 
understanding of Islam and what it means to be a practicing Muslim Tatar woman in 
Russia today.  
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 “Without faith, a person sinks to the bottom,” 
 
Guzel, a 29-year-old medrese1 student 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about “piety stories,” the stories that practicing Muslim Tatar 
women in Tatarstan, Russia, tell about their paths to Muslim piety. These women, many 
of whom lived most of their lives as Soviet citizens, see Islam and a Muslim life style as 
a way to personal and social transformation. The communicative practice of sharing piety 
stories provides one way—a discursive one—for both the story teller and the audience to 
experience this transformation first-hand. As such, these stories are an inseparable part of 
the women’s iman [Tat. ‘faith’], identity, the local Muslim discursive community, and the 
Tatars religious revival.2  
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand what practicing Muslim Tatar 
women, as social actors, do when they tell or hear a piety story and what rhetorical and 
social effects story-sharing has on both the narrator and the audience. Drawing on 
research on conversion narratives (Stromberg, 1993) and life stories (Linde, 1993) and 
assuming a performative approach to language (Austin, 1961, 1962), I argue that through 
sharing piety stories, women perform their identities and negotiate group memberships. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This spelling of the originally Arabic word madrasah reflects the Russian pronunciation of the word. Unless indicated 
otherwise in the dissertation, for ease of comprehension, I use this particular transliteration of the originally Arabic 
word. This style of transliteration is not inappropriate because a fair number of medrese students that I met during 
fieldwork, especially the younger generation, regularly use the Russian version of the word. Because both Russian and 
Tatar have many Arabic borrowings, and the same Arabic word may be pronounced slightly differently in Russian than 
in Tatar, I represent these differences in pronunciation (and ultimately, language use) through different spellings, or 
transliterations. For example, if an interviewee used the word madrasah in Tatar, I transliterated it accordingly: 
mädräsä. 
2 In my treatment of the Tatars’ religious revival, I draw on Hirschkind’s (2006) conceptualization of the Islamic 
Revival, based on Egypt’s example, as “not a given socio-ideological formation but a contingent and shifting 
constellation of ideas, practices and associational forms” (p. 207). I elaborate on the Tatar Muslim revival in chapter 2. 	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More importantly, piety stories provide a discursive way for the speaker to practice being 
a Muslim in the very moment of interaction, and for the audience, a blueprint for 
becoming one. Ultimately, drawing on the understandings of agency as (a) an ability to 
make choices and impact the environment (Giddens, 1984) and (b) an ability to submit to 
prescribed norms of behavior (Mahmood, 2005), I demonstrate that piety stories create a 
communicative and communal space where women strategically construct and exercise 
their agency. 
Post-Soviet socio-economic upheaval led Tatar women to make new sense of the 
world: their sense of self, their beliefs and values, and their understanding of what it 
means to be a woman in post-Soviet Russia. The Tatar ethnic and religious revival further 
sharpened Tatars’ sense of identity, putting the role of Islam in the center of Tatars’ 
debates on their identity and future. In this context, Muslim Tatar women agentively use 
piety stories to negotiate their identities, gain a group membership, re-affirm their 
commitment to Islam, and provide the audience with a sample path to Muslim piety, 
which they regard as a means to personal and social transformation.  
More specifically, older Tatar women who experienced adulthood during the 
Soviet era and became practicing Muslims later in life, strategically craft continuity and 
coherence in their stories as a way to achieve moral standing and authority among those 
who might question their commitment to piety, such as the younger generation of Muslim 
Tatar women. In another instance, women question the benefits of gender equality that 
were once promoted by the Soviet government and are now supported by advocates of 
women’s rights whose understanding of freedom as a universal individual right is based 
on a progressivist and liberal political agenda (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Mahmood, 2005). 
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Tatar Muslim women provide their own interpretations of what it means to be a (Muslim) 
woman (or man) in post-Soviet Russia where the government’s neo-familial policies 
compete with the double-burden that many women continue to carry as main 
breadwinners and caregivers. Finally, as the Russian government struggles to define and 
institute an official form of Islam in an effort to curb Russian Muslims’ interest in 
exploring religious traditions that are new to them, Tatars debate whether and what kind 
of Islam should define their identity. Women use piety stories to counter negative 
stereotypes formed on the basis of a Muslim’s sources of religious knowledge (such as a 
website, for example) and his or her physical practices (such as the daily prayers, or a 
long beard, for example). In the process, Muslim Tatar women normalize and legitimize 
their own religious identities and practices which otherwise may be interpreted as foreign 
to Tatars’ religious tradition and thus their future. In doing so, they actively construct and 
exercise their agency at the discursive level. 
This study is based on ethnographic research that I conducted in the Tatarstan 
capital city of Kazan and some of its suburbs over a total period of thirteen months (June-
July 2006; August-September 2008; August 2009-April 2010). The main theoretical 
framework for this dissertation is a study of (conversion) narratives, which approaches 
discourse as an observable performance (Goffman, 1981) and focuses on conversion 
narrative itself, as opposed to an actual conversion event that took place in the past and is 
now being shared (Stromberg, 1993). Such an approach still allows for an exploration of 
the significance behind religious experience because “in order to tell the stories of their 
conversions, believers must talk about aspects of their experience that have profound 
meanings for them” (Stromberg, 1993, p. 15).  
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While data for this study consist of individual women’s discourses and 
experience, they are grounded in ethnographic observations and larger socio-cultural 
realities. My inquiry into the local communicative practices shared by practicing Muslim 
Tatar women was conducted with the ultimate goal of understanding some of the ways 
these women make sense of themselves, the world they live in, and their positions in it. In 
some respect, then, this study is an attempt to contribute to the body of knowledge, 
grounded in local socio-historical milieu, that is generated in response to Abu-Lughod’s 
(2002) call to abandon the apriori assumptions that Muslim women need saving from 
oppressive structures that are inherent in Islam. It is my hope that my analysis of piety 
stories will provide insight into the broader social and historical forces that these stories 
are part of such as the Tatars’ post-Soviet ethnic and religious revival.  
 
Origin of this Study 
Growing up during the last decade of the Soviet Union, I witnessed Islam—as I 
knew it—take an unexpected turn, embodied in my mother’s religious transformation. 
My earliest experience of Islam—at the age of four—was my mother’s quiet recitation of 
a short prayer in Arabic every night before bedtime. I could not understand the meaning 
of it at the time, but I remember the way it sounded: “Ahuzu billyahi mina shaitan irrazim 
bismillyah irrahman irrahim. . . .”3 I remember asking my mother what the words meant 
during her occasional attempts to teach them to my sister and me. She would say that 
they helped to keep cherti [Ru. ‘demons’] away at night. I was a four-year-old, terrified 
of darkness and a terrible sleeper, and my mother’s simple explanation made perfect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This transcription reflects they way my mother recited the prayer, as I remember it.  
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sense. My mother also put an old Qur’an under my pillow, wrapped in a white cotton 
scarf. Those things made me feel secure and sleep better.  
On occasion—when someone in our family was sick or when something 
important was to take place—my mother would visit an old Tatar couple that happened to 
be our neighbors in a Soviet style apartment building. She referred to them as Shamil 
babay [Tat. ‘grandfather; old man’] and Saniya apa [Tat. ‘aunt’]. I often accompanied 
her. The couple was in their seventies, and spoke only Tatar during our visits. After 
reciting some Qur’anic verses in Arabic, Saniya apa would say a prayer in Tatar with her 
hands in the air, palms put together as if trying to catch some rain drops. At the end of the 
prayer, she would touch her face with her hands, as if washing her face with water. My 
mother and I would repeat the movements, and everyone would say “Amin” at the end.  
I enjoyed our visits to the old couple because they always gave me treats, like 
caramelized candy. As someone who was growing up without grandparents or elderly 
relatives around, I was also filled with curiosity about the couple—I did not know anyone 
else who was that old and gentle. When I was about five, we moved to a different 
apartment, and our visits to the old couple became rare. Our last visit to Saniya apa took 
place when I was about nine. Shamil babay was gone by then. Saniya apa passed away 
shortly thereafter. Almost twenty years later, in the course of my fieldwork, I learned that 
Shamil babay was a mullah [Tat. ‘Muslim clergy’] in one of Kazan’s mosques, and was 
sent to prison by the Soviet authorities. I also learned that he was the one who performed 
isem kushu, a Tatar Muslim name-giving ceremony, when I was born.  
After Shamil babay and Saniya apa passed away, my mother befriended a Tatar 
family who also happened to be our neighbors. In the mid nineteen-eighties, at the very 
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beginning of Perestroika, Gorbachev’s political reforms, they were the only observant 
Muslim family that we knew of in our small industrial town just west of Kazan. The 
husband’s father, an elderly Tatar man whom I’ll call Khasan babay, had the same peace 
and gentleness about him as Shamil babay and Saniya apa. A former coal miner, he 
became observant4 upon retirement, and my mother visited him for the same purposes she 
used to visit the other couple. I often came with her. When Khasan babay became 
seriously ill, my mother would bring him her homemade food. He would encourage her 
to start performing namaz, the Muslim five daily ritual prayers. She originally began 
reciting only the morning prayer, performing it before leaving for work early in the 
mornings. She was in her early fifties and was several years short of reaching official 
retirement age of fifty-five. These were the difficult times of the 1990s Yeltsin5 era 
reforms with economic shock therapy, price liberalization, and privatization, which left 
many ordinary citizens unemployed and with no means for survival. To help support 
family when both her and my father’s wages were held back for several months, my 
mother did not retire, but changed jobs and continued working until she was forced to 
retire at the age of sixty. It was then that she began performing all five daily prayers.  
When I returned home after having been away in the U.S. for three years for 
graduate school, I learned that my mother had begun studying at a local medrese, but left 
it shortly after due to time constraints and family obligations. She continued with her five 
daily prayers. Upon one of my visits home four years later, my mother greeted me with a 
headscarf tied in the back of her neck, which I had only previously seen her wearing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Based on my memory, his religious observation was marked by the performance of the five daily prayers, attending 
Friday mosque sermons, and a pilgrimage to Mecca (a rare opportunity at the time). 
5 Boris Yeltsin was Mikhail Gorbachev’s successor and the first president of the Russian Federation (following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union). 
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during private religious gatherings in honor of someone’s death, birth, or marriage.  She 
announced that she had re-entered the medrese and was determined to finish it that time. 
From calf-length skirts typical for the Soviet generation women of her age, she had 
switched to full-length skirts and long-sleeve tops to dress in accordance with what she 
was taught to be the proper way for a Muslim woman to dress. On hot summer days, 
however, she still wore short-sleeve tops, coupled with long skirts and a headscarf, while 
pointing out that the short-sleeved tops were not the proper way to dress for a Muslim 
woman, particularly of her age. I also discovered that, having become convinced that 
alcohol is haram [Ar. ‘forbidden’] in Islam, my mother no longer served guests any 
alcohol and refused to attend celebrations if alcohol was being served. Instead, she began 
attending and hosting Qur’an ashlar [Tat. ‘Religious gatherings with the purpose of 
reciting the Qur’an, usually accompanied by meal’] several times a year, but particularly 
during important Muslim holidays such as Uraza bäyräm [Tat. ‘the celebration of 
Ramadan’]6 or Korban bäyräm [Tat. ‘the celebration of Qurban’].7  
By my next visit home from the U.S., my mother had graduated from the 
medrese. Her growing piety was marked for me by further changes in her wardrobe and 
diet. She no longer wore short-sleeve blouses outside the home, even on hot summer 
days. She also no longer consumed any meat if she was not sure that it was halal [Tat/Ar. 
‘Islamicly permissible’], meaning that the animal was slaughtered in accordance with the 
requirements of Muslim law. She stopped shaking hands with men who were not her kin 
and who, in her judgment, would be able to understand her conviction that only a 
woman’s husband or a close male kin had the right to touch her. Out of politeness, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Also known as Eid-ul-Fitr (Ar.), is a Muslim holiday that marks the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan [Ar.] 
during which Muhammad received the revelation to the Qur’an. 
7 Also known as Eid-ul-Adha (Ar.), is a Muslim holiday of the sacrifice that celebrates Abraham’s obedience to God.	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occasionally shook hands with men who, according to her, were not aware of or would 
not easily understand the religious tradition she followed.  
My mother’s religious transformation affected her life in very tangible ways. 
They were marked by the changes in her social circle, her diet and wardrobe, and the 
ways she organized her daily schedule (around prayer times) and spent her free time (by 
practicing tajwid [Ar. ‘Rules of Qur’anic recitation’]). But those changes did not end with 
her. They affected the family and friends in multiple, sometimes unexpected, ways, from 
their ongoing attempts to understand her piety or their own relative lack of it, to their 
beginning the five daily prayers or following Muslim dietary laws, or to following in her 
footsteps by entering the medrese. My mother never talked to me about her religious 
transformation, perhaps assuming there was nothing to say because I was witnessing it. 
But on a number of occasions, I overheard others ask her about her newfound Muslim 
piety, and heard her tell a story in response.  
 
Defining and Analyzing Piety Stories 
To refer to Muslim Tatar women’s narratives about their paths to Muslim piety, I 
have coined the term “piety story.” Previous research on personal narratives associated 
with religious experience uses such terms as “conversion narrative” (Griffin, 1990), 
“conversion story” (Stromberg, 1993), or “spiritual journey” (Molina-Markham, 2012). 
These terms focus not only on conversion understood as a change from one system of 
belief to another, but also as an ongoing change in one’s religious commitment within the 
same normative religious system, which is also the case with practicing Muslim Tatars. 
Additionally, following Stromberg’s definition of conversion stories (1993, p. 32), I 
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consider Muslim Tatar women’s narratives about striving to maintain their piety as an 
inseparable part of their piety stories. Even though these narratives may be tied to a 
specific point in time—a specific point of “conversion,” they often go beyond the original 
event, underlining the ongoing nature of one’s religious commitment. 
While I build on the above-mentioned research on conversion narrative, I chose to 
call Muslim Tatar women’s narratives “piety stories” because I believe that the existing 
terminology does not accommodate for the normative understanding of Muslim piety 
central to my analysis. To illuminate how Muslim piety differs from Christian 
understandings of faith, which are at the center of conversion narratives mentioned 
above, I use Mahmood’s (2005) explanation of Muslim piety. Mahmood (2005) stressed 
that normative Muslim piety is grounded in physical (bodily) manifestations that are 
prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative conduct based on the Prophet 
Muhammad’s example’] and are binding on every able Muslim. The most basic daily 
bodily practices are, for example, the five daily prayers, observance of modest clothing, 
and dietary requirements. One’s piety—commitment to God—is thus determined by and 
enacted through one’s ability to submit to these numerous requirements on a daily basis, 
which becomes an ongoing quest. To simplify, one’s spiritual state is directly tied to 
one’s ability to perform the normative physical rituals. Furthermore, unless one was 
socialized into these rituals since early childhood, one has to gradually learn to perform 
them and do so in a proper manner. 
This is certainly the case for most Muslim Tatar women at the center of this 
dissertation, who turned to Muslim piety—became observant Muslims—later in life, due 
to the Soviet state’s policy of atheism. I refer to these women throughout the dissertation 
	   10 
as observant, practicing, or pious, interchangeably.8 Furthermore, one’s familiarity with 
and acknowledgement of the rituals and does not constitute piety—it is one’s ability to 
enact them on a daily basis that does. Even if a Muslim Tatar woman underwent a 
conversion experience similar to that of an Evangelical Christian, she has to strive to 
achieve Muslim piety on a daily basis and in very specifically prescribed ways. 
Moreover, because the Qur’an and Sunnah regulate every aspect of life, physical 
manifestations of Muslim piety (such as the headscarf, for example) become public and 
observable by others (Muslims and non-Muslims alike). Therefore, some physical 
manifestations of a Muslim woman’s piety (such as her dress, for example) are present in 
the moment of interaction and are not only heard about, but also directly observable by 
others. Finally, I use the analytical term “piety story” as opposed to “piety narrative” to 
emphasize the “extended reportability” (Linde, 1993, p. 22) of these narratives—their 
repeated sharing overtime. To sum up, what I term a “piety story” in this dissertation 
refers to all narratives an individual woman tells about her path to Muslim piety.       
 In my analysis of the piety stories, I draw on Stromberg’s (1993) notion of 
identity as a style of doing things. Such conceptualization of identity places the focus of 
my analysis on the style of the women’s narratives. As Stromberg (1993) suggests, such 
an approach calls for attention to the linguistic practices—interplay of ideas, narrative 
viewpoint, speech units—that the narrators use to enact personal experience in terms of a 
“canonical language” (p. 34).9 I also draw on Linde’s (1993) approach to analyzing life 
stories, which focuses on linking the structure of narrative to ways the narrator uses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is not to say that Muslim women who are not observant are not pious (in the sense of being devout or faithful), 
but to emphasize, drawing on Mahmood (2005), the practice of Muslim piety.	  	  	  
9 By “canonical language” Stromberg (1993) refers to “a set of symbols concerned with something enduring and 
beyond everyday reality” (p. 3), not in the strictly Christian sense as in “biblical canon.” I follow Stromberg’s usage in 
my dissertation. 	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story, thereby allowing to look at a narrative as a social practice. Such an analysis 
involves examining multiple levels of linguistic units, “beginning with the smallest 
linguistic level of morphological structure, continuing through the structures at the level 
of the discourse unit, and culminating at the cultural and historical level of the coherence 
system” (Linde, 1993, p. 224). Overarching assumptions underlying this work are (a) that 
language embodies the social and ideological and is, therefore, always indexical and 
never neutral; and (b) that interlocutors are never isolated and their speech acts constantly 
compete for meaning (Duranti, 1994). With that in mind and following Bakhtin’s (1981) 
observation that “form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal 
discourse is a social phenomenon” (p. 259), I also analyze what is being said, in addition 
to how it is being said. Finally, emphasizing the situational nature of communicative 
practices and their role in expressing and constituting identities (Bucholtz and Hall, 2005; 
Bailey 2000a, 2000b), I locate these piety stories within the contexts where they take 
place, examining the situational detail and, when appropriate, the role of the researcher.   
 
Understanding Muslim Piety and (non-liberal) Agency 
In my dissertation, I draw on Giddens’ (1984) understanding of agency as 
people’s "capability of doing . . . things” because agency “concerns events of which an 
individual is the perpetrator, in a sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given 
sequence of contact, have acted differently” (p. 9). Such a definition (a) views agency as 
an individual ability to make choices and impact the environment (the structure), (b) 
underscores that structure and agency, the macro (history) and the micro (subjectivity) 
are necessarily and continuously dependent; and (c) that structure is both enabling and 
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limiting. In my analyses, I modify Giddens’ (1984) definition of agency by answering 
Ortner’s (1984) call to go beyond the concept of agency as a mere “en-actment of the 
rules and roles of the system” (p. 159) and to understand the workings of agency at the 
level of an individual, through an interaction. As I illustrate throughout this dissertation, 
practicing Muslim Tatar women use piety stories strategically and creatively to negotiate 
and legitimize their identities, gain group membership, re-enact their commitment to 
Islam, and invite the listeners to step onto the road to piety that they see as a venue for 
personal and social transformation. The women’s ability to utilize piety stories as 
communicative resources for performing those social actions constitutes multiple 
instances of agency. 
Ortner’s (2006) emphasis on understanding how agency works at the micro/local 
level is based on the assumption that “agency is not some natural or ordinary will: it takes 
shape as specific desires and intentions within a matrix of subjectivity—of (culturally 
constituted) feelings, thoughts, and meanings” (p. 110). Such an approach allows for 
culturally specific forms of agency, which sometimes can be easily overlooked and 
misinterpreted. In the case of practicing Muslim Tatar women who are the subjects of this 
dissertation, it is the nonliberal understanding of agency, tied to the notion of Muslim 
piety, which informs my analyses and discussions in this dissertation.  
The nonliberal understanding of agency challenges the poststructuralist feminist 
assumption that agency must be understood only as an ability to resist or subvert the 
existing norms and authority (Mahmood, 2005). For Muslim women, this alternative 
understanding of agency is directly tied to the concept of Muslim piety. As suggested 
above, Muslim piety is grounded in the minutiae of physical daily rituals so much so that 
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they are both an outcome and a source of faith (Mahmood, 2005). Such an understanding 
of piety requires more than having faith that one “carries in his or her heart”: it requires 
the correct performance of daily rituals prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
Furthermore, such a concept of piety provides a basis for an alternative notion of agency 
that requires a departure from the poststructuralist feminist understanding of agency 
exclusively as one’s ability to undermine, subvert, and resist existing norms and 
authority. Many contexts demand an alternative understanding of agency as one’s 
ongoing effort and ability to submit one’s body and mind to those norms and authority.  
 As I worked on this project and shared parts of it with American academic and 
non-academic audiences, a frequent initial reaction to it was a sense of surprise over what 
was perceived as the women’s combination of religiosity, as marked by practice, and 
relative absence of faith. This was typically followed by a sense of pity for the Tatar 
Muslim women who were “brainwashed” to believe that submission can be a source of 
faith and will earn a reward from God. I myself was guilty of applying my own liberal 
expectations to the women I thought I knew and understood well. Having studied Muslim 
communities in the U.S. during graduate school, I was particularly impressed by the 
activism of the younger generation of Muslim Americans who, I thought, considered 
themselves full members of the wider American society and actively participated in it. 
This meant that they had access to higher education and took advantage of it; they 
actively participated in campus life and were active members of their local communities, 
and upon graduation, they built careers. Most importantly, they were often interested in 
the issues of social justice, which meant that they cared and took steps to help people 
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who were not family and friends, regardless of their religious affiliation.10 This was 
regardless of the fact whether or not women wore scarves, observed the prayers and other 
rituals. In other words, their “Muslimness” did not stand in the way of their 
empowerment and activity in the wider (non-Muslim) society.  
These observations resulted in my having certain expectations, before I began my 
fieldwork, of observant Tatar Muslim women. The legacy of the Soviet experience, 
which promoted women’s emancipation and gender equality by making women work 
outside the home, in combination with post-Soviet freedoms, led me to expect Tatar 
Muslim women to be as active outside of their homes as inside of them. However, I 
quickly found myself disappointed when, during our initial encounters, younger women 
(especially) did not talk about any such activities and seemed to have no desire for what I 
thought of as personal or social transformation. Instead of answering my questions, these 
women “interrogated” me about my own, possibly suspect religiosity11 and never failed 
to correct poorly executed religious practices that I might perform. Like Mahmood (2005, 
p. 37), who studied the mosque movement and politics of piety among women in Egypt, I 
initially felt “repugnance” in these encounters. 
Mahmood (2005) explains this mismatch as a function of researchers’ 
unconsciously imposing a liberal/progressivist feminist framework on pious Muslim 
women rather than as a function of shortcomings in the agency of pious women. She 
argues that even such feminist anthropologists as Abu-Lughod (1986), while extending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I formed this impression particularly after learning about “Project Downtown,” which was carried out by Muslim 
Student Associations throughout many U.S. campuses. The immediate purpose of the project was to provide free food 
to the needy, which was often financed by students themselves and carried out by them. For more information about 
this project, go http://projectdowntown.org/ 
11 As chapter 4 on piety stories will illustrate, women often wanted to know my “story,” and while such role reversal 
took place fairly often, it was not always hostile. With time, I learned how to navigate through certain questions and my 
religious knowledge and practices also became more advanced to the point of not being questioned. During her 
fieldwork among Uzbek women, Peshkova (2006) observed a similar role reversal, which she calls a methodological 
“role inverse” (p. 42).  
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the feminist critique to contexts that were not structured by liberalism with its emphasis 
on individual freedom (in particular in her study of Bedouin women’s poetry as a socially 
legitimate practice of women’s resistance to male domination), still operated within the 
underlying assumptions of the dominant feminist paradigm. Mahmood (2005) finds that 
Western feminists recognize only certain types of subjects and agency, but treat their 
understandings as universal, thus transforming their feminism from an academic, 
analytical perspective to a “politically prescriptive project” (p. 10). This Western feminist 
perspective treats (a) resistance/subversion as the only agentive response to domination 
and (b) freedom as individual (personal) autonomy. These assumptions have implications 
for how agency is (mis)understood and approached, as Mahmood (2005) elaborates: 
if the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and 
culturally specific (both in terms of what constitutes “change” and the means by 
which it is effected), then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in 
advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that 
enable specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity. Viewed in this 
way, what may appear to be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a 
progressivist point of view, may actually be a form of agency—but one that can 
be understood only from within the discourses and structures of subordination 
that create the conditions of its enactment. In this sense, agentival capacity is 
entailed not only in those acts that resist the norms but also in the multiple ways 
in which one inhabits norms. (p. 15) 
 
Mahmood (2005) illustrates how Muslim women achieve agency not by 
subverting the highly prescriptive religious norms, but by submitting to them. Drawing 
on Foucault’s work on ethical formations, she explains the importance of “embodied 
ethics”: the physical manifestations of piety in Islam such as the five daily prayers, the 
veil, and the diet, but also obedience to one’s pious spouse. Finally, Mahmood 
underscores that her emphasis on agency as ethical self-formation is not apolitical 
because, as theories of the public sphere acknowledge, regulation of the daily bodily 
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practices is key to “shaping the civic and public sensibilities essential to the consolidation 
of a secular-liberal polity” (p. 74) such as the Egyptian state.   
While Mahmood’s ethnographic study was conducted in Egypt, it has important 
theoretical implications for other regions undergoing Muslim revival. This is particularly 
relevant with regards to the issues concerning normative practices associated with 
Muslim gender roles. As Peshkova (2013), observes in her explorations of non-liberal 
forms of freedom and desire among Uzbek Muslim women, most feminist scholarship on 
Muslim women in Central Asia, for example, is still conducted within the overriding 
feminist paradigm of domination and resistance. This dissertation is the first study to 
explore this alternative form of agency among Muslim women in Russia. As I will 
illustrate throughout the dissertation, Mahmood’s (2005) argument of embodied piety as 
a basis for agency that can effect personal and social transformation helps make sense of 
these women’s piety stories and shows that “what may appear to be a case of deplorable 
passivity and docility from a progressivist point of view” (p. 15) is an historically and 
culturally specific form of agency. 
  
Organization of the Dissertation  
Chapter 2 provides historical background and social context relevant for this 
study, tracing Tatars’ position as an ethnic (Tatar) and religious (Muslim) minority within 
imperial, Soviet, and present-day Russia. I provide a brief historical overview of popular 
Tatar discourses on gender and women’s issues, focusing on perceptions of the role of 
women, and suggest how those discussions may have affected the Tatar women’s social 
roles. Finally, I describe the Tatars’ recent post-Soviet ethno-religious revival and a 
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continuum of contemporary Muslim Tatar forms of piety, including my own 
positioning(s) along it. 
In Chapter 3, I present methodology for data collection and analysis that I 
employed for this project. I discuss the rationale for an in-depth ethnographic study and 
my focus on an individual woman’s experience and narrative as a window into the larger 
social reality. I describe the data collection and selection process and the roles my 
identity as both a Tatar “native” and U.S.-based and U.S.-educated researcher played in 
the data collection process. I follow with a discussion of discourse analysis and “life 
story” as a key unit of analysis. I address concerns associated with language use, 
interpreting and writing up the data. Finally, I explain how my simultaneous positioning 
as a researcher and a native impacted my social and moral standing in relation to this 
project.  
In Chapter 4, I explore religious contexts in which piety stories are usually told, 
drawing on four piety stories-sharing experiences. I analyze the culturally shared 
premises and social meanings behind the communicative practice of sharing paths to 
Muslim piety. I argue that soliciting and sharing stories about one’s path to Muslim piety 
is a communicative way of performing identity and re-affirming one’s commitment to 
Muslim piety. I further demonstrate how story telling contributes to community building 
if the storyteller succeeds in orienting herself toward her audience (through stance-
taking) and the audience shares in the religious commitment. Finally, I argue that, in the 
moment of interaction, the stories provide a discursive way for the speaker to practice 
being a Muslim and for the audience, a blueprint for becoming one. By doing so, these 
piety stories serve as a source of agency for both personal and social transformation. 
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In Chapter 5, I explain how the Soviet era’s atheism policy and the post-Soviet 
religious revival may have contributed to generational differences in the ways practicing 
Muslim women of the Soviet and post-Soviet generations understand Muslim piety. In 
particular, I suggest that, in the context of the recent Muslim revival, the older 
generation’s non-observance of Islam earlier in life may raise questions about the quality 
of the older women’s faith and their moral standing, particularly from the younger 
generation of practicing Muslims. Using piety stories of two older Tatar women from 
different walks of life and with varying degrees of piety, I demonstrate how the Soviet-
era Muslim women strategically create continuity and coherence in their commitment to 
Muslim piety even when such piety was not observed on the physical level for the bulk of 
their lives, during the Soviet era. I conclude that the older Muslim women discursively 
construct continuity and coherence in their beliefs as a way to create moral character and 
achieve moral authority vis-à-vis those who may be skeptical about their religious 
commitment, such as the younger generation of Muslim women.  
 Chapter 6 explores a function of piety stories, dagvat [Ru. ‘invitation/call to 
Islam’], through which the speaker appeals to the listener to join the speaker in Islam. As 
the audience for many piety stories and as a Muslim who was perceived to be relatively 
less pious, I was regularly exposed to dagvat. I begin with a brief overview of the Muslim 
notion of da’wah [Ar. ‘invitation/call to Islam’] and show how an act of engaging into 
da’wah represents a moral act, binding on all members of the Ummah, the Muslim global 
community. Providing specific examples, I then explain and illustrate how the notion of 
da’wah is used and understood by the Tatars in their contexts today. Finally, drawing on 
piety stories of two Muslim Tatar women (and data excerpts used in previous chapters), I 
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demonstrate how piety stories may serve as an indirect form of da’wah, the ultimate 
purpose of which is to effect a personal and social change.  
In the two remaining data-based chapters, I shift the focus of my analysis from 
examining culturally specific communicative features and functions of piety stories to 
investigating what these stories—and their narrators—can tell us about the sociocultural 
reality of which they are part. In Chapter 7, through narratives I examine Muslim Tatar 
women’s perceptions of gender roles and norms in the context of the post-Soviet Muslim 
revival. In my analysis, I respond to Abu-Lughod’s (2002) call for abandoning apriori 
criticisms of Islam as an inherently oppressive force towards women12 and locate the 
narratives within the local socio-historical milieu. I argue that the Muslim Tatar women’s 
understanding of gender roles and norms must be analyzed against the backdrop of the 
Tatar historical legacy, influenced by Islam; Soviet gender legacy and post-Soviet 
transitions; and current government’s neofamilial rhetoric, reflected in present-day 
popular views on gender. I then present an attitude toward gender that is popular in 
Russia in order to illustrate that strict division of gender roles and patriarchy are not out 
of the norm and often endorsed by many Russian citizens, whether Christian, Muslim, or 
secular. I also explain how the Russian government’s pronatalist policies—in light of 
Russia’s demographic crisis—contribute to such perceptions of gender roles. I further 
provide an overview of the Tatar sociohistorical legacy, informed by Islam, that positions 
Muslim Tatar women’s ideas about gender within the local context. By analyzing 
excerpts from the “Women in Islam” class discussions at a local medrese, I demonstrate 
that the students, young practicing Muslim Tatar women, don't passively learn gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Such criticisms are often produced by those advocates of women’s rights whose understanding of freedom as a 
universal individual right is based on progressive and liberal political agenda (Abu-Lughod 2002; Mahmood 2005).	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roles and norms that are associated with the Muslim norm, but also challenge them, 
asserting agency. Finally, I analyze a piety story of a practicing Muslim Tatar woman 
who compared her roles as a woman during the Soviet era, the post-Soviet transitions, 
and after becoming a practicing Muslim woman. Her narrative illustrates that Muslim 
Tatar women find a clear delineation of gender roles and rights in Islam liberating and 
use it as a source of agency. 
In Chapter 8 I explore Tatars’ search for and negotiation of an identity in light of 
the post-Soviet ethnic and Muslim revival. Based on women’s narratives and my 
ethnographic observations, I discuss two socio-cultural trends at the heart of Tatars’ 
search for identity. One suggests that Tatars’ interest in revitalizing their language and 
building a sovereign nation is also accompanied by a growing interest in Islam, which is 
no longer treated as a marker of ethnic identity, but a powerful force in its own right. 
Drawing on an older Muslim Tatar woman’s story, I further illustrate the generational 
difference in the way Tatars perceive identity. Unlike the younger generation of Tatars, 
the older generation considers the ethnic element of Tatar identity, exemplified in the 
Tatar language, an important feature of Tatars’ identity and future.  
The other trend suggests that Tatars debate to what extent and what type of Islam 
should be part of their identity and future. These debates are happening in the context of 
post-Soviet religious revival in Russia and Tatarstan and the Russian government’s 
attempts to control the religious space by instituting an official form of Islam and 
defining what type of Muslim it deems “good.”13 In these public and private debates, a 
Muslim’s sources of religious knowledge (such as a website, a book, or a religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I draw on Mamdani’s (2004) discussion of “good Muslim”/”bad Muslim,” which is presented in more detail in the 
next chapter.  
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teacher) and physical rituals (such as the style of one’s dress or the five daily prayers) are 
often considered reliable markers of his or her religious identity. Using two practicing 
Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories as a basis for analysis, I argue that practicing 
Muslims are aware of stereotypical perceptions formed on the basis of one’s sources of 
religious knowledge (when, for example, one’s Arab religious teacher is associated with 
conservative Islam) or physical practices (when, for instance, the length of one’s beard is 
taken as a sign that one has peaceful or violent religious convictions). I conclude that the 
women find communicative strategies to deal with such perceptions and use piety stories 
to negotiate and legitimize their religious identities and the forms of Islam they practice, 
thereby exerting a sense of agency.  
In the final chapter, Chapter 9, I first outline research questions and goals at the 
heart of this dissertation, and explain my methodological choices of ethnography and 
discourse analysis, and my theoretical focus on agency. I then describe how my own 
journey, as a researcher but also a human being, contributed to and ultimately framed this 
dissertation’s questions and conclusions. I proceed with a discussion of theoretical 
implications of this dissertation, particularly stressing the need for “expansion of the 
normative understanding of critique” (Mahmood 2005, p. 119) in relation to studies that 
focus on societies that operate under an unfamiliar set of beliefs. Finally, I propose a 
number of ways this dissertation’s research could be capitalized on in order to explore 
issues that remained outside of the scope of this work.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE TATAR COMMUNITY AND THE MUSLIM REVIVAL 
The piety stories that I analyze in this dissertation take place in a particular 
historical moment in a particular ethnic and religious context. This historical legacy 
contributes to and is reflected in the piety stories, and is, therefore, an inseparable part of 
my analysis and discussion. In this chapter, I provide historical background on the ethnic 
Tatar community, the post-Soviet Muslim revival, and the role of women in Tatar society 
today.   
 
Tatars Today 
The Volga Tatars (Tatars hereafter) are Russia’s largest ethnic minority and a 
dominant ethnic group (titular nation) of the Republic of Tatarstan. Tatarstan is located at 
the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, about 600 miles east of Moscow and west 
of the Ural mountains. This location places Tatarstan at the heart of central Russia, which 
is considered the European part of Russia (versus Russia’s East and the Far East, which 
are to the east of the Urals). Tatarstan’s territory measures 26,000 square miles (68,000 
square kilometers), which is the size of Ireland (Kondrashov, 2000, p. ix). The republic 
has a political status of a subject of Russian Federation. This means that, unlike some 
Central Asian republics that had been part of the Soviet Union but obtained independence 
from Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan is not an independent 
state. 
According to the 2010 Russian Census (“Okonchatel’nye itogi,” 2010), Tatars 
constituted 3.87% (or 5,310,649) of the total population of Russia. They make up 52.3% 
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(or 2,012,571) of Tatarstan’s total population of 3,786,488, which breaks down as 
follows: 
Tatars:  2,012,571  (52.3%) 
Russians: 1,501,369 (39.7%) 
Chuvash: 116,252 (3.1%)  
Others: 186,258 (4,9%) 
Tatars’ sense of identity, including their relationship to Islam, has been shaped by 
their centuries-long co-existence with other cultures/polities, from the Golden Horde14 to 
present-day Russia. While Tatars’ ethnogenesis has been at the center of scholarly debate 
over the past century,15 a dominant theory shared by present-day scholars traces Tatars’ 
origin to a combination of ancestors: (a) Volga Bulgars, a medieval Turkic people who 
inhabited the Middle Volga and the lower Kama region, with the capital city of Bolgar16 
since around the eighth century when they began converting to Islam;17 (b) Kipchak 
Turks, and (c) Mongol and Turkic tribes.  
Indeed, most Tatars today claim that they are descendants of Volga Bulgars who 
were then successively incorporated into the Golden Horde, converting it to Islam, and 
then into Kazan khanate. Schamiloglu (1990, 2001), Shnirelman (1996), and Matsuzato 
(2001) explain that such uninterrupted ancestry with Volga Bulgars at its root is a modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A Russian name for the Kipchak khanate, established by Batu Khan in the 13th century as the most north-western 
part of the Mongol Empire. At its peak, the Golden Horde included most of European Russia (“Golden Horde,” 2013). 
15 These theories trace Tatars’ origin directly or indirectly to three groups of ancestors: Volga Bulgars (Turkic people), 
Kipchak-speaking Turks, and Mongol Turks (Wertheim, 2003a, p. 7). 
16  The region’s geography corresponds to the present-day Tatarstan.  
17 A first accurate account of Volga Bulgars’ conversion to and practice of Islam is attributed to Ibn-Fadlan, the chief 
secretary of the court representatives which the Baghdad Caliph Al-Muqtadir (908-932) sent to the Volga Bulgars in 
922 CE (see, for example, Stewart Gordon’s chapter “Caliph and caravan: Ibn Fadlan, 921-922 CE” in When Asia Was 
the World, (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2009), pp. 21-38. Some evidence indicates that Bulgars were first 
introduced to Islam as early as seventh century, before they moved to the Middle Volga (Mukhametshin, 2009). For 
further discussion on the spread of Islam in the Volga River region see Rafik Mukhametshin, Islam v obshchestvennoi i 
politicheskoi zhizni tatar i Tatarstana v XX veke (Kazan, Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005).  
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ideological construct, created in response to Russia’s unfavorable perception of Tatars as 
direct descendants of the Golden Horde, and thus, enemies. The Russian tsar Ivan the 
Terrible conquered Kazan in 1552 in a brutal invasion, murdering most of the population 
and launching a fierce baptizing campaign to convert the remaining population to 
Orthodox Christianity (Kappeler, 2001). Drawing on Pelenski’s (1974) antipodal 
comparison,18 Rorlich (1986) suggests: “After the conquest, their [Muscovite elite] 
policies vis-à-vis the population of the khanate in general, and the Tatars in particular, 
were shaped by a perception that placed the Tatars and the Russians at antipodes; as can 
be seen in the following comparison: 
Russians: Believers, religious, Christians, pious, pure, peaceful, and good 
Tatars:  Nonbelievers, godless, pagans, impious, unclean, warlike, and bad” (pp. 
37-38).19 
Tatars’ identities and religion have thus been long stigmatized by Christian Russians. 
Describing the impact of the Russian conquest on Tatars, Rorlich (1986) 
concludes: “the very existence of its people as a different national, cultural, and religious 
entity was in danger” (p. 38). Present-day Tatars still feel this danger so much so that 
they continue to commemorate Khater Kone [Tat. ‘Memory Day’] on the second Sunday 
in October by marching from Kazan’s central Ploshchad’ Svobody [Ru. ‘Freedom 
Square’] to the Kazan Kremlin.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Rorlich (1986) explains that Pelenski (1974) drew on structural anthropology and applied the principle of binary 
opposition in his delineation of the two ethnic groups (note 2, p. 207).	  	  
19 Faller (2011) suggests that linguistic knowledge started playing into the perceived ethnic differences only in the 19th 
century (p. 7). 
20 The public commemoration of (and participation in) the Memory Day was at its peak during the Tatars’ Sovereignty 
Movement in the 1990s, as Faller’s (2011) description of the event illustrates (p. 283). Admittedly, according to the 
archives of the pro-Moscow Tatarstani newspaper Vecherniaia Kazan’ (its re-print of the coverage of the event in 
1992), about 1,000 “radicals” gathered for the event in 1992 (“Den’ pamiati,” 2013). In comparison, only about a 
hundred people publicly commemorated the event by gathering in the Freedom Square in 2012, according to the Tatar-
Bashkir Service of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFL/RL) (“Kazanda Khäter,” 2012). 
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Post-Soviet 1990’s Sovereignty Movement as Precursor to Muslim Revival 
The 1990s Tatar sovereignty (independence) movement left an important mark in 
the history of post-Soviet Tatarstan and contributed to the Tatar Muslim revival. The 
independence movement took multiple forms, but its key ideas trace their roots to both 
Russian Imperial and Soviet policies toward minorities. The Soviet rule (1922-1991),21 in 
particular, not only repressed religious freedoms and minority rights, but also deprived 
Tatars of a possibility of having an autonomous Volga-Ural state that they had envisioned 
as a territorial and political sanctuary.22 Therefore, the Tatar sovereignty project’s efforts 
were primarily focused on political (national) independence from Russia. Additionally, in 
its discursive and symbolic form—perhaps the most prominent form at the popular 
level—a call for sovereignty manifested in revitalization of the Tatar language in both 
public and private domains.  
In addition to the language revitalization efforts, the sovereignty movement 
manifested in Tatars’ renewed interest in religion as an inseparable part of Tatar identity 
and their efforts to build their social relations and worlds in accordance with norms that 
were perceived to be “Tatar.” In other words, Islam played a symbolic role, as opposed to 
being a powerful force of its own.23 However, as the sovereignty movement’s goals and 
aspirations became less possible to realize by the first years of the 21 century, leading to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 While these dates refer to the period when the Bolsheviks in the region were officially in power, the Volga area was 
intermittently under the Bolshevik rule during the civil war (since 1919). See Richard Pipes (1997), The Formation of 
the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923. Harvard University Press. 	  
22 Matsuzato (2001) contends that Tatars’ failure to secure territorial autonomy following the events of 1917 affected 
the way Tatar nationalists formulated their slogans during the final decade of the Soviet Union’s collapse (p. 49). 
23 Following Mukhametshin (2009), I suggest that such ethnicity-religion dynamic, in which religion was a marker of 
ethnicity, was a reflection of the decades-long Soviet state’s official policy of atheism, which forced religion out of the 
domain of everyday life. It is also likely that, as former Communists, the leaders of the Tatarstan sovereignty project at 
the government level (such as Mintimer Shaimiev, Rafael Khakimov) did not perceive religion as a key component in 
the process.	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Tatars’ disappointment and loss of hope in legitimate political processes, Islam began to 
play a more prominent role in the way Tatars envisioned their identity and future. This is 
because, I argue, in the context where certain social and political goals (such as those 
articulated by the sovereignty movement) are unattainable, Muslim piety provides an 
alternative way for personal and social transformation. 
 It has been posited that the demise of the Soviet Union was the result of the 
“triumph of the nations” (Helene d’Encausse, as cited in Graney, 1993, p. 80).24 
Gorbachev’s political experiments, known as perestroika [Ru. ‘restructuring’] and 
glasnost [Ru. ‘openness’], resulted not only in the reshaping of the country’s political 
system from the top, but in the widespread national mobilization on the part of the Soviet 
Union’s republics of all levels. The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was one 
of many political units (ranging from Union Republics25 to Autonomous Okrugs26) of the 
Soviet Union that lined up to get some sort of independence, or sovereignty, from it. It 
has also been posited that Tatarstan’s quest for sovereignty in the 1990s—the most 
momentous time in the history of Tatars since the Bolshevik revolution—is a legacy of 
Tatars’ failure to obtain the Idel-Ural state and, after the revolution, the status of the 
Union republic despite repeated attempts (Matsuzato, 2001).  
On August 30, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR adopted the 
“Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Tatar S.S.R.” This political move has been 
considered a compromising step on the part of the Tatar political elite—which was still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For alternative interpretation of the reasons for the Soviet Union’s collapse, see, for example, Ronald Suny (2010) 
Russia, the USSR, and the successor state (especially chapter 21, “The end of the Soviet Union”), Oxford University 
Press.  
25 Largest units of the USSR with the highest level of sovereignty, manifested in their own constitution, state symbols, 
and a theoretical right to secede from USSR (somewhat similar to states). 
26 Smaller units within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (part of the USSR) with the lowest level of 
sovereignty (somewhat similar to counties).	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Communist and headed by the Republic’s communist leader Mintimer Shaimiev—that 
sought to both appease the bourgeoning Tatar nationalist movement27 and negotiate a 
privileged status for the republic (and thus its leadership) (Graney, 1999; Matsuzato, 
2001). In practice, the declaration of sovereignty originally resulted in symbolic and 
discursive claims to independence, as opposed to immediate institutional or material 
gains. However, the declaration of sovereignty, even as a symbolic political act, would 
not have been possible without some nationalist impetus at the popular level. It was 
demonstrated in the 1992 referendum, in which 61.4% of voters supported sovereignty 
(Iskahkov, 2005, p. 145).  
While Graney (1999) argues that Tatarstan’s 1990s sovereignty project28 initially 
focused on undoing Russification policies of the Soviet Era and on Tatarization at the 
expense of the needs of other nationalities—manifested in increasing the number of 
Tatars in the government, reopening Tatar language schools, making Tatar a second 
official language of the Republic, and institutionalizing Tatar holidays—it was not a 
“racial nationalism” because even the staunchest supporters of Tatarstan’s complete 
autonomy imagined it as a “multinational polity” (Wertheim, 2003a, p. 18). Moreover, 
the sovereignty project was not uniform and was also represented by a grassroots 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The movement was led by the Tatar nationalist organization Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr (TOTs) [Ru. ‘The 
Tatar Public Center’], founded in 1988. Matsuzato (2001) contends that the organization was headed by prominent 
members of the Tatar Communist party, such as Rafael Khakimov, and thus was heavily influenced by the then 
Communist Party. The Tatar ethnologist and activist Damir Iskhakov suggests that the organization (and the 
movement) traced its roots to the Tatar intelligentsia who, as early as 1960-1970s, attempted to revitalize Tatar history, 
education, and political status (Iskhakov, 2005).   
28 From the political science point of view, Graney (1999) defines Tatarstan’s political project of the 1990s as “sub-
state sovereignty” because it did not involve the actual secession from Russia, Tatarstan did not establish its own army, 
currency, or border controls (p. 3). At best, Tatarstan was able “to negotiate favorable new tax regimes with the 
Russian Federation, to pursue lucrative international financial ties, and to expand and consolidate [its] domestic 
political control (Graney, 1999, p. 3). 
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sovereignty movement, whose ideas about, goals for, and means of achieving sovereignty 
did not mirror the official political version of it, as Faller’s (2011) study illustrates.29 
Drawing on Brubaker (1994), Verdery (1996), and Martin (2001), among others, 
Faller (2011) suggests that the roots of the 1990s nationalisms, including Tatar 
nationalism, can be traced to the Soviet nationalities policies, which sought to contain 
national sentiment of non-Russians by creating territory-specific national homelands. She 
observes: “post-Soviet nationalisms do not reveal the existence of age-old ethnic 
rivalries, but rather emerge from structures of feeling constructed by Soviet nationality 
policies” (Faller, 2011, p. 10). So, if an arbitrarily-drawn territorial boundary defined the 
geographical form of a non-Russian “nation,” language was one of the components that 
filled its content30 (at least during the initial stage of the Soviet korenizatsiia [Ru. 
‘indigenization’] policy), and one Soviet state was what housed all of them.  
This is not to say that Tatars lacked national consciousness prior to 191731 and 
needed to be helped along in their development from being a “primordial” ethnic group to 
a modern nation.32 Rather, the Soviet nationalities policy contributed to the direction and 
form of the nationalisms of the 1990s. This is why the 1990s Tatar nationalism project 
focused, first and foremost, on sovereignty, which, in turn, had multiple forms. In its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 I consider the strength of Faller’s (2011) study in its ethnographic approach to investigating the everyday 
implications of the Tatar sovereignty project, in that she convincingly illustrates how individual actors—ordinary 
residents of Tatarstan—understood sovereignty and acted upon their understanding(s) in every day life.	  	  
30 In addition to national territories and national languages, national elites and national cultures were thought to be key 
components of the Bolsheviks nationalities policy (Martin, 2001, p. 10).  
31 As Rorlich (1986), for example, illustrates, Tatars’ sense of national identity was well developed by the time of the 
Revolution, which was particularly evident in the reformist movement of the early eighteenth-early twentieth centuries. 
She further points out that language played an important role in their sense of national identity (p. 65). I thank Audrey 
Altstadt for pointing this out. 	  
32 Hirsch (2005) explains that at the root of the Bolsheviks’ nationalities policy was a belief in state-sponsored 
evolutionism. She further explains that “state-sponsored evolutionism was . . . premised on the belief that ‘primordial’ 
ethnic groups were the building blocks of nationalities and on the assumption that the state could intervene in the 
natural process of development and ‘construct’ modern nations. . . . The short-term goal of state-sponsored 
evolutionism was to ‘assist’ the potential victims of Soviet economic modernization, and thus to differentiate the Soviet 
state from the ‘imperialistic empires’ it disdained. The long-term goal was to usher the entire population through the 
Marxist timeline of historical development: to transform feudal-era clans and tribes into nationalities, and nationalities 
into socialist-era nations—which, at some point in the future, would merge together under communism” (pp. 8-9).   
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discursive and symbolic forms, the most prominent forms at the grassroots level, a call 
for sovereignty manifested itself in revitalization of the Tatar language. In fact, it was at 
the forefront of the sovereignty project, while religion (Islam) played a symbolic role, as 
opposed to being a powerful force of its own.  
Indeed, as the korenizatsiia policy was believed to have reached its goal and was 
stopped by the 1930s,33 it was shortly followed by the opposite development: ethnic 
schools and publishing houses were closed and “national cadres” replaced with Russians. 
As a result, out of 31 Tatar national schools functioning in Kazan in 1917, only two were 
open by 1945 (Faller 2011, p. 9), and the Tatar language education took place mostly in 
the private space of people’s homes (mostly in rural areas). As Russian was made the 
only official language and the only language used in college entrance exams, in 1969 
only one third of Tatars attended eleven higher education institutions in the republic, 
while representing 49.1% of the republic’s total population (Rorlich, 1986, p. 160).34 By 
the 1980s, only 12% of the republic’s students35 studied in Tatar (mostly in rural areas), 
and only one Tatar school remained open (in Kazan) (Musina, 2004).  
It was not surprising then that at the grassroots level, Tatarstan’s move to 
sovereignty materialized in attempts to revitalize the Tatar language in all domains and in 
the creation of two discursive worlds (one, accessible to Tatar speakers, and the other, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As the case with the Tatar national Communist Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev illustrates, the real reason for overturning 
korenizatsiia was the Bolshevik authorities’ fear of the nationalist sentiment’s potential of turning into bourgeois 
nationalism. A former jadid, he grew interested in revolutionary socialism and eventually joined the Bolsheviks in 
1917. He advised Stalin on nationality issues until 1923 when he was accused of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic activities. 
He was executed on Stalin’s order in the late 1930s. Audrey Altstadt (personal communication, May 29, 2013) suggests 
that Sultan-Galiev’s crime was not just nationalism, but altering Lenin’s interpretation of socialism as anti-imperialism. 
She points out that, using Britain and India as an example, Sultan-Galiev argued that the oppressed in a colonial nation 
could still oppress the colonial peoples, referring to Muslims in Russia. For more information on Sultan-Galiev’s case, 
see Rorlich (1986).  
34 A case in point is Taskira apa [Tat. ‘aunt’], an older Tatar woman I interviewed and whose story I present and 
analyze in chapter 8. 
35 Students in secondary schools (an approximate equivalent of K-12 in the United States).  
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the rest) as the fate of the Tatar language stood for the fate of the Tatar “nation” (Faller, 
2011).36  
At the state level, Tatarstan’s sovereignty project resulted in the republic 
government’s ability to negotiate a favorable economic regime vis-à-vis Moscow,37 
which translated into a higher standard of living for Tatarstan’s residents and political 
control (and thus financial privileges) for the Republic’s elites. Matsuzato (2001) argues 
that Tatarstan’s sovereignty as a political project was possible largely due to Tatarstan’s 
former Soviet leader and first president Mintimer Shaimiev’s ability to pressure Moscow 
for political and economic concessions, especially by means of insuring Tatarstan’s 
electoral vote in support of Yeltsin in the 1991 and 1996 presidential elections. However, 
as Yeltsin’s position began to weaken, Putin’s ascent to power in 2000 marked the end of 
the sovereignty projects and the beginning of centralizing reforms that undid successions 
gained by republics previously. While Shaimiev managed to remain in power for another 
two terms,38 he was unable to preserve previously-negotiated political gains for Tatarstan: 
the 1994 bilateral treaty with Moscow was dissolved and replaced with a new (2007) 
agreement, which no longer defines Tatarstan as a “sovereign” state.  
While Graney (1999) contends that, despite Putin’s centralizing reforms, 
Tatarstan’s government (headed by Medvedev’s appointee Rustam Minnikhanov since 
2010) is able to continue to negotiate with Moscow, I support Faller’s (2011) assessment 
that “Tatarstan sovereignty as a popular movement no longer exists and that Tatarstan’s 
nation-builders’ aspirations have become largely denuded of political thrust” (p. 12). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This sentiment is also expressed by the sovereignty movement activist and my interviewee Taskira apa who, while 
becoming a practicing Muslim later in life, continued to believe that the livelihood of the Tatar nation rested on the 
livelihood of the Tatar language.	  	  
37 Originally through the 1992 referendum and Constitution and the 1994 bilateral treaty with Moscow. 
38 Matsuzato (2001) contends that despite the 1999 political battles between Putin and Shaimiev, Putin needed 
Shaimiev’s support, which ensured Shaimiev’s leadership position in the republic (p. 71). 
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According to Tatar ethnologist Damir Iskhakov (2004, 2005), reasons for the decline of 
the national movement are complex and include, but are not limited to, the inability of 
supporters of complete autonomy to realize their aspirations, absence of leaders, lack of 
support from the Tatarstan’s government that itself was limited by its relations with 
Moscow, and inability to develop an ideology that would reflect the interests of the entire 
Tatar society, not just its factions. The centralizing reforms of the Russian government 
initiated by Putin certainly played their role even at a symbolic level, as illustrated by 
Tatarstan’s 1999 law that legitimized a Latin-based Tatar alphabet, but was struck down 
by the Russian Duma’s anti-latinization measure in 2000.39  
Whatever the case may be, Faller (2011) concludes: “A loss of hope in their 
ability to create sustained political change or to live in freedom has caused many former 
nation-builders and other Tatars to increasingly turn to religion as a source of inspiration 
and refuge, to burrow deeper into Islamic teaching as a way to protect themselves from 
the outside world” (p. 297). While I also observed a shift from Tatars’ focus on reviving 
their language and obtaining sovereignty to their growing interest in Islam (Karimova, 
2010), it would be incorrect to conclude that practicing Muslim Tatar women whom I 
have met throughout fieldwork turn to Islam as a result of unrealized ethno-national 
aspirations. Rather, the Tatar sovereignty movement’s inability to engender sustainable 
change may have contributed to the overall instability of post-soviet conditions in which 
people have to create new ways of being and look for new meanings in the quickly-
changing world around them. As my discussion in chapters 4, 5, and 6 illustrates, I argue 
that behind Tatars’ interest in Islam is the promise of being part of the Ummah 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Faller’s (2011) chapter 3 provides an excellent account of the role of symbolic capital, such as alphabets, in creating 
certain subjects.	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[Arabic]—the global community of Muslims—with its sense of collective responsibility 
and moral duty incumbent upon all members of the Islamic community, which may 
provide a source of inspiration for Tatars. In the context of the present-day Russian state 
where Tatars’ aspirations for political and cultural autonomy are impossible to realize, 
Muslim piety becomes an alternative path to personal and social transformation.    
  
Muslim Revival in Tatarstan40   
Tatars, like Central Asian Muslims, have traditionally practiced the Hanafi 
madhhab [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’] the oldest, and typically perceived as the most 
liberal, of the four main Sunni Muslim schools of religious law.41 The Russian conquest 
of 1552 and subsequent policies turned Islam into a symbol of the Tatar national (and not 
just religious) identity (Mukhametshin, 2009, p. 35). The Soviet state’s policy of atheism 
further pushed Islam into the realm of cultural traditions and rituals, resulting in its 
vernacularization.42 The Tatar Muslim revival that has taken place over the past two 
decades is marked by the fact that Islam is once again becoming a force in its own right, 
as opposed to a synonym for Tatars’ ethno-national identity. The revival is supported by 
a number of facts. While in 1988, three years before the Soviet Union’s collapse, there 
were 18 Muslim communities in Tatarstan, by 1998 their number increased to over 70043 
(Mukhametshin, 2009, p. 38). The number of Muslim religious organizations registered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In my treatment of the Tatars’ religious revival, I draw on Hirschkind’s (2006) conceptualization of the Islamic 
Revival, based on Egypt’s example, as “not a given socio-ideological formation but a contingent and shifting 
constellation of ideas, practices and associational forms” (p. 207). 
41 The other three are Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i. 
42 I borrow the term “vernacular” from Flueckiger (2006) who uses it to describe a “popular, non-institutionally based 
Islamic practice” (p. 2).	  
43 According to Musina, in 2007 there were over 2,000 Muslim communities in Tatarstan (R. Musina, personal 
communication, June 20, 2013). 
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in Tatarstan as of January 1, 2013 was 1193; mosques owned and used by Muslims – 
1382 (compared to only 18 mosques in 1988) (Musina, 2013).  
According to sociological survey data, the number of Tatars who identified 
themselves as veruiushchie [Ru. ‘believers’] rose from 34% in 1990 to 66% in 1994, to 
81% in 1998, to 83.3% in 2002 (Musina, 2008), and to 87% in 2011/2012 (Musina, 
2012b). The same sociological studies (Musina 2008) suggested that the number of urban 
Tatars who attended mosques on a regular basis rose from 7.9% in 1990 to 24.4% in 
2001, and to 33.7% in 2002. Musina (2008, 2012b) argues that, while there is some 
indication of an increase in religious practice and confessional consciousness, the data 
suggest a larger rise in religious consciousness. Unlike religious practice and confessional 
consciousness that are tied to a specific religion, religious consciousness is characterized 
by one's “general” belief in God.44  
Indeed, the then deputy of Tatarstan’s chief mufti Valiulla Iakupov45 in a personal 
interview suggested that the number of practicing Muslims among Tatars remained low, 
around ten percent, although, no official records were kept and statistics available, 
according to him (V. Iakupov, personal communication, 2009). However, a sociological 
survey among Tatar youth suggests that the number of practicing Tatars among them is 
rising. For example the number of practicing Muslim Tatars who observe religious rituals 
rose from 4.1% in 2001 to 12.2% in 2004 (Khodzhaeva and Shumilova, 2008).46 Based 
on a more recent (2011/2012) survey, Musina (2012b) also found that the age group with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In sociological survey data, religious consciousness is measured by asking: “Do you believe in God? Are you a 
believer?” (Musina, 2008, p. 97).	  
45 Iakupov was assassinated on July 19, 2012, by what was believed to be terrorists (see, for example, a transcript of 
Vladimir Putin’s speech during his visit to Tatarstan shortly after the event (“Poezdka v Tatarstan,” 2012)). Alexei 
Malashenko, a Moscow-based Carnegie center expert on Islam in Russia, also attributed the killing to “radicals” in his 
2013 article “The dynamics of Russian Islam” (Malashenko, 2013). 
46 The authors point out that one’s religious practice does not always indicate high degree of religious competence 
when it comes to theological knowledge. They further point out that observing Tatars tend to come from backgrounds 
with a strong ethnic (Tatar) component.	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the lowest percentage of individuals who identified themselves as non-believers was 
Tatars 35 years of age and under. The Tatar historian and ethnologist Damir Iskhakov 
(2010) observes that Tatarstan’s religious revival is not an isolated local phenomenon, 
but rather a post-Soviet one.47 In Russia, for example, the number of mosques rose from 
about 160 in 1991 to over 8000 in 2009, as did the number of students seeking Muslim 
religious education abroad (four in 1991 and about 1,000 in 2009) (Goble, 2009).  
While Iskhakov (2013b) posits that the Tatars’ interest in Islam is an indicator of 
their growing “ethno-confessional nationalism” as opposed to “religious consciousness” 
(p. 1), my research demonstrates that there are Tatars who do display “religious 
consciousness” and no longer conflate ethnic, national, and religious elements of their 
identity. Furthermore, as I illustrate throughout the dissertation, and particularly in 
chapter 8, age plays a role in the way Tatar women perceive the role of Islam vis-à-vis 
ethno-national elements of their identity. I conclude that the younger generation of Tatar 
women (below thirty years old) exhibit a more pronounced interest in Islam as a defining 
element of their identity. This tendency is exemplified in the younger generation’s belief 
that to be a Tatar and to be a Muslim are two different things. This belief further 
underscores the emphasis that the younger generation places on Islamic knowledge and 
daily practice that are not synonymous with Tatar ethnic traditions and occasional 
religious observations. I suggest that the older generation of Tatars (especially sixty and 
older) is also becoming more interested in Islam, even though the ethnic and national 
components of Tatar identity, such as the Tatar language, for example, remain equally 
important to them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Current estimates indicate the number of Muslims in Russia is close to 20 million (Malashenko, 2013).	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The fact that Islam in Tatarstan is becoming an important force in its own right is 
further supported by the proliferation of new mosques, Islamic educational institutions, 
media, businesses, services, and women in Islamic dress. As I demonstrate in chapter 8, 
Tatars’—and other Russian Muslims’—interest in Islam is further illustrated by a debate 
over what kind of Islam the Tatars (and other Muslims living in Russia) should practice. 
Some scholars48 and public officials49 suggest that the opening of borders after the fall of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the newly-acquired religious freedom which 
came in its wake resulted in radical, specifically Wahhabi/Salafi,50 forms of “non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See, for example, Galina Emelianova, “Transnational Islam versus Ethnic Islam in Eastern Europe: The Role of the 
Mass Media” in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, eds. Stefano Allievi and 
Jorgen S. Nielsen (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003), 243-280; Humphries, Conrad, Salakhatdinova, and Kouznetsova-
Morekno (2005), New ethnic identity: The Islamitization [sic.] process in the Russian Federation, International Review 
of Modern Sociology 31(2), 207-231. 
49 For example, in a recent article, Artur Lukmanov, first Secretary in Russia’s department on new Challenges and 
threats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian federation, claimed that radical Islam is quickly spreading 
throughout former Soviet Union and Russia’s Volga region and now poses a political threat (Lukmanov, 2013, pp. 108-
109). Lukmanov (2013) based his conclusions on statements by Rais Suleimanov, head of the Volga branch of the 
Russian Institute of Strategic Research. Suleimanov’s claims about the threat of radical Islam in the Volga region and 
about Tatarstan’s ethnic policies have been openly questioned by academics specializing in research on present-day 
Islam and ethno-religious relations in Russia/Tatarstan (see, for example, Iskhakov (2013c), Titova (2012), Isaev, 
(n.d.)). 
50 Esposito (2003) explains the origin of the term “Wahhabis” (plural of “Wahhabi”) in the following way: 
“Eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society. Founded by Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a Hanbali scholar, in Arabia. Proclaimed tawhid (uniqueness and unity of God) as its primary 
doctrine. Began in response to the perceived moral decline and political weakness of the Muslim community in Arabia. 
Proposed a return to an idealized Islamic past through reassertion of monotheism and reliance on Quran and hadith, 
rejecting medieval interpretations of Islam and jurisprudence. Emphasized education and knowledge as weapons in 
dealing with nonbelievers. Known for its sometimes violent opposition to the popular cult of saints, idolatry, and shrine 
and tomb visitation, as well as the sacking of Shii shrines in Najaf and Karbala in 1802. Formed an alliance with 
Muhammad ibn Saud in 1747, which served as the basis for the consolidation of the present-day kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Referred to as Wahhabis by opponents, but referred to themselves as Muwahhidun, or those upholding the 
doctrine of tawhid” (“Wahhabis,” 2003). He explains the origin of the term “Salafi” as follows: “Name (derived from 
salaf, “pious ancestors”) given to a reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Emphasized restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Quran and 
Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah. Prime objectives 
were to rid the Muslim ummah of the centuries-long mentality of taqlid (unquestioning imitation of precedent) and 
stagnation and to reform the moral, cultural, and political conditions of Muslims. Essentially intellectual and modernist 
in nature. Worked to assert the validity of Islam in modern times, prove its compatibility with reason and science, and 
legitimize the acquisition of Western scientific and technological achievements. Sought reforms of Islamic law, 
education, and Arabic language. Viewed political reform as an essential requirement for revitalization of the Muslim 
community. Its influence spread to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, India, Indonesia, and Egypt in particular. The 
most influential movements inspired by Salafi were the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan. 
In the late twentieth century, the term came to refer to traditionalist reformers” (“Salafi,” 2003). In the context of 
present-day Russia, these terms are controversial because they are often used interchangeably to refer to what are 
perceived as conservative forms of Islam, regardless of whether those forms of Islam can be considered Wahhabi/Salafi 
on a theological, and not political, basis. Altstadt (2013) further observes that Russian authorities routinely apply these 
terms to Muslims whom they want to suppress (A. Altstadt, personal communication, May 29, 2013).   
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traditional and transnational Islam”51 spreading among post-Soviet Muslims via 
educational opportunities abroad and local schools funded by foreign sources, foreign 
Muslim missionaries, religious literature, and other channels. At the root of this fear is 
the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” paradigm, manifested in today’s “Culture Talk,” a type 
of public discourse that views culture (understood as modernity) or its absence as the 
dividing line between those who value civic coexistence and those who espouse violence 
(Mamdani, 2004). This paradigm treats modern political movements that capitalize on 
Islam (such as Islamists) as primordial cultural or religious entities, which are inherently 
opposed to what’s believed to be progressive, secular values. Such a paradigm requires 
that a judgment value be placed on Muslims on the basis of compatibility of their form of 
Islam (manifested in their actions) with those values. 
In the Russian context, this paradigm is manifested in the Russian government’s 
response to Islamic revival and the government’s attempts to control the religious space. 
Akhmetkarimov (2012) observes: “two decades of state policies toward Islam resulted in 
nation-wide controversies over the nature and the level of state involvement in religious 
affairs” (p. 1). Among such controversial acts is the Russian state’s attempt to support an 
“official” Islam by encouraging Muslim clergy to restructure Muslim institutions to 
create a strict administrative hierarchy. However, in the absence of agreement on what 
“official” Islam is or should be, such a task becomes impossible.52 This is demonstrated 
by a recent controversy over local authorities’ bans on headscarves in Russia’s public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Emelianova, “Transnational Islam versus Ethnic Islam in Eastern Europe: The Role of the Mass Media,” p. 245.	  
52 For one possible definition of “official Islam,” Akhmetkarimov (2012) refers to Mukhametshin, who defines it as 
Islam “based on general (normative) Islamic principles stripped of the national roots of indigenous religious thought” 
(as cited in Akhmetkarimov, 2012, footnote 3).  
	   37 
schools. The bans generated lawsuits and a heated public discussion.53 It also prompted 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to make the following public statement in a recent 
press conference: “When it comes to hijabs: you know that in our culture (when I say – 
‘our,’ I mean traditional Islam) hijabs don’t exist. . . . And we are going to implement 
traditions that are foreign to us – why? And, of course, we all have to pay attention to 
this, and talk about it directly, and refer in this case, of course, to the representatives of 
traditional Islam.”54 Based on Putin’s quote, then, “official Islam” is “traditional Islam,” 
but what constitutes the latter is usually defined by what it is not: “foreign.”   
In this context, the Tatarstan regional government and Muslim clergy have had to 
perform a tough balancing act of supporting Tatars’ religious revival, while also ensuring 
that Tatars’ religious sentiments do not threaten Russia’s unity. As I demonstrate in 
chapter 8 on piety stories as sites of Tatars’ identity struggle, one significant way 
religious revival manifests itself among ordinary Tatars, Muslim clergy, and government 
officials today is in a debate over the extent and the kind of Islam Tatars should practice. 
In the Tatarstan context, the “official” or “traditional Islam” has been associated with the 
notion of “Tatar Islam.” Tatarstani historian Rafik Mukhametshin characterizes “Tatar 
Islam” as a “fusion of Islam with Tatar ethnic and cultural norms and practices” (2009, p. 
34).55 He argues that the way Islam evolved in the territory of present-day Tatarstan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For a brief coverage of the Tatarstan case in the Russian media, see, for example, (Postnov, 2013). For a reaction 
from a member of the Tatarstan Muslim clergy, see Batrov (2013). For a discussion of the Stavropol case in the 
Russian media, see, for example, (Ol’shanskii, 2013). For a Russian nationalist point of view, see (“Stavropol’skii 
krai,” 2012). For a brief summary of the Stavropol case in English, see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report (“Head 
scarves,” 2012). For discussions on political meanings behind the Muslim veil in a secular state, see, for example: in 
Turkey, Gole (1996); in France, Moruzzi (1994), Carle (2004); in Egypt, Mahmood (2005); for comparative analyses 
see Benhabib (2010), Ahmed (2011). 
54 My translation from Russian. The exact words are as follows: “Что касается хиджабов: Вы знаете, ведь в нашей 
культуре (когда я говорю – нашей, я имею в виду традиционный ислам) никаких хиджабов нет. [. . .] А мы у 
себя будем внедрять чуждые нам традиции – зачем? И конечно, мы все должны на это обращать внимание, и 
прямо об этом говорить, и опираться в данном случае, конечно, на представителей традиционного ислама” (The 
official website of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, http://президент.рф/news/17173).    
55 Also see Mukhametshin (2005).	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played an important role: geographical remoteness of the region from both Central Asia 
and Middle East, the heartlands of Islam at the time, enabled Tatars to develop flexible 
religious and legal systems over a period of six centuries. As a result, Islam among Tatars 
“developed not so much in the context of abstract Islamic doctrine, but rather under the 
impact of specific local social, economic and political conditions” (Mukhametshin, 2009, 
p. 34). He further observes that after the Russian invasion of 1552 and religious 
oppression that followed, Tatars’ religious tradition came to stand for independence, 
informing Tatars’ political and social life. Finally, the two distinctive features of  “Tatar 
Islam” were a variety of ways in which ethnic traditions contributed to various 
understandings of Islam by different social strata, and a Sufi component56 (particularly 
the Yasawiyya and Naqshbandiyya brotherhoods).  
There is, however, a lack of agreement on what Tatar traditional Islam actually 
means theologically and practically, as Tatar intellectuals, local Muslim clergy, and 
average Tatars have interpreted the concept differently.57 Based on those interpretations, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For more information on the Sufi tradition in the Volga region, see Kemper (2008). 
57 Mukhametshin (2009) suggests that, unlike their predecessors who interpreted Islam from a strictly theological 
perspective, present-day Tatar intellectuals ground their interpretations in multiple frameworks (including a secular 
one) and often view Islam’s vis-à-vis its relationship to Tatar nationalism and modernity, stripping it of its theological 
essence. One example is an interpretation offered by a Tatar national intellectual Rashat Safin in his book Tatar Yuly 
[Tat. ‘Tatar way’], where Safin sees Tatar Islam as a democratic, liberating force that frees one from any type of 
authority (political or religious) and allows one to control one’s own life. Further, Safin argues that what’s often viewed 
as “normative Islam” is, in fact, an “Arab” form of Islam (Safin, 2001). Another, more secularized, version of “Tatar” 
Islam is “Evroislam” [Ru. Euroislam] advanced by Rafael Khakimov, a Tatar politician and former advisor to 
Tatarstan’s first President Mintimer Shaimiev. In his 2003 book Gde Nasha Mekka? [Ru. ‘Where is our Mecca?’] 
(under his shortened last name Khakim) and a recent internet article, Khakimov (2013) approaches Islam vis-à-vis its 
relationship to modernity and argues that Islam is compatible with modernity so far as Islam is interpreted in such a 
way that it facilitates modernization. He goes so far as to suggest that even religious practices that constitute the pillars 
of Islam, such as the five daily prayers, should be subject to a personal interpretation and thus are not binding on a 
Muslim. Finally, Khakimov denies the validity of madhhabs [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’] in favor of Qur’an and 
Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative conduct based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example’]. One of Khakimov’s critics was a Tatar 
Muslim scholar and clergy Vailulla Iakupov who argued that Tatars should revive Islam based on their ancestors’ 
religious tradition (“Islam traditsii” [Ru. ‘Islam of tradition’]), where tradition is sacred religious knowledge, thought, 
and philosophy, not just religious institutions and norms.57 Iakupov argued that there was never tension between Islam 
and science, and therefore there was no need to “reform” Islam to make it compatible with modernity (2004a). Finally, 
Iakupov rejected madhhab-free interpretations of Islam, arguing that madhhabs serve as safeguards of the sacredness of 
the religious knowledge, systemizing it in accordance with Sunnah and protecting it from irrelevant facts. He called on 
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suggest that, in line with Putin’s definition of “traditional Islam,” Tatar traditional Islam 
is often defined by what it is not, or in its juxtaposition with what are perceived to be 
“non-Tatar” forms of Islam. Iskhakov’s (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) recent analysis of the 
meaning politicians and clergy ascribe to Tatar “traditional Islam” supports this 
observation. In particular, Iskhakov (2013a) states: “In recent years, we time and again 
hear from Russia’s, including Tatarstan’s, politicians of all levels that they are advocates 
of ‘traditional Islam.’ In addition, it seems, the very concept of ‘Tatar Islam’ is perceived 
by them as something quite ‘internal’ and, thus, unambiguous and clear, especially in 
relation to ‘external’ Islam, which in their eyes is completely ‘foreign,’ or at least—
suspicious” (p. 1).58  
I would further suggest that while intellectuals, clergy, and some politicians—in 
other words, people who have some familiarity with Islamic theology—associate “Tatar 
Islam” with the Hanafi madhhab, an average Tatar perceives “Tatar Islam” as the kind of 
Islam Tatars observed before the post-Soviet opening of the borders. As I illustrate in 
chapter 8, non-Tatar, or foreign, forms of Islam are further equated with the kind of Islam 
practiced by “Arabs.” In practical terms, it means that such observances of Muslim piety 
as the headscarf, a diet that excludes pork, alcohol, and other products that are prohibited 
by the Muslim normative law, or separation of space in accordance with gender lines are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tatars to remain loyal to the Hanafi tradition, which, he believed, was preserved among Tatars in its purest form and 
informed the Tatar mentality and national character. 
58 My translation of the following original quote in Russian: “В последнее годы от российских политиков разного 
уровня, включая и татарстанских, мы раз за разом слышим о том, что они являются приверженцами 
«традиционного ислама». При этом, видимо, сам концепт «традиционного ислама» представляется им чем-то 
очень «внутренним», а поэтому понятным и ясным, особенно по отношению к исламу «внешнему», в их глазах 
совершенно «чуждому», во всяком случае – подозрительному.” Iskhakov (2013c) further argues that Tatars posses 
the theological legacy and intellectual capacity to develop such an understanding of “traditional Islam” that would 
spread its influence on the “Muslim world,” and not the other way around as is happening now. The problem, Iskhakov 
(2013c) states, is that such a concept of traditional Islam would unite the Muslim Tatar community to a degree that will 
create a political threat to Russia’s current non-democratic regime. Therefore, Iskhakov (2013c) concludes that, while 
Russia’s politicians encourage “traditional Islam,” they do not support its development in practice (p. 2). 
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perceived as “Arab,” non-Tatar Islam. In this context, practicing Muslim Tatar women 
are often seen deviating from the “Tatar” norm and are often the subjects of heated 
debates and controversy. This is why, I argue, Muslim Tatar women’s stories about their 
paths to Muslim piety serve as discursive sites where Tatars’ struggle over the role of 
Islam in their identity and future takes place.  
 
The Role of Women in the Recent Muslim Revival  
The role of women in the recent Muslim revival is prominent for a number of 
reasons. Musina (2006) suggests the present-day Muslim revival among Tatars is typical 
in that, based on sociological survey data, women are more religious than men. 
According to a 1994 survey, among women, 42% identified themselves as practicing 
Muslims, in comparison with only 19% of men. However, only ten percent of women 
identified themselves as non-believers, in comparison with 25% of men.59 In a 1999 
survey the gap between women and men who identified themselves as practicing 
believers was smaller: 35% of women identified themselves as practicing (vs. 30% of 
men). At the same time, the number of those who identified themselves as non-believers 
was higher among men (21%) vs. women (13%)60 (Musina, 2006; R. Musina, personal 
communication, June 20, 2013). More recent data support a similar trend: in a 2011 
survey among 506 urban Tatars (251 men and 255 women), 32.3% of women identified 
themselves as practicing, in comparison with 50.2% of men61 (Musina, 2012a). In a 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Among women, the rest of the numbers were as follows: 35% were non-practicing believers and 13% were 
undecided; among men, 35% were non-practicing believers and 20% were undecided.    
60 According to the 1999 survey, 41% of women identified themselves as non-practicing believers and 16% were 
undecided. Among men, these numbers were 32% and 17%, respectively. 
61 The rest of the data broke down as follows: 45% of men and 40.4% of women identified themselves as symbolic 
(non-practicing believers); 8.4% of men and 5.5% of women were undecided; 13.5% of men and 3.1% of women 
identified themselves as non-believers; 0.8% of men and 0.8% of women had difficulty answering. 
	   41 
survey among 301 rural Tatars (147 men and 154 women), 71.4% of women identified 
themselves as praciticng, in comparison with 46.5% of men62 (Musina, 2012a). 
A prominent role of Tatar women in the recent Muslim revival may be explained 
by the fact that the status of women and their (Islamic) practices have served as 
barometers of societal relations and struggles. Furthermore, because Muslim female piety 
is grounded in physical manifestations (such as the hijab) that may set them apart from 
other female members of society, they have been historically more politicized. For 
example, Keller’s (1998), Northrop’s (2000), and Kamp’s (2006) discussions63 of the 
fledgling Soviet authorities’ fierce fight against the Uzbek practice of veiling—just one 
among many campaigns geared towards “emancipating” Uzbek women—illustrate that 
the Muslim veil (or its absence) epitomized gender relations and ultimately served as a 
window into Uzbek society’s norms and values. Similarly, Rorlich’s (1986) investigation 
into the early twentieth century’s Volga Tatar religious reformers’ debate on the role of 
women and the legitimacy of the veil revealed that “the veil stood as the symbol of the 
traditional attitude toward women” (p. 63).  
Present-day headscarf controversies indicate that Muslim women—and what they 
represent—continue to remain politicized. I would further suggest that a simple 
comparison of hijab-related debates point out to an increasing politicization of Muslim 
women. When in 2001 a group of practicing Muslim Tatar women filed a lawsuit against 
the local government’s ban on headscarves in passport photographs, the incident 
generated wide national and international resonance, reflected in active media coverage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The rest of the data broke down as follows: 40.8% of men and 22.7% of women identified themselves as symbolic 
(non-practicing believers); 6.1% of men and 3.9% of women were undecided; 5.4% of men and 1.9% of women 
identified themselves as non-believers.	  
63 As Kandiyoti (2007) observes, these scholars provide different views on the issue.  
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The pro-Kremlin daily Izvestiia’s called on the then Tatarstan president to prevent the 
women’s aspirations from “turning into Islamic extremism-fanaticism-fundamentalism” 
and “another September 11” (Bovt, 2002). Nonetheless, when the case reached the 
Russian Supreme Court, the court ruled in favor of the women. In comparison, when 
local authorities’ recently banned headscarves in public schools in the Stavropol krai [Ru. 
‘region’] and Tatarstan, the lawsuits filed on behalf of Muslims were lost.64 Moreover, 
the controversies prompted Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to weight in on the issue 
and define the headscarves as a “foreign” tradition that has no place in Russia. 
In the Tatar context, as I illustrate in chapter 7 on gender roles, present-day 
debates on issues related to women (and gender roles) are partly informed by popular 
beliefs that Tatar women were always more progressive than Muslim women of Central 
Asia or the Middle East. Their progress is measured by key social issues that are markers 
of modernity and, as such, are still used to “evaluate” Muslim women today: their 
appearance (in particular, presence or absence of the scarf), position vis-à-vis men, and 
access to education. More specifically, it is believed that Tatar women never covered 
their heads (or covered them only for prayer), never participated in polygyny, and were 
highly educated. However, as Kandiyoti (2007) points out, these claims are reflective of 
the Jadids’, the nineteenth-century Tatar reformers’, normative ideas about women, 
which were formed in response to Russian imperial representations of Muslim societies 
as backward and represented an effort to modernize themselves. Moreover, these ideas 
were not formed in isolation but in a dialogue with other Muslim reformers in Western 
colonial empires, who also viewed the expansion of women’s rights as a key indicator of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 For more information on the recent cases, see footnote 53 above.  
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progress.65 Referring to Khalid’s (1998) analysis of Jadidsm in Central Asia Kandiyoti 
(2007) observes: “It is within this reformist current that we find the first stirrings of 
advocacy for an expansion of women’s rights. . . . Critiques of the practice of polygyny, 
the poor treatment of women and their lack of education were central themes in calls for 
reforms aimed at achieving national renewal and progress” (p. 603).  
Rorlich (1986) proposes that the early Jadids’ debates on modernization as the 
only way for Tatars’ survival prepared ground for cultural, social and political redefining 
of the role of women, which was in full swing in the early twentieth century. For 
example, in 1910, the imam of Ufa openly voiced the view of those who believed that the 
veil had never been a requirement in the Shari’ah [Ar. ‘Islamic normative law’].66 
Rorlich (1986) further suggest that the evolution of the Tatar society is epitomized by the 
appointment, in May 1917 during the All-Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow, of 
Muhlise Bobi,67 a Tatar teacher from the village of Izh-Bobi, as the first female Muslim 
judge [Tat. kazïy] and a member of the Muslim Religious Board of Ufa. Rorlich 
concludes that the evolution of Tatar society and religious thought would not have been 
possible without Tatar women’s own active role, high educational level, and 
determination to defend their own rights (p. 63).68  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Rorlich (1986) observes, for example, that the leading Tatar Jadids Musa Bigi and Rizaeddin Fahreddin were in 
conversation with Egyptian reformers on the issue of the veil (p. 63). She further points out that the issue of polygamy 
was openly addressed in an article “Evropeizatsiia Musul’man” [Ru. ‘Europeanization of Muslims’], in a 1907 issue of 
Penzenskie vedomosti (a Russian newspaper), which criticized polygamy because “it had a detrimental effect on ‘the 
education of children as future citizens of their country’”(p. 63).  
66 Tatars who argue that Tatar women “never” veiled often refer to (family) photographs of the late nineteenth–early 
twentieth century period.  
67 For more on the Bobi family, see Makhmutova (2003), Gimazova (2004). 
68 Rorlich (1986) further argues that due to their advanced status and exceptionally high educational level Tatar women, 
unlike Central Asian women, could not be used be used by the Soviets as a surrogate proletariat (note 76, p. 218). This 
claim should be re-evaluated in the light of, for example, Kamp’s (2006) observation that Uzbek women’s unveiling 
took place not as a result of their adopting the Soviet ideas and acting as surrogate proletariat, but due to internal 
struggles taking place in the Uzbek society at the time.	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I argue that the impact of these relatively recent, but dramatic, changes in the role 
and status of Tatar women is demonstrated in the way most Tatars view women vis-à-vis 
Islam today. I further argue that present-day Tatars’ normative ideas about women and 
gender are also a product of their socio-historical development as a nation. For example, 
the prevailing discourse among secular Tatars and even an older generation of partially 
observant Tatars is built around specific ideas of what a “traditional” Muslim Tatar 
woman is like. According to this discourse, Tatar women never wore the headscarf 
outside the sacred space of the mosque or during prayers. Those who wore the 
headscarves all the time, tied them in the back, displaying their necks and covered 
carefully only for prayer. Along the same lines, it is believed that Tatar women never 
wore long loose (“baggy”) dresses. Further, the notion of polygyny and dowry are also 
believed to be “foreign” to Tatar women (and men). These ideas about a traditional Tatar 
woman are often juxtaposed with what’s believed to be new (for Tatars) ways of being a 
Muslim, which come from the “Arab world” or “the Arabs.” For women, it is embodied 
in the way women dress (in long loose dresses), tie their scarves (carefully, all the way 
around the neck and face), and their accepting attitude towards polygyny and dowry.  
This discourse built around the two ways of being a Muslim (woman), which are 
often believed to be antithetical to each other, is a reflection of the larger issues discussed 
above, namely, Tatars’ struggle over the role and type of religion that should define their 
future and identity. Furthermore, as Sabirova’s (2006) and Ibrahimpasic’s (2012) studies 
among practicing Muslim women in Moscow and Bosnia illustrate, such division of 
Muslim (female) piety on “traditional,” or “conventional” and “new,” or “pious” is not 
uncommon among those communities of Muslims that are undergoing a religious revival. 
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In actuality, Muslim Tatar women experience and practice their faith vis-à-vis recent 
Islamic revival in a multitude of ways. Drawing on the ways Bosnian Muslim women 
identify themselves, one analytical way that Ibrahimasic (2012) proposes to capture this 
variety is through the notion of “a broad, albeit imperfect continuum that ranges from 
deeply religious to intensely secular” (p. 12-13). The notion of a continuum of piety may 
be useful in describing the multiple degrees of piety as a result of a Muslim revival. I 
suggest, however, that it has to be treated with caution. If such a continuum is built 
around the popular discourse of what Muslim (female) piety is or should be, its polar 
opposites, such as “deeply atheist” and “strictly devout, as exemplified in Salafi Islam” 
(Ibrahimasic, 2012, p. 13), are not reflective of the ways Muslims experience their piety, 
but, rather, of popular representations of such experiences. As I will illustrate throughout 
this dissertation, particularly in chapters 7 and 8, the ways Tatar women experience piety 
in the context of the recent Muslim revival are humanly complex and informed by the 
intricate historical legacy of the Volga Tatars within the Russian Empire, the Soviet 
Union, and the post-Soviet Russian state.      
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CHAPTER 3  
DATA AND METHODS 
Fieldsites and Data Collection  
I collected data for this dissertation in Tatarstan, primarily in Kazan, over a total 
period of thirteen months (June-July 2006; August-September 2008; August 2009-April 
2010). I chose to conduct my research in Kazan for several reasons. As Tatarstan’s 
capital, Kazan has been a center of Tatars’ ethnic and religious revival. Kazan’s 
population—53% Tatar, 40% Russian—is the result of centuries long, but incomplete, 
Russian assimilation policies. Finally, as one of Russia’s higher education centers, Kazan 
hosts students from all over Tatarstan and Russia, making it possible for me to interview 
practicing Muslim Tatar women from outside Kazan.  
My first research trip to Kazan took place in the summer of 2006, when I attended 
the Second Tatar Youth Forum in Kazan, a Tatarstan government-sponsored cultural 
event bringing together ethnic Tatar youths from around the world. The forum provided a 
unique opportunity for informal observation and initial contact with Tatar youth, 
intelligentsia, and public officials. It also provided an impetus for narrowing my focus to 
practicing Muslim Tatar women for reasons mentioned above.  
I made my second research trip to Kazan in the summer of 2008 to make 
arrangements and begin collecting data. Because I wanted to spend time with and talk to 
observant Muslim women, I narrowed down my main research sites to mosques and 
Islamic educational institutions where I had hoped to find them. While it may not be 
possible to speak of a Tatar mosque movement similar to the one Mahmood (2005) 
examined in her ethnography, several of Kazan’s 38 mosques proved key sites for my 
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research. Practicing Muslim Tatars often perform one of the five daily prayers at mosques 
on the way to or from work or during a lunch break. In accordance with Sunnah, men try 
to perform Friday prayers in mosques, which have been consistently collecting more 
crowds on Fridays. (Practicing women come to mosques on Fridays in order to listen to 
the weekly sermon performed on Fridays). Non-practicing Tatars who observe only 
events that mark a life cycle come to mosques to perform certain Islamic rituals, such as 
nikakh [Tatar/Arabic], the Muslim marriage, or isem kushu [Tatar], the name-giving 
ceremony for a newborn. As such, mosques serve as religious centers where one can meet 
Tatars with various degrees of religiosity.  
Moreover, as centers of informal religious education, many mosques provide free 
regular lessons. I met many Tatar women taking advantage of these learning sessions. 
Because lessons vary in difficulty, they were an opportunity to meet women interested in 
Islam but exhibiting various degrees of religiosity and Islamic knowledge. Finally, these 
sessions, partly due to gender segregation, provide women with an opportunity to ask 
questions, initiate discussions, and socialize in a safe space—an environment that was 
particularly conducive for meeting women, establishing rapport with them, and 
conducting interviews and focus groups.  
During this trip, I also gained access to and conducted limited observations and 
interviews at two Islamic higher educational institutions—the Russian Islamic University 
(RIU) and the Mukhammadiia medrese. I chose these institutions because of their 
positive reputation and popularity among many Tatars and other Russian Muslims and 
because they represented two different kinds of Islamic schools available in Russia today. 
Founded in 1998, the Russian Islamic University is endorsed and indirectly supported 
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(through grants) by the Republic of Tatarstan (among other Tatarstan government 
entities). It offers degrees in both secular (such as theology) and religious disciplines and 
is believed to endorse a traditional for Tatars Hanafi school of law in Sunni Islam. For 
example, its website states that Hanafi is the dominant religious school adopted by the 
university. The Mukhammadiia medrese was originally founded in 1881 by the 
prominent Tatar religious leader Galimjan Barudi, but was closed in 1918, re-opening 
again in 1993.69 The medrese operates on donations and certifies its graduates for service 
in Muslim parishes by providing religious education. Because both institutions admit 
female students from all over Tatarstan, Russia, and Central Asia, they provided fruitful 
sites for meeting Muslim women from all walks of life.70 To gain access to the Russian 
Islamic University and the Mukhammadiia medrese for this and another upcoming 
research trip, I approached rectors and vice-rectors at both institutions and introduced my 
research to them, asking for permission to observe and interview students, to sit in 
classes, and to attend campus events, and I was granted access to both institutions.     
By the end of the second research trip, I established rapport with prominent 
Muslim women activists and attended public events they organized. I began conducting 
observations and interviews at Kazan’s mosques and the two Muslim educational 
institutions. I utilized social networks and approached Muslim women in public places to 
establish contacts and do interviews. During the trip, I also conducted preliminary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The medrese was re-opened thanks to, in great part, the efforts of the local Tatar sovereignty movement activists who 
demanded that the medrese not only open its doors on paper, but that the original building be returned to the medrese (it 
had been occupied by a local business). Taskira apa, the medrese teacher and a former sovereignty movement activist 
whose story I analyze in chapter 8, told me that in their efforts to restore the medrese in its original building, the Tatar 
activists resorted to lying on the tramways that ran in front of it and blocking the traffic. According to her, it was this 
form of physical protest that eventually resulted in the medrese’s reopening its doors where it functions now. Another 
interviewee, Madina apa, also briefly reminiscenced on the re-opening of the medrese in her data segment # 2, chapter 
5. For more information on the medrese, see Rorlich (1986, p. 93), Medrese (2008). 	  
70 Many of Muslim women I met were simultaneously enrolled in the Mukhammadiia medrese and RIU to be able to 
get “solid” religious knowledge from the former and a state-certified diploma of higher education from the latter, as 
they would often explain it to me. 
	   49 
interviews with Muslim officials, Tatar scholars, and public representatives. This 
research trip yielded over twenty (mostly recorded) interviews and a field notebook. 
Upon arrival in Kazan for my third, final and most extensive, data-collection trip 
(August 2009-April 2010), I re-activated access to the Mukhammadiia medrese and the 
Russian Islamic University and contacted women I had met during previous trips. In a 
close-knit Tatar society, where social networks and personal introductions matter, it was 
vital to re-establish rapport with research participants, gatekeepers, and public figures. To 
recruit new interviewees and to increase my chances of meeting women of all ages and 
from a diverse socioeconomic background, I chose to attend informal lessons at two 
mosques in diverse neighborhoods of Kazan. Kol-Shärif, Tatarstan’s newest main 
mosque, is located in the Kazan Kremlin (also home to the Tatarstan’s President’s Palace 
and multiple government institutions) and functions not only as a mosque, but also as a 
museum. My impression was that, having been recently built in the historic downtown 
and surrounded by expensive residential neighborhoods, Kol-Shärif seemed to be 
frequented by middle-to-upper-middle class parishioners, government officials, and 
younger people. The second mosque, Nurulla, is older (dating to ca. 1845) and located in 
one of Kazan’s oldest residential neighborhoods, mostly populated by lower- to middle-
class retirees. Located fairly close to Kazan’s main train station and a big local market, 
the Nurulla mosque was also known to welcome Muslim worshipers of diverse 
backgrounds (such as Shia, for example).  
Differences in demographics between the two mosques were not as significant as 
I had initially thought they would be. In other words, women from diverse backgrounds 
and all walks of life frequented both mosques. What mattered, however, was the specific 
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abïstaylar [Tat. ‘Tatar female Muslim religious teachers’] who taught those lessons and 
acted as figures of religious and moral authority at each mosque.71 The Nurulla mosque 
hosted a number of abïstaylar who were highly respected among Tatar women for their 
education (most of them were graduates of the Mukhammadiia medrese) and life 
experience because some managed to remain observant Muslims even during the Soviet 
times and thus were considered the preservers of knowledge. In particular, Rashida 
abïstay, who taught at the Nurulla mosque, was a legendary figure who observed Islam 
all her life, gave secret religious lessons during the Soviet period and was interrogated 
and arrested for that, but never gave up her religious practice. Moreover, as her multiple 
students told me in the course of my fieldwork, they respected Rashida abïstay for her 
charismatic personality, down-to-earth wisdom, oratory skills, softness that veiled 
enormous character strength, and her ability to suspend moral judgment and listen 
carefully when people sought advice and guidance from her. One of my interviewees, 
whose story is analyzed in chapter 7, put it best: “I keep coming to her mosque lessons 
even after attending the Mukhammadiia medrese because no one can teach as close to the 
realities of the real life as she can.”  
In addition to sitting in classes at the Kazan Mukhammadiia medrese and the 
Russian Islamic University and attending informal mosque lessons at the Nurulla and 
Kol-Shärif mosques, I participated in informal and formal activities, such as fast-breaking 
dinners and tea gatherings in private and public spaces. I utilized a number of tactics to 
solicit interviewees. I met seventy percent of my interviewees at local mosques, 
medreses, or the Russian Islamic University. In about twenty percent of all of my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Kol-Shärif mosque was also frequented by younger Muslims who were attracted to and regularly attended 
Friday sermons given by Ramil Iunusov, its chief imam at the time. 	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interviews, I relied on previously established connections, asked group leaders or 
teachers to introduce me to their students, and received suggestions to interview a 
particular woman because her personality or story were deemed worthy by the 
recommender. Finally, relying on physical manifestations of Muslim piety, such as the 
headscarf and modest dress, I sometimes approached women with a request for an 
interview at a bus stop, a store, a library, and other public places. Those interviews 
accounted for about ten percent of data.  
I usually interviewed women right where I met them (such as the Russian Islamic 
University, the Mukhammadiia medrese, or a particular mosque). On a few occasions, I 
interviewed women at my rental apartment, at a cafeteria, or at their home. I usually let 
the interviewee suggest a place for us to have a conversation and would honor their 
preference unless a scheduling conflict would prevent me from doing so. I also conducted 
participant observation and interviews among members of the Tatar Cultural Club 
“Shärïq” [Tat. ‘East’]. Meeting and interviewing Tatars at this secular-oriented,72 but 
primarily Tatar speaking, venue helped me understand relationships between Islamic and 
Tatar-ethnic loyalties.   
While I had developed a detailed questionnaire (see appendix A), after about a 
month in the field, I realized that a better strategy would be to use it as a general 
reference, letting women share their stories in the manner that they chose. In addition to 
using a tape recorder to conduct interviews, I also made notes about recurring/central 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 While the main goal of the “Shärïq” club was to support the Tatar language and culture among younger Tatars, its 
meetings were not completely devoid of religious elements. For example, during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, 
female club members observed modest clothing by donning headscarves. Some women donned them for the duration of 
the meetings only, while others wore headscarves permanently. Club meetings during Ramadan were also held with 
snacks and tea, so that guests and club members who observed the fast could break the fast on time. During my visits to 
the club, I also observed some club members and guests perform the ritual prayer if its time coincided with the time of 
the meetings, which took place in the evening. This is despite the fact that in my interviews with them some members 
of the club claimed to be non-practicing Muslims or claimed to observe a different religion altogether. 
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themes in a narrative, creating a roadmap of an interview. My data collection process 
resulted in thirty in-depth interviews (ranging anywhere from two to nine73 hours of tape 
time) and forty brief personal interviews (ranging from 15 minutes to an hour of tape 
time), resulting in roughly 170 hours of tape. My fieldwork also yielded interviews with 
non-practicing Tatar women (approximately 20 hours of tape)74, one semester’s worth of 
the “Women in Islam” class sessions at the Mukhammadiia medrese, which I attended 
and recorded (approximately 20 hours of tape), informal mosque lessons at Kazan’s 
Nurulla and Kol-Shärif mosque (approximately 90 hours of tape), informal “tea” 
gatherings organized by women at the mosques (approximately 20 hours of tape), focus 
group and random discussions of issues related to Islam (25 hours of tape), recordings of 
public Muslim events (approximately 15 hours of tape), and interviews with public 
officials, including Muslim clergy (approximately ten hours).  
 
Coming to Piety Stories 
A larger question underlying my research on Tatar women’s interest in Muslim 
piety was why women turn to Islam as a way of life despite potential challenges 
associated with a Muslim life-style in a secular state. These challenges range from 
observing one’s daily needs, such as dietary requirements75 or performance of the five 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 I met and talked with some of the interviewees on multiple occasions.   
74 None of those interviews made it into the dissertation as a subject of an individual analysis; however, I drew on them 
to create a continuum of beliefs and perceptions about faith present in Tatarstan today.     
75 In simplified terms, no pork or alcohol is allowed. Cattle and poultry must be slaughtered in accordance with a 
certain ritual for the meat to be considered “halal,” or appropriate for consumption in accordance with the Muslim 
normative law. Some women I interviewed shared that they stopped eating out because of difficulty finding dining 
establishments that would meet their religious dietary requirements. While the number of Muslim-oriented restaurants 
has been growing in Kazan, they are still few and far-between outside Tatarstan’s capital. Furthermore, some women 
reported that they reduced their socialization with friends who did not take into consideration such dietary requirements 
because going out with them meant not only having to attend dining establishments that carried alcohol and pork, but 
sometimes sitting at a table where those products were served. Practicing Muslim Tatar women who had children in 
school or kindergarten also reported difficulties associated with ensuring that their children were served proper food.   
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daily prayers,76 to issues that are politicized to the point of being presented as disruptive 
to the established social order, such as the hijab.77 One way to get at the answer was for 
me to ask pious Tatar women that question directly. Typically, I used the question to 
begin my one-on-one interviews, and I often received a narrative, or a piety story, in 
response.78 I further observed that sometimes interviewees began their narrative before I 
had a chance to ask them anything, by saying: “O chem Vy khotite sprosit’? Kak ia 
prishla v islam?” [Ru. ‘What would you like to ask about? How I came to Islam?’]. My 
affirmative response to the question often resulted in a story about a woman’s path to 
Muslim piety. The phrase “priiti v islam” [Ru. ‘to come to Islam’] or variations thereof,79 
thus, referred to a culturally shared communicative practice of sharing one’s path to Islam 
and often marked the beginning of a piety story.  
Moreover, in the course of their narratives, some women talked about sharing 
their stories with other women, which alerted me to the fact that sharing a story about 
one’s path to Islam was a commonly shared cultural practice, a ritual of sorts. Finally, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Reported difficulties associated with performance of the five daily prayers ranged from time constraints at work or 
school to inability to perform the mandatory cleansing ritual before the prayer (and thus inability to perform the prayer) 
due to absence of public bathrooms in working order. As a result, many women shared that, in part as a solution to this 
particular problem, they started planning their daily activities around prayer times.  
77 In simplified terms, a Muslim woman’s covering also referred to as a veil or headscarf. Modest clothing for men at a 
minimum presupposes coverage of the body from waist down, and for women – the entire body except for the face, 
hands, and feet. While certain attributes of men’s appearance, such as a beard, may also be politicized (as I discussed in 
chapter 8), it is the headscarf that has been politicized as a threat to the established (secular) social order. In addition to 
the passport pictures case that I discussed in chapter 2 on Tatars’ historical background, approximately ten women I 
interviewed described difficulties associated with their ability to openly wear the headscarf in public (at school or at 
work). At least one of my interviewees (at the time of fieldwork) reported removing the headscarf upon a request from 
her employer, a state public office. Recent controversies in the Stavropol krai [Ru. ‘region’] and Tatarstan associated 
with banning of the headscarves in public schools (at the local level) further illustrate the politicization of the issue, 
with real consequences for observant Muslim women. For more information on these cases, see footnote 53. 
78 My approach was similar to a biographical-narrative interview, which is solicited by an opening question, usually 
followed by life story (Rosenthal, 1993).	  
79 Referring to a similar phenomenon, Sabirova (2006) uses the phrase “obrashchenie k islamu” [Ru. ‘turning to 
Islam’]. She points to the difference in meaning between the phrases “obrashchenie k islamu” [Ru. ‘turning to Islam’] 
and “obrashchenie v islam” [Ru. ‘turning in Islam’], where the latter meaning presupposes the notion of conversion (as 
in change of religion) from a religion to Islam. In my experience, the most widely used phrase was “priiti k islamu” 
[Ru. ‘to come to Islam’], which, as I suggest, refers to a woman’s stepping on the path to Muslim piety. Furthermore, 
other phrases were used to mark such religious experience. As one data segment in this chapter illustrates, for example, 
one Tatar woman marked her commitment to Muslim piety by referring to it as “priniat’ islam” [Ru. ‘to accept 
Islam’]. Later in the chapter, I discuss an older woman’s objection to the use of the phrase “to come to Islam” (or a 
variation thereof) on the grounds that it denies the presence of faith in her life before she became a practicing Muslim.  
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I spent more time among practicing Muslim women—at a mosque, in the medrese, in a 
private home, or at a social event—I observed that story-sharing, in one form of another, 
happened often and spontaneously, but almost always in a religious context and in the 
process of meeting a new person/new people and introducing people who have not met 
before, by asking “Kak ty prishla v islam?” [Ru. ‘How did you come to Islam?’] or “Kak 
davno ty v islame?” [Ru. ‘How long have you been in Islam?’] or a close variation.  
 Once I realized that my initial interview questions often yielded an entire (piety) 
story, I treated them only as a general guide and solicited such stories within the 
discursive conventions typical for them, as chapter 4 will illustrate (although in this 
chapter I refer to them as “interviews”). When it was possible and beneficial for my 
research, I attended co-ed events and also interviewed male figures (usually religious and 
political experts). While I initially relied on participant observation and interviews as my 
two primary research tools, my status as both a “native” and a researcher/observer 
complicated my positioning and what was expected of me and sometimes turned me into 
a full participant. 
 
Data Selection and Analysis 
 The amount of data I collected, while, on the one hand provided me with enough 
material to write a dissertation, on the other, presented me with the daunting task of 
deciding which narratives to include in it. While the forty brief personal interviews and 
interviews with non-observant Tatar women contributed to my understanding of beliefs 
and perceptions about faith present in Tatarstan today, I at the outset limited my sample 
of data to the thirty in-depth interviews. To sort through those in-depth interviews, I drew 
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on key features of “life stories” (Linde, 1993) and conversion narratives (Snow and 
Machalek 1984; Hovi 2004) to make a repertoire of discursive elements that would be 
present in a piety story. In particular, I looked for such elements as (a) reportability 
(Linde 1993) that enables the narrator to tell and retell the story over a long period of 
time, (b) construction of narrative in accordance with the “before and after” pattern that 
indicated a change in one’s life (Hovi 2004), (c) biographical reconstruction (Snow & 
Machalek, 1984) whereby the narrator re-constructs the past vis-a-vis the new world view 
(such as Islam), and (d) adoption of a master attribution scheme (Snow & Machalek, 
1984), or the narrator’s tendency to attribute life’s events to a single cause. I then relied 
on my interview notes and partial listening of the data to narrow down my collection of 
interviews to those that had the most of those features, twenty of the thirty in-depth 
interviews.  
Even though I used certain features of life stories and conversion narratives to 
guide me through this initial data selection process, I tried to avoid imposing pre-set 
categories on the data. Rather, at that stage of the data selection, I looked for recurring 
themes, in accordance with open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 1998). In the next step 
of data selection, I employed in vivo coding, the process of utilizing “terms used by the 
social actors themselves” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 220). During this process, I logged 
the twenty interviews I had selected in the previous stage, which involved making 
comments about the data and generated initial data write-ups, description, and analyses.  
The final stage of data selection involved transcribing and translating instances of 
data80 that I identified as most compelling about a certain phenomenon or experience. In 
some cases an experience was shared by other women and thus was, to an extent, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 I performed all data transcription and translation. 
	   56 
representative. In other cases, an individual woman’s experience did not easily fit into a 
certain category, but still contributed valuable insights towards better understanding of a 
phenomenon. Making an argument for examining culture at the level of individual lives, 
Okely observes that “’cracks of resistance’ to dominant ideologies [. . .] are often more 
visible when we look at the lives of and listen to the stories of unusual individuals” (as 
cited in Flueckiger, 2006, p. 24). Sharing in that vision, I did not dismiss women whose 
stories, narrative styles, or personalities came across as “unusual,” but treated them as 
case studies that provided unique opportunities for understanding things that otherwise 
would have “fallen through the cracks.” 
To sum up, this ethnographic project, with an emphasis on narrative, was 
designed with the purpose of focusing on individual women’s experiences. Unlike 
sociological studies, for example, that tend to focus on groups as units of analysis, 
assuming social coherence and transferability of experience across the entire group, the 
purpose of this project was to look at individual actors and their personal experiences vis-
à-vis the socio-historic realities that they were part of. As such, the individual women’s 
stories and their analysis are not meant to give the reader a comprehensive account of the 
recent Muslim revival in Tatarstan. Rather, I suggest that these individual stories, as a 
form of a communicative resource available to women, “offer different solutions to the 
problem of establishing and sustaining a particular version of the social world [and 
identity]—with its assumptions about knowledge and power, access and denial, 
continuity and change—without denying the possibility of other versions, with their 
orders and power relations” (Duranti, 1997, p. 330). As such, these stories can contribute 
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to a better understanding of some ongoing processes and discourses related to the role of 
Islam in Tatars’ quest for identity and the role of women in such a quest.  
 
Discourse Analysis 
I employ discourse analysis as the main analytical tool in my examination of 
practicing Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories. As mentioned above, I draw on 
Stromberg’s (1993) notion of identity as a style of doing things, which places the focus of 
analysis on the style of the women’s narratives. Such an approach calls for attention to 
multilevel linguistic practices—interplay of ideas, narrative viewpoints, speech units—
that the narrator uses to enact personal experience in terms of a canonical language (p. 
34). To conduct this multidimensional discourse analysis effectively, I utilize the concept 
of “a life story” (Linde, 1993). Linde (1993) defines life story as a unified discourse unit 
“that moves from the level of the individual construction of sentences, through the form 
of narratives and the social negotiation of narratives, up to the social level of belief 
systems and their history, and finally to their effect on the construction of narratives” (p. 
3). Therefore, as a unit of analysis, a life story goes beyond a single word, utterance, 
conversational turn, or a sentence, and includes all of the stories and associated discourse 
units81 that constitute a single life story (p. 21), thus allowing for richness and fullness of 
data. At the same time, the multidimensional structure of a life story allows for a 
possibility of an in-depth analysis of its smaller elements, without getting lost in the data. 
Ultimately, my choice of a life story as a unit of analysis was dictated by the fact that it 
productively accommodates Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories, identity-oriented 
narratives about their paths to Muslim piety.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Linde (1993) identifies them as “explanations and chronicles” (p. 21). 
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Ochs and Capps (2001) observe that at the heart of a narrative is “telling a story 
with another” as opposed to “telling a story to another” (p. 2). As I illustrate in the next 
chapter, sharing a piety story is, in a way, telling a story with another because the 
audience’s feedback contributes to the way the narrative is delivered. In other words, 
storytelling presupposes a strong performative component. From that perspective, then, a 
narrative is a contextually and situationally grounded mode of symbolic communicative 
action. It is “a situated performance” (Brockmeier and Carbaugh, 2001, p. 13) that is 
partially dependent on the situational context. Therefore, in my analysis of the piety 
stories, I account for the immediate context in which story sharing takes place and that 
contributes to the situated performance of the narrative. Finally, following Bucholtz 
(2005) observation that “for language and gender research, the most prominent issues in 
discourse analysis are the nature of context, the role of agency versus dominant forms of 
power, and the analytic stance of the researcher” (p. 63), I locate the immediate 
situational context in which piety stories take place within the larger socio-historical 
milieu. In my analysis of the piety stories, therefore, I regularly shift between analyses of 
the micro and macro dimensions of discourse, for example, between the details of a given 
subject’s story and aspects of the larger historical context, such as the fall of the Soviet 
Union, that inform the stories.  
 
Transcription and Translation of Narratives 
The narratives provided in this dissertation usually took place in a mix of Russian 
and Tatar,82 with frequent insertions of Arabic, a sign of both the Tatars’ Islamic revival 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Only one narrative took place exclusively in Tatar, and I translated it into English myself. I identify the instance in 
the dissertation.  
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and a speaker’s personal piety.83 As these shifts in language can serve as important 
markers of identity and piety, I tried to preserve the instances of code-switching from 
Russian to Tatar and Arabic as much as I could (by using the Latin alphabet to 
transliterate them for easier comprehension), which resulted in relatively complicated 
transcripts. If a word in Russian carried a specific cultural meaning that its English 
equivalent could not communicate, I also preserved the Russian in the English transcript. 
If a word in a transcript carried a cultural meaning that could not be represented with a 
short gloss, I explained it in a footnote and in my analysis of the transcript. Finally, as a 
result of the recent Muslim revival, both Tatar and Russian are experiencing an influx of 
religious Arabic terms. These terms are recent borrowings into the Russian language. 
While contemporary Tatar language84 had contained some of these terms, new Arabic 
terms are also becoming part of it. Therefore, throughout her narrative, a practicing 
Muslim Tatar woman may use older Arabic (and Farsi) borrowings that had become part 
of the Tatar language, as well as newer Arabic borrowings that are part of the recent 
revival. The latter are more likely to be used by a younger generation of practicing 
Muslims who are not “wedded” to the Tatar language and are more likely to follow 
Arabic or Russian, rather than Tatar, pronunciation. This variability is a reflection of the 
competing discourses of Islam and identity in the current Muslim revival. If a certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In Writing Women’s Worlds: Bedouin Stories, Abu-Lughod (2008) talks about the frequent use of religious terms (in 
Arabic) by her interlocutors and her decision to omit them.	  	  
84 I refer to the Tatar language based on Cyrillic, which was introduced in 1939. Prior to 1939, Tatar was based on an 
Arabic alphabet, which was later (in 1928) replaced with the Latin script.  For a historical account of the change of 
alphabets, see Rorlich (1986, pp. 150-152). As Faller (2011) observes, illumination of the Arabic and later Latin 
alphabets were political, as well as cultural moves, and resulted in the loss of literacy (and thus historical and cultural 
legacy) by some generations and in fragmentation of knowledge once shared by Turkic-speaking people (p. 117-118). 
Faller (2011) refers to the Soviet alphabet reform as “Soviet colonialism” (p. 117). A recent (1999) attempt by the 
Tatarstan’s government to switch the Tatar language to a Latin-based alphabet was defeated by the Duma’s 2002 law 
that prohibited use of non-Cyrillic alphabet in the Russian Federation. In 2004, the Tatarstan’s government took the 
case to the Russian Constitutional Court, where the case was thrown out.  
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pronunciation of an Arabic term was crucial to my data, I identified it in either the 
transcript or data analysis. 
 I transcribed and translated all narratives into English myself, occasionally 
consulting with more proficient Tatar/Arabic speakers.85 Unless indicated otherwise, the 
majority of stories analyzed in this dissertation were told in Russian with an occasional 
mix of Tatar and Arabic. Interview transcription conventions, which I used to present 
excerpts of data, are presented in an appendix B. In the analysis sections of the 
dissertation (not in the excerpts of data), I present culturally meaningful 
Arabic/Tatar/Russian words in italics, immediately following them in square brackets 
with an abbreviated language marker (“Tat.” for Tatar, “Ru.” for Russian, and “Ar.” for 
Arabic) and English translation in single quotation marks. For example:  
As Muslims, we have to perform namaz [Tat. ‘Muslim ritual prayer’] five times a 
day.  
I thought I was a mere baba [Ru. ‘woman’]. 
I would not have come to Islam had it not been for Allah subhana wa ta’ala [Ar. 
 
‘God, May He be Glorified and Exalted’]. 
 
Finally, due to the fact that currently there is no universally agreed upon Tatar to 
English transliteration system, in this dissertation I utilized Tatar transliteration 
conventions offered by Suzanne Wertheim (2003a) in her dissertation Linguistic Purism, 
Language Shift, and Contact-induced Change in Tatar (p. 355). Transliteration 
conventions for both Tatar and Russian are presented in an appendix C. I provide a 
glossary of Arabic, Tatar, and Russian words used throughout the dissertation at the end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In those instances, a translation would be made into Russian first, with my consequent translation into English.	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of the manuscript, right after the bibliography. I take responsibility for any errors or 
inconsistency associated with language use. 
 
Community Member as Researcher 
While my fieldwork was productive and yielded more data than I could use in my 
analysis (as suggested above, not all stories made it into the dissertation), there are 
methodological issues that require further commentary that have little to do with “hours 
of data recorded” or “discourse analytic concepts.” In one way or another, they have to 
do with my own identity as both a community member and a U.S.-trained researcher, 
which inform my theoretical stance and positioning.  
 
Language 
As an ethnic Tatar, I was required to take Tatar classes throughout elementary and 
middle school in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Those classes, however, were nor more 
than a Soviet-era curriculum formality and accounted to one hour of Tatar per week.86 
While I have no doubt that my Tatar language teacher loved her native tongue, her 
primary method of teaching was to sing to her students and make us sing along. I have to 
confess that I did not share my teacher’s passion for Tatar music at the time.87 An “A” 
student all around, I rarely succeeded in her class, and I was happy when I no longer was 
required to take Tatar toward the end of middle school and in high school.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86  I also discuss the Soviet language policies in chapter 2 on Tatarstan’s history.	  
87 In her chapter on mong—Tatar melancholy songs that draw on and elicit the feelings of grief-sorrow—Faller (2011) 
describes an episode where, during a special tea-drinking session organized for the researcher to tell her about and sing 
Tatar music, a Tatar teacher scolded her Tatar students for not knowing any mongful songs. The teacher was concerned 
about and disappointed with the younger generation’s lack of knowledge on mong and proceeded to sing one herself (p. 
263). It is quite possible that my Tatar teacher sang mong during our Tatar lessons. The only memory I have about 
those songs is on an emotional level: they made me feel sad (because of the slow tempo) and bored (because I did not 
understand the lyrics).  
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Growing up in a Russian-majority industrial town of Zelenodolsk, just west of 
Kazan, my sources of learning Tatar were limited to occasional interaction in Tatar at 
home. My parents, both ethnic Tatars, were born in Kazakhstan, then a Soviet Republic, 
in the early 1940s, and their knowledge of the language was limited to the conversational 
level and came from their immediate family. Considering the fact that both of them lost 
all of their parents and grandparents by the age of 25, their limited knowledge of Tatar 
was not unexpected. As in many Tatar families where parents were born and grew up 
under the Soviet regime, my parents usually spoke Tatar only when they wanted to hide 
something from my sister and me. My mother’s command of the language was better 
than that of my father. To her credit, every now and then she would declare a “Tatar 
only” policy in our home, but it would usually take only five minutes before everyone 
switched back to Russian again.  
Some ethnic Tatars might call me a “mankurt,”88 a derogatory term for Tatars 
who did not speak the language and showed little interest in learning it. While my 
identification as a “mankurt” was (and is still) deeply personal and internalized—
meaning that I had perceived my lack of skills and interest in the Tatar language as my 
personal problem—American anthropologist’s Helen Faller’s (2011) discussion of how 
Tatars identify their language skills illustrates that it is a social problem. Faller (2011) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The word “mankurt” comes from the Soviet era Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov’s novel I dol’she veka dlitsia den’ 
[Ru. ‘The Day Lasts Longer than a Hundred Years], whose theme is the fate of the people who forget their native land, 
language, and history. According to a legend narrated in the novel, “mankurt” is a slave whose memory is erased by 
wrapping the slave’s shaved skull with piece of freshly slaughtered camel’s skin. The term “mankurt” became popular 
in the post-Soviet in relation to people who are considered indifferent to their motherland, native language and culture. 
For example, in response to a journalist’s question about his opinion of the term “Russian-speaking Tatars” or 
“Mankurts,” the chair of the World Tatar Congress Renat Zakirov suggested: “They are the reality of contemporary 
life. Many Tatars became ‘Mankurts’ against their own will. It may be seen as a result of the assimilation of our people 
over the centuries. It was particularly prominent during the Soviet	  time. We have to work with this group of our 
compatriots, of course, especially because they continue to consider themselves Tatars” (Sultan, 2006). While I have 
never been called “mankurt” in my face, based on my familiarity of the use of the term, I would not be surprised if I 
was called “mankurt” behind my back.	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states: “Tatars generally say that ‘to know Tatar’ is to be fully conversant in Tatar 
quotidian speech and literary language . . . . Bilingualism often becomes a topic of 
ideological discourses about linguistic purism, as many Tatar-speakers say they are not 
fully bilingual because they do not know Tatar literary language, only everyday speech” 
(p. 14).  
My serious interest in studying the Tatar language began in graduate school in the 
U.S. in preparation for my dissertation research, and I then began a self-study of Tatar 
that is on-going to this day. My knowledge of Tatar at the time of my field research was 
good enough to make introductions and carry an informal conversation. It was not good 
enough to carry on in-depth political or religious discussion. Furthermore, my anxiety 
about my Tatar proficiency was exacerbated by my conviction that, as a Tatar born and 
raised in Tatarstan, I would be expected to deliver perfect Tatar and no mistakes would 
be tolerated.89 As a result, if my interlocutors felt comfortable communicating in Russian, 
I would initiate my interaction in Tatar and eventually switch to Russian. I am aware of 
the impact that language use may have had on such interactions. I am thankful to my 
Tatar interlocutors for accommodating to my fears and weaknesses and encouraging me 
to continue learning the language. If an interaction took place in Tatar, I made sure to 
clarify concepts that I felt unsure about. Having the digital recorder and being able to go 
back and listen to conversations multiple times also helped with potential language 
comprehension and translation problems.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  My anxiety was not completely ungrounded. Wertheim (2003a, 2003b) and Faller (2011) discuss some Tatars’ 
efforts to purify the language by refusing to accommodate to non-speakers of Tatar or speakers of poor Tatar.	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Translation 
Another challenge in my data analysis was my translation of the material. As 
Duranti (1997) observes, translation “implies a long series of interpretations and 
decisions that are rarely made apparent in the final product” (p. 154). During the 
translation process, I constantly had to choose among imperfect options to keep both the 
form and meaning of discourse as close to the original as possible. Due to the very 
different nature (and structure) of English, Tatar, Russian (and Arabic), it is impossible to 
preserve both form and meaning fully in the translations. My own level of mastery of 
these languages also limited my translation although I did consult native speakers of each 
of the languages.  
Duranti (1997) further clarifies that “the activity of translating is intimately 
related to ethnography, to the contextualization of words within the activity and the larger 
sociopolitical and cultural systems in which their speakers participate” (p. 154). This 
means that the micro-level literal translation that I conducted intertwined with my role as 
an ethnographer, which included being a data collector, a (cultural) interpreter, and writer 
of the final product. What made this role complicated was my position as both the 
researcher and a “native” in the data analysis and write-up stages of this project. 
 
Negotiating ethnographic worlds 
While the older generation of women were welcoming to me and admired my 
Western education and what they perceived as my interest in “Islam” (both of which their 
own children often lacked, according to the women), the younger generation often 
challenged my intentions and religiosity during my fieldwork by questioning me about 
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my life and never hesitating to correct me when they noticed lapses in my judgment or 
piety. As a U.S.-based researcher married to an American (and thus a non-Muslim) and 
as an individual whose religious knowledge and practices were often lacking, I was also 
an outsider.90 My disappointment at my situational outsider status partly came from my 
assumption that, as a Tatar woman born, raised, and educated in Tatarstan (whose entire 
family still resides there), I was a “native.” I thought I would have enough cultural and 
religious capital to stand on equal footing, particularly with younger women to whom I 
was closer in age. I had also assumed that, because I was not a theology student and was 
not studying “Islam” but rather discursive ways of identity construction by and among 
these women, I would not be judged so critically on my (sometimes suspect) Muslim 
religious knowledge.  
Commenting on a somewhat similar position in the field when the researcher 
becomes the interviewee and the one being observed, while the interviewee becomes the 
interviewer and the observer, Peshkova (2006) argues such “methodological role inverse” 
“allowed partial subversion of the power differences by allowing sharing the position of 
authority” (p. 42). In my case, while such role reversal often put me in an uncomfortable 
spot, it led me to reflexivity91 and forced me to bracket92 my initial assumptions and 
beliefs.  
On one level, I had to come up with a strategy to position myself in such a way 
that would allow me to deal with the immediate effects of my ambiguous positioning and 
identity. I tried to highlight Muslim and Tatar aspects of my identity in some situations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Older women were also very curious about my life, but, unlike younger women who were interested in my piety, the 
older women were interested in more “secular” aspects of my life, especially my life in the U.S.   
91 In this context, reflexivity implies attention to what we do as researchers and how it affects the process and outcome 
of interaction. For a discussion on reflexivity in ethnographic work, see Davies (1999).  
92 I refer to Edmund Husserl’s notion of the phenomenological reduction that involves suspending the researcher’s 
assumptions and beliefs. For further reading see Sokolowski (2000). 	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(particularly when meeting women), and remain an observer (still partially participant) in 
others. For example, out of respect for my interviewees and places where most interviews 
took place (the mosques and Muslim educational institutions), I wore a headscarf and 
dressed modestly, making sure my clothes covered my body leaving only my hands and 
feet visible. If I found myself in a mosque where a call for one of the five daily prayers 
was followed by a collective prayer, I participated in the collective prayer, which was 
considered Sunnah, and thus an appropriate thing to do. At other times, during other 
religious events that could be considered less obligatory for Muslims, I tried to remain an 
observer.  
Neither wearing a headscarf in a religious setting nor participating in a collective 
prayer was an unfamiliar experience for me but keeping the headscarf on while leaving a 
mosque was. Growing up in the Soviet Union, I participated in religious gatherings that 
my mother or other Tatar relatives organized in the privacy of their homes to mark an 
important life event, such as death of a kin or a marriage engagement. During such 
gatherings, it was culturally and situationally expected that all women (and girls) don a 
scarf (even if leaving part of their hair, neck, and chest exposed). It was also expected 
that all present participate in the collective listening of the Qur’anic surahs [Ar. ‘verses’] 
(performed by an older Tatar man or woman) and then hold out the palms of their hands 
together during doga [Tatar], a non-ritual prayer93 that followed. Addressed directly to 
God, doga was a personal prayer request for health, happiness, and prosperity for those 
present in the room and their families, as well as for a place in heaven for the deceased. 
Doga was recited by the ceremony leader out-loud and accompanied by frequent 
collective interjections of “Amin!” [Tat. ‘Amen!’] from those present, as they slightly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 As opposed to namaz, the Muslim ritual five-daily prayer, prescribed in the Qur’an. 
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rocked back and forth in their seats to the improvisational rhythm of the prayer. Even 
though the women promptly removed the scarves upon the events’ completion, and no 
one actually performed namaz, the Muslim ritual prayer, these events constituted a sacred 
physical and virtual space where collective worshiping took place. They made the rituals 
of temporarily donning the scarf and participating in a collective prayer familiar 
experiences. I was not, however, accustomed to leaving the headscarf on outside such a 
gathering or outside a mosque, which constituted a new experience for me because it 
marked me in a very specific way in public: as an observant Muslim woman.    
When it came to the interviewing processes, I dealt with ambiguities by 
reciprocating the degree of openness that I would expect of, or receive from, my 
interviewees. As a rule, I would not disclose personal information about myself that I 
would not feel comfortable asking an interviewee, but would share it if the other person 
shared it with me voluntarily and expected the same in return. The level of trust and 
power-dynamics between an interviewee and me varied on a case-by case basis: I became 
friends or acquaintances with some interviewees and maintain contact with them, while I 
might never again see or speak with others. Ultimately, in my relationship with the 
interviewees I strived to develop “an emotional empathy” (Marranci, 2008, Kindle 
Locations 275-276). I came to appreciate and enjoy certain practices (even if for a time), 
such as dressing in a modest way and using the headscarf to carefully cover my hair and 
neck. Ethnographers, like ethnographic subjects, cannot be denied their humanity. 
In a famous piece, Geertz (1973) suggests that  “Doing ethnography is like trying 
to read (in the sense of “construct a reading of”) a manuscript—foreign, faded, full of 
ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but 
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written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped 
behavior” (p. 10).94 While I take it for what it’s worth—a metaphor—I treat the metaphor 
that compares doing ethnographic work to reading a “foreign,” “faded” manuscript with 
caution. Understood from a humanistic view point, our readings of other people’s words, 
spoken or written, are in a way always foreign and faded, but when applied to the notion 
of culture, the metaphor reifies a culture. Furthermore, it puts someone like me—a 
researcher that comes from that culture—in a difficult position of having to experience, 
interpret, and speak from two different worlds simultaneously.  
Five years after Clifford and Marcus’ (1986) edited a collection of essays on 
“writing culture,” Abu-Lughod (1991) provided a revision to the concept because the 
approach ignored feminists and “halfies,” people who identify with more than one 
cultural background, as both groups did not fit neatly into the “self”/”the other” 
dichotomy. By suggesting to “write against culture,” Abu-Lughod proposed to generate 
the kind of ethnographic writing—“ethnography of the particular”—that avoided 
sweeping generalizations and focused on people’s individual experiences that are 
grounded in local (and) historical contexts. To the best of my ability, I wrote this 
dissertation in the spirit of Abu-Lughod’s (1991) plea that “we must constantly attend to 
the positionality of the anthropological self and its representations of others” (pp. 141-
142).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Hoffman (2009) finds treating culture as text problematic because it betrays not only “the literary metaphor, but also 
the literacy metaphor” (p. 418). She argues: “When these ‘texts’ are written artifacts, the question of access is acute, as 
questions of power immediately arise, particularly because individuals’ access to literary practices is conditioned by 
wealth or poverty, geographical location (often a related concern), but also intrafamily relations—as when parents and 
especially fathers choose which daughters to send to school, and for how long” (p. 418). Hoffman (2009) further probes 
the culture-as-text approach by analyzing how it is (in)applicable to female Tashelhit Berber–speakers in Taroudant 
Province of Morocco in their use of oral religious texts. 
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CHAPTER 4  
“PIETY STORIES”: MUSLIM TATAR WOMEN’S IDENTITY PERFORMANCE 
AND TRANSFORMATION THROUGH STORYTELLING 
 
Drawing on research on conversion narratives (Stromberg, 1993) and life stories 
(Linde 1993), this chapter explores culturally shared premises and social meanings 
behind the communicative practice of sharing paths to Muslim piety. I argue that 
soliciting and sharing stories about one’s path to Muslim piety is a communicative way of 
performing identity and re-affirming one’s commitment to Muslim piety. Depending 
upon whether the storyteller is able to orient herself toward her audience (through stance-
taking), the audience shares in the religious commitment, and community building95 takes 
place. Finally, I argue that, in the moment of interaction, the stories provide a discursive 
way for the speaker to practice being a Muslim and for the audience, a blueprint for 
becoming one. By doing so, these piety stories serve as a source of agency for both 
personal and social transformation. 
As described in chapter 3 on methodology, piety stories often occurred 
spontaneously when I asked women how they came to Islam. In addition, in the course of 
their narratives, some women talked about sharing their stories with other women, which 
alerted me to the fact that sharing a story about one’s path to Islam was a commonly 
shared cultural practice, a ritual of sorts. Finally, as I spent more time among practicing 
Muslim women—at a mosque, in a medrese, in a private home, or at a social event—I 
observed that story-sharing, in one form or another, happened often and spontaneously, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 By community, I refer to both a Muslim community at the local level, such as mähällä [Tat. ‘local community’], a 
group of Muslims attending the same mosque, and the global level such as the Ummah [Ar. ‘Muslim community 
around the world’].  
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but almost always in a religious context and in the process of meeting a new person/new 
people and introducing people who have not met before. 
In this chapter, I first review concepts from research on conversion narrative 
(Snow & Machalek, 1983; 1984; Staples & Mauss, 1987; Stromberg, 1993) and life 
stories (Linde, 1993), suggesting the key role of language in the reflection and 
constitution of identity, as well as in personal and social transformation. I explain how 
those notions of language, personhood, and change apply to Muslim Tatar women and 
their piety stories. I then analyze three different instances of piety stories that occurred 
spontaneously in the course of my fieldwork and one story that I solicited, all of which 
point to the importance of piety stories as a culturally meaningful form of 
communication. In particular, the first data excerpt from an informal religious dinner 
gathering is an example of how a woman’s piety story is used to construct identity, 
negotiate membership, and build a community. The second segment from a lesson at the 
local medrese demonstrates how piety stories serve as a source for transformation of not 
only the speaker herself, but also the audience, ultimately resulting in a social change. In 
my analysis of the third segment of data, I illustrate how the communicative practice of 
sharing piety stories often results in reciprocation, whereby the speaker, having shared 
her story, invites other audience members to share their stories or the audience members 
volunteer to do so, resulting in a role reversal of sorts. Such reciprocation further 
contributes to identity and membership negotiation and group unity. Finally, the fourth 
data segment is an example of a piety story shared by an older practicing Muslim Tatar 
woman who became an observant Muslim later in life. Unlike younger practicing women, 
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she did not speak about the moment of “conversion,” but positioned her entire life, and 
not just the years of practicing, as a life-long path toward Muslim piety.  
 
Conversion Narratives and Life Stories 
Although research on conversion narratives largely focuses on (Evangelical) 
Christianity, it provides some useful insights that I draw on in my analysis of the piety 
stories. Among them are the notions of biographical reconstruction and self-
transformation, both of which underline the importance of language in the reflection and 
constitution of identity. Informed by symbolic interactionism and Mead’s idea of 
“universe of discourse,” Snow and Machalek (1983) suggest that conversion involves a 
change in one’s consciousness. They propose the notion of the biographical 
reconstruction as one of four characteristics of a convert (and his or her new 
consciousness). Biographical reconstruction, reflected in the language use, refers to the 
convert’s ability to rhetorically reconstruct the events of the past anew, in accordance 
with the new “universe of discourse,” new meanings and new perspectives. Building on 
Snow & Machalek (1983, 1984), Staples and Mauss, (1987) conceptualize conversion not 
as a change in consciousness (reflected in language), but as “a change in the way a person 
thinks and feels about his or her self” (p. 137), thus placing the notion of personhood in 
the center of conversion. Based on that, and drawing on Turner’s (1976) notion of the 
“real self” (vs. the “spurious self”), they further suggest that conversion can be 
conceptualized as a change in the “real self,” or self-transformation, “the creation of a 
new vision of who we really believe we are when all our social roles and self-
presentations are stripped away” (Staples & Mauss, 1987, p. 137). Finally, and most 
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importantly, Staples & Mauss (1987) treat language and rhetoric not as a tool to access a 
convert’s consciousness, but as a mechanism for self-transformation, which underlines 
their functionalist approach to language. In such light, biographical reconstruction is not a 
“characteristic” of a convert (Snow & Machalek 1983, 1984); rather, it becomes a 
“method” for self-transformation (Staples & Mauss, 1987, p. 138).  
Analyzing conversion stories of Evangelical Christians in the U.S., Stromberg 
(1993) further advances the idea of language as self-transformation in the context of 
religious conversion. While his research is based on American born-again Christians, I 
argue that its major premise—that religious discourse (via conversion narrative) allows 
for a reconciliation of one’s conflicting desires (by linking them to a largely-shared belief 
system) and thus enables self-transformation (p.29)—is transferrable to the case of 
practicing Muslim Tatar women today and their piety stories. Drawing on the speech act 
theory, Stromberg (1993) emphasizes the constitutive function of language, which allows 
the speaker to do things with words because it not only reflects an appropriate meaning 
and context, but also creates them in the act of speech. Based on this understanding of 
language, Stromberg (1993) proposes to think of identity as “ways of doing things,” 
which underlines its interactional nature (p.27). Further, drawing on Rappaport’s (1977) 
notion of ritual, Stromberg (1993) places the performance of conversion narrative in the 
realm of ritual because, functionally, such narrative aims to connect personal experience 
with the divine (canonical language) (p. 11). It is the speaker’s ability to appropriate the 
canonical language for metaphorical purposes—to think of his or her personal experience 
in canonical terms—that ultimately enables the speaker to re-live the transformative 
conversion experience again and again (in the act of speaking) and which, in turn, 
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contributes to the experience of self-transformation. From this perspective then, 
conversion, is not limited to a singular identifiable occurrence (even if the speaker 
portrays it as such), but is an ongoing process.  
While at the heart of Stromberg’s (1993) theory of conversion narrative is the 
canonical language of Evangelical Christianity, his analysis can be extended to other 
religious contexts, including Islam. This is, in great part, due to Stromberg’s analytical 
definition of canonical language as language that draws “upon the mystical, the infinite, 
upon that, which has significance beyond the everyday” (p. 62). As such, canonical 
language is not tied to Evangelical Christianity in any particular analytical way. In my 
analysis of the piety stories, I draw on Stromberg’s research with a few changes that 
account for a different religious and socio-historical context. As Mahmood (2006) 
suggests, Muslim piety is grounded in physical (bodily) manifestations that are 
incumbent on every able Muslim (albeit, with varied degrees of urgency, depending on a 
particular act and context). Among the daily acts of piety, for example, are the five daily 
prayers, observance of modest clothing96 and dietary97 requirements. Therefore, it is not 
only the speaker’s ability to relay her experiences in the canonical language of Islam that 
constitutes the performative act of religious commitment and self-transformation 
(although canonical language is also important). It is the woman’s familiarity with the 
basic acts of Muslim piety and her ability to show her connection to them on a personal 
level, via narrative, that signifies her commitment to Islam. This is why, following 
Sabirova (2006) and Garaev (2008), I argue that the physical experiences of taking on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In simplified terms, modest clothing for men at a minimum presupposes coverage of the body from waste down, and 
for women – the entire body except for the face, hands, and, in accordance with some schools Muslim religious 
thought, feet.   
97 In simplified terms, no pork or alcohol is allowed. Cattle and poultry must be slaughtered in accordance with a 
certain ritual for the meat to be considered “halal,” or appropriate for consumption in accordance with the Muslim 
normative law.  
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performance of the five daily prayers and donning of the headscarf98 often become key 
narrative turning points in Muslim piety stories. These physical acts illustrate the 
woman’s spiritual commitment to Islam and, in a narrative, mark the “before” and “after” 
life experiences,99 as my analysis will shortly demonstrate. I further argue that a Muslim 
Tatar woman’s ability to speak about her religious commitment in a piety story goes 
beyond contributing to her own self-transformation: it provides other practicing women 
with shared meanings and experiences to draw from, and invites non-practicing women 
to step onto the road to Muslim piety, thereby effecting a social transformation.     
Conversion narratives can be conceptualized as one type of a biographical 
narrative, or a life story. I particularly draw on Linde’s (1993) notion of life story because 
of its emphasis on the relationship between narrative and belief systems that are not 
simply expressed in the narrative, but also constitute it. Linde (1993) defines life story as 
a unified discourse unit “that moves from the level of the individual construction of 
sentences, through the form of narratives and the social negotiation of narratives, up to 
the social level of belief systems and their history, and finally to their effect on the 
construction of narratives” (p. 3). According to Linde, life stories (a) express our sense of 
self by telling others about what kind of person we are and how we got to be that person, 
(b) they are a mechanism by which we express to, and negotiate with, others our sense of 
self, (c) they help us assert and negotiate group membership by way of sharing and 
following the group’s norms, and, finally, (d) they draw on systems of knowledge and 
belief to create coherence (pp. 3-4). In this chapter, I analyze three different spontaneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The formative experience of donning of the headscarf is reflected in special discourse associated with it. In Russian, 
a commonly used phrase referring to a woman’s decision to begin wearing a headscarf is “odet’ platok” [‘одеть 
платок']. While stylistically incorrect (the verb “odet’” is a transitive verb, similar to the English verb “to dress” 
someone or something, and thus requires an object; a more correct way would be to say “nadet’ platok” [‘надеть 
платок']), the phrase is commonly used to refer to the headscarf experience.	  	  	  
99 Hovi (2004) and Speelman (2006) also point out to a typical for a conversion narrative “before” and “after” division.  
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instances in which piety stories took place and one solicited story, all of which point to 
the importance of piety stories as a culturally meaningful form of communication that 
serves the four key functions outlined above.  
 
Identity Construction, Membership Negotiation, and Community Building  
The first data segment presented below is an example of how a woman’s piety 
story is used to construct identity, negotiate membership, and build a community. As a 
Muslim Tatar woman named Aygul spontaneously begins narrating her path to Muslim 
piety, she reveals her religious commitment—and thus religious identity—by relating her 
personal experience to the kinds of acts (such as the five daily prayers) that, according to 
her, make one a Muslim and by describing her understanding of the notion of faith. By 
doing so, she implicitly and explicitly communicates her system of beliefs and thus takes 
a certain stance, which defines her identity. Other interlocutors’ reaction to her stance—
in the form of agreement, questioning, or clarification—reveals their identities and 
constitutes the acts of membership negotiation and community building, if her stance is 
shared by the other members of the immediate discursive (Muslim) community.  
The excerpt is based on my recording of a spontaneous informal conversation that 
took place during an Iftar [Tat.], a fast-breaking dinner during the Muslim holy month of 
Ramadan. I was invited to the dinner by a young (early twenties) practicing Tatar Muslim 
woman Rufina, whom I had met only a few days earlier. Hosting an Iftar and inviting 
people to an Iftar—particularly fasting Muslims—is considered an act of savab [Tat.], an 
act of Muslim piety to be rewarded by God. Originally from a neighboring republic 
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within Russia,100 Rufina was a full-time student at one of Kazan’s many higher 
educational institutions. She rented a modest apartment in a remote, working-class 
neighborhood of Kazan and worked full-time while going to school, which indicated her 
family’s modest status and/or her desire to be financially independent of her parents 
despite her own limited means. Hosting an Iftar involves expenses and work to prepare 
food, and the fact that Rufina was doing it despite her modest means indicated her high 
degree of piety.  
When I arrived at Rufina’s apartment on a warm August evening, there were 
about eight other young women in the room, and all (myself included) but one were 
dressed in accordance with what is believed to be the prescribed Muslim dress code for 
women. All of the women wore clothes that covered their bodies completely, leaving the 
hands and feet seen. The women wore headscarves that were carefully tied, so that no 
hair or neck was showing. The clothes varied in style (some were more loose than others) 
and color. But the clothes indicated that the women carefully dressed in a way that 
suggested a commitment to Muslim piety that went beyond occasional observances of 
life-changing events, common among secular Tatars.  
After short introductions and small talk—most women had just met one another 
for the first time at the Iftar—women started asking one another about their paths to 
piety. I realized the importance of the interaction and turned my recorder on, with 
permission, a few minutes into the conversation when Aygul, a young Tatar woman, was 
sharing her personal experience on the road to piety. As Aygul was telling her story, I 
interjected a few questions along the way, as did Chulpan. Chulpan was the only woman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The Russia Federation consists of 83 federal subjects, 21 of which are at the level of a republic, a nominally 
autonomous political unit with its own parliament and head (president). For more information on the history of Russia’s 
political subdivisions, see chapter 2 on Tatars’ historical background.	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in the room whose dress did not match patterns common among pious women in Kazan. 
Her headscarf was tied in the back, displaying her bangs and neck. The way Chulpan tied 
her headscarf indicated that she did not wear it on a regular basis and simply put it on 
temporarily for this special religious occasion, a common practice among non-observant 
Muslim Tatar women. Two more things made Chulpan stand out from the rest of the 
group: she wore a pair of pants with no tunic covering her lower body (a preferred way to 
wear pants for a practicing Muslim woman), and she was older (in her mid-thirties) than 
the rest of the group. As Aygul was wrapping up one part of her story, Chulpan suddenly 
asked me what I was recording it for.  
Aygul’s story, Chulpan’s question, and a conversation that followed provide a 
glimpse into how a piety story—and discussion about piety—serve as culturally specific 
communicative means for identity, and group membership, negotiation.  They also 
provide a glimpse into Aygul’s personal transformation as she stepped on the road to 
piety and her indirect encouragement for Chulpan to dispel doubts about Chulpan’s own 
Muslim identity (and thus Chulpan’s affiliation with the immediate group and the 
Ummah) even though Chulpan was a non-practicing Muslim. The conversation took 
place in Russian, unless otherwise stated in the transcript. The interaction participants are 
marked by their first name’s initials.101   
Iftar dinner at Rufina’s apartment - Data segment # 1:      
A: 
 
L: 
A: 
 
L: 
A: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
5. 
6. 
So, when I just started reciting namaz [Tat. ‘formal Muslim prayer’], I…well for a 
while= 
=Do you recite all five namaz? 
Yes. I used to recite only the afternoon one. So, I began reciting only the  
    [ 
    Really? 
afternoon [namaz]; recited it for about a month, right, and my friend would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 My turns are marked by “L” for “Liliya.” 
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Ch: 
A: 
Ch: 
A: 
 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
 
Ch: 
A: 
L: 
 
Ch: 
L: 
Ch: 
 
A: 
Ch: 
A: 
Ch: 
A: 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Ch: 
L: 
Ch: 
 
 
 
7. 
8. 
 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
 
23. 
24. 
25. 
 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
 
always tell me: “You,” he says, “how many namaz do you recite?” I say: “One.” 
[He says]: “Why? When,” he says, “will you start reciting all five?” ((with a 
smile)) 
And your friend, was he a Muslim? 
Yes. He is the one who taught me everything.102  
Аah. 
And I say: “Well- soon,” I say. “Well,” I say, “when I feel,” I say, “that it's time 
for me to recite, I will begin reciting all five [namaz].” A:::nd, so, once I saw a 
dream that I am reciting namaz, and they say: It's not,” they say, “enough. You,” 
they say, “need to recite more” ((laughing)).  
Really? Namaz, right? 
Yes. And after that, I began reciting all five namaz, immediately, the next day, 
as soon as I woke up ((laughter)), I started reciting all five namaz  
because= 
=And where are you (pl.)103 recording this? 
On your phone? 
Well, I am writing a dissertation about Muslim women…a:::nd 
              [ 
             Аah…well, I am not a Muslim 
You are not a Muslim? 
I am Muslim…sort of  
    [ 
    No, every person is a Muslim. 
Basically, I, I believe that He exists, I:::= 
=Well, but sezge isem birdeler [Tat. 'You were given a name'],104 after all? 
Yes. 
You are already a Muslim, you see? So, in their mother's womb, every, sort of, 
person, even Russian, who- who- any ethnicity – he105 is already a Muslim. So, 
when he is born, right, he is any-, so whatever faith his parents give him, that's 
what he becomes. But, all of them, originally, are all Muslims. Because, Muslim, 
how is it translated? A “servant of God”…So, Muslim translates as “a servant of 
God,” and so that's why all, as a matter of fact, all are Muslim. It's just when they 
are born, their parents give them a different faith.   
Well, I have such, such, since I am not dressed=  
=Are you a Tatar, Chulpan? 
Yes. Since I am not dressed like you all. But I sort of believe in my own way in 
my soul that He exists, right, but I am thinking that I am probably some deficient 
Muslim   
               [ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 In the course of the conversation, it became clear that by “everything” Aygul here refers to her current state of 
knowledge about Islam.  
103 “You” here indicates a plural, formal form of “you” [“Vy”] in Russian. Such form is used among strangers and as a 
gesture of respect.  
104 Aygul refers here to the Muslim ritual of name-giving, which loosely can be compared to the ritual of baptizing in 
Christianity, and is seen by some as making one officially a Muslim.	  	  	  
105 The use of masculine by Aygul here does not mean her favoring of one gender over the other. Rather, she uses 
masculine pronouns because the Russian word for “the human being” [chelovek] is masculine and calls for masculine 
pronouns when referring to it.  
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A:    
 
 
 
Ch: 
A: 
 
 
 
Ch: 
A: 
 
Ch: 
 
A: 
 
Ch: 
 
A:   
Ch: 
A: 
 
D: 
A:  
 
42. 
43. 
44. 
 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
 
52. 
53. 
54. 
 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
 
60. 
61. 
 
               No::::, this, the most important is to 
have faith in your heart. But the fact that, sort of, you (pl.) don't wear, say, the 
headscarf, you (pl.) don't recite namaz, means that you (pl.) don't observe- Em,  
   [ 
   This I can't. 
namaz is one of the five pillars of Islam. And you (pl.) simply don't observe it. 
And, sort of, it is, of course, a sin to some extent, right, but you (pl.) don't cease 
to become a Muslim because of it. Even those people, who drink, smoke, well, 
do bad things, they are still Muslims. 
Is that so?          
They simply commit a big sin. 
                [ 
                 Well, I just heard that a Tatar doesn't mean a Muslim. Muslims are 
only those who accepted Islam=  
=Well- yes, a Tatar does not mean a Muslim.  
   [ 
   I understood that it’s you, you accepted Islam – you are 
Muslims, but I am just some “Tatar from a tramway depo.”106 
No::::! ((laughter)). No::::, a Tatar – yes, there are also Baptized Tatars= 
=Well, that's actually true ((in a quiet voice))= 
Yes. But if you (pl.), if you (pl.) in your (pl.) heart- 
  [ 
  And there are also Russian Muslims. 
Yes. 
 Aygul, a recent graduate of a prestigious university and a holder of a secure job, 
was one of the more active participants of the evening and enthusiastically shared her 
path to Muslim piety with the rest of the group (in lines 1-19). Aygul’s decision to talk 
about how she started praying—from once a day to five times a day—was not 
coincidental. Throughout my multiple conversations with, and observations among, 
practicing Muslim women, I noticed that one’s commitment to the five daily prayers 
indicated a degree of Muslim piety and was often considered an important stepping stone 
on the road to Muslim piety, usually followed by donning the headscarf. From that 
standpoint, my own question (line 3) to clarify how many times Aygul prayed was an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Chulpan here actually uses the Russian derogatory idiom “tatarka s tram. Parka” [Ru. ‘татарка с трам. парка’],  
which literally translates as “a Tatar from a tramway depot” and conveys a derogatory reference to a Tatar as dumb and 
uneducated.   
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indirect attempt to identify her degree of piety, and thus some aspects of her religious 
identity. Throughout my fieldwork, I was asked the question about my prayer routine (in 
one form or another) multiple times and heard it posed many times, especially in 
introductory types of situations. As is evident from lines 7 and 8, Aygul’s friend who 
introduced her to the basics of Muslim piety often asked her how many times she prayed. 
As I suggested earlier following Mahmood (2005), because Muslim piety is grounded in 
physical rituals, one’s commitment to daily Muslim rituals, especially the five daily 
prayers that are considered one of the five pillars of Islam, serve as indicators of one’s 
piety and religious identity. That is why many piety stories, as in Aygul’s case, and 
discussions that follow often focus on physical manifestation of Muslim piety. 
 Aygul’s story is suddenly interrupted by Chulpan who asked me where I was 
recording the conversation (line 20). The way Chulpan phrased her question made it 
unclear whether she meant a recording device (understood so by Aygul, which is evident 
in her response “On your phone?” (line 21)) or the purpose of my recording of the 
conversation. Before I began recording the conversation, I had explained the purpose of 
the recording, so Chulpan’s question was most likely about the device. However, my 
(mis)interpretation of it and my desire to clarify what I was doing led to an interesting 
discussion. When I reiterated that I was writing a dissertation about Muslim women (line 
22), Chulpan jumped in to say that she was not a Muslim (line 23). The interaction that 
followed provides a glimpse into how Chulpan’s identity—and thus her sense of 
belonging (or not) to the rest of the group—is negotiated.  
Having first asserted that she was not a Muslim (line 23), Chulpan clarifies what 
she meant by that, and thus her stance on religion and, ultimately, her own identity. It 
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would be socially awkward and inappropriate for a Tatar to voluntarily and publicly 
declare that he or she is not a Muslim and to do so among other Tatars at a Muslim 
religious gathering, such as an Iftar. Despite a growing trend among young practicing 
Muslim Tatars to differentiate between ethnic and religious aspects of their identity 
(being a Tatar no longer automatically qualifies one as a Muslim), a centuries-long bond 
between Tatars’ ethnicity and Muslim religion remains recognized by the majority of 
Tatars. Therefore, a Tatar’s assertion that he or she is not a Muslim would first and 
foremost be interpreted as one’s conversion to another religion or one’s ultimate absence 
of faith, and either assumption would put a person in an awkward social standing in the 
context of an Iftar. Neither of these being the case, Chulpan rushed to state that she is 
indeed a Muslim. What made Chulpan originally deny her religious identity (and even 
express her own inferior status because of it, as evident in line 56) was the quality of her 
Muslimness—the fact that she was the only non-practicing Tatar in the presence of the 
pious Muslim Tatar women, whom she considered “real” Muslims (lines 55-56). 
Chulpan proceeds to clarify that she is “sort of” a Muslim (line 25), and that she 
believes “that He exists” (line 27). In lines 39-41 Chulpan explains why she identified 
herself as “not” a Muslim or “sort of” a Muslim: “Since I am not dressed like you 
all…am thinking that I am probably some deficient Muslim,” implying that she was not a 
practicing Muslim. But a key to Chulpan’s complicated identity negotiation dance lies in 
lines 52-53 and 55-56 when she voices a newly emerging sentiment, especially popular 
among younger (in their late teens through late twenties) pious Muslim Tatars, that “a 
Tatar doesn’t mean a Muslim” and “Muslims are those who accepted Islam” (lines 52-
53). Chulpan’s discourse here is an example of double-voicing (Bakhtin, 1981) when she 
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articulates what other women’s perception of her might be. Double-voicing implies the 
presence of two “voices” within an utterance, specifically when “words are spoken as if 
they are to be understood as being in quotation marks” (Bailey, 2007, p. 268). Chulpan’s 
discourse indicates that, as an older, non-practicing Tatar, she is likely aware of the 
newly emerging sentiment that differentiates ethnic and religious components of the 
Tatar identity, an issue I will address at length in Chapter 8. It further points to a growing 
role of religion in both the Tatar society and to Tatars’ competing notions of their 
identity.  
Chulpan’s identity negotiation is successfully resolved with the help of Aygul 
who does not deny the newly popular sentiment (line 54), but provides an explanation of 
what it is to be a Muslim in the first place (lines 28; 30-36; 42-44; 46-49) and why 
Chulpan is a indeed a Muslim. Aygul uses three different arguments to “prove” that 
Chulpan is a Muslim. On the one hand, she asserts that every person is born a Muslim—
“a servant of God”—and unless one’s religion has been changed later on, he or she 
remains a Muslim (lines 30-36). On the other hand, by double-checking in Tatar if 
Chulpan underwent “isem kushu,” a Muslim name-giving ceremony performed shortly 
after one’s birth (line 28), Aygul implies that the presence or absence of the ritual 
qualifies one as a Muslim or not. Finally, in lines 42-43, Aygul asserts that “the most 
important is to have faith in your heart,” after Chulpan admits that she believes (lines 27, 
39). All three sentiments are popular among non-practicing Tatars today who use them as 
“proof” of their Muslim identity.  
It is Aygul, a practicing Muslim Tatar, who draws on these sentiments to help 
Chulpan align herself with the rest of the group and forge Chulpan’s sense of belonging 
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to it. Chulpan herself voices a sentiment common among practicing Tatars that being a 
Tatar no longer means being a Muslim. I argue that such role reversal, when both a 
practicing and a non-practicing Muslim Tatar woman draw on and thus acknowledge the 
other side’s sentiments, is a successful communicative strategy for identity and group 
membership negotiation. To be sure, Aygul does not merely acknowledge Chulpan’s 
Muslimness, thus giving her “a free pass.” Aygul explains that the fact that Chulpan does 
not wear the headscarf and does not recite namaz, the five daily prayers, makes her a non-
observant Muslim, perhaps even a sinner, but still a Muslim (lines 43-44; 46-49). By 
doing so, Aygul helps foster a sense of belonging that would allow Chulpan to feel part 
of the immediate group of women, and by extension—the larger Muslim community, the 
ummah. Moreover during my fieldwork many Muslim women described a sense of 
belonging to a Muslim community as empowering in the context of post-Soviet search 
for identities. Based on that, I further argue that Aygul’s attempts to make Chulpan feel 
part of the group could be interpreted as a welcoming gesture to Muslim piety, especially 
because as a Muslim, even though non-practicing, Chulpan is already half-way there.    
Chulpan’s identity narrative differs from a typical piety story in the following 
way: she first denies being a Muslim, then admits to “sort of” being one, then explains 
why she had originally denied her Muslim identity. The fact that by the end of the 
interaction Chulpan comes to accept Aygul’s arguments as to why she, Chulpan, is a 
indeed Muslim (line 58) points to a successful resolution of her identity negotiation 
process, which made her—even if only at a discursive, emotional, and symbolic level—
part of the group. Once the conversation was over, the question of Chulpan’s piety was 
never brought up for discussion again. As other women proceeded to a different topic, 
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Chulpan admitted to Aygul that it would be difficult for her to start observing the daily 
prayers. In response, Aygul gave Chulpan a booklet she had compiled about the five daily 
prayers and other introductory material for a beginning practicing Muslim. Aygul 
encouraged Chulpan to begin reciting one prayer a day, just like Aygul had done at the 
beginning of her road to piety. “I myself had difficulties at the beginning…when I came 
to Islam,” said Aygul explaining that her own struggle at the beginning of her road to 
piety prompted her to put the booklet together to help others. While Aygul was the only 
woman I met who herself compiled a booklet on the basics of Muslim ritual practices, it 
was not uncommon among practicing Muslim women to share information about the 
basic tenets and practices of Islam with non-practicing Muslim Tatars. As I will illustrate 
in chapter 6, such social practice can be considered an act of dagvat [Tat./Ru. ‘call to 
Islam’], an invitation to Islam. In the context of the Iftar dinner, Aygul’s sharing the 
booklet with Chulpan could be interpreted as her invitation for Chulpan to step onto the 
road to piety.  
Aygul’s piety story followed by Chulpan’s identity narrative are examples of how 
piety stories and discourses generated by them can function as communicative means of 
identity expression, group membership negotiation, and community building, particularly 
when women meet each other for the first time. As described by Linde (1993), narratives 
serve as “important social resources for creating and maintaining personal identity (p. 
98). Piety stories, however, are not limited to introductory types of situations and may 
occur (a) spontaneously, (b) in a familiar setting, or (c) without explicit solicitation from 
others, albeit almost always within religious contexts. Ultimately, the interaction around 
Chulpan’s identity points to a spectrum of Muslim piety observed among Tatars, and also 
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to the fact that Tatars are aware of such a continuum and of discourses associated with 
various points along the spectrum.  
 
Piety Story as a Source of Personal and Social Transformation 
In addition to allowing women to express their identities and negotiate group 
membership, piety stories can serve as a source for transformation of not only the speaker 
herself, but also the audience, ultimately resulting in a social change. In the act of 
narrating a story about her path to Muslim piety, the storyteller connects the sacred 
religious knowledge and canonical language to her personal experience, thereby 
reconstructing and reliving the transformative experience of stepping onto the path to 
Muslim piety. Because the narrative act is also an act of sharing, the deeply personal 
experience that the storyteller chooses to share becomes public, communal knowledge, 
available to the audience. In the case of piety stories that are shared in religious contexts, 
this knowledge encourages other women to step onto a similar path and shows them the 
road head. Therefore, piety stories serve as a source of inspiration and agency and a 
model for transformation that go beyond the narrator.  
The next data segment illustrates a piety story’s potential to move the audience to 
step onto and stay on the path to Muslim piety by way of personal example. The data 
segment was recorded at the “Woman in Islam” class at the Mukhammadiia medrese 
(Tatarstan’s major Islamic higher educational institution located in its capital Kazan) 
where I audited the class for one semester in the fall of 2009. “The Woman in Islam” 
class is one semester long, is taught to sophomore female students, and focuses on a 
proper role of a Muslim woman in and outside the home. A medrese teacher shared this 
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piety story with her sophomore female students, all practicing Muslims, during a regular 
class break. The teacher, a medrese graduate herself and an observant Muslim Tatar in 
her mid-twenties, rarely left the classroom during breaks and often chatted informally 
with her students, most of whom were in their late teens-early twenties.  
This particular data segment is interesting not only because the teacher volunteers 
to spontaneously share her piety story with her students, whom she knows fairly well 
from previous classes, but also because of the response the story receives from one 
student, Olima (O). Olima, of Central Asian origin (not an ethnic Tatar), was born into a 
family of an imam and lived in Kazan with her family most of her life. I argue that the 
teacher (T) decides to share her story to bond with her students who are of a younger 
generation. Many of them, like Olima, were born into observing Muslim families and 
never had to find their own paths to piety like the teacher and her generation did, having 
been born into non-observant families during the Soviet period. I further suggest that, by 
way of her own example, the teacher uses the moment as a teaching opportunity to 
encourage her students to persevere in their iman [Tat./Ar. ‘faith’] and to stay on the path 
of Muslim piety in spite of difficulties that they may encounter. By doing so, she not only 
narrates a story of her personal transformation, but also encourages it in her students.  
Whereas the teacher is sharing her personal piety experience during a class break, 
she nonetheless remains an authority figure in the classroom and maintains her authority 
status by underlining the generational difference between herself and her students at the 
beginning of the narrative. Most of the courses for full-time (day-time) students at the 
medrese, including “The Woman in Islam” class are lecture-centered, where the teacher 
takes “center stage” and relays information to her students predominantly in a uni-
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directional fashion. This is particularly true for freshmen and sophomore students (those 
at the beginning stages of their religious education), whose participation in a lecture class 
is limited to occasional comments or questions. Teachers, most of whom are at least ten 
years older than their teenage students, remain figures of authority outside lecture halls, 
which is evident in the formal way students address107 and interact with their teachers. It 
is important to note that this kind of formality between teachers and students is not 
unique to a Muslim formal educational setting, such as a medrese, but is characteristic of 
both traditional secondary schools and higher educational institutions in Russia. Such 
formality both contributes to and reflects the sense of authority that teachers enjoy. 
An important feature of the teacher’s narrative is the coherence with which her 
story is constructed, which contributes to achieving authority. Linde (1993) suggests that 
if the narrator wants to communicate herself as a culturally proper person, she has to 
achieve coherence in her narrative. Coherence is both “a social obligation that must be 
fulfilled in order for the participants to appear as competent members of their culture” 
and “a personal demand…to understand our life as coherent, as making sense, as the 
history of a proper person” (Linde, pp. 16-17). Whereas Linde’s notion of a successful—
coherent—narrative is culturally predicated, I argue that it is relevant in this particular 
case. As a figure of authority and a role model, the teacher is obligated to create a 
coherent story about her path to Muslim piety as a testimony of her commitment to Islam, 
which would then position her as a proper, competent member of the local Tatar Muslim 
community. According to Linde (1993, p. 100) such coherence in a life story must be 
achieved in relation to three major characteristics of the self: continuity of the self 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 A typical way students at the medrese address their teachers is by using the teacher’s first name, followed by an 
Arabic, gender-specific word for “teacher.” For example, a male teacher would be addressed as “Ravil ustaz [Ar. ‘male 
teacher’].” 
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(particularly through time); relation of the self to others; and reflexivity of the self 
(particularly moral evaluation of the self). My analysis illustrates that all three coherence-
related characteristics of the self are present throughout the teacher’s story below, which 
contributes to her commitment to Islam, her authority status, and make her appeal to stay 
on the path to Muslim piety more powerful. 
Informal conversation during a medrese class break - data segment # 2: 
T: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O: 
T: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
 
21. 
As a matter of fact, recollecting how we were accepting Islam, I remember in our 
courtyard, well the town where I was born, [there were] very few Muslims. Well, 
one can say there were almost no [women] there in headscarves. I remember 
when I began wearing the headscarf, all neighbors, everybody is staring at you. 
Old ladies are sitting on the benches, and their head[s] goes like “zing” ((turns 
her head, laughs)). [They say] something like: “Look, a nun108 is passing by,” 
this and that…Then after about a year has gone by….well, patience, of course. 
Whenever such moments take place, [you] think, sort of, you recall ahadith [Ar.  
         [ 
         Uhum 
‘accounts of exemplary sayings/deeds of the Prophet Muhammad’] that [say] if  
all the people gather to cause someone harm, they will not be able to cause harm, 
right, unless it’s Allah’s will…And so…I remember in a year, [it is] a same usual 
day, [you] pass, as always, doorways, and so [you] cross the street, and farther the 
same old ladies are sitting ((with a smile)), and completely, a year passed by, 
[they] talk differently: “Oh, good for you” and “she doesn’t drink or smoke”  
and such. And you think: “Masha’Allah [Ar. ‘God has willed it’],109 these are the 
same people, and how little time has gone by.” And many do so, and relatives 
perceive [you] similarly usually. At first they also say: “Mujahideen [Ar. ‘who 
struggle for God’].”110 Or something like “Shakhidka” [Ru. ‘suicide bomber’]111 
and all that and then, later: “Masha’Allah!” “Good for you!” yes, that’s the way it  
            [ 
            “Good for you” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108  Meaning a “spinster nun.” 
109  The Arabic phrase is used to express praise to Allah and appreciation for an event or person.  
110  While the teacher here uses the plural form of the original Arabic word “Mujahid,” which translates as “the one 
who struggles on the path to Allah,” the present-day Russian calque of the Arabic word is most likely associated with 
Soviet military campaign against the Afghan opposition fighters in the late 1970s. Thus, the present-day Russian calque 
has a negative, derogatory connotation and refers to a Muslim militant, terrorist, or someone who is believed to have 
radical Muslim views, which is the meaning that the teacher is trying to invoke.  
111  The teacher here refers to the derogatory meaning that the Arabic word “shaheed” acquired in present-day Russian. 
The original Arabic word refers to honor a Muslim who died defending their faith, country, or family. The meaning is 
not limited to acts of fighting in the military sense, as a woman who dies during childbirth, for example, can also be 
referred to as “shaheed.” The Russian version of the word (“shakhidka”), however, usually refers to Muslim female 
suicide bombers or women who are believed to hold radical Muslim views, which is the meaning that the teacher is 
trying to invoke.  	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T: 
 
O: 
 
T: 
O: 
T: 
S: 
T: 
O: 
 
T: 
 
O: 
T: 
O: 
 
 
T: 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
 
32. 
 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
 
37. 
was. Well, I think it happens practically for everybody this way ((smiling 
voice)). Well, ok, Olima has grown up in a family, right, where, right= 
=It's really interesting for me to be listening to all this; [I] would have liked to 
go through this ((laughing)) 
No, it’s not worth it. ((laughing)) 
Not worth it, then? ((laughing)) 
No, not ((laughing))= 
=What’s….not worth it? 
She says: ”I would like to go through this, too” 
It’s just a precious feeling probably. 
                         [ 
                         Well, the feeling, of course, is yes, the headscarf is appreciated,  
       [ 
                                                   is appreciated afterwards… 
and, of course, [you] look differently at everything= 
=I have heard all kinds of stories, at the Nurulla mosque during every single trip 
there. A girl was telling a story, and I was in shock ( ), remember, in total shock.  
                                                                                       [ 
                                                                                       Yes, yes.  
 
The teacher begins her piety story by recalling how she started on her road to 
Muslim piety. She uses the phrase “prinimat’ islam” [Ru. ‘to be accepting Islam’] to 
mark off the beginning of her spiritual journey. The use of the progressive verb (line 1) 
and a later reference to how things were within a year (line 7) emphasizes a process and a 
sense of continuity through time. I further suggest that by using the plural first person 
noun “we” in “how we were accepting Islam,” the teacher speaks on behalf of her 
generation of Muslim women, marking the difference between herself and her students 
who, on average, are ten years her junior, and thus positioning herself in relation to her 
students in a certain way.  
During the time frame the teacher is referring to (the 2000s), the post-Soviet 
Muslim revival was still closely tied to the ethnic revival, and practicing Muslims (as 
opposed to non-practicing, symbolic Muslims) were a tiny minority even within 
historically Muslim ethnic groups such as Tatars. Moreover, the Muslim revival at the 
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time was limited to Russia’s ethnic, historically Muslim regions, such as Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan. An ethnic Tatar herself, the teacher was born and lived outside Tatarstan 
in a Russian region before she came to Kazan to study at the medrese. Therefore, the 
teacher could also be speaking on behalf of those practicing Muslim women who, at the 
time, happened to live outside central Russia’s historically Muslim regions such as 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in a less diverse environment.  
The teacher’s description of her neighbors’ reaction reflects her struggle on the 
way to piety, symbolized by the act of donning the headscarf and events surrounding the 
act. Whereas observing the five daily prayers is also considered an important step on the 
way to Muslim piety, it is the donning of the headscarf, an act that is unequivocally 
public, that is considered by practicing Muslims a real litmus test of her iman [Tat./Ar. 
‘faith’]. In line 3, for example, the teacher uses the fact that “there were almost no 
[women] there in headscarves” to support her earlier statement in line 2 that “in the town 
where I was born, [there were] very few Muslims.” Her narrative continuous with the 
description of neighbors’ (as well as “others’” and relatives’) negative reaction to her 
donning of the headscarf (lines 4-7), animated by the teacher in a direct speech (lines 6; 
18-19). Derogatory Russian terms like “monashka,”112 “mudjahideen,” or  “shakhidka” 
came up over and over in my interviews with practicing Muslim women as some of the 
names Muslim women were often called because of their Islamic dress. These terms 
reflect an average person’s (specifically, a secular ethnic Russian’s or a secular ethnic 
Tatar’s) initial stereotypical perception of a practicing Muslim woman in Russia. The 
teacher’s description of her neighbors’, relatives’ and other people’s reaction to her piety 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 The Russian word “monashka” [‘nun’] has a negative connotation in present-day Russia. It refers not only to a 
woman’s secluded life-style but also to her inability to adjust to the worldly life (to marry, have children, etc.), which 
further implies some deficiency in the woman’s character. A more neutral term for a “nun” in Russia is “monakhinia.” 
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further demonstrates her ability to relate her self to others, an important mechanism for 
achieving coherence. 
In line 7, the teacher takes a pause to reflect on her experience and uses the 
moment to share with the students her way of dealing with the difficulties on her road to 
piety (lines 8-12). Linde (1993) suggests that reflexivity—the narrator’s ability to treat 
herself as an other, which is most often done through “the determination of the moral 
value of the self” (p. 105), is crucial for achieving narrative coherence. The teacher not 
only emphasizes the importance of patience (line 7), but also refers for guidance to a 
specific source of Muslim religious authority—ahadith [Ar. ‘accounts of exemplary 
sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad’]. These accounts, put together in 
collections in accordance with certain denominations within Islam, are considered by 
Muslims second only to the Qur’an itself in their importance and thus are carefully 
studied. The teacher’s reflexivity here is acknowledged by Olima, who, even if she hasn’t 
gone through the exact same experience herself, can at least relate to it on a moral level. 
The teacher’s ability to maintain continuity of the self throughout her narrative is 
evident in her continuous references to time. Having shared her initial struggles and 
reflected on the experience, the teacher then proceeds to account for a change that she 
had noticed in others’ perception of her within a year’s time (lines 7; 12; 14). As I have 
noted above, the “before and after” pattern is common for conversion narratives when a 
convert relays her experiences before and after the conversion. Here, the teacher herself 
comments on the difference: “completely, a year passed by, [they] talk differently” (lines 
14-15), and the “before and after” pattern is further evident in the teacher’s articulation of 
her neighbors’ comments that changed from chauvinistic terms to approval, such as 
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“good for you”; “[she] doesn’t drink or smoke” (lines 14-15); and “Masha’Allah” [Ar. 
‘God has willed it’] (line 20). Here, again, Olima relates to the teacher’s story by 
repeating other’s positive comments (line 21). 
The teacher signals the end of her piety story by a concluding statement “that’s 
the way it was” (lines 20, 22). She then proceeds to once again reflect on her experience 
by saying: “Well, I think it happens practically for everybody this way” (line 22). This 
statement is particularly important because it conveys the teacher's acknowledgement of 
other practicing Muslims’ experience. By pointing out in line 23 that Olima’s situation is 
somewhat exceptional because Olima was born into and grew up in a practicing Muslim 
family (“Well, ok, Olima has grown up in a family, right, where. . .”), the teacher 
indirectly qualifies that by “everybody” she means those women for whom Muslim piety 
was not a “given,” but a journey. According to the teacher then, her personal piety story 
is in a way a reflection of a collective religious experience of practicing Muslim women. 
Moreover, the fact that the teacher has the knowledge of other Muslims’ experiences of 
their road to piety indicates that these experiences do not simply exist: they are shared.  
Olima’s reaction to the teacher’s story is telling on many levels. While she is able 
to relate to the teacher’s experience (as evidenced in her supportive comments throughout 
the teacher’s narrative), Olima’s knowledge of the experience is more second-hand 
(mediated) than first-hand (intimately personal). For example, in response to the teacher’s 
qualification that Olima’s situation is an exception, Olima enthusiastically responds: “It's 
really interesting for me to be listening to all this; [I] would have liked to go through this” 
(lines 24-25), where “this” is a newly observant Muslim woman’s experience on the road 
to piety. Whereas the teacher jokingly says that “it’s not worth it” (lines 26; 28), Olima 
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explains what attracts her in these experiences—and stories based on them—“It’s a just a 
precious feeling probably…is appreciated afterwards” (lines 31; 33).  
This life-changing experience, summarized in the teacher’s words “and, of course, 
[you] look differently at everything” (line 34) and epitomized by her donning of the 
headscarf “the feeling, of course, is yes, the headscarf is appreciated” (line 32) is her 
personal-experience-based, yet not unfamiliar to Olima, which is what might make it 
seem so attractive. In lines 35-36 Olima reveals her further familiarity and fascination 
with piety stories and experiences they convey: “I have heard all kinds of stories, at the 
Nurulla mosque during every single trip there. A girl was telling a story, and I was in 
shock ( ), remember, in total shock.” Olima’s statement reveals that piety stories are 
common (“during every single trip”), diverse (“all kinds of stories”), that they take place 
in particular spaces and circumstances (“the Nurulla mosque”); they are shared (“a girl 
was telling a story”) and reacted to (“I was in shock ( ), remember, in total shock”). The 
teacher’s affirmative agreement with Olima’s statement (“Yes, yes” line 37) indicates 
that Olima’s familiarity with piety stories can be related to, and thus it is not uncommon. 
The teacher’s story analyzed above is another example of a piety story. Shared 
extemporaneously during a class break, the story served two main purposes, intentional 
or not: (a) it helped the teacher bond with her students by sharing her personal experience 
that the students could relate to on some level and (b) it created an informal teaching 
opportunity for the teacher to indirectly (by way of personal example) encourage her 
students to persevere in their faith and stay on the road to piety. I further argue that the 
story sharing experience was successful because the teacher was able to achieve 
coherence throughout her narrative, by creating a sense of a continuous self in time, by 
	   94 
clearly positioning herself in relation to others, and by reflecting on her experience. The 
fact that Olima, a student who might have been least inclined to relate to the teacher’s 
story (because Olima was raised a practicing Muslim) enthusiastically reacted to and 
engaged in the story-telling experience suggests that the teacher’s story was successfully 
shared and received.  
Linde (1993, pp. 101-102) emphasizes that the narrator is successful in telling a 
story if she can position herself in such a way that she is distinguishable from others 
(different and unique), and yet not to the point where others are not able to relate to her. 
Furthermore, Gilligan argues: “women must define themselves relationally, rather than 
individually or oppositionally” (as cited in Linde, 1993, p. 104). Olima’s reaction to the 
teacher’s story indicates that the teacher has succeeded in conveying her unique, yet 
recognizable, experience on the road to Muslim piety. The teacher’s successful, even if 
impromptu, narrative, as well as her knowledge of other pious women’s experiences, 
indicate the teacher’s familiarity with the ways piety stories are shared, their cultural 
significance and particularities.  
Olima’s final comment about her experience of regularly hearing piety stories, 
such as the one told by the teacher, at the Nurulla mosque suggests the importance of the 
communicative practice of sharing piety stories. It reveals that observant Muslim women 
talk about their road to piety on a regular basis, in spaces where they feel secure and 
comfortable, such as a mosque, a medrese, or a private home, and with audiences who 
would be able to relate to their experience, such as other practicing Muslim women or 
women showing some interest in Islam. Therefore, piety stories, while deeply personal in 
their detail and individual women’s circumstances, are a culturally accepted 
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communicative practice, made public within the Ummah, the Muslim community, in the 
moment of sharing.  
 
Role Reversal and Reciprocation in the Sharing of Piety Stories  
Olima’s final comment in the excerpt above is not the only example of metatalk 
about piety stories, talk in which a woman comments on the communicative practice 
itself. Throughout my fieldwork and in the process of sharing their stories with me, 
women often (even though frequently only in passing) commented on the practice of 
sharing piety stories, thereby acknowledging the culturally shared significance of it. 
Furthermore, as the next data segment illustrates, the experience of sharing piety stories 
often involves reciprocation, whereby the speaker shares her story with the audience and 
then either directly invites other audience members to share their stories or the audience 
members volunteer to do so, resulting in a role reversal of sorts. Such reciprocity allows 
for further identity and group membership negotiation, but also creates a sense of unity in 
the discursive community if the narrated experiences conform to the culturally shared 
values. 
The datum below is part of an informal conversation that took place between me 
and a group of mostly ethnic Tatar and a couple of ethnic Russian Muslim female 
students at the Russian Islamic University (RIU) in Kazan, following an informal 
presentation about American Muslims that I gave there as part of a research grant 
requirement.113 Having met some of the women and received questions about American 
life, I volunteered to tell the women my impressions about American Muslims and life in 
the U.S. As my presentation was drawing to an end, women from the audience started 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 I conducted dissertation research with support from the IREX-IARO 2009-2010 grant.  
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asking questions about my own life. They wanted to know how long I had lived in the 
U.S., if I had a family, where my spouse was from and whether he was a Muslim. Finally, 
one of the women in the audience asked: “Vy davno v islame? [Ru. ‘Have you been in 
Islam for a long time?’] and Kak davno Vy v islame? [Ru. ‘How long have you been in 
Islam?’]. These questions that were posed to me after my presentation, in their exact 
form, served as a culturally understood invitation to share one’s piety story with others. 
In the excerpt below, having answered the women’s questions, I solicit the audience’s 
comments on the social practice of sharing stories about one’s path to Islam that we – the 
audience and I – have just engaged in. Gulnara (marked by “G.”), an ethnic Tatar and a 
RIU student answers my (marked by “L.”) question, an audience member (marked by 
“A.”) agrees with her, and an ethnic Russian Muslim convert (marked by “S.”), also a 
RIU student, joins in the discussion toward the end. 
Informal conversation at the Russian Islamic University - data segment # 3: 
L: 
G: 
 
 
 
L: 
G: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
 
Is it common to share stories about one’s path to Islam? 
Well, we have, sort of, for how long, for four years, a tradition, always as soon 
as freshmen [arrive], we gather them all around a table, and everyone shares 
them 
[ 
Really? 
yes, who came how, and so I’ve just noticed for all those years, well, from the 
freshmen year, I’ve noticed that Allah subhana wa ta’ala114 [Ar. ‘God, May 
He be Glorified and Exalted’]; somehow himself maybe chooses, so that  
precisely, precisely these people, with some distinct characteristics, precisely 
for the first time entered school here, and then with every year [you] 
understand how people come to Islam and [you] become convinced that, well, 
Allah subhana wa ta’ala [Ar. ‘God, May He be Glorified and Exalted’], he 
himself, not due to some reasons—we sometimes look for a reason as to why 
this particular person came to Islam—Allah subhana wa ta’ala [‘God, May 
He be Glorified and Exalted’], I don’t know, due to some actions 
himself leads the person to Islam. 
         [ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This spelling reflects the way the phrase is often pronounced among Tatars. A normative way to pronounce the 
phrase is “Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala.”  
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A: 
G: 
L: 
 
A: 
 
G: 
 
 
 
 
R: 
 
 
S: 
 
 
 
A: 
S: 
 
 
 
 
A: 
S: 
17. 
18. 
19. 
 
20. 
 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
 
25. 
26. 
 
27. 
28. 
29. 
 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
         Yes, yes.  
Simply unexpectedly, somehow leads to Islam, and that’s it= 
I agree that it’s difficult to find one common denominator 
    [ 
    Yes, yes. 
 [1 turn omitted] 
Yes, Allah somehow distinguishes certain people with his grace, precisely 
because [he] leads [them] to [the] understanding, whereas sometimes [you] can 
keep explaining to some people, and it’s simply impossible if everything is 
shut off [inside them].   
        [ 
        Yes, Allah tägalädan115 [Tat. ‘from God, the Exalted’], until a time comes, 
any situations won’t help, this is the first reason: Allah opens up our hearts.  
                                [ 
                                Yes, if there were some 
extraordinary situations, right, and as a result they would always lead people to 
religion, but there are a lot of these kinds of situations in people’s lives 
                           [ 
                           A lot, a lot, yes, yes= 
=There are everywhere, just take any person, I always look outside on the 
street, there are lit windows, and behind each window is not just one life, not 
just one destiny, but many, a family, as a rule, but everyone has its own 
[life/destiny], right, even though they are together, they all have their stresses, 
some problems, I don’t know, difficult situations= 
=Yes, yes, yes= 
= but not all come [to religion], there isn’t a single principle [reason]. 
 
In lines 2-4 and 6, Gulnara talks about the “tradition” among RIU students of 
sharing stories about one’s path to Islam, about “who [came] how” (line 6). Gulnara 
recalls that the tradition existed for four years, for as long as she has been a student at 
RIU. According to Gulnara, older students like herself welcome new students by 
soliciting stories from them. In lines 6-16 Gulnara indirectly explains the value of the 
experience of listening to piety stories: “for all those years” (line 6), “with every year, 
you understand how people come to Islam” (line 10). In lines 12-16 Gulnara shares a 
personal revelation that she has arrived at after listening to the stories: she became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115  “Allah tägalä” is an older borrowing from Arabic and translates from Tatar as “God, the Exalted.” The affix “dan” 
is a Tatar language affix that indicates the elative case whose meaning is “from/out of.” Thus, the phrase is a mixture of 
Arabic and Tatar and translates as “From God, the Exalted.” 
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“convinced that, well, Allah subhana wa ta’ala [Ar. ‘God, May He be Glorified and 
Exalted’], he himself, not due to some reasons – we sometimes look for a reason as to 
why this particular person came to Islam.” I argue that Gulnara doesn’t dwell on the 
details of an individual story not because they are, or the story-sharing process itself, are 
unimportant, but because she has regularly experienced it for at least “four years” (line 
2), and it became natural, a “tradition,” something taken for granted, and yet still 
important. I further suggest that, similarly to the “Woman in Islam” teacher, Gulnara sees 
one’s resolve in staying on the road to piety as, ultimately, a will of God, without which 
the journey would not happen in the first place. Gulnara reiterates this sentiment 
repeatedly in lines 18 and 21 through 24.  
Moreover, the fact that the sentiment is shared by other Muslim women in the 
audience, which is evident in their comments (lines 25-26; 27-29; 30-37), points to the 
shared system of values. Referring to a shared system of beliefs as a coherence system, 
Linde (1993, p. 163) suggests that the absence or present of such a coherence system 
points to the shared stance (or distance) between the speaker and the audience. The 
ultimate social significance behind coherence systems is that they “provide people with a 
vocabulary for creating a self” (Linde, 1993, p. 189). This notion is similar to 
Stromberg’s (1993) assertion that the author of a conversion narrative draws on the 
canonical language in the process of narrating his or her conversion experience, which 
enables self-transformation.  
Drawing on that, and based on the data segment discussed above, I argue that the 
coherence system shared by the women—their faith in Allah and his will as the ultimate 
cause for everything—provides the women with vocabulary to share their piety stories in 
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such a way that enables the narrator to practice her beliefs, and the audience, to share in 
them and follow on her path, thereby affecting personal and social transformation. For 
Gulnara, the significance of story telling, therefore, is both in its immediate process of 
identity-performing and bond-making possibilities (otherwise the tradition wouldn’t exist 
in the first place), but also in its larger function of making sense of the world and arriving 
at truths that are collectively shared and re-enforced, based on other people’s experiences 
and in the context of her own and shared beliefs. It is through the process of listening to 
others’ stories for “several years” that Gulnara became convinced that Allah “himself 
leads a person to Islam” (line 16).  
Finally, the way women use language in the process of sharing stories or while 
talking about the story-sharing experience sheds light not only on our understanding of 
how identities are performed and transformed, but also on what these communicative 
practices tell us about social realities that they are part of. In lines 8, 13, 16 Gulnara 
switches to Arabic while referring to Allah (marked in the script with bold). The phrase 
“Allah subhana wa ta’ala” is part of the Muslim canonical language and translates 
roughly from Arabic as “God, May He be Glorified and Exalted” to express reverence 
while referring to God. Code-switching to Arabic, and this longer version of the term in 
particular, points to a certain degree of piety that Gulnara, who is in her early twenties, 
aspires to observe.  
In the process of conducting interviews and observations, I noticed that younger 
Muslim Tatar women use religious terms in Arabic often and freely and prefer them to 
Tatar religious terms. I have also noticed that those women who use Arabic terms 
extensively rarely know their exact meaning because they learn the words’ usage in 
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context, as opposed to through a dictionary or a language class. This points to 
generational differences among observant Muslim Tatar women. Younger women are 
more likely to study Islam in Russian and thus to be religiously socialized in Russian and 
Arabic. Gulnara’s code-switching to Arabic indicated her lesser attachment to the ethnic 
(Tatar) element of her identity and stronger attachment to the religious one, a trend that is 
becoming commonplace among Tatars under the age of thirty.  
As the data analysis above illustrates, the practice of sharing life, or piety, stories 
is a communicative act that is becoming commonplace—a tradition—as more Tatar 
women become observant Muslims. While there are similarities to some of these 
stories—and the way they are shared—this tradition is not monolithic and its 
particularities can shed light onto a variety of Muslim Tatar women’s experiences, belief 
systems, and larger social realities that they are part of.  
 
A Piety Story Without Conversion 
A final data segment presented below illustrates a narrative that is significantly 
different both in content and language use from the previous examples for two reasons. 
Unlike the examples above, it was not presented spontaneously by the teller: I solicited 
the woman’s piety story, which she shared with me at her home, in the presence of her 
adult daughter, also a practicing Muslim. But secondly, and most importantly, in her 
piety story the interviewee did not relay a conversion experience per se, typical for born-
again Christians and practicing Muslim Tatar women. Rather, claiming that she was born 
a Muslim, Zubarzhat khanïm [Tat. ‘madam’]116 conveys her life-long commitment to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 The term “khanïm” is a formal form of address used to address a woman. It is more formal and indicates distance 
between the speaker and the addressee than the Tatar term “apa,” literally translated as “aunt,” and used to address 
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Muslim piety. Such a narrative turn, emphasizing a woman’s long-term commitment of 
faith, even if at different points in life she was not a practicing Muslim, allows for 
creation of a continuity of faith even when the physical Muslim piety was not always 
there. As Linde (1993) suggests, such continuity creates the notion of coherence of not 
only the story, but also the narrator’s identity. I argue that in the context of the Tatar 
Muslim revival when the older generation of Tatar women (sixty and up) became 
practicing Muslims later in life (because of the Soviet state’s atheist policy), piety stories 
allow older women to demonstrate their life-long commitment to faith. This commitment 
further translates into a continuity of their identity, coherence in their lives, and 
ultimately, the moral standing of their character. In such instances, the performance of 
piety stories still allows for a woman’s personal transformation, but the one that has been 
in the making all her life. While I discuss this argument in more detail and support it with 
two narratives in the next chapter (chapter 5), I include Zubarzhat khanïm’s narrative here 
because of the way she phrased her response to my request to share her story with me. 
A woman in her sixties, Zubarzhat khanïm was a public figure well known among 
Tatars, who was still professionally active and enjoyed a certain amount of fame. Her 
above-average socio-economic status also set her apart from the majority of younger 
observant women who were at the beginning stages of their professional careers. I met 
with Zubarzhat khanïm several months into my fieldwork. By that time, I was 
accustomed to hearing the question “How did you come to Islam?” Perhaps having 
internalized it, I often began my interviews with it and heard a piety story in response. I 
began my interview with Zubarzhat khanïm with the same question. Zubarzhat khanïm’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
one’s older sister, female relative, or a woman older than the speaker. As a “native,” I felt obligated to observe these 
forms of address not only in the field, but also while referring to older women in my analyses here. I addressed 
Zubarzhat as “khanïm” out of respect and because of her status as a public figure. 
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immediate response was different from the way most young women whom I interviewed 
responded to this question, which underscores an interesting generational difference 
among Muslim Tatar women. Many young women associated stepping on the road to 
piety with the moment they began daily observances of Muslim rituals (such as the five 
daily prayers, for example) and often began their stories with accounts of immediate 
experiences that led to those daily observances. The older generation of practicing 
women frequently considered their entire lives as journeys to Muslim piety, where 
becoming a practicing Muslim was one of many experiences along the way.  
Unlike the other data segments analyzed above, Zubarzhat khanïm spoke with me 
in Tatar, using Russian and Arabic words every once in a while. While the interaction is 
translated from Tatar into English in the excerpt below, I preserved the original language 
where I judged it to be important for clarifying a thought.117 In accordance with 
transcription conventions I use throughout the dissertation, Tatar words are italicized and 
bold-faced; Arabic words are bold-faced, and Russian words are italicized. 
Zubarzhat khanïm’s piety story - data segment # 4: 
L: 
 
Z: 
 
 
 
L: 
Z: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Zubarzhat khanïm [Tat. ‘madam’], how did you come to Islam? This is my first 
question.  
I did not come to Islam; I was born in Islam. First, historically, my forefathers 
were in Islam. And I was born. And I was most probably born with tuly iman 
[Tat. ‘complete faith’]. Allahï tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] [gave] me complete 
iman [Tat. ‘faith’], complete iman, you understand, right?  
Yes. 
So. Because, since my childhood, since the time I could remember, my very first 
thought was: “Who created this world?” I would also give this question to my 
teachers, and to my parents…my parents did not have time to give the answer, 
and yet my only thought [was]: “Who created this world? Who created this 
nature? Who gives us sustenance? Who created a thousand different flowers, 
trees, these…this beauty, harmony who created it? A thousand different flowers 
emerge from this black soil, a thousand kinds emerge, a million – why is black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 It is possible that throughout her interview, Zubarzhat khanïm occasionally used Russian to clarify for me Tatar 
words that she found important, yet difficult for someone with limited Tatar to understand.  
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L: 
Z: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
soil the way it is? Who creates/produces it? Who am I? Why does my mind work 
this way? Why do different thoughts come to my mind? Why does my heart ache 
here?” My heart here, you understood, right? “Why does it ache? Why do they 
tell me that to act this way is good, and to act that way is bad? Why does my soul, 
my heart, why does it tell me [a certain way]? Why should one act this way, but 
not that way? Who is telling me this? Who am I guided by? Who guides me? Who 
guides me?” So, these were my very first questions. And so…     
And when did these questions… 
As far back as I remember myself, as far…then when I started growing up, right, I 
started to realize, but before… I would look, when I was a child, would look…I 
will say this in Tatar: I would be in awe. I would be taken away, while looking at 
this beauty, this world. So. And then…after growing up and beginning to work, 
so, when I was in school, I would exhaust my teachers: “Where is the end of the 
earth? Where is this, the universe’s end? Why does the earth not fall?” They 
would explain to me the laws of physics, but they would not satisfy me 
because…they, they…I understood that they did not give the full answer. They 
don’t know themselves. Don’t know, don’t know the answer to my questions. So, 
after that, then…my grandma performs the prayer. I see my grandma perform the 
prayer. Freezing winter. The bathroom is outside, outdoors. Grandma goes 
outside, takes kumgan [Tat. ‘pitcher for ritual ablution’], on her feet [are] felt 
boots. Do you know what felt boots are? These, woolen boots, this kind of felt 
boots, this kind ((shows their height)). [She] puts them on bare feet, goes outside, 
takes taharät [Tat. ‘ablution’] there, then comes back in, a washbowl, this, 
washbowl, washbowl, washes in cold water, and – warm water puts in kumgan, 
of course – washes her feet. Then – [it was] small, my grandma’s house was 
small, and ours was small. There, you know, winds blow, [you] couldn’t walk 
barefoot on the floor. Grandma spreads namazlyk [Tat. ‘prayer rug’], stands on 
it with bare feet, performs namaz [Tat. ‘Muslim ritual prayer’]. 
 
Unlike younger women, Zubarzhat khanïm does not begin her narrative with a set 
point in time when she came to Islam (lines 3-6). Instead, she explains that she “was born 
in Islam” (line 3). However, her reasoning as to why she was born and thus is now a 
Muslim is different from that of Aygul’s in an earlier data segment recorded at an Iftar 
dinner. Aygul, in her attempt to reassure Chulpan that she indeed was a Muslim, relied on 
both theological reasoning (every person is born a servant of God and thus a Muslim) and 
the presence of the Muslim name-giving ritual. Zubarzhat khanïm, however, suggests that 
she has always been in Islam because: “First, historically, my forefathers were in Islam. 
And I was born. And I was most probably born with complete faith” (lines 3-5). 
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Zubarzhat khanïm emphasizes the importance of her ancestors’ religion in determining 
her own religious identification. Furthermore, by stating that she was born with 
“complete faith,” Zubarzhat khanïm may be referring to the Maturidi theology of Islam, 
which was the foundation of the Hanafi madhhab [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’] 
traditionally practiced by Tatars, and in accordance with which one’s faith [iman] does 
not increase or diminish, but is a given constant (what changes is one’s degree of piety). 
Finally, when Zubarzhat khanïm states that she was born with complete faith, she uses the 
Tatar word “iman,” an Arabic borrowing that denotes one’s embrace of and commitment 
to Islam. Therefore when Zubarzhat khanïm states that she was born with complete faith, 
she refers to specific faith—the faith of her Muslim Tatar forefathers. In lines 5-6, when 
Zubarzhat khanïm emphasizes that God gave her complete faith, she once again uses 
another Arabic borrowing to refer to God [Tat. ‘Allahï tägalä’], a term that I heard 
repeatedly during my research but was less common when I was growing up in Tatarstan 
in the 1990’s. 
Zubarzhat khanïm’s response to my original question (lines 3-6) reflects the 
traditionally strong association of ethnic and religious identity among Tatars. In other 
words, for Zubarzhat khanïm, to be born to Muslim Tatars is to be born a Muslim Tatar. 
Unlike the newly emerging sentiment among predominantly younger (ages between teens 
and late twenties) practicing Muslim Tatars who suggest that being a Tatar does not mean 
being a Muslim, there is a strong association between one’s ethnic and religious identity 
among an older generation (fifty plus) of practicing Tatars and non-practicing Tatars of 
all ages—the majority in today’s Tatarstan. As Mukhametshin (2009) suggests, this could 
be due to the fact that during the Soviet period Islam was relegated into the realm of 
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ethnic rituals and traditions. But it could also be due to the fact that, as a Tatar abïstay 
[Tat. ‘a female religious authority’] recently observed in a public roundtable discussion 
among Muslim women,118 a distinct feature of the Hanafi school of law in Sunni Islam—
the Muslim school of law that Tatars have traditionally observed—is that a non-
practicing Muslim is still considered a Muslim, even if a sinful one. The abïstay stressed 
this feature of the Hanafi madhhab [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’] in comparison of the 
Salafi Islamic tradition, which, according to her, considered a non-practicing Muslim a 
non-Muslim (Shakir, 2012). From that perspective, Zubarzhat khanïm’s idea of what it 
means to be a Muslim is somewhat similar to that of Aygul who, during the Iftar dinner, 
persuaded Chulpan that she was still a Muslim even though a non-practicing (and thus a 
sinful) one. However, unlike Aygul, who stressed the ritual prayer as a turning point on 
her road to piety—a common practice (along with the hijab narrative) among younger 
women—Zubarzhat khanïm’s narrative did not have such a point. 
In lines 8-21 Zubarzhat khanïm recalls her childhood experience of contemplating 
the world and, particularly, its creator. Her story begins with her birth and continues with 
her childhood memories, thus taking a different path than that common among younger 
practicing women. Similarly to Aygul, who emphasizes the time she started praying, the 
“Woman in Islam” teacher concentrates on experiences associated with her donning of 
the headscarf—acts that marked how the younger women “came to Islam” or “accepted 
Islam” and that were often identified with specific Muslim practices. Even though 
Zubarzhat khanïm had been a practicing Muslim for several years before our encounter 
(she prayed five times a day, wore the headscarf, and had performed hajj, the Muslim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The forum was organized by the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan and featured female scholars 
who specialized in Islam and female Muslim activists.   
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pilgrimage to Mecca), throughout the rest of her narrative she did not focus on specific 
practices that made her a Muslim. Rather, Zubarzhat khanïm talked about how “tuly 
iman,” complete faith that was given to her by “Allahï tägalä” [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’], 
directly or sometimes at the intuitive level reflected on her entire life. In that sense, 
Zubarzhat khanïm’s whole life story is a piety story.    
The trajectory of Zubarzhat khanïm’s narrative reflects another generational 
difference among practicing Muslim Tatar women. Older women whom I interviewed, 
most of whom were in their sixties or older and retired, did not see a contradiction 
between their pre-retirement secular life and their increasingly observant life around the 
time of retirement. Just like Zubarzhat khanïm, they told me that they had always had 
iman, faith, in their hearts, which had been passed along from their parents and 
grandparents. Even though they did not pray or did not wear the headscarf during most of 
their adult lives, they always tried to live in accordance with the moral principles of their 
faith, as they often told me, and as two narratives that I analyze in the next chapter will 
illustrate. Perhaps this is why, as I observed, it was much less common for older 
practicing Muslim Tatar women to ask each other about their path to Muslim piety. I 
argue that the older generation shared an assumption that they were always pious in their 
hearts, and retirement at an older age (along with the post-Soviet freedom of religion) 
enabled them to begin to practice Muslim piety on a daily basis. From that perspective, 
their road to piety was a life-long project, un-interrupted (even if indirectly shaped) by 
the social realities that it was part of, as was their personal transformation. The older 
women’s model for personal and social transformation—reflected in the trajectories of 
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their piety stories—is not tied to a moment of conversion, but, rather, rooted in their rich 
life experience and faith that they carried on throughout their lives.   
In this chapter, I introduced and analyzed the communicative practice of sharing a 
form of personal narrative that I call “a piety story.” While these stories are united by a 
common leitmotif—one’s path to Muslim piety—they are not monolithic and vary based 
on the communicative situation and the speaker’s individual life circumstances. Taking 
place in a religious social context, these narratives may be shared spontaneously at an 
informal private gathering, such as an Iftar dinner, during a class break or a presentation, 
or may be solicited by the original narrator from the audience to achieve the reciprocity 
of sharing. Whatever the case may be, I suggest that piety stories, similarly to life stories 
(Linde 1993), serve important pragmatic communicative and social functions. They 
provide a culturally specific way to perform identity, negotiate group membership, and 
forge a communal bond, both within the immediate discursive community and the global 
Muslim Ummah. Most importantly, drawing on Stromberg (1993), I suggest that piety 
stories serve as a source of agency as they provide a discursive way for the speaker to re-
affirm her commitment to Muslim piety and for the audience, a blueprint for achieving it. 
It is in this moment of interaction—in the sharing of the narrative experience of faith—
that possibilities for personal and social transformation occur. 
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CHAPTER 5  
“BY THE GRACE OF GOD”: PIETY STORIES OF SOVIET-ERA WOMEN AS 
NARRATIVES OF MORAL SELVES 
 
 Drawing on identity narratives of two older, Soviet-era Tatar women from 
different walks of life and with varying degrees of piety, this chapter explores how—by 
creating coherence in their piety stories—the women position themselves as moral 
subjects (and thus good Muslims) in the face of personal and social change. This is 
particularly true of those practicing Muslim women who were born and grew up in the 
Soviet Union and became practicing Muslims later in life, following the post-Soviet 
Muslim revival. The official state policy of atheism, preceded by centuries of Russian 
imperial colonization, created political and social conditions that virtually prevented 
people from practicing their religion on a daily basis. Because Muslim piety is grounded 
in daily physical practices, such status of religion vernacularized Islam, pushing it 
underground and out of the realm of the daily religious into the realm of ethnic customs 
and traditions observed on special occasions. For traditionally Muslim Tatars this meant a 
loss of access to both abstract (theological) religious knowledge and practical quotidian 
physical observances that constitute the very essence of Muslim piety and Muslims’ 
identity.   
The recent Muslim revival created conditions that enabled a return of Islam into 
the fabric of the everyday life, manifested by an increasing number of Muslim Tatars’ 
embracing physical manifestations of Muslim piety. Nevertheless, the majority of 
Tatarstan’s and Russia’s population—among them non-practicing Tatars and, largely, 
those who hold secular views—are unconvinced about the physical aspect of Muslim 
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piety as an integral part of the spiritual. While they may attribute younger practicing 
Muslims’ religiosity to temporary curiosity, typical for the young age, they are even more 
skeptical about the older generation’s relatively recent interest in observing Muslim piety. 
Moreover, the younger generation of practicing Muslims themselves may also raise 
questions about the older generations’ character integrity, personal authenticity, and 
religious commitment. While these younger Tatars may be aware of the Soviet state’s 
atheist policy, they have never lived under those conditions themselves and never 
experienced them first-hand. Therefore, both groups may challenge the older women’s 
turn to piety by asking why they had not been interested in Islam all their lives, but are—
all of a sudden—now turning to it?  
Such questions, whether legitimate or not, may result in the older generation’s 
quest for establishing themselves as moral subjects who, as Zubarzhat khanïm’s narrative 
in the previous chapter illustrated, have always believed in God and lived by a culturally-
accepted set of values that present-day practicing Muslims share and strive to cultivate. I 
argue that one way women achieve such a moral stance is through ascribing coherence to 
their lives—and thereby integrity to their character—in the process of sharing their piety 
stories. The sharing of their narratives then, becomes a moral project and a resource that 
the older women utilize to achieve agency.   
In this chapter, I first compare religious experiences and conceptualizations of 
Islam by two groups of women who constitute the majority of present-day practicing 
Muslim Tatars: the younger generation (under thirty) and the older generation (sixty and 
up). Understanding these differences provides a social context for analyzing the older 
women’s stories and the work they do to present their lives and selves as coherent and 
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thus moral. I then review the concepts of (a) conversion as a change in one’s universe of 
discourse, (b) biographical reconstruction, (c) master narrative (Snow & Malachek, 1983, 
1984), and (d) coherence (Linde, 1993) to explain how narrators use discursive strategies 
to create coherence as a basis of morality. I then present segments from two piety stories 
narrated by older practicing Muslim Tatar women to illustrate how they use specific 
discursive strategies to create coherence in their lives as a token of their coherent and 
thus moral selves. The first story, narrated by Madina apa, is an example of how the 
narrator creates coherence in her story by positioning herself as an adequate (moral) 
character that has always embraced a (moral) value system. The second story, told by 
Alfia apa, demonstrates how the narrative (and thus character) coherence is created 
through the richness of account (by narrating multiple noncontradictory accounts) and a 
(moral) value system, both of which serve as a testimony of the narrator’s coherent, 
moral self. 
 
Understanding Generational Differences Among Muslim Tatar Women 
The experiences related in the two women’s narratives I analyze in this chapter 
are representative of the older generation of practicing Muslim Tatar women’s 
trajectories of their religious commitment. Their stories also shed light on the ways the 
older women’s experience of piety is different from that of younger women. While the 
Tatars’ interest in Islam is not limited to one particular generation, the present-day 
community of practicing Muslim Tatars is dominated in size by two groups of women: a 
younger generation of women (ages between teens and late twenties), and an older 
generation (women sixty and up).  
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The first group was born and/or came of age during the Tatars’ post-Soviet ethno-
religious revival, so Islam has always been part of their lives in some shape or form. 
Some of these young women were born into observant families and therefore were 
directly introduced to Muslim practices early on. Others were socialized into the Tatar 
post-Soviet society with its high interest in Islam, and thus were introduced to some form 
of Islamic knowledge and practice indirectly through friends, relatives, media. For these 
women, becoming a Muslim was rarely associated with a need to “explain” absence of 
religion in their lives before becoming observant Muslims, as a change in their beliefs 
and practices happened early enough for them to say confidently: “I have been a 
practicing Muslim all my life.” Alternatively, a young woman’s interest in Islam could be 
perceived as her identity-searching, which would be understood as a natural process at an 
early stage in life.  
The older generation’s interest in Islam is perceived as a somewhat natural (and 
culturally expected among the Tatars) stage of one’s life, often associated with life after 
retirement. It was and is still common to hear from the Tatars that they will begin 
observing important daily Muslim practices (such as the daily prayer, fasting, etc.) as 
soon as they retire. While retirement provides time flexibility and convenience for 
observing daily rituals or studying at a local medrese or mosque, it also symbolically 
marks the beginning of the end of life cycle, and, therefore, may be considered an 
appropriate time for preparing for the end of life. While the older generation’s interest in 
religion may be perceived as somewhat natural by Tatars, the younger generation of 
practicing Muslims may still wonder about the older women’s delayed commitment to 
piety and question its authenticity.      
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Questions regarding authenticity and sincerity of religious commitment are even 
more applicable to women who constitute a minority among practicing Muslim Tatars. 
These are women who are generationally “in-between”: women in their thirties, forties, 
and early fifties. They came of age or lived a significant part of their adult lives during 
the Soviet Union’s collapse and post-Soviet transitions, associated with socioeconomic 
instability and loss of core values that had been part of their lives. They are too old to be 
doing soul-searching and too young to join the ranks of long-term retirees. As a result, 
their turn to piety may be under closer scrutiny than that of younger or older women, and 
these “in-between” women may feel pressure to provide a culturally acceptable 
explanation to their newfound religiosity.  
Generational differences among practicing Muslim Tatar women are not unique to 
the women residing in Tatarstan. Commenting on different age groups in the Muslim 
Tatar community of medrese-going female students in Moscow, Sabirova (2006) also 
highlights three groups of women: kïzlar [Tat. ‘girls’] - the younger girls less than 22 
years of age, most of whom are students; khanïmnar [Tat. ‘ladies’] - the middle group 
mostly consisting of working women; and äbilär [Tat. ‘grandmothers, older women’] the 
older group of retirees (p. 148). While noting the age differences among the women, 
Sabirova proposes to think about the way women position themselves as Muslims in their 
narratives not in terms of age, but in terms of two models of the Muslim Tatar identity 
formation process: conventional (for Tatars) and nonconventional (p. 157). The 
conventional model presupposes the narrator’s locating of her new religious experiences 
into the framework of the existing Tatar life/environment. In accordance with the 
nonconventional model, on the other hand, the narrator positions herself as a new, 
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“different” (from Tatar), type of a “practical Muslim” who values Muslim ritual (bodily) 
practices and religious knowledge associated with them (p. 158). Sabirova suggests that 
the nonconventional model is more typical for younger women, while the older 
generation of women is more likely to embrace the conventional model. As a way to 
legitimize their Soviet (and sometimes active Communist) past in their stories, these 
older women try to communicate a sense of “always believing in one’s heart,” even if 
they did not manifest their beliefs externally (p. 114).  
Sabirova’s description resonates with my own observation that, unlike the 
younger women, many middle aged and older Muslim Tatar women often responded to 
my request to tell me how they came to Islam with “I did not come to Islam; I was born 
in Islam,” as Zubarzhat khanïm’s narrative in the previous chapter illustrated. Their 
narratives often began with childhood memories of grandparents’ Qur’an and prayer 
recitations or their parents’ and even their own attempts to secretly observe some Muslim 
rituals despite the Soviet state’s atheist policy. I propose that the older women 
conceptualize themselves as Muslims and legitimize their past by creating a continuity of 
core values in their narratives—as a way to create coherent lives, and thus coherent, 
moral selves.  
 
(Re)constructing Coherent Past to Achieve a Moral Self 
In my analysis of the two women’s stories, I draw from sociology the notion of 
conversion as a change in one’s universe of discourse (Snow & Malachek, 1983, 1984) 
and from linguistics the notion of coherence (Linde, 1993) as a primary discursive 
strategy involved in creating life stories. As discussed in the previous chapter, Snow & 
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Malachek (1983) propose that while religious conversion is often associated with change, 
a productive way to think about the change is not in terms of a radical personal change, 
but a change in one’s universe of discourse (p. 265). Because such conceptualization 
presupposes a replacement of once secondary universe of discourse with a primary one, it 
is not limited to conversion from one religion to another or from absolute lack of faith to 
becoming a born-again believer. Snow & Malachek (1983, 1984) further suggest four 
rhetorical attributes of conversion. Of particular relevance among them are biographical 
reconstruction and adoption of a master attribution theme.  
Biographical reconstruction refers to a rhetorical process whereby “the disjointed 
pieces are reassembled in accordance with the new universe of discourse and its 
grammar. Some aspects of the past are jettisoned, others are redefined, and some are put 
together in ways previously inconceivable. One's biography is, in short, reconstructed” 
(Snow & Malachek, 1983, p. 266). The adoption of the master attribution scheme takes 
place when “feelings, behaviors, and events formerly interpreted with reference to a 
number of casual schemes are now interpreted from the standpoint of one pervasive 
schema. [And] matters that were previously inexplicable or ambiguous are now clearly 
understood” (Snow & Malachek, 1984, p. 173). Following Staples & Mauss (1987), I 
depart from Snow & Malachek’s (1984) treatment of biographical reconstruction and 
adoption of a master attribution theme as rhetorical indicators of a convert. Instead, I 
approach them as rhetorical strategies that enable one—in the act of narrative—to 
position oneself as a coherent and thus moral self. This is where Linde’s (1993) notion of 
coherence becomes useful in helping to understand these strategies within life stories.    
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Linde (1993) suggests that coherence (rather than factuality) is central to life 
stories because it is considered a key criterion for external (social) and internal 
(personal/psychological) judgment. Linde further proposes that in life stories coherence is 
based on exhibiting causality and maintaining continuity, which is achieved on multiple 
levels and through various strategies. At the most basic (structural) level causality is 
achieved by use of appropriate clauses (such as “because,” “since,” “therefore,” etc.), and 
continuity is achieved through consistent use of the past tense.  
At the next, social level, continuity may be achieved through establishing 
adequate causality, defined by Linde as “a chain of causality that is acceptable by 
addressees as a good reason for some particular event or sequence of events” (p. 127). 
Adequate causality may be achieved through a) the speaker’s emphasis on certain 
character traits or b) the richness of the account that is created through temporal depth 
(stories going back in time) or a set of multiple noncontradictory accounts. In that 
respect, adequate causality is similar to biographical reconstruction. Finally, at the 
highest level, coherence is created by drawing on a coherence system, defined as “a 
discursive practice that represents a system of beliefs and relations between beliefs” 
(Linde, p. 163). Linde further suggests coherent systems may provide archetypes and 
vocabulary for creating a self and that most religious systems are examples of coherent 
systems. A coherence system, then, can be compared to a master attribution scheme, as 
both presuppose the presence of “one pervasive schema” (Snow & Malachek, 1984, p. 
173). 
As I will illustrate, Tatar women of middle/older generation try to achieve 
coherence in their piety stories as a way of (re)creating moral selves. Their quest for 
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achieving coherence—and thus positive moral standing in their own eyes and the eyes of 
others—is necessitated by the fact that they became religiously observant “in the middle” 
of their adult lives. As such, their “conversion” experience does not fit with Tatars’ 
culturally accepted expectations of one’s turning to religion at the beginning or end of the 
life cycle. Furthermore, this need for coherence is intensified by expectations associated 
with Tatar gender roles that still hold true today for the majority of Tatars (practicing 
Muslims or not) at least discursively if not in practice. These expectations include 
modesty, patience, self-control, and ability to conform to (and therefore honor) existing 
social gender norms.119      
 What the stories analyzed below have in common is the narrators’ age and their 
attempts to position themselves as moral selves by coherently reconstructing and thus 
legitimizing their Soviet-era past before they became observant. While the specific 
rhetorical strategies that the women employ and that are analyzed here differ, an element 
that unites them is the adoption of a common system of beliefs (a master attribution 
scheme) that the women draw on to explain events in their lives in order to create 
coherence at the highest level, the level of a coherence system. In these narratives, this 
highest order coherence is manifested in the women’s belief that, no matter how 
accidental and unlikely the women’s paths to Islam were, that they came to Islam by the 
grace of God, Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’].  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Faller (2011) discusses the importance of patience (sabïrlïk) and the ability to keep emotional outbursts in check as 
gender-specific social expectations of women in Tatar society.  
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Madina apa: Moral Character and Value System as Bases for Coherence 
 
The first data excerpt comes from my first conversation with Madina apa [Tat. 
‘aunt’], during which she shared her story with me. By talking about the values that have 
been part of her entire life, Madina apa creates the kind of character, the self, that has 
always been highly moral. I met Madina apa in the summer of 2008 when I also 
interviewed her at one of Kazan’s medrese, where she worked at the time. When I came 
back to Kazan in the summer of 2009 to continue fieldwork, Madina apa was still 
working at the medrese, and we talked again. While the second conversation was more 
informal—as Madina apa and I updated each other on what had happened in our lives 
over the course of the year—it once again turned to the subject of Madina apa’s path to 
Islam. Shared with me over two different occasions (and recorded by me both times), 
Madina apa’s story represents a clear example of a life story defined by Linde (1993) as a 
“discontinuous unit, consisting of a set of stories that are retold in various forms over a 
long period of time and that are subject to revision and change as the speaker drops some 
old meanings and adds new meanings to portions of the life story “ (p. 220).  
There are two reasons for including Madina apa’s narrative in support of my 
argument. The first one is Madina apa’s age and her own characterization of it. During 
our second conversation, Madina apa told me how she was offered to teach Arabic at a 
Tatar school because of her age: “I was neither an äbi [Tat. ‘older woman, 
grandmother’], nor a girl then, but a woman of a middle age, which suited them [the 
school].” Madina apa, therefore, was conscious of the age group that she belonged to 
when she stepped on the path to Muslim piety and that her story represents. Secondly, 
and most importantly, throughout her piety story, Madina apa strived to create a sense of 
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coherence in her life (and narrative) as a way to position herself as a moral self despite 
not being an observant Muslim all her life, as her narrative will shortly illustrate. I argue 
that one coherence strategy that Madina apa utilized in her narrative was to emphasize 
the values that define her (moral) character. Commenting on the speaker’s choice of her 
character as a coherence-creating strategy, Linde (1993) emphasizes that “an explanation 
rooted within the self and the self’s agency, as character traits must be, is preferable to 
one rooted outside, since an externally based account invites attribution to either accident 
or determinism” (p. 131). Both data excerpts analyzed below are taken from my first 
conversation with Madina apa. While during our second conversation Madina apa retold 
her piety story to me, it was punctuated by her questions about my own life (as someone 
she had gotten to know previously) and my responses, which would be a distraction for 
the analysis at hand.  
The first data excerpt below is Madina apa’s response to my question about her 
path to piety. While it was not uncommon for women’s eyes to water occasionally as they 
shared their stories with me, Madina apa was fighting back tears throughout her entire 
narrative. This is particularly evident at the opening (line 4) where, before beginning her 
story, she first pauses to collect herself, then smiles, and finally chokes up. In my 
analysis, I do not approach Madina apa’s emotional state as a subjective experience that I 
can have access to or fully understand. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) argue that “the 
reality of emotion is social, cultural, political, and historical” and advocate for a shift in 
emphasis from emotions as located within the body to “discourses on emotions and 
emotional discourses [that] are commentaries of the practices essential to social relations” 
(p. 18-19). Following that stance, I locate Madina apa’s emotions in the sociocultural 
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context and suggest that Madina apa was fighting back tears to achieve a culturally 
appropriate way for a Tatar woman to handle emotional situations: with modesty, 
patience, and calm.120 I further believe that the emotional force behind Madina apa’s 
story, illustrated in repeated attempts to fight back tears, speaks, first and foremost, to the 
sincerity of her narrative.   
Madina apa’s story – data segment # 1: 
L: 
M: 
L: 
M: 
L: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
I am interested in your path to Islam. How did you come- 
- to Islam?  
You probably lived most of your life during the Soviet Union, right? 
((Very long pause)). Yes, exactly so ((smiles, then chokes up)).  
I would be grateful if you could share with me- 
((Deep sigh)). Well, perhaps my whole life ((chokes up))… I was looking for 
purity. It is a part of me … ((chokes up)). But the fact that we live… in such a 
((deep sigh)), not a republic, in such a … country, where one has to raise children 
not in an environment one would like to. That is why I had been doing a lot of 
searching ((chokes up)), I did not know ((long pause)). Indeed, in the Soviet time 
we lived- there was alcoholism, and all of that. This did not leave my family 
untouched.  The fact that the family that had been created … was not the  
family it should have been, right? ((chokes up)). The true Tatars, they are a very 
pure people, ime [Tat: ‘right’]? ((Deep sigh)). We were already russified121 at that 
time. And so, we ate what we were not supposed to and led not the kind of life 
style we should have led. But when the family was created and the children were 
born, I realized that that was not the way to live. The children went to school 
((long pause)) without knowing their own language. What was happening in my 
heart! I- ((chokes up)) I don’t know what was happening. I-…some force was 
leading me exactly where it needed to. At that time, gymnasiums122 were opening, 
Tatar gymnasiums ((sigh))… And one woman told me: “If you are a Tatar, and if 
you don’t understand what is happening in your heart, try sending your child to 
the Tatar gymnasium.” This is where my life, such as it is now, began ((chokes 
up)). Everything turned upside down. …. In the first place, I came to religion 
because I had to help my child to learn the letters of the Arabic language. Since I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Faller (2011) makes a similar observation, referring, for example, to funerals. Tatar women of childbearing are 
discouraged from attending funerals and those women who attend are supposed to refrain from crying not to make it 
more difficult on everyone else (p. 153). This practice differs, for example, from the Russian custom of loud weeping 
[Ru. ‘prichitanie’] during a funeral when close female relatives of the deceased weep and verbally express their grief 
and sorrow.   
121 Madina apa uses the term “obrusevshie” [Ru. ‘обрусевшие'] which most often carries a negative connotation of 
being assimilated by a dominant (Russian) culture.	  
122 One of the Post-Soviet secondary education trends was to modify formerly Soviet schools and model new schools 
after gymnasiums that existed in Russia before the Revolution and were know for a more holistic approach to 
education. Thus the term “gymnasium” (or “gymnasia”) was applied to many new schools opening in the post-
perestroika period, whether they actually lived up to the model or not.  
	   120 
26. 
27. 
 
28. 
29. 
30. 
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32. 
had sent her to the gymnasium, there was the Arabic language as a subject. I did 
not know [the language], and I could not help my child.  
[portion omitted] 
As far as Arabic is concerned, I had to learn the letters, so I had to find where  
… I could learn them. I went to a mosque, I … learned to write and read. I studied 
at the mosque for a year, and, naturally I could help my daughter and check her 
homework. So this is the way I came [to Islam], gradually, step by step, step by 
step ((chokes up)). 
  
In the data excerpt above, Madina apa begins her story by acknowledging the fact 
that she lived most of her life during the Soviet Union (line 4). She opens her narrative 
not with matter-of-fact biographical information, but by describing a set of values—
purity—that she believed in her “whole life” (line 6) and that are part of her (line 7). By 
doing so, Madina apa at the very outset positions herself as a certain type of character she 
is and has always been: pure, moral. By using the adversative conjunction “but,” she then 
juxtaposes the external conditions that she, as a Soviet and now post-Soviet Russian 
citizen, has to live and raise her children in (lines 7-9). The fact that, while describing the 
country as an inappropriate environment for raising children, Madina apa switched to the 
collective “we,” indicates that she is speaking not only on her own behalf, but, possibly, 
on behalf of the listener, other Muslim Tatar women, or other mothers living in Russia.  
Why would Madina apa switch the narrator’s point of view within the first minute 
of her story? I argue that the way I invited Madina apa to share her story with me (by 
asking if she lived most of her live during the Soviet Union in line 3) could have been 
perceived by Madina apa as a challenge by a younger generation, represented by me, to 
“explain” her relatively recent piety and implied absence thereof during the Soviet times. 
I further claim that in order to address the potential problem of discontinuity in her story, 
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her life, and her character, Madina apa begins her narrative by describing the core values 
that have always been part of her, that define her self.  
Furthermore, speaking on behalf of other women (through the collective “we”), 
allows Madina apa to point out that the kind of life she used to live is a shared 
experience, a consequence of living in a certain place at a certain time, and thus is not 
indicative of who she truly is. A similar dynamic continues in lines 9 and 11 where 
Madina apa describes her personal soul searching when everyone (expressed by “we”) 
lived in a Soviet society plagued by problems. While Madina apa acknowledges the 
social problems, such as alcoholism, that “did not leave her family untouched” (lines 11-
12), her use of a passive voice while describing her family at the time (lines 12-13) once 
again indicates Madina apa’s distancing herself from the values she never shared even if 
they had affected her family. Madina apa further negotiates her personal responsibility 
(or lack thereof) for her family’s problems by stating (in lines 9-10) that she did not know 
what was the right thing to do and thus could not be held accountable for not doing it.  
Madina apa’s narrative above is focused on the “before” part of the “before and 
after” pattern, which is typical for conversion narratives where narrator compares her life 
(and thus herself) before the conversion (“me then”) and after (“me now”). The “before 
and after” conversion narrative is an example of reflexivity, which Linde (1993) defines 
as the narrator’s (“me now”) ability to separate herself from and evaluate the protagonist 
(“me then”) (pp. 122-123). While becoming a pious Muslim changed Madina apa and her 
family’s lives (as a second data segment will illustrate), Madina apa does not distance her 
present self from her former self entirely, but strives to create a continuity by describing 
the values she always held important. To do otherwise, would be to not only undermine 
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her personal integrity, but the integrity of an entire people she represents and speaks on 
behalf of: the Tatars. Madina apa comments on the integrity of Tatars—and thus her 
own—by stating in line 13 that “the true Tatars, they are a very pure people, ime [Tat. 
‘right’]?” By phrasing the statement as an alternative sentence with the alternative clause 
in Tatar (ime), Madina apa solicits another Tatar’s (the researcher’s) reassurance of the 
Tatars’, and thus her own, purity. This was not the only instance of Madina apa’s 
expressing her belief in the purity of the Tatars. When I met with Madina apa again 
during my second field trip, she reminisced about her path to piety by recalling that her 
grandmother was an abïstay [Tat. ‘female religious authority’] whom she witnessed 
reciting namaz, the daily prayer. “[Faith] probably passes with blood,” Madina apa 
suggested. During my fieldwork I observed that Madina apa’s recollection of her pious 
forefathers was a typical way women of her age started their stories, as Zaburzhat 
khanïm’s narrative in the previous chapter also illustrates.123    
Madina apa continues her narrative by providing an alternative explanation for 
why the Tatars, such as her family, while being a very “pure” people, were not immune 
from the social problems of the Soviet time: “We were already russified at that time. And 
so, we ate what we were not supposed to and led not the kind of life style we should have 
led” (lines 14-15). While the Russian version of the word “russified” often refers to 
cultural assimilation, language use in particular124 (as is evident from Madina apa’s 
story), I propose that Madina apa implies religious assimilation as well. By saying that 
they ate what they were not supposed to Madina apa refers to her family’s, as well as the 
majority of other Tatars’, ignorance and/or inobservance of the Muslim dietary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Sabirova (2006) makes a similar observation in her study of practicing Muslim Tatar women in Moscow. 
124 For “russification” in the context of the language use, see Wertheim (2012, p. 265). 
	   123 
requirements that prohibit the use of alcohol and encourage the consumption of only 
halal125 food.  
Furthermore, the fact that Madina apa refers to the religious assimilation as 
“russification” points out the fact that, unlike a younger generation of Muslim Tatars who 
are more likely to separate religious and ethnic elements of identity, people of Madina 
apa’s age and older tend to conflate the religious and the ethnic aspects of identity.126 
This is further evident in Madina apa’s connecting the inappropriate lifestyle with her 
children’s lack of Tatar language skills (lines 16-18), which created a deep moral crisis 
within her. For Madina apa, as well as for her friend who suggested that Madina apa 
send her children to the Tatar school (lines 21-22), to be a moral person means to be a 
proper, “pure” Tatar, and thus not to be “russified.” I further propose that Madina apa’s 
use of the collective pronoun “we” in her discourse of russification (lines 14-15), may 
index not just her own family, but an entire community of Tatars who could not live up to 
their internal purity, due to russification. This is also evidenced by what Madina apa told 
me when we met again upon my return to the field. Commenting on the fact that the Tatar 
school that she had sent her daughter to held some religious celebrations, Madina apa 
concluded that the Tatars always lived with the religion in their hearts.   
On the surface, Madina apa summarizes her initial path to Islam as circumstantial 
and even accidental—as a consequence of her daughter’s entering the Tatar school and 
Madina apa’s having to help her with Arabic (lines 24-31). However, a closer 
examination of Madina apa’s narrative indicates that, while the change (and thus the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 In simplified terms, no pork or alcohol is allowed. For further explanation, see footnote 77 above.  
126 With respect to language use as a marker of ethnic, but also religious identity Faller (2011) observes that “the act of 
speaking Tatar is thought to affect one’s internal disposition in a way that brings the speaker closer to Islam” (p. 246). I 
further explore the older generation’s conflation of ethnic and religious identities in chapter 8.	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discontinuity) in her life is apparent on the outside, Madina apa’s internal character did 
not change because a quest for purity has always been part of her. Furthermore, Madina 
apa’s description of changes in her life focused on the physical manifestations of piety, 
which she either believed in but could not practice (in the case of alcohol) or did not 
know about (in the case of the headscarf and halal food), due to russification: 
Madina apa’s story – data segment # 2: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L: 
M: 
 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
I studied at the Märjani mosque 127 for a year. At the time, the Mökhämmädia 
mädräsä128 had just-, this building wasn't even there; there was something else in 
this building, right? [I] went from one part of the city to another … part,  
where they gave knowledge of Islam.  
I did not wear the headscarf then, was embarrassed. I would walk into the mosque 
and put it on, then would close the door and take it off. “What would people say? 
What would society say?” That's the way it was. And then, when I learned more, 
deeper about religion, about the fact that it is necessary …, the Qur'an  
specifically for women, that it is necessary to cover oneself, that it is not for 
something or someone, but for oneself, for one's health, for the society's health. 
So, when I realized that, I took religion seriously. And began to live in 
accordance with the Shariah [Ar. ‘Muslim normative law’].    
How did it change your life?       
Oh, it turned it upside down 180 degrees. 
[portion omitted] 
Well, our family always celebrated holidays, you know this, right? And, there 
always was … alcohol, right? Even when I was not in Islam, I was never a 
supporter [of alcohol]. I didn't want it, I didn't like it. But since the entire society 
lives this way, I had to do the same thing, so that people wouldn't say that you are 
a miser, you don't provide [alcohol], you are this and that, right? ((chokes up)). 
When I had come to Islam, I realized that alcohol is not allowed, pork is not 
allowed. Not just prohibited, but fundamentally: why, for what [reasons], what 
good it brings. When you go with knowledge ((sighs)), one really wants to … 
decline all this. And so, gradually, step by step, we were able to achieve all this.  
 
 Madina apa’s account of how her life changed with practice of Islam is preceded 
by her description, in lines 33-36, of her journey in search of Islamic knowledge, as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 The name of Kazan’s chief mosque, titled after a prominent Tatar thinker of the 18th century, the only mosque 
functioning during the Soviet era. 
128 Throughout her narrative, Madina apa pronounced “Mukhammadiia medrese” in a Tatar way, which is reflected in 
the transcript. 	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continuation of her search for purity. The fact that Madina apa travelled to the other side 
of the city to study at the Märjani mosque, the only functioning Kazan mosque at the 
time, indicates her strong desire for obtaining religious knowledge that would allow her 
to act on her beliefs. The importance of religious knowledge for Madina apa, as well as 
other “post-Soviet” Muslims of Madina apa’s age, can be explained by the fact that 
Muslim piety is grounded in daily physical practices, the knowledge about which was 
unavailable during the Soviet time.   
Even though Madina apa treats the changes in her life as apparent (manifested in 
the “before and after” discussion of donning of the headscarf (lines 37-43) or embracing 
Muslim dietary requirements), Linde (1993) would suggest that her ability to speak about 
them as such is an act of reflexivity indicative of a moral narrator, and thus moral 
character:  
[. . .] the reflexivity created by the act of narration means the speaker is always 
moral, even if the protagonist of the narrative is not. Thus, if a person tells a 
narrative that indicates that he or she acted badly, the fact the narrator knows and 
indicates that the action was not right reveals understanding of and allegiance to 
the norms shared by the speaker and addressees, even if the protagonist did not 
know them, or was not able to live up to them at the time. In response to such 
narratives, a negative judgment can be brought against the protagonist, but not 
against the speaker. (pp. 123-124) 
 
Similarly, commenting on the process of biographical reconstruction whereby the 
narrator reconstructs her past, Snow & Machalek (1983) observe: “Gripped by the 
realization that preconversion interpretations were erroneous, the convert comes to 
redefine the past ‘correctly’” (p. 267). I argue that the ability of the narrator to 
reconstruct the past and thereby “redeem” herself in the discursive moment of reflexivity 
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(a confession of sorts)129 allows for the possibility of personal transformation of not only 
the speaker herself, but also—by way of example—the listener. In this particular 
instance, Madina apa’s account of her initial struggle with donning the headscarf serves 
as a way of saying: “I have been there. I know what you might be going through. I am 
not perfect, but I did it, and so can you.”  
I further argue that by stating in lines 48-49 that even before Madina apa became 
a practicing Muslim, she never supported the presence and use of alcohol in her home, 
Madina apa points to the continuity of some of her core values, and thus the integrity of 
her character. Therefore, while becoming an observant Muslim did change her and her 
family’s lives, it did not change, but empowered her to be the kind of person she had 
been looking to be all her life: pure and moral.   
 While important, I argue that character is not the only element that Madina apa 
draws on in her story to create continuity and coherence. Another important characteristic 
of Madina apa’s and other women’s stories is the presence of a coherence system, which 
“provides the environment in which one statement may or may not be taken as a cause of 
another statement” (Linde, p. 163). The notion of a coherence system is somewhat similar 
to that of a master attribution scheme, based on research in the sociology of conversion, 
and refers to a process “by which people form causal interpretations of the behavior of 
self and others and the events in the word around them” (Snow & Machalek, 1983, p. 
269). In the case of Madina apa and other women I interviewed, the coherent system is 
based on their faith, where God is the one who set them on the path to piety, and is the 
ultimate cause of their faith. This sentiment was illustrated in the previous chapter when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The theological notion of confession typical for Christianity is absent in Islam. There is also no intermediary (in the 
form of a priest or Jesus Christ): a Muslim must ask God for forgiveness directly.  
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Gulnara, a student of the Russian Islamic University, shared how listening to new 
students’ stories about their path to Islam, she became convinced why and how people 
step on the way to Muslim piety:130 
“with every year [you] understand how people come to Islam and [you] become 
convinced that, well, Allah subhana wa ta’ala [Ar. ‘God, May He be Glorified and 
Exalted’], he himself, not due to some reasons – we sometimes look for a reason as to 
why this particular person came to Islam— Allah subhana wa ta’ala [Ar. ‘God, May He 
be Glorified and Exalted’], I don’t know, due to some actions himself leads the person to 
Islam. [. . .] Simply unexpectedly, somehow leads to Islam, and that’s it. [. . .] Allah 
somehow distinguishes certain people with his grace, precisely because [he] leads [them] 
to [the] understanding, whereas sometimes [you] can keep explaining to some people, 
and it’s simply impossible if everything is shut off [inside them].   
 
Gulnara’s conviction that people turn to Muslim piety by the grace of Allah was 
enthusiastically supported by other women in the audience, exemplified by an older Tatar 
woman’s comment: “Yes, Allah tägalädan [Tat. ‘from God, the Exalted’], until a time 
comes, any situations won’t help, this is the first reason: Allah opens up our hearts.” The 
sentiment was further supported by a Russian Muslim convert who suggested that all 
people had problems, but not everyone was a believer and that the presence of faith in 
one’s heart was ultimately up to God.  
As Madina apa continued her narrative, she talked about challenges that she and 
her daughter encountered on their paths to piety. For example, her husband reacted 
angrily to Madina apa’s and her teenage daughter’s donning of the headscarf—a reaction 
that is not uncommon on the part of male relatives of practicing women, as I discovered 
during fieldwork. This counters a widespread stereotype, which I frequently heard from 
non-Muslim and non-practicing Muslims both in Tatarstan and the U.S., that men are the 
ones who force the women to cover. In the course of our conversation, Madina apa 
suggested that her husband’s original negative reaction to her and her daughter’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 If a short segment of data did not call for a line-by-line analysis, I did not number the lines in that data segment.	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embodied piety could be explained by the fact that, as someone who lived in the secular 
Soviet state all his adult life, it was not easy for him to change his old habits, such as love 
for alcohol, for example.  
Madina apa commented on the struggles she and her daughter encountered on the 
path to their piety as follows: “There were … lots of problems, but nonetheless we 
remained very strong Muslims.  May Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] further give 
us strength.” Her comment suggests that the source of her and her daughter’s faith—their 
ability to become pious Muslim women and their strength to remain so—is Allah tägalä. 
Finally, by concluding that, despite her own ignorance, her husband’s resistance, and 
social pressure, “gradually, step by step, we were able to achieve all this” (line 55), 
Madina apa attests to personal and social transformation (represented by her husband, 
older daughter, and relatives), thereby showing the listener the transformative potential of 
piety.  
 
Alfia apa: Richness of Account and Value System as Bases for Coherence 
While secular Tatars (and those who consider themselves secular131) might 
interpret Madina apa’s ability to attribute the origin and the nature of her faith to God as 
deterministic and a sign of passivity, practicing Muslim Tatar women take it as a sign of 
sincere, strong iman [Tat. ‘faith’] that they ask for in their daily prayers, and as a sign of 
agency. I further observed that women often interpreted one’s ability to recognize God’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Following Asad (2003), I treat the term “secular” as “a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledge, 
and sensibilities in the modern world” (p. 25). Based on my fieldwork observations, I conclude that those who consider 
themselves secular (whether ethnic Tatars or not) in present-day Russia do not always share a certain set of behaviors, 
knowledge, and sensibilities. One way to describe what unites them is their own perception of themselves as secular. I 
would also suggest that those Tatars who identified themselves as secular explained to me that they did not necessarily 
deny the existence or importance of God, or faith. Rather they did not see relevant the daily application of religious 
observances and practices to their own lives.  	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will as the first step in one’s ability to submit to it, the first step on one’s path to Islam as 
in “the voluntary submission to God.” To understand a Muslim’s voluntary submission to 
God and His will as a sign of strong faith and agency, one must abandon, as Mahmood 
(2005) insists, the Western notion of agency, which is grounded in the notion of an 
individual freedom that can only be obtained through resistance to and subversion of the 
authority. “Viewed in this way,” Mahmood explains, “what may appear to be a case of 
deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist point of view, may actually be a 
form of agency—but one that can be understood only from within the discourses and 
structures of subordination that create the conditions of its enactment” (p. 15). 
One characteristic and function of such alternative understanding of agency was 
that practicing Muslin Tatar women such as Alfia apa often narrated their religious 
experience not only with the benefit of looking back, but also with an intent to recognize 
certain events or people in their lives as “signs” from God to step on the path to piety. 
Thereby, they provided an interpretation of the past that both reflected and constituted 
their commitment to Muslim piety, faith, and, ultimately, God. As Snow & Malachek 
(1983) observe, in the process of biographical reconstruction “the disjointed pieces are 
reassembled in accordance with the new universe of discourse and its grammar” (p. 266). 
This was particularly true of the middle-aged and older women who, while they lived 
most of their lives during the Soviet time, were able to attribute pious meanings to certain 
experiences that had occurred long before the women became observant. A piety story by 
Alfia apa is a case in point.  
I met Alfia apa one Saturday morning during an informal mosque lesson at the 
Nurulla mosque. Unlike Madina apa who gave up a full-time low-level government job 
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to raise her children, to teach part time, and then do administrative work at the medrese, 
Alfia apa was a former government employee who dedicated her life to a successful 
professional career (albeit at the expense of her family, which she regretfully admitted 
during our conversation). Since the teaching job and the job at the medrese paid very 
little, Madina apa relied on her husband to provide a middle class standard of living for 
them. In contrast, Alfia apa, admitted to enjoying the benefits of having worked at a 
high-level government position, such as connections (important social capital in Russia) 
and a comfortable pension that allowed her to maintain an upper-middle class life style 
upon retirement. Unlike Madina apa who always carefully covered her body and head, 
Alfia apa did not wear the headscarf outside the mosque and was not as committed to 
performing the five daily prayers at the set times as Madina apa was. These differences in 
observing the Muslim rituals would be enough for the general public and practicing 
Muslim Tatars alike to locate Madina apa and Alfia apa at different points on the Muslim 
piety continuum. Finally, while Madina apa’s religious education began at the Märjani 
mosque where she attended informal lessons and to which she attributed her initial 
interest in Islam, she eventually graduated from the Mukhammadiia medrese. Her level of 
religious education, thus, was higher than that of Alfia apa’s who admitted to coming to 
the three-year long informal class at the Nurulla mosque in order to learn how to perform 
the five daily prayers correctly and how to read the Qur’an on her own.  
While Madina apa and Alfia apa came from different socio-economic 
backgrounds and, generally, had different life experiences, their relatively late interest in 
observing Islam—even though not uncommon for middle-aged and older Tatar women—
could serve as a reason for a particularly careful evaluation of their commitment to 
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Muslim piety, the extent and quality of their religious knowledge, or, ultimately, the 
integrity of their character. Whereas an evaluation of character is always part of an 
identity negotiation process, I argue that the younger generation of practicing Muslim 
women often view the middle-aged and older generations’ turn to piety with careful 
attention. I further argue that this is because the younger generation of practicing Muslim 
women were brought up when the post-Soviet Muslim revival was already under way, 
which enabled them to be practicing Muslims most of their short adult lives. Therefore, 
the trajectories of their lives and their paths to piety diverged from those of the Soviet 
generation of women who were non-practicing most of their lives.  
In the course of my fieldwork, I have witnessed how, while listening to an older 
woman’s piety story, younger women expressed their tacit approval or disapproval of a 
certain act or experience the older woman relayed. This was often done through Arabic 
religious terms that younger women use frequently in their daily life as a sign of piety. 
For example, an act that was deemed pious or moral was often met with “Masha’Allah” 
[Ar. ‘God has willed it’]132 or “Subhan Allah” [Ar. ‘Praise be to God’],133 whereas an act 
deemed incompatible with Muslim piety was often met with “Astaghfirullah!” [Ar. ‘I 
seek forgiveness from God!’].134 I further observed that when it came to the Soviet era 
women’s pre-piety experience, the younger women’s response was often silence or 
insertions of “Astaghfirullah!” that was accompanied by the shaking of one’s head in 
disapproval.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In a daily life, the phrase is used to express praise to Allah and appreciation for an event or person. 
133 The phrase is used in the ritual of tasbih [Ar. ‘verbal glorification of God through a sequence of repeated phrases’], 
as well as in daily life to express an admiration for something good.	  
134 In a daily life, the phrase is used by Muslims to express their wish to abstain from doing something wrong or to ask 
forgiveness for an improper action or feeling. A Muslim is also encouraged to recite the phrase after every ritual prayer.  	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The younger women’s assessment of the older women’s piety and character also 
came through in-group discussions of certain religious issues (at a mosque or medrese). 
In one particular instance, an older Muslim Tatar woman who was a Mukhammadiia 
medrese graduate and occasionally gave informal mosque lessons told me about a 
younger woman’s questioning of the validity of her religious knowledge by asking for 
proof (citations) from original religious sources. The older woman was offended by the 
younger woman’s questioning of her religious knowledge and thus authority. I would 
further suggest that the exchange violated the traditional for Tatars custom of treating an 
older person as a figure of authority, which conveyed respect. This is why, I argue, in 
their narratives about their paths to Muslim piety Madina apa and Alfia apa strive to 
create a sense of coherence, as a way to position themselves as people who have always 
had faith in their hearts as a moral compass. According to the women’s narratives, the 
recent Muslim revival has finally enabled them to act upon moral values they believed in 
their whole lives.  
Drawing on Linde’s (1993) discussion of adequate causality as a prerequisite for 
coherence, I argue that, unlike Madina apa, who relied on her positive character as an 
adequate cause for piety, Alfia apa employed a somewhat different strategy in her story: 
“richness of account” (p. 135). Linde (1993) suggests that richness of account may be 
created through (a) temporal depth and (b) multiple noncontradictory accounts. As a form 
of adequate causality, temporal depth is somewhat related to positive character because, 
according to Linde, “our tenet of our common-sense view of the self is that an activity, an 
aptitude, or an ambition that goes back to early childhood must be seen as intrinsic to the 
self” (p. 135). While Alfia apa’s story does not focus on early childhood, it goes back far 
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enough to achieve a similar effect, as her narrative will shortly illustrate. Furthermore, 
Alfia apa’s story provides several (at least two, by her own admission) noncontradictory 
accounts of her road to piety. Linde explains that a combination of multiple 
noncontradictory accounts offer sufficient causality because “they show that a choice was 
not random or insufficiently motivated” (p. 140). Finally, I propose that, similarly to 
Madina apa, Alfia apa ultimately credits Allah tägalä for setting her on the road to piety, 
thereby locating her story and self within the same coherence system: Islam.  
For ease of comprehension and analysis, I present Alfia apa’s narrative in three 
separate data excerpts, divided at the narrative point where Alfia apa finishes one account 
and begins another. I approached Alfia apa at the mosque while she and other students 
were waiting for the arrival of an abïstay, a religious teacher, to start the lesson. Alfia apa 
readily agreed to share her story with me and proceeded to begin her narrative then and 
there, in the presence of her adult daughter (in her mid-thirties) and a close friend (in her 
early forties), both of whom observed a degree of religiosity similar to that of Alfia 
apa’s, as I later found out. Alfia apa paused her narrative when the teacher arrived, with 
a suggestion to continue it at a restaurant when the lesson was over. Alfia apa explained 
that the three of them enjoyed an occasional lunch at the restaurant after the mosque 
lesson, so I agreed to join them. The first data excerpt below is Alfia apa’s response to 
my question about how she came to Islam: 
Alfia apa’s story – segment # 1: 
A: 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
So, how did I come to Islam? My mom died early; she was 51, and I was 29. I 
grew up in an atheistic family. My mom was a teacher, and dad was the head of a 
collective farm, meaning faith was out of the question there. You know what kind 
of times those were, right? So. She was born in 1927. My father also worked for 
the police. So, there was never any mentioning of God in the family. And my 
mom passes away at 51. She had an aggressive cancer then. When she was dying- 
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L: 
A: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
It so happened there were three of us, sisters, and I had to take care of her. And 
she is telling me: “Go find a babushka [Ru. ‘old lady’]135, Kïzïm [Tat. ‘my 
daughter’], I don’t have long to live. It’s necessary to recite Yasin.”136 I didn’t 
even understand what it was, Yasin. How so? She had never talked about it.  
Did she recite namaz [Tat. ‘ritual prayer’]?  
She herself did not recite namaz. She did not know anything except Bismillyahi-
rahmanir-rahim.137 I went looking for a babushka, brought her, and Yasin was 
recited for her. She was already very ill at the time. When she was dying she said: 
“Kïzïm [Tat. ‘my daughter’], they say there we wait for your prayers only. I was 
nadan [Tat. ‘ignorant’],” meaning “uneducated,” “you can not recite, and I could 
not teach you. Go to a mosque from time to time and give alms in my name.”  So, 
she passed with this vasïiat [Tat. ‘covenant’]. And, of course, I would go by a 
mosque and give alms, but not very often. And so there were the following two 
occurrences in my life. So, once I am on my way to work, and an old man cannot 
get on the bus. The crowd pushes him away, he almost falls down, everyone tries 
to get on this bus; everyone is late for work. I approached him—I had extra 
time—and say: “Babay [Tat. ‘old man, grandfather’], why are you traveling so 
early? You will get trampled over.” And he says: “Min kïzïm [Tat. ‘I, my 
daughter’],138 work at a mosque.”  
This was in Kazan? 
This was in Kazan. We lived in the x district then. And so, I tell him: “Just a 
minute, I will help you.” So, when a bus came, I sort of pushed him onto the bus 
and asked for a seat for him, I myself traveled standing up. Then the space began 
freeing up on the bus, and I sat down. I tell him: “Babay [Tat. ‘old man’],139 
since you work at a mosque, may I give you khäer [Tat. ‘alms’]? There hasn’t been 
a year yet since my mom died.” And I wrote down for him.140 He was a very 
religious old man, his eyes were so kind. I did it and forgot about it. And all of a 
sudden, I have a dream that night. My mom greets me home after work, all 
dressed up, a lot of food on the table, she says: “Kïzïm [Tat. ‘my daughter’], sit 
down, I made [it] for you.” I remembered millet porridge, yellow, tarï iarmasï 
[Tat. ‘millet porridge’], right?  
Yes, I know tarï iarmasï.  
So, I sat down and say: “Mom, why did you do this? You were so sick recently, I 
would’ve cooked myself.” And she goes: “Iuk, iuk, iuk [Tat. ‘no, no, no’], kïzïm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Whereas Alfia apa uses the Russian word babushka, which can be translated as “an old lady” or “grandmother,” she 
does not mean “grandmother,” an “old lady,” and certainly, not a Russian old lady. She refers to a Tatar old lady, most 
likely an abïstay, a Tatar female religious authority who, during the Soviet period, was one of the very few sources of 
Muslim religious knowledge.  
136 “Yasin” is a Tatar pronunciation of the title of the 36th surah [Ar. ‘chapter’] of the Qur’an. In accordance with 
Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative conduct based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example’], the surah is recited when a Muslim is 
nearing death.	  
137 Alfia apa refers to the Arabic phrase that usually translates as “"In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most 
Merciful." The phrase opens every Qur’anic surah, except the ninth, and is recited during the daily prayer. Tatar 
Muslims with only the most passing connection to Islam would be familiar with this phrase. In the context of everyday 
life, the phrase is pronounced by Muslims before doing something in order to receive a blessing from God, and thus 
succeed at whatever he or she is doing.  
138 Also, “my girl.”	  
139 Also “grandfather.”  
140 Alfia apa means she wrote down her mother’s name, so that the old man could pray for her mother.	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41. 
42. 
43. 
[Tat. ‘my daughter’]!” And she pours oil [into the porridge], so happy, so happy. 
And so, naturally, when I woke up, I understood why, right? Ok, so that’s one 
dream.  
 
Unlike many practicing Muslim Tatar women of her age, Alfia apa does not begin 
her narrative by stating that she had been born in Islam or that she believed in her heart 
all her life. Quite the opposite, Alfia apa begins her narrative by admitting that she grew 
up in an “atheistic family” (line 2) and that “faith was out of the question there” (line 3). 
She mentions her parents’ professional background as a possible reason of why “there 
was never any mentioning of God in the family” (line 5). At the time of Alfia apa’s 
parents’ generation (1940-1950s), one could secure employment and/or build a successful 
professional career, such as rising to the ranks of the head of a collective farm, only by 
being an active member of the Communist party and thus by embracing (at least on the 
outside) the Soviet state’s official policy of atheism. 
While other women of Alfia apa’s age (for example, Zubarzhat khanïm, discussed 
in chapter 4) often told stories about witnessing their parents’ or grandparents’ secret 
observances of Muslim rituals—in an attempt to illustrate that faith was always part of 
their family—Alfia apa did not provide such accounts. She further illustrates the relative 
absence of religious observances/discussions in her family by stating that her mother did 
not recite namaz [Tat. ‘ritual prayer’] (line 12) and that “She did not know anything 
except Bismillyahi-rahmanir-rahim” (lines 12-13), a Qur’anic phrase pronounced by 
Muslims before doing something. According to Alfia apa, her own first personal 
experience with Islam took place at 29 when her mother was dying of cancer and asked 
Alfia apa to find someone to recite “Yasin,” a Qur'anic surah (chapter) recited by 
Muslims at someone's death bed to ease the process of passing. While Alfia apa admits 
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that she did not understand what “Yasin” was since her mother had never talked about it 
before (lines 9-10), the fact that her mother asked for it indicates some presence of faith 
in the family, or their understanding of some religious observances related to life-cycle 
rituals. It is further evidenced by the fact that Alfia apa's mother, while admitting that she 
was illiterate in the matters of religion because she could not “recite,” asks her daughter 
to give alms, so that prayers are said in her name (line 17).  
The story of Alfia apa's mother's death could be considered one account of Alfia 
apa's initial interest in religion. While Alfia apa does not mark it as such (by saying, for 
example, that she would give alms, but not very often – line 19), she begins her narrative 
with it to provide an important piece of information without which the other two stories 
would not have had the same rhetorical effect. Furthermore, while Alfia apa (who was 
sixty years old at the time of the interview) did not go all the way back to her childhood, 
her account of an event that took place thirty years ago provides temporal depth to her 
story, contributing to the creation of coherence. The fact that at twenty-nine Alfia apa 
was the sole caretaker for her dying mother and was the one to carry out her mother's 
religious wish characterizes her as a caring daughter who respected her parents and 
religious traditions. Therefore, it characterizes her as moral.   
Alfia apa continues to create coherence in her story by narrating two more 
accounts that contributed to her stepping on the road to piety, both accounts from a 
relatively distant past. She marks them by saying (in lines 19-20) that “there were the 
following two occurrences in my life.” The first one is Alfia apa’s helping a babay [Tat. 
‘old man’] onto the bus (lines 20-34) and a dream that follows (lines 34-42). The 
significance of this account is in both its meaning and form. Alfia apa interprets the 
	   137 
dream following her kind gesture toward the old Tatar man (who was also a religious 
authority at the time) as an important sign related to her mother’s dying wish to make 
prayers in her name, which he did. This is evident from Alfia apa’s statement in lines 42-
43: “And so, naturally, when I woke up, I understood why, right?” where Alfia apa refers 
to the reason she saw the dream, without actually stating it. The form in which Alfia apa 
presents the story—with detailed descriptions and dialogue—also contributes to the 
richness of the account. Finally, the significance of this account is also in the fact that its 
protagonist, Alfia apa, is a highly moral person. She is moral not just because she helped 
the old man, but because she “did it and forgot about it” (lines 33-34). She probably 
would not have remembered it had it not been for the dream, which points to the 
generosity, sincerity, and morality of the protagonist’s character. Not distancing herself 
from the protagonist allows the narrator to make a connection with the protagonist: Alfia 
apa was and is a moral person.    
Having finished narrating the first occurrence, Alfia apa marks it by saying “Ok, 
So that’s one dream” (line 43) and immediately moves on to describing the next non-
contradictory account that contributed to her piety and to her piety story’s coherence:  
Alfia apa’s story – segment # 2: 
A: 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
 
 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Then there was another occurrence in my life, which also took place the year 
my mom died. I go home from work. Well, back then, if you lived here, you would 
know… 
Yes, I remember the Soviet times.  
There was nothing [in the stores]. So, they used to sell beef ribs. They would sell 
them in a cafeteria. [We] would stand in line. Do you remember there were these 
meshed grocery bags? 
Yes, yes, yes. 
So, I was carrying [the ribs] home in a plastic bag inside the meshed bag. There 
was an old Russian woman who lived in our apartment building. I no longer 
remember her name. I was only 29. And so she is sitting—it turned out she was 
not receiving a pension—there were old ladies then who were not entitled to a 
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L: 
A: 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
social pension. So, she says: “Oh, where did you buy these ribs? They would 
make a nice soup!” Those ribs were cheap then, but impossible to buy. I thought, 
oh gosh, we even buy meat from the market. But for her [the ribs were] important, 
so I gave her the whole bag. We used to live on the fifth floor, and she lived on the 
ground floor. So she says: “Your mom died recently. May she rest in peace.” And 
while I was walking up the stairs, I heard her pray. That night I see a dream. My 
mom, she is so happy, and she says: “Kïzïm [Tat. ‘my daughter’], you sent me a 
jacket. It’s black, but still it’s so nice, so warm!” What does it mean? It means that 
they know everything about our deeds here.141 I started thinking about it. We used 
to live in a one-bedroom apartment, I was in line for [a bigger] apartment.142 
When was all that? 
It was in the 1980s. I was waiting for an apartment. Now they want to give it upon 
Moscow’s approval, now they don’t. It just wouldn’t work out. So, I stopped by a 
mosque—I was drawn there after those dreams. There were signs. Although up to 
this day, I am trying to talk my sisters into [believing], but they have not turned 
yet.   
  
The fact that Alfia apa marks the second account as related to the first one, by 
putting it in the same time frame and context (lines 44-45), indicates that the second 
account is narrated with the same purpose: to create a continuity and coherence in Alfia 
apa’s life story as a token of the narrator’s coherent, and thus her moral, character. The 
second account mirrors the first one in many aspects even though they are both 
“occurrences” (line 44), events that could not have been purposefully planned by her. 
Both events (a) happen within the first year of Alfia apa’s mother’s death (line 44); (b) 
take place when Alfia apa goes to work (the first account) or from work (the second 
account, line 45); (c) involve Alfia apa’s impromptu kind gestures toward an older 
person who happens to be religiously observant and poorer than Alfia apa’s family; (d) 
followed by dreams of her happy mother; (e) feature rich detail and dialogue; (f) prompt 
Alfia apa to think about their significance (line 63) and ascribe religious meaning to them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 By “here” Alfia apa means life on earth (as opposed to afterlife). 
142 During the Soviet time, the government distributed apartments free of charge to a certain segment of the population. 
There were huge waiting lists, and one could be on a waiting list from a couple of years to several decades, depending 
on a combination of factors.	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(lines 63-64); and (g) portray Alfia apa as a caring individual, and thus highly moral, 
without much effort on the part of the protagonist to be one. Finally, Alfia apa treats 
these events not as individual unrelated occurrences, but as interdependent and significant 
to her piety, evident in the opening of Alfia apa’s narrative of a third account (waiting for 
an apartment): “So, I stopped by a mosque—I was drawn there after those dreams. There 
were signs” (lines 68-69). As a result, these two accounts are not only noncontradictory, 
but surprisingly similar by the narrator’s own estimation.  
 The significance of these accounts is further evident in Alfia apa’s comment on 
them, when we resumed our conversation after it was interrupted by the teacher’s arrival 
and the mosque lesson. Alfia apa picked up her narrative with the following summary: 
“So, there were these signs. I began to believe. Of course, I was far from the faith. But I 
began to believe that people die and come alive because my mom appeared in my dreams 
so vividly and with such signs.” Alfia apa’s statement may seem contradictory because, 
in one breath, she says that she began to believe but was far from the faith. However, this 
contradiction is clarified at the end of Alfia apa’s account of yet another occurrence that 
contributed to her path to piety: her narrative about receiving a state-subsidized apartment 
she had been waiting for and eventually received.  
She begins the third account in lines 64-69 of the last excerpt when she talks 
about waiting for a bigger apartment and uncertainty surrounding the situation with it. In 
the absence of a private housing market143 during the Soviet period, a worker was entitled 
to a state-subsidized apartment (or to a bigger apartment if the family had outgrown an 
existing one, which was Alfia apa’s case). One, however, had to wait for it for years or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 A rare exception was so called cooperative apartments (“kooperativnye kvartiry”) that one could buy for a full-
market price.  
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even decades and was ultimately at the mercy of those in charge. Alfia apa continued the 
account with a narrative of going to a mosque to give alms with hopes to solve the 
apartment situation: 
Alfia apa’s story – segment # 3: 
 
A: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L: 
A: 
 
 
 
 
 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
[portion omitted] 
So, I had to solve the housing question. And I was solving it myself. We had a one 
bed-room apartment. [. . . ] I went to the Märjani mosque to see an abïstay [Tat. 
‘female religious authority’]. [She was] very pleasant, educated. And I tell her that 
there was no luck in my getting an apartment. She says: “Do you believe in the 
Almighty? Do you recite namaz [Tat. ‘ritual prayer’]?” “No.” “You need to carry 
out the Korban [Tat. ‘animal sacrifice’] ritual144 in order to get the apartment.” So, 
I ordered the Korban ceremony, and it was carried out. It happened to be the 
Festival of the Sacrifice, the end of August. She helped me; I bought it; she gave 
me addresses, and I gave away all the meat from the sacrifice. It was right before I 
received an apartment. When I came to those addresses, I was so surprised to see 
women with no legs, others just after a surgery, some with many many kids, and 
things like that. And so I gave away the meat, and in December I got the 
apartment. It was at the end of August, so if you count, I got the apartment after 
four months.  
What year was that? 
It was 1989. My mom passed away in 1979, and I got the apartment in ten 
years. It wasn’t right away. It was ten years without faith. I believed in God: 
Bismillyahi-rahmanir-rahim. Allahu Akbar.145 And when I got the apartment, I 
really started believing in God. I was thinking a lot, and realized that I must learn 
to recite namaz [Tat.’ ritual prayer’]. But back then there were no books, 
remember, Liliya? So I bought somewhere a Xeroxed copy of namaz. It contained 
a lot of errors, but I did not know.   
   
On the surface, Alfia apa’s decision to go to the mosque (a spiritual place) to 
solve a housing problem (a worldly issue) may seem contradictory and may raise 
questions about the integrity of her character. However, I argue that, if interpreted within 
the socio-historical context at hand, it indicates quite the opposite. During the Soviet era, 
the only way one could expedite the process of getting free housing was through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Alfia apa is talking about the sacrifice of a livestock animal during the Muslim Holiday known among Tatars as 
Korban Bayram (“Eid-ul-Adha” in Arabic), which honors Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son as an act of 
worship and obedience to God. Giving away the sacrificial meat as charity is considered Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative 
conduct based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example’]. 
145 Arabic phrases translated as “In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful” and “God is the Greatest” 
respectively and used by Muslims during formal prayers and in daily interactions as a form of “informal” worship.	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powerful connections or by bribing the appropriate officials in charge. The fact that Alfia 
apa did not do either (because she says “I was solving it [the housing question] by 
myself” (line 72)) points on the one hand, to her powerlessness in front of the system, 
but, on the other hand, to the presence of faith in her heart. As the Soviet state of atheism 
resulted in people’s losing religious knowledge, it was common among Tatars to turn to 
elders with their spiritual and worldly needs. As the only ones who preserved the Muslim 
religious tradition even if often in a vernacular form,146 older Tatars who possessed some 
religious knowledge often acted as figures of religious authority and mediators between 
Allah and people. While, in the context of the post-Soviet religious revival practicing 
Muslim Tatars stress the importance of a personal appeal to God and frown on the 
practice, it is still not uncommon to witness non-practicing Tatars stop by a mosque and 
ask a mullah [Tat./Ar. ‘Muslim clergy’]147 to recite a prayer in someone’s name or pray 
for a positive outcome in a private matter. Therefore, Alfia apa’s decision to go to a 
mosque to seek help with the housing problem was not unusual. 
In the narrative above, Alfia apa presents an account that is both accidental on the 
surface, and yet a formative experience for her road to piety. It is accidental because it is 
not directly related to the other two occurrences Alfia apa talked about. It is formative 
because after following the abystai’s advice, which resulted in the successful resolution 
of the housing problem, Alfia apa admits that she “really started believing in God” (line 
89-90). She precedes that by saying that “it was ten years without faith” (line 88). I 
propose that when Alfia apa states that she was “far from faith” and that she lived “ten 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Mukhametshin (2009) suggests that the Russian colonial rule resulted in the merger of ethnic (Tatar) traditions and 
religious (Muslim) practices, further intensified by the Soviet state’s policy of atheism, which led to vernacularization 
of local Muslim practice and knowledge.  
147 Today, the term is mostly used to refer to an older generation of Muslim clergy. The younger generation prefer to be 
referred to as “khäzrät” [Tat./Ar. ‘Muslim clergy’].	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years without faith” (line 88), she does not mean she was an atheist. What she means is 
that, as many other Tatars at the time, she was not a practicing Muslim. This is evident in 
her statement: “I believed in God: Bismillyahi-rahmanir-rahim. Allahu Akbar” (line 
89) where Alfia apa illustrates the kind of faith that she had: its observance was limited 
to the few Muslim phrases she knew, which was typical for the majority of Tatars at the 
time. She further makes it clear that it was the abystai’s question about namaz, combined 
with the successful resolution of the housing problem, that prompted her to think about 
the way she believed (line 90). The fact that Alfia apa links the emergence of strong faith 
(lines 90-91) with the decision to recite namaz points to the evolution, and thus 
continuity, of her Muslim piety, not to a jump from an absolute absence of faith to 
believing.  
This is further evidenced in the rest of Alfia apa’s narrative (not provided here in 
full due to space limitations). As she continued her story, Alfia apa conveyed that while 
she learned the elements of the prayer then, she did not begin performing it until several 
years later, due to not having an opportunity to find out how to put the elements together 
in the correct way. Similarly to her narrative pattern above, Alfia apa describes an 
opportunity to learn the prayer from a relative as what could be considered an accident: 
she happened to visit the relative who happened to be reciting namaz at the time of Alfia 
apa’s visit. The fact that Alfia apa credits Allah with this and the other three occurrences 
in her life is evident from her saying: “Apparently, Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] 
Himself led me to this.” She further explained that her learning how to recite namaz 
coincided with a serious problem in her family, and thus the prayer was Allah’s way to 
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prepare her how to deal with it: “Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] probably helped 
me the most. I then firmly stood for namaz.”148  
As evident from Alfia apa’s narrative, while the multiple accounts of her path to 
piety may initially have seemed to the protagonist (Alfia apa then) unrelated to one 
another, they are later perceived by the narrator (Alfia apa now) as a continuous journey 
to piety, made possible by Allah tägalä. Thus, coherence and continuity in Alfia apa’s 
narrative, life, and character are created not only through the richness of account (by 
going back in time and a combination of multiple noncontradictory accounts), but also 
through positioning the narrative within the coherence system (religious system in this 
case) that would be understood and shared by her audience: her daughter, her friends, me, 
and other practicing Muslim Tatar women. Ultimately, for Alfia apa and other practicing 
Muslim Tatar women, coherence in their lives, hearts, and character was indicative of the 
coherence of God’s design and his grace.   
 Alfia apa’s and Madina apa’s stories about their ways to Muslim piety are 
examples of what Snow & Malachek (1983, 1984) refer to as a change in a universe of 
discourse. Such change presupposes a replacement of once secondary universe of 
discourse with a primary one, which is evident in the narrative strategies of biographical 
reconstruction of the past and attribution of a master narrative scheme. While Alfia apa’s 
path to piety was different from that of Madina apa, what united these women’s stories 
was the presence of coherence and continuity in their narratives, as a reflection of the 
kind of people that they are and the values that they hold: coherent and thus moral.  
Drawing on Linde’s (1993) catalogue of rhetorical strategies that speakers utilize 
to create adequate causality and continuity (as prerequisites for coherence), I argue that in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 “To stand for namaz” means to begin reciting the Muslim five daily prayer on a regular basis.  
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Madina apa’s narrative coherence is rooted in her moral character. Even when she was a 
non-practicing Muslim, Madina apa’s belief in the Tatar purity and her continuous 
attempts to find it in a Soviet, and later post-Soviet, societies plagued by problems 
characterize her as moral. Similarly, Alfia apa’s story also portrays her as a moral person, 
not only because of the actions she takes on the road to piety, but also because of 
coherence and continuity achieved in her narrative through temporal depth and multiple 
noncontradictory accounts.  
Finally, both women’s belief that their road to piety was made possible by the 
grace of Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’], allows the women to locate their 
narratives and, ultimately selves, within the value system shared by other Muslim Tatars. 
Such sharing of beliefs—in a narrative, in the presence of other women—not only 
enhances coherence, but also resolves any potential questions about the older Muslim 
Tatar women’s past and their present-day commitment to Muslim piety. Ultimately, it 
allows the women to experience personal transformation in the act of story-sharing and 
provides the audience with a repertoire of paths to Muslim piety from which to draw.   
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CHAPTER 6  
VOICING AN INVITATION TO MUSLIM PIETY THROUGH PIETY STORIES 
In this chapter, I introduce and analyze another culturally specific function of 
piety stories, the function of dagvat149 (from Arabic “da’wah”150), an invitation or call to 
Islam and Muslim piety. By using one practicing Tatar Muslim woman’s piety story as a 
case study, I illustrate how, in the process of sharing piety stories, Muslim women engage 
in an oral, indirect form of dagvat, the purpose of which is to invite the interlocutor(s) to 
consider, and possibly share, the speaker’s system of belief and, ultimately, to step onto 
and stay on the road to piety. Hirschkind (2006) explains that, as an act that enables a 
Muslim to inspire others to pursue greater piety, da’wah becomes a collective moral duty 
that is binding on Muslims as members of the Ummah, the global Muslim community (p. 
109). As a form of da’wah, then, piety stories represent a form of moral discourse, and 
their sharing is an act of piety. Finally, I propose that, by engaging in dagvat through the 
communicative act of storytelling, Muslim Tatar women voice their agency by 
advocating for a pious lifestyle that they see as a means to a personal and, ultimately, 
social transformation. 
In this chapter, I first define da’wah and explain its significance as a moral, 
collective action incumbent upon Muslims as members of the global Muslim community. 
I then describe a variety of ways da’wah is understood and practiced among present-day 
Muslim Tatars, showing how a piety story serves as a discursive form of da’wah. Using a 
piety story of a practicing Muslim Tatar woman (Mariam apa) as a case study, I illustrate 
how she uses piety stories (her own and others’) to nurture the moral state of multiple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Dagvat is an English transliteration of the Russian version (“дагват”) of the Arabic borrowing. 
150 Also transliterated from Arabic into English as da’wa or dawah.	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communities she belongs to (from her immediate family to the Ummah) by encouraging 
personal transformation through Muslim piety. I proceed to examine rhetorical strategies 
Mariam apa utilizes in her piety story in order to deliver dagvat. One of them is didactic 
stories—stories about other people’s lives—that serve as real life examples in support of 
a moral point. Next, I illustrate how Mariam apa’s meta-comments about doing dagvat 
through her own piety story highlight her familiarity with the practice and ability to 
utilize it to guide the listener onto the road to piety. I conclude that, as a moral discursive 
act that provides Muslim Tatar women with an opportunity to invite the listener to 
Muslim piety, dagvat in the form of piety stories becomes a source of agency for personal 
and social transformation.  
 
Da’wah as Moral, Collective Action 
 
The notion of da’wah, as an invitation or call to Islam, appears in the Qur’an and 
other Muslim classical religious texts. Its original meaning refers to “God's way of 
bringing believers to faith and the means by which prophets call individuals and 
communities back to God” (“Dawah,” 2003). Over time, the concept acquired multiple 
meanings, ranging from an individual activity, such as prayer, to religious political and 
social movements of the twentieth century, such the Da’wah movement in Egypt.151 
Contemporary discussions on da’wah center around questions on whether da’wah can be 
considered a missionary/proselytizing practice similar to the one found in Western 
Christianity and on the means whereby da’wah is/should be carried out.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Racius’ (2004) dissertation discusses the multiple nature of da’wah; Muslim scholars, Sakr (1997) for example, also 
emphasize the multiple nature of da’wah. Mahmood (2005) and Hirschkind (2006) provide insights into the twentieth 
century Da’wah movement in Egypt.  
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Relevant to my inquiry is Hirschkind’s (2006) observation that one of da’wah’s 
early meanings, which remains key to contemporary Islamic thought, is “that of a duty, 
incumbent upon some or all members of the Islamic community, to actively encourage 
fellow Muslims in the pursuance of greater piety in all aspects of their lives” (p. 109). 
Therefore, da’wah is a social or communal activity, not just an act of an individual faith 
and conviction. Through his analysis of cassette sermons in contemporary Egypt, 
Hirschkind (2006), for example, explains how da’wah becomes a moral and communal 
act at the discursive level in the context of secular Egypt’s Islamic revival:152 
To assume the position of a da’iya (one who undertakes da’wa) is to adopt the 
rhetorical stance of a member of the Islamic umma153 acting on behalf of that 
particular historical project (and thus not simply as an individual concerned for 
his or her own moral conduct)…Da’wah is constituted whenever and wherever 
individuals enter into that form of discourse geared toward upholding or 
improving the moral condition of the collective . . . . (p. 116) 
 
In other words, Hircshkind implies that da’wah is not simply a type of moral discourse – 
it is moral action. Furthermore, because every Muslim is simultaneously a member of a 
local and global community of Muslims (the Ummah), his or her conduct is reflective and 
constitutive of the Ummah and is never completely personal. It is bound not only by the 
tenets of the faith, but also by one’s membership in the Ummah. 
 
Da’wah in the Local (Tatar) Context  
My analysis of Mariam apa’s narrative below illustrates that da’wah also serves 
these functions among Muslim Tatar practicing women and their piety stories in 
particular, in the context of the Tatar Muslim Revival. Growing up in Tatarstan in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Hirschkind (2006) defines Islamic Revival in Egypt as follows: “While this movement encompasses a wide variety 
of phenomena, from political parties to underground militant organizations, in Egypt its broadest section has always 
remained grounded in grassroots efforts to revitalize Islamic forms of knowledge, pedagogy, comportment, and 
sociability” (p. 6).  
153 “Community” (Arabic).	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1990s at the peak of Tatars’ ethno-religious revival, I witnessed multiple instances of 
what could be considered da’wah—ranging from Friday mosque sermons to an older 
Tatar woman’s request that her granddaughter wear longer skirts, avoid sleeveless tops 
and say “Allah birsa” [Tat. ‘God willing’] when making plans. I argue that the latter were 
not necessarily conceived of and carried out as carefully planned acts of da’wah (such as 
a mosque sermon, for example), but were part of the daily practices that indirectly serve 
the da’wah function of maintaining the healthy moral state of the Ummah.  
The Tatar word for da’wah is däg’’vat 154 and is most likely an older Arabic 
borrowing that translates as a call to Islam. According to one of my interviewees, a 
practicing Muslim Tatar woman in her early seventies who became an abïstay, a female 
religious authority, after she retired, the term and its religious meanings were once 
actively used by Tatars (her parents’ and grandparents’ generations), but became absent 
from an average Tatar’s lexicon during the Soviet times. However, as a result of the post-
Soviet Muslim revival and re-emergence of practices associated with da’wah, the term is 
gradually making its way back. Moreover, its Russian version—dagvat155—is the one I 
repeatedly heard among practicing Muslims during my fieldwork. The Tatarstan-based 
Muslim newspaper Umma156 conducted a text-message reader survey on “What is dagvat 
(a call to Islam) in your life?” [Ru. “Chto v vashei zhizni est’ dagvat (prizyv k islamu)]?” 
The readers’ responses reflect practicing Muslim Tatars’ understanding of da’wah today:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Transliteration of the Tatar word “дəәгъват” 
155 Transliteration of the Russian word “дагват“; also spelled as “да'ва” and “да'ват” (Safiullina, 2005, p. 78).  
156 The newspaper is endorsed by Tatarstan’s Spiritual Muslim Board. Its title translates from Arabic as “Muslim 
community.” I accessed the survey online (http://www.e-umma.ru/node/889).	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• “Dagvat is adab [Ar. ‘good manners, behavior’]. Good treatment of everyone and 
neat appearance” [Ru. “Dagvat – adab. Khoroshee otnoshenie ko vsem i opriatnyi 
vneshnii vid.”] 
• “A call – is a story about Islam; it begins since childhood” [Ru. “Prizyv – eto 
rasskaz ob islame, on nachinaetsia s detstva.”]  
• “The most important call is one’s own positive example.” [Ru.“Samyi glavnyi 
prizyv – eto sobstvennyi polozhitel’nyi primer.”] 
• “I think one need not call [someone else to Islam], but one needs to simply answer 
questions [about Islam]; that’s all.” [Ru. “Ya schitaiu, chto prizyvat’ nikogo ne 
nado, a prosto otvechat’ na voprosy.”] 
The readers’ responses suggest that, while the present-day concept of dagvat still 
denotes the basic notion of calling/inviting to Islam, it is being used in relation to a 
multitude of practices. The first response, for example, shows the close association 
between dagvat and being a good person through “good treatment of everyone” and 
observing “adab,” good manners, behavior. The third responder views “one’s own 
positive example” as an act of dagvat. Yet, the second response underlines the discursive 
side of dagvat as “a story about Islam.” Similarly, I argue that another example of a 
discursive act of dagvat is a personal narrative such as a piety story. The piety story 
analyzed below is a case in point. 
 
Case Study: Mariam apa’s Piety Story as a (Discursive) Act of Da’wah 
The piety story analyzed in this chapter is a case study of dagvat in the form of 
personal narrative shared by Mariam apa, a self-identified half-Tatar, half-Uzbek 
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practicing Muslim woman in her late forties. By focusing on Mariam apa’s narrative, I 
illustrate the potential of piety stories to serve as a form of discourse designed to nurture 
the moral state of multiple communities the speaker belongs to—the family, the 
neighborhood, the town, the country, the Ummah—by encouraging personal 
transformation through Muslim piety. Emphasizing the importance of case studies that 
focus on an individual, Flueckiger (2006) and Peshkova (2013) argue that examining a 
culture at the level of an individual life provides a lens for looking at wider conditions 
and communities. Furthermore, while Mariam apa’s personality and story may come 
across as atypical or even idiosyncratic to those who exhibit a skeptical view towards 
Muslim piety (for example, non-observant Muslims or secularists), it is because they do 
not easily fit within the dominant structures and discourses and, as such, provide an 
opportunity for seeing what’s beyond the surface (Okely, as cited in Flueckiger 2006, p. 
24).   
I interviewed Mariam apa over the course of three three-hour long conversations 
at the Mukhammadiia medrese in Kazan, where Mariam was a fourth-year extramural 
student. I chose Mariam apa’s story for a diversity of its rhetorical features that resemble 
a more direct form of da’wah, such as a khutbah [Ar. ‘sermon’] and include citations 
from the Qur’an and ahadith [Ar. ‘accounts of exemplary sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet Muhammad’], didactic stories, and rhetorical questions that follow or precede 
moral points. By making Mariam apa’s narrative resemble the traditional form of 
da’wah, these rhetorical features demonstrate her mastery of da’wah and make moral 
points that she sets forth in her story more appealing. Moreover, several hours into our 
conversation, Mariam apa characterized her own narrative as dagvat intended for me and 
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punctuated the rest of her story with metatalk on various kinds of dagvat she had engaged 
in, being a practicing Muslim. In the process of introducing myself and telling her about 
myself and my research, I shared with Mariam apa that I had adopted some Muslim 
practices (such as the five daily prayer and the headscarf, for example) upon beginning 
my fieldwork in Kazan, only a couple of months before our meeting. Therefore, for 
Mariam apa, I was not an inexperienced Muslim whose iman [Ar./Tat. faith] needed to 
be protected, nurtured and cultivated. 
Furthermore, a woman’s piety rarely stopped with her and often affected her 
immediate family in multiple, sometimes unpredictable ways (as did the family affect her 
iman). As a result, in the process of sharing their piety stories women often asked and 
talked about immediate family members. In the course of our interaction, Mariam apa 
and I discussed our family members’ attitudes toward faith and discovered that men in 
our families showed less interest in religion than women. This may be why, at some point 
in her narrative, Mariam apa told me a story about a Muslim Tatar friend who was 
concerned about religious differences in her marriage. Mariam apa encouraged the friend 
to deliver dagvat to her ethnic Russian non-practicing husband. As a point of comparison, 
Mariam apa weaved in a story about another family where both husband and wife were 
practicing Muslims and lived happily. “Indeed, you see,” Mariam apa told me, “people 
are happy in Islam.” She proceeded with a comment on the importance of dagvat in a 
Muslim’s life: 
A Muslim must not live quietly, as it happens, if a person nearby doesn’t know about 
faith. One should try to deliver [religious knowledge] because, for example, my 
Russian neighbor might say on the Judgment day: ‘And she was my neighbor; she 
surely knew, why didn’t she tell me?’ There is a hadith [Ar. ‘an account of exemplary 
sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad’] about a place that Allah ordered the 
angels to destroy because there were non-believers [there]. They [the angels] saw there 
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one righteous man, so they came back and said: ‘We could not [destroy the place] 
because there is a righteous man there.’ Allah said: ‘Begin with him because he knows 
but hasn’t delivered [religious knowledge] to others.’ You see, knowledge, it bears 
down, so that you, it is a mission. What is this knowledge for? Knowledge is light, so 
that it must enlighten someone. Not just that you [alone] are enlightened, and you see 
everything.     
 
While in the above passage Mariam apa uses a Russian (and thus non-Muslim) person as 
an example of someone who could benefit from dagvat, her opening sentence—“if a 
person nearby doesn’t know about faith”—indicates the importance of dagvat to 
everyone, including fellow Muslims, as I positioned myself.  
Mariam apa was not the only woman I interviewed who, in the process of sharing 
her piety story with me, simultaneously engaged in dagvat and commented on its 
importance. Malika, another practicing Muslim Tatar woman in her early thirties (whose 
piety story is analyzed in chapter 8) also commented on the importance of dagvat in the 
course of our conversation—without directly referring to the practice—in the following 
way: 
The religion encourages us to...we need to tell...we need to, sort of, correctly carry 
[religious knowledge] to people, so that... no one…everyone has information about 
Allah. So that [when you are] before God on the Judgment day, he wouldn’t ask you: 
“Why did you keep silent? Why didn’t you speak?” So, um, the human-, the humanity 
is one community; it’s one body...and you can’t just preserve purity this way and not 
strive so that those next to you live the same way, you see, it’s impossible. So a 
Muslim, any Muslim, he157 incites neighbors in his own way, everyone in a different 
way ac-, according to his personality and knowledge, but everyone has this desire. 
 
Just like Mariam apa, Malika considers it a duty “to carry [religious knowledge] to 
people.” By referring to the humanity as “one community,” “one body,” Malika invokes 
the Muslim notion of ummah—what Hirschkind (2006) refers to as “fundamentally a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Third person singular masculine pronoun “he” is used to agree with the singular masculine noun “Muslim.” Third 
person singular masculine is often used in Russian to describe a non-specific situation, and it is particularly used in 
formal speech. It does not necessarily imply the speaker’s preference of one gender over the other.  
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moral space” (p. 117)—that presupposes collective (vs. personal) accountability that is 
binding on all members of the community. Perhaps because both Mariam apa and Malika 
had been practicing Muslims for an extended period of time and possessed advanced 
religious knowledge, their awareness and mastery of dagvat are particularly manifest in 
their narratives. 
While Malika’s and Mariam apa’s narratives provide a commentary on da’wah, I 
argue that piety stories can serve as da’wah even if their content is limited to a detailed 
account of a woman’s path to Islam and does not address the question of da’wah in any 
way. A piety storyteller can engage into da’wah by way of “engaging the listener’s 
heart.” Hirschkind’s (2006) insights into sensory affect of Muslim sermon listening are 
particularly useful here. He observes: 
From early in the development of Islam, sermon audition has been identified as 
essential to the cultivation of the sensitive heart that allows one to hear and 
embody in practice the ethical sensibilities undergirding moral action. Beyond the 
cognitive task of learning rules and procedures, listeners hone those affective-
volitional dispositions, ways of the heart that both attune the heart to God’s word 
and incline the body toward moral action. (p. 9)   
 
While a Muslim piety story is not identical to a Muslim sermon (past or present) 
in its purpose, content, form, mode of delivery, or setting, I argue that a piety story is also 
capable of “cultivating of the sensitive heart,” by allowing the speaker to re-create—and 
the audience, to share in—the speaker’s deeply personal experience on the path to 
Muslim piety. In the course of my fieldwork, I have not only observed the affective 
impact of sharing of piety stories that would orient the listener’s body, through her heart, 
to a moral action, but I have experienced it myself first hand. A practicing woman’s 
narrative about her donning the headscarf was often one of the most affective parts of her 
piety story, as it referred to a moral action that was not easy to commit to (as the 
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teacher’s narrative in chapter 4 illustrates). Such a story could often contribute to the 
listener’s donning of the headscarf, or encourage her to keep it on despite the difficulties 
associated with it.   
My conversation with Mariam apa took place in the presence of Raisa apa, a 
practicing Tatar Muslim woman in her fifties who was a medrese worker and Mariam 
apa’s acquaintance. While I made every effort to conduct interviews in a private setting, 
with just me and the interviewee present, sometimes the interviewee would invite 
someone else to listen to our conversation or simply would not mind if another person 
remained in the same room. I propose that sometimes such occurrences were not simple 
coincidences but were reflective of the interviewee’s desire for a certain type of 
interaction: her intention to deliver dagvat—through her piety story—to someone else 
besides me. For example, Malika, a practicing Tatar Muslim woman in her early thirties 
whom I quoted above, brought her non-practicing Tatar cousin to our interview. During 
my interview with Mariam apa at the Mukhammadiia medrese, Raisa apa happened to be 
on duty in the same vicinity. At the time, Mariam apa was recalling a dream158 that she 
interpreted as a message from Allah159 to not be afraid of anyone but Him. Having 
noticed Raisa apa nearby, Mariam invited her to join in our conversation by saying: 
“This will be interesting for you to hear as well, as a lesson.” This invitation revealed 
Mariam apa’s intention to deliver dagvat to me and Raisa apa, a Tatar woman who 
became a practicing Muslim only recently.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Mariam apa considered her dreams to be messages from God; in the course of our three interview sessions, Mariam 
recollected many dreams and provided her interpretations of them. At some point in the interview she admitted that she 
“probably came to Islam through dreams.”  
159 Unless otherwise indicated in a transcript, Mariam apa used the term “Allah” throughout her narrative.  
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Below I present the data segment that was part of Mariam apa’s piety story. In 
this segment, Mariam apa engages in dagvat by openly speaking about the benefit of 
religious knowledge: 
Mariam apa’s story – segment #1: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
 
And the greatest knowledge, the best knowledge—I understood it later by the age 
of forty—that we say “Allah is great!” and so knowledge from Him is also the 
greatest. Even if you have a hundred degrees, they will not substitute this 
knowledge for you. If you have this knowledge, you are with Allah. Allah will 
open all roads for you. The main thing, I am saying, is you give your all, and you 
will receive the quality and reliability.160 Anyone can err; anyone can deceive 
somewhere something, but there is no such thing about Allah: He never errs and 
He never deceives. He had promised, He says: “If you are with me, no one,” you 
know, “even if the entire world would want to destroy you, it won’t be able to if 
I,” He says, “am for you. If [I] am against,” just try to say something that 
wouldn’t be liked by Allah, “the entire world would want to protect you, but no 
one will be able to,” it is said. And, indeed, this is true. Everyone has trials, and 
every day, if there is faith in [one’s] soul, every person gets through these trials. 
And faith helps to go through gracefully. And you, so that, not being afraid of 
anything, but being afraid of Allah, and you are getting through these trials. 
Allah—bam—throws you such a reward, such gifts. I know from people’s lives.  
 
While the beginning of Mariam apa’s narrative may seem random and directly 
unrelated to her own story, it refers back to a previous conversation she and I had had. As 
we were getting to know each other, Mariam apa had asked me about my education and 
the academic degree I was working on. Later on, I expressed to her my sentiment about 
the importance of secular education. When in line 3 Mariam apa states: “Even if you 
have a hundred degrees, they will not substitute this knowledge for you,” she uses the 
second person pronoun “you” not only as a rhetorical device to address her imaginative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Mariam apa is referring to the dream she had shared with Raisa apa and me. In the dream, she and her husband 
were at a market buying goods in bulk at a store for further resale (Mariam and her husband traded goods for a living). 
The storeowner had promised her husband that he would sell them the best quality goods at the lowest price if they 
bought in bulk. They did exactly that, and receive a great deal, despite another trader’s efforts’ to frighten them and 
sabotage the deal. Mariam interpreted her dream to her husband in a religious sense: “’so, everywhere, and in the 
Qur’ran as well, they say that those who are in trade with Allah those will not be at a loss, that precisely this kind of 
trade is profitable.’ And, indeed, only Allah has the best quality [goods] and the cheapest, but you have to give it all, all 
your money. How simple, isn’t it?”	  	  	  
	   156 
audience, but also to address me personally to invite me to think about the importance of 
religious knowledge. She continues her dagavat by quoting Allah in lines 8-12, which 
points to Mariam apa’s knowledge of the Qur’ran and her ability to draw on it as part of 
dagvat. According to Mariam apa, religious knowledge is a foundation of faith and one’s 
commitment to God. If such commitment is without hesitation, it will be rewarded by 
Allah.  
Mariam apa supports her argument by not only quoting God himself, but also by 
using other women’s piety stories as “real life” evidence when she begins re-telling 
someone else’s piety story by saying “I know from people’s lives” (line 16). In the data 
segment below, Maria apa continues her dagvat by, first, relaying and commenting on a 
piety-story-sharing experience she had engaged in and then re-telling the piety story in 
support of her sentiment. Raisa apa, who had briefly left the conversation, returns and 
asks permission to join us again. 
Mariam apa’s story – segment #2: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Just yesterday, I was sitting and speaking with a girl. Well, it’s interesting to talk, 
after all. I quickly pop a story; she is sitting: “Wow, goosebumps!” A story of 
people with Islam. I say: “And now you tell me.” Well, I understand that she also 
knows such things. She says: “You know…” You may have already heard. One 
woman came to this girl to study, and—she was not all that young—she worked 
at a bank. And, while working at the bank, she came to a mosque to study. “And 
I,” she said, “once noticed that she began to take the headscarf off when she 
comes.161 I thought she just wanted to adjust [it]; I did not understand that she is 
out on the street without the headscarf. I wanted to adjust: ‘Let me see, let me see, 
they will see you, let me tie it nicely for you.’ And she says: ‘Oh no, heavens, no!  
I don’t wear the headscarf when I am out.’ I,” she says, “we talked for a long 
time, that ‘it’s Allah, that it’s a command from Allah; why should you be afraid 
of people?’ And she began to explain: ‘I work for a bank, and I will have, well, 
[they] fire me’.” And she said: “I said that Allah is the giving one; don’t be afraid; 
[one] should only be afraid of Allah.” And so this is what happened some time 
later…Evidently, she, having listened to—the other one must have managed to 
deliver [her message] convincingly—and that one started to wear the headscarf at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Evidently, Mariam apa misspoke here. She most likely meant to say “leaves.” 
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work also. She chose “what’s more important for me?” And her boss came and 
called her. [He] says: “Choose either Allah or work.” And she chose, of course, 
Allah. She cried, she said.  
May I listen in? ((listens from a distance))  
[portion omitted] 
And so, when she chose Allah, she cried, you know, but she had to leave her job. 
“And,” she says, “there was such a surprise. I am out walking,” she says, “in a 
month or two, and there is a familiar face in a hijab [Ar. ‘headscarf’], in a 
headscarf a woman [is walking] toward me. ‘Assalyamu aleikum [Ar. ‘Peace be 
upon you’],162 we said hellos. So what happened in a short period of time. She 
lost her job and came to Kazan. She had such a salary, about twenty thousand,163 
at the bank… 
It probably wasn’t in Kazan? 
No, but not far way, but for that area it was a big salary, twenty thousand.  
In Tatarstan? 
Yes. And she got a job as a sales associate here at a store. Just a hundred rubles 
per day. Imagine, it’s only three thousand, but in return she is with Allah. And, 
she says, that it so happened that during such a short period of time she got 
married. Her husband is 38 years old, as it turns out, he is a Muslim. And he is an 
architect himself, so they live in an apartment building now; he drafted it himself. 
She has such a huge, chic apartment, she says. And she almost monthly travels to 
Turkey, travels here and there; her own wardrobe… 
God gave all this, you see.  
Yes. In a short period of time. It was just necessary to make a choice, that’s all. 
And before that, I told her a story that I had read in the Kïybla164 magazine. Do 
you know [it]?  
 
In the excerpt above, Mariam apa uses someone else’s piety story in support of 
the arguments she makes as part of her dagvat to me. But before sharing the story with 
me, Mariam apa comments on the role and impact of a “story of people with Islam” 
(lines 17-20). Not only does Mariam apa find such stories interesting, she is aware of 
their emotional affect and uses them as dagvat: “Well, it’s interesting to talk, after all. I 
quickly pop a story; she is sitting: ‘Wow, goosebumps!’” (line 18). In lines 57-58, 
Mariam apa clarifies that the story she had shared with the woman came from the Tatar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Muslim greeting. 
163 Rubles per month, which is an above average salary for a woman in provincial Russia at the time of interview 
(2009).	  
164 “Kïybla” is a Tatar form of the Arabic word “qibla,” which refers to the direction of the sacred Muslim place, 
Kaaba, in which direction Muslims turn during prayer. Mariam apa is referring to a Tatar-language Muslim magazine.   
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Muslim magazine Kïybla, which indicates the presence of piety stories in print media.165 
Furthermore, by saying that she understands that her interlocutor “also knows such 
things” (19-20) and by asking me if I have already heard the story she is about to tell, 
Mariam apa indirectly comments on the popularity of the story sharing practice. Finally, 
by asking her interlocutor to share a story, having told one herself, Mariam apa invites 
the other woman to participate in the dagvat experience not only as its recipient, but as a 
da’iyah, the one delivering da’wah.  
By initiating such role reversal, Mariam apa creates a reciprocal relationship that 
forges solidarity and enables her listener to begin enacting Muslim piety without a delay, 
in her own moment of story telling, right then and there. In his analysis of cassette 
sermons in Egypt, Hirschkind (2006) draws on Wilberg’s definition of communication as 
“a collective performance, founded upon active dynamic for which both the speaker and 
the listener are responsible” (p. 23). Based on this notion, I argue that the story sharing 
practice provides an opportunity for collective da’wah where the listener’s perception—
her ability to listen with her heart— is as integral to the experience as the da’iyah’s 
ability to cultivate the sensitive heart.   
The piety story that Mariam apa retells in lines 20-54 reflects a typical “before 
and after” pattern of a conversion narrative. It focuses on one’s initial interest in religion, 
a turning point (often accompanied by dramatic trials and tribulations), and the outcome 
of the change, in this instance a “happy end,” which supported the main message of 
Mariam apa’s dagvat: if you commit to God, He will generously reward you. In addition, 
the piety story contains elements of direct dagvat, delivered by Mariam apa’s interlocutor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Muslim print and digital media in Tatar and Russian are abundant with piety stories, as I discovered during my 
fieldwork.	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to the story’s heroine when the former learned that the young woman was afraid to wear 
her headscarf outside the mosque (lines 27-28; 30-31). While in this instance Mariam sets 
off her acquaintance’s speech with “she says” (line 27) and “she said” (line 30), at the 
time of our conversation I perceived the utterances as Mariam apa’s indirect dagvat to 
me, especially because the sentiment resonated with her earlier message on religious 
knowledge and commitment to God (lines 1-16). Finally, the fact that Mariam shares her 
acquaintance’s moral stance on the story and further voices it as dagvat to Raisa apa and 
me is evident from Mariam apa’s final comment. When in reaction to the story Raisa apa 
says: “God gave her all this, you see,” Mariam apa responds: “Yes. In a short period of 
time. It was just necessary to make a choice, that’s all” (line 55), thereby summarizing 
the moral point of the story.     
 
Dagvat in the Form of Didactic Stories Within Piety Story 
While Mariam apa shared another woman’s piety story by summarizing it clearly 
and concisely in a linear fashion, her own narrative about her path to Islam was very 
circumlocutory. It could be due to the fact that I met with Mariam apa three times, for 
three hours at a time, so Mariam apa relayed a large amount of information to me. But it 
could also be due to the fact that, in the process of sharing her piety story, Mariam apa 
was concerned not only with its content and factuality, but also with its impact and 
purpose: to deliver dagvat to me. From the very beginning Mariam apa’s narrative was 
filled with multiple stories not only about her own life, but also about the lives of her 
family members and friends, despite my continuous questions about Mariam apa’s own 
life. This was one of the reasons why, not satisfied with what I learned about Mariam 
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apa’s own religious experience during our first conversation, I asked her to meet with me 
again.  
However, a closer examination of Mariam apa’s narrative later on led me to 
realize that throughout her talk, Marriam apa relied on other people’s stories as real life 
examples for a moral point she was trying to make and inviting me to consider. I argue 
that Mariam apa drew on these stories as a rhetorical strategy for delivering an indirect 
dagvat to me. As such, these micro-narratives within her own macro-narrative166 become 
didactic stories. Commenting on masalah, didactic stories shared by Uzbek female 
spiritual leaders (otinchalar), Peshkova (2006) argues that these didactic stories provide 
models for social behavior that are considered morally appropriate within the local 
context. Moreover, female spiritual leaders perceive the telling of these stories as part of 
their moral obligation “to actively engage in the transformation of their lives, their family 
lives, and their communities into informed Muslims” (Peshkova, 2006, p. 179). Similarly, 
Mariam apa weaved in didactic stories within her piety story with the purpose of creating 
a moral impetus for her listeners’ transformation as, first and foremost, members of the 
Ummah.  
The excerpt below is an example of a brief story Mariam apa tells about her 
friend. She then follows the story with a moral point. Mariam apa weaved the story into a 
narrative thread about her family member who used to practice fortunetelling, which is 
considered haram [Ar. ‘forbidden’] in Islam: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 I draw here on Gergen (1994) who suggests: “macronarratives refer to accounts in which events span broad periods 
of time, while micronarratives relate events of brief duration” (p. 203). 
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Mariam apa’s story – segment # 3:167 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
 
So, a girl friend of mine wanted to start a business with her husband, and a psychic 
said there wouldn’t be any luck. They say, there wasn’t any luck, indeed. Well, 
that’s because you haven not asked from Allah. In Islam, they ask from Allah, and 
then Allah necessarily gives to the one who asked. And because you haven’t asked, 
Allah gave the other one, and now you think: “Oh yeah, that [psychic] told the 
truth.” You will go, run to her again next time since she tells the truth, it turns out. 
So, that’s how it goes. It doesn’t leave any hope, right? 
 Having summarized the story in lines 1-2, Mariam apa proceeds to emphasize the 
moral point exemplified by it: “In Islam, they ask from Allah, and then Allah necessarily 
gives to the one who asked” (lines 3-4). The brief story above does not describe Mariam 
apa’s own religious experience per se. Instead, it reflects Mariam apa’s system of 
belief—her moral stance—that she conveys through the story and invites her listener to 
consider. It is not only the content, but also the form of the narrative, that makes it both a 
didactic story and an instance of dagvat. When Mariam apa summarizes the key point of 
the story, she switches from the third person narrative to the second person, addressing 
her interlocutor directly, and thereby inviting her to think about the moral of the story 
(lines 3-6).   
 
Performing Dagvat and Commenting About It 
 While we routinely rely on storytelling to make sense of the world (Linde, 1993), 
what makes Mariam apa’s narrative an instance of dagvat is the belief system—Islam— 
that she espouses and invites the listener to consider, as the excerpts above illustrates. In 
addition, half way into our first conversation, Mariam apa admitted that her narrative was 
partially dagvat to me. She had just finished telling me about a religious dream she had, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Because this segment did not follow the previous segment immediately, I started the line numbering anew. I 
followed this rule throughout the rest of the data segments in the chapter.  
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one of many spiritual dreams that she had had and considered important milestones in her 
spiritual development. In the dream, she saw the words of the shahadah [Arabic], the 
declaration of faith in the Islam,168 spelled out in front of her eyes in Arabic, even though 
Mariam apa admitted that she did not know the Arabic letters at the time: 
Mariam apa’s story – segment # 4: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
 
I would notice that all serious, meaningful dreams, they haunt me, and I begin to 
search for something. Why is it so? I did not understand the meaning of the dream at 
all, but now I know that Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] gave me to    learn 
the meaning, so in the dark these letters, these words were spelled: “There is no god 
but God, and Muhammad is His messenger.” He illuminated the meaning of these 
words for me. So, why was it positioned from the direction of Kibla?169 There, 
these surahs [Ar. ‘Qur’anic chapters’] begin with the word “Qul’!” [Ar. ‘Say’] 
“Say!” Meaning that I am also ordered: “orient yourself in the direction of Kibla 
and say, recite namaz [Tat. ‘ritual prayer’]” these words, right? And then, also, I 
learned that when you say “La ilaha illa’Llah” [Ar. ‘There is no other god, but 
Allah’] …I am telling you this as dagvat, a bit….on the one hand, right? You will 
also understand through this that Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] says that 
on the Judgment Day, these sincerely spoken words “La ilaha illa’Llah, 
Muhammadur rasulu l-Lah,” on the scale, when all our good deeds will be 
weighted, they will be the heaviest. No matter what good deeds you may have 
done, right, they, as it happens, will be the heaviest on the scale, heavier than 
anything else. [Meaning] that we believe sincerely that there is one God, and 
Muhammad is His messenger, right?     
 The excerpt above suggests not only Mariam apa’s direct dagvat to met, but also 
the importance of dreams in her spiritual development. While analyzing the centrality of 
dream narratives among Evangelical Christian converts, Stromberg (1993) observes: “for 
many members of our society, a dream is a mystical phenomenon, something with a 
mysterious connection to everyday reality” and that a dream creates a setting where one 
can experience “normally unacceptable aspects of [her] own feelings and desires” by 
blending the canonical and metaphorical language (p. 62).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 In English, the shahadah translates as “There is no other god, but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger” and 
professes the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as a Prophet.     
169 The direction of Muslim ritual prayer. 
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The importance of dreams in one’s spiritual development is not limited to 
members of the Evangelical Christianity movement in the West. Commenting on the 
daw’ah practices of female members of the mosque movement in Egypt, Mahmood 
(2005) describes one daiyat’s (one who deliver da’wah) urge “to serve God in da’wa, a 
calling that was repeatedly revealed to her in the form of a dream” (p. 92). Finally, 
exploring the significance of dreams in the context of the radical social change in post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan, Louw (2010) argues that dreams, their sharing, and interpretations 
become “a social riddle,” a means by which the dreamer (and those involved in the 
dream) must decide where he or she can exercise free will, or what is out of his or her 
control and must be left to fate (p. 289). Therefore, while Mariam apa’s dream narratives 
may come across as mystical or supernatural, they are not considered to be out of the 
ordinary in the local context.  
Mariam apa first explains the importance of dreams in her spiritual development 
(lines 1-2). She then interprets the dream she saw and, in the process, explains the 
meaning of the shahadah, partially reciting it (lines 4-10). She then admits (line 11) that: 
“I am telling you this as dagvat, a bit…on the one hand, right?” and proceeds to comment 
on the importance of the shahadah, reciting it in Arabic and translating the meaning for 
me (lines 12-18). The narrative above is an example of Mariam apa’s dagvat to me not 
only because she identifies it as such, but also because of the way she interprets the 
dream. Instead of simply reciting the shahadah, as was done in the dream, Mariam apa 
proceeds to translate it from Arabic into Russian and explains to me the importance of 
these words in Islam. She does so by quoting religious authority (lines 7-9) and by 
switching to the second person narrative to address me directly (lines 11-16). Finally, by 
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using the collective “we” in the final sentence and concluding it with the agreement tag 
“right?” (lines 17-18), Mariam apa positions both herself and her interlocutor as 
members of the collective Ummah and speaks on behalf of it: “we believe sincerely that 
there is one God, and Muhammad is His messenger.”   
 
Dagvat as a Source of Agency for Personal and Social Transformation 
As interview excerpts above illustrate, Mariam apa was not only familiar with the 
practice of dagvat; she engaged in delivering dagvat when she could, through 
storytelling. In the course of our conversations, Mariam apa described her multiple 
attempts to deliver dagvat to her family members and friends. I argue that, similarly to 
Uzbek female spiritual leaders (Peshkova, 2006), Muslim Tatar women like Mariam apa 
engage in dagvat to advocate for a pious lifestyle that they see as an opportunity for 
personal and, ultimately, social transformation. Drawing on Mahmood’s (2005) 
conceptualization of agency as an ability to realize oneself through the enactment of a 
norm, I further argue that dagvat provides an opportunity for Mariam apa and women 
like her to voice their agency. In this case, the norm is grounded in “Islamic scriptures, 
social practices, and forms of bodily comportment considered germane to the cultivation 
of the ideal virtuous self” (Mahmood, 2005, p. 2). From this perspective, the 
communicative act of dagvat, then, is not simply an instance of moral discourse, but also 
moral action geared toward bringing members of the Ummah—and thus the Ummah 
itself—closer to a moral ideal.  
In the course of our conversations, Mariam apa frequently mentioned various 
Muslim bodily practices she found essential for a Muslim to follow. Those included 
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mandatory practices, such as the five daily prayers, but also practices that constituted 
Sunnah, normative conduct based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example. Among the 
latter was, for example, a suggestion to always eat with one’s right hand because the left 
hand was to be used for other purposes (such as cleaning one’s body). In the excerpt 
below, I ask Mariam apa if she was able to follow certain practices she had just told me 
about. She first responds by using her Tatar husband as an example and in the process 
describes her efforts to deliver dagvat to him. In the course of the conversation Mariam 
apa eventually opens up about her husband’s alcohol addiction—a common problem for 
many families in Russia—and Muslim piety as a way to solve this not only personal, but 
also social problem. 
Mariam apa’s story – segment #5: 
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Are you able to follow all this at home? 
Yes, today we already, well. It happens that my husband, for example, grabs 
something with his left hand. He knows that I watch him with my peripheral 
vision, when we are next to each other, and he says: “I’ll eat with my right [hand], 
don’t you worry.” He already-  
Does he already recite namaz [Tat. 'ritual prayer']? 
Well, he. He began reciting it at one time; apparently, I began to press on him too 
hard; I began to set a condition that…First, all my topics began to be about Allah, 
and he would get irritated by it at first. And I, whenever we would drive 
somewhere to trade, I would bring different books, as if they were my lessons, 
and I need to translate them from Tatar: he did not understand Tatar. And I would 
send him to the mosque on Fridays. And so that he understands, I would take a 
book in Tatar, these topics, sermons, and would begin reading as if they were my 
lessons. I would say: “If I tell you this, you will understand, and I will understand. 
I need to summarize to someone. I will read slowly, and if you don’t understand a 
word, you ask about the word, just about the translation.” And then I would ask 
again: “And was there a place where you didn’t understand? Did you understand 
or not?” And he would think slowly, but I sometimes saw tears in his eyes, and I 
thought “it means [yours] isn’t the heart of flint, it means you still feel something, 
you know.” And then I say: “I want a Muslim husband. When I was marrying 
you, I married you as a Muslim.” He: “There’s plenty of time. Plenty of time, 
when I am old.” As we usually say. But how do you know how long you are 
given? And so then he got so tired of those topics, evidently, and if these topics 
irritate, it means shaitan [Ar./Tat. ‘Satan’]. [If] at once the person doesn’t want to 
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listen, it means shaitan got a tight grip on him, and one has to look for some other 
methods. And so I asked in different ways: “I would adore you, almost, if you are 
a Muslim, a believer.” And he would close his eyes. He did not want to give away 
that he was angry. [. . .]  
[portion omitted] 
But very very slowly somehow it got to the point where he says: “That’s the only 
thing that’s on your mind. You don’t even notice it yourself.” I say: “I notice 
everything. I understand that I became different. But,” I say, “if you want, accept 
me the way I am now, but if you can’t, divorce,” I said. I said: “That Mariam 
died, she is no longer here. There is only this one now. If you want, accept her, if 
you want, you know. But you must know that if you won’t be a Muslim, I won’t 
be able to live with you.” And, indeed, as if something turned inside me. And 
so…Everything is somehow beautiful in Islam, and you don’t want to accept here 
((points to her heart)) neither these shows,170 nor, you know. One wants to speak on 
this topic, to learn, to study. And your friend doesn’t understand. I married him as 
a friend, after all. Because he understands, that it’s not just an attraction, but he 
understands me. And now these topics don’t interest him. If I constantly develop, 
why does he experience such stagnation? Well, [we] could read together at least, 
he could simply listen to what I learn. And all this got to me, you know…Well, I 
understood that I wouldn’t be able [to live] otherwise. [. . .]   
[portion omitted] 
And so, one time, it so happened that I said…At first, I would [call on] him in a 
nice way. And he would get annoyed. I didn’t want in a pushy way at first. But, I 
realize that he doesn’t want to listen. I said…You know, before, when he- he  
drank before. I would feed him well, so he doesn’t develop an ulcer; I would 
make him eat. But then I said that I wouldn’t talk to him anymore, wouldn’t even 
cook for him. “I don’t see you at all,” I tell him,” don’t see you, that’s all. Either, 
or, make your choice.” Before, even if we fight, I would notice about myself that I 
couldn't stay offended for a long time. As if I don’t talk, my heart would break. I 
would speak out everything and would talk right away. But then I was not able to. 
I would talk for three days for the first time, would not see him, would not notice. 
And it was wild for him. We had lived together for so many years; children were 
grown up. And he would not understand. He was in such as state, as if he was 
crying. On the one hand, I felt sorry for him; on the other, my heart wouldn’t 
accept, that’s it. And then after three days I started talking to him. I say: “What 
did you decide?” He says: “There is no escaping. I will study.” I convince him to 
study. You know. And he went, started studying. And the teacher who said he 
would translate into Russian for him—the lessons were in Tatar—never 
translated, as it turned out. I am the kind of person that I “pull leather,” and I will 
ask everything I need to know. He is shy. When director walks into the classroom 
to teach Islamic worldview, he teaches in Tat- in Russian. But when a teacher, he 
for some reason… Well, he thinks he understands, since he is Tatar. So he was 
given a nickname. One time he missed a class; his friend came. He laughs and 
says: “They were looking for you yesterday. They said: ‘Where is Russian 
Anvar’?” Because he doesn’t understand. So, he, as lessons went on, he tried to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Mariam apa is referring to TV shows that she used to watch, but eventually found unappealing.  
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take notes in Russian, drew graphics. But what kind if studying is it? But he did 
start reciting namaz, everything, he learned. And so it happened that in the 
summer relatives came for an anniversary, friends gathered, and he had a drink 
with them. And there it went again. He quit his namaz. But he doesn’t drink  
as much as he used to before, of course, and he goes to the Friday [prayer]. When  
I tell him something, he listens. So then, things have stopped at that for now. And  
he once told me: “When you finish [studying], I will then begin, after all.” And I 
called him for namaz; he said: “I’ll start in the winter.” I told him: “Don’t you 
forget that you are promising this before Allah. Not for me, so and so, this is 
serious.” And I think, this year, Alla birsa [Tat. ‘God willing’], if I graduate, I 
will say: “Now you, it’s time for you to study now.”   
 
 The excerpt above illustrates Mariam apa’s dagvat to her husband in an attempt 
to not simply introduce the Muslim lifestyle to her household, but to deal with a specific 
personal—and by extension—social problem of his alcohol addiction. To echo Mahmood 
(2005), the cultivation of the ideal virtuous self in Islam is embedded in the outward 
manifestation of piety: the performance of certain bodily practices. For example, in lines 
2-5 Mariam apa describes her husband’s attempt to remember to eat with his right hand, 
a practice followed by pious Tatars.171 My follow up question about whether Mariam 
apa’s husband recited namaz was not accidental: in the course of my fieldwork, I noticed 
that one’s performance of the five daily prayers was often considered an indicator of 
one’s iman [Tat/Ar. ‘faith’]: one’s commitment to Muslim piety (or lack thereof). In 
response, Mariam apa does not give a simple answer, but tells a story of her efforts to 
invite him to Islam—her dagvat to him.  
Mariam apa admits in line 8 that one way her own commitment to Islam 
manifested itself was in her desire to speak only about Allah—another common 
occurrence among pious Tatars. In lines 9-20 Mariam apa further describes a specific 
strategy she employed for delivering indirect dagvat to her husband. While traveling to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 I personally experienced the popularity/importance of this particular practice when an unfamiliar Muslim woman 
corrected me for eating with my left hand during dinner at the Mukhammadiia medrese.	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trade shows,172 she translated sermons from Tatar into Russian out loud as if the material 
was part of her medrese lessons, which she could understand better by reading it out loud. 
As Mariam apa revealed to me in the course of our conversation, she learned to speak 
Tatar while attending a local medrese, while her husband never mastered the language.  
Her husband’s response in lines 21-22—that he would become an observant 
Muslim when he is old—reflects what pious Muslim Tatars consider an average (non-
practicing) Tatar’s attitude toward religion: that it is an occupation for old people, 
retirees. When Mariam apa comments on her husband’s answer to her dagvat with “As 
we usually say” (line 22), she indicates that she is well aware of this attitude toward 
religion. She challenges such an attitude with the rhetorical question addressed both to 
her husband and to the listener: “But how do you know how long you are given?” (lines 
22-23). During my fieldwork, I often heard a pious Tatar pose this question in a 
conversation to a non-practicing Tatar who would respond to dagvat in the same way 
Mariam apa’s husband responded to her call for Islam. Furthermore, Mariam apa’s 
explanation of her husband’s unwillingness to listen to her dagvat was also quite 
common among practicing Muslim Tatars: ““[If] at once the person doesn’t want to 
listen, it means shaitan [Ar/Tat. ‘Satan’] got a tight grip on him, and one has to look for 
some other methods” (lines 24-26). Mariam apa’s questioning of her husband’s—and an 
average Tatar’s—assumption that religion is for old age and her reasoning for why 
dagvat is declined indicates Mariam apa’s familiarity with the local discourses and 
practices of dagvat.  
As Mariam apa continues to describe her attempts to bring her husband closer to 
faith (lines 29-43), she describes a turning point in her own spiritual development and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Mariam apa and her husband traded for a living.	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explains why it is important to her that he follow: “And, indeed, as if something turned 
inside me. And so…Everything is somehow beautiful in Islam, and you don’t want to 
accept here [points to her heart] neither these shows, nor, you know. One wants to speak 
on this topic, to learn, to study” (lines 35-38). I argue that Mariam apa’s words reflect not 
simply a shift in her personal belief system, but also her belief in Islam as a possibility for 
personal and social change. Mariam apa’s reference to TV shows is not accidental: 
previously in our conversation, she talked at length about how they reflected dominant 
social values, the values she no longer was willing to accept. Mariam apa’s agency, thus, 
is manifested in her dagvat narrative through her rejection of the values she no longer 
considers moral and through her adherence to the new system of belief.  
The final segment of the excerpt (lines 44-78) further illustrates Mariam apa’s 
efforts to effect change in her husband’s life by way of dagvat. In particular, in lines 46-
47 Mariam apa talks about her husband’s struggle with alcohol, a common problem of 
many families in Russia. During my fieldwork, several practicing Muslim Tatar women 
of Mariam apa’s age (fifty and older) told me about their spouses’ alcohol addiction and 
their own initial attraction to Islam due to its prohibition of alcohol. For example, Madina 
apa, whose story was analyzed in the previous chapter, talked about resenting her 
husband’s love for celebrations accompanied by large amounts of alcohol consumption. 
This was also the case with younger practicing women whose fathers suffered from the 
addiction. Because, as one of the survey respondents at the beginning of the chapter 
suggested, dagvat can be carried out through one’s action, Mariam apa’s description of—
and changes in—her attitude toward her husband’s addiction also reflects changes in her 
dagvat strategy toward her spouse. At first, Mariam apa called on him “in a nice way” 
	   170 
(lines 44-45), took good care of him, so that drinking would not affect his health (lines 
47-48), and did not stay offended for long after they fought (lines 50-51). After a while, 
however, she could no longer continue to treat him the same way and asked him to make 
a choice (line 50).  
In present day Russia, alcohol consumption is cultivated and considered an 
integral part of the Russian man’s character. In their research on socio-historical roots of 
heavy alcohol consumption among men in Russia, Hinote and Webber (2012) argue that 
heavy drinking has been a key marker of masculinity for over a century, and today it is 
further reinforced through hegemonic masculine ideals exemplified by Putin himself (p. 
306).173 At the same time, there is no state/public support for alcohol addicts who are 
mostly men. As a result, female family members are left to deal with their spouses’, 
fathers’, and sons’ addictions. In this context, I argue, the change in Mariam apa’s 
attitude toward her husband—and thus a change in her dagvat—reflects her desperation 
over this personal and social problem. The result of Mariam apa’s dagvat is illustrated by 
her husband’s agreement to study at the local medrese (line 58) even if he quickly lost 
interest due to his lack of knowledge of Tatar, according to Mariam apa (lines 67-68). 
But perhaps a more important indicator of the dagvat success was her husband’s practice 
of namaz, the Muslim ritual prayer (lines 68-69). As I noted before, one’s decision to 
recite namaz is often considered an indicator of one’s piety and a turning point in one’s 
spiritual development. Mariam apa’s admission (lines 70-71) that her husband resumed 
drinking, even if less than before, and quit namaz after a social gathering with relatives 
points to both the seriousness of the alcohol problem and a temporary/unpredictable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Drawing on archival evidence and ethnographic research, Faller (2011) suggests that Tatar men had acquired taste 
for vodka during World War II when vodka was included in rations that all Soviet soldiers received (p. 42). 
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nature of the dagvat effect.  
The final part of Mariam apa’s narrative about her dagvat toward her husband 
reflects another important belief shared by practicing Muslim Tatars today: one’s 
spiritual development is ultimately in God’s hands—a leitmotif of Madina apa and Alfia 
apa’s narratives in chapter 5. This is evident through Mariam apa’s words “Allah birsa” 
[Tat. ‘God willing’] in relation to her ability to graduate from the medrese—a condition 
for her husband’s continuing of his religious education. It also reflects a complex Muslim 
notion of qadar, divine destiny, or God’s knowledge of all events, a kind of 
predestination that does not exclude the possibility of free will.174 When applied to 
da’wah, it relieves da’iya (the da’wah giver) from sole responsibility for his or her 
da’wah efforts.  
The Muslim scholar Sakr (1997) writes in relation to the methodology of da’wah: 
“One has to remember that in Da’wah, we do not look for results in as much as we should 
be concerned for the lawful methods proceeded by good intention” (p. 13). Even though 
Mariam apa’s dagvat to her husband did not have an immediate effect, she does not deny 
its role completely, which is evident in her description of some changes in her husband’s 
behavior: “But he doesn’t drink as much as he used to before, of course, and he goes to 
the Friday [prayer]. When I tell him something, he listens. So then, things have stopped at 
that for now. And he once told me: “When you finish [studying], I will then begin, after 
all” (lines 71-75).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam’s definition of the Muslim notion of destiny, “Muslims believe that 
human beings are morally and ethically responsible for their actions but are utterly dependent upon God for the ability 
and power to act” (“Jabr,” 2003). 
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Moral Action and Agency in Piety Stories Through Dagvat 
I argue that Mariam apa’s narrative about her dagvat efforts to her husband, 
combined with other instances of dagvat she told me about, and engaged in, during our 
conversation, illustrates Mariam apa’s (and other practicing Muslim Tatar women’s) 
belief in the power of dagvat to effect personal and social transformation. While, in 
accordance with the Muslim theology, Mariam apa left the final “say” in her husband’s 
spiritual development (or lack thereof) up to God, her agency was manifested in her 
continuous attempts to deliver dagvat to her spouse and her insistence (in an earlier 
segment) that “Allah necessarily gives to the one who asked” (line 4).   
 The fact that Mariam apa’s piety story was filled with multiple accounts of 
dagvat—and was by itself an instance of it—reflects Mariam apa’s identity as a da’iya 
[Ar. ‘one engaged in da’wah’] and speaks to the presence of the practice among pious 
Muslim Tatars. As the Muslim newspaper survey I quoted at the beginning of the chapter 
illustrates, dagvat is understood in multiple ways not only by its scholars, but also by 
Muslims themselves. Using Mariam apa’s narrative as a case study, I illustrate that the 
act of sharing a piety story presents an opportunity for engaging in an oral, indirect form 
of dagvat. As a member of a local and global Muslim community, a practicing Muslim 
Tatar woman may pursue the opportunity in order to fulfill an obligation to improve the 
moral condition of the Ummah. As such, piety stories represent a form of moral 
discourse, and their sharing is a moral act. Ultimately, engaging in dagvat through the 
communicative act of storytelling, provides a Muslim Tatar woman with an opportunity 
to voice her agency, understood as an ability to realize oneself through the enactment of a 
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norm, by advocating for a pious lifestyle that she sees as a possibility for personal and, 
ultimately, social transformation. 
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CHAPTER 7   
GENDER IN CONTEXT  
  
In the two remaining chapters, I shift the focus of my analysis from examining 
culturally specific communicative features and functions of piety stories to investigating 
what these stories—and their narrators—can tell us about the social reality of which they 
are part. In this chapter, I examine what practicing Muslim Tatar women’s narratives can 
tell us about their own and others’ views of gender roles and norms. In my analysis, I 
respond to Abu-Lughod’s (2002) call for abandoning apriori criticisms of Islam as an 
inherently oppressive force towards women175 and locate the narratives within the local 
socio-historical milieu. In particular, I argue that Muslim Tatar women’s understandings 
of gender roles and norms must be analyzed against the backdrop of the Tatar historical 
legacy, influenced by Islam; Soviet gender legacy and post-Soviet transitions; and the 
current government’s neofamilial rhetoric, reflected in present-day popular views on 
gender.  
Focused on a gender-specific class discussion at a local medrese, one part of my 
analysis reveals that young practicing Muslim Tatar women do not always take at face 
value Muslim normative gender roles. The women’s ideas about what it means to be and 
act as a Muslim woman vary and demonstrate their agency. My analysis of gender is also 
based on an examination of an older practicing Muslim Tatar woman’s piety story. Her 
narrative further demonstrates that a woman’s ideas about gender roles and norms are not 
shaped by her religious convictions alone. Rather, what contributes to a Muslim woman’s 
understanding of gender roles are micro-level factors, such as the peculiarities of her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Such criticisms are often produced by those advocates of women’s rights whose understanding of freedom as a 
universal individual right is based on progressive and liberal political agenda (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Mahmood, 2005).	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individual life experience, and the macro-level context, such as the Russian state’s neo-
familial stance that encourages women to return to traditional family roles. Finally, I 
conclude that in a post-Soviet society that has gone through painful changes, women find 
Islam’s protection of their rights and freedoms appealing. 
I begin my discussion by arguing the necessity of theoretical frameworks that 
challenge liberal approaches to gender, which often disregard local contexts, discourses, 
and desires. I then present a popular Russian attitude toward gender to illustrate that strict 
division of gender roles and patriarchy are not out of the norm and are often endorsed by 
many Russian citizens, whether Christian, Muslim, or secular. I explain how the Russian 
government’s pronatalist policies—in light of Russia’s demographic crisis—contribute to 
such perceptions of gender roles. I further provide an overview of the Tatar 
sociohistorical legacy, informed by Islam, which positions Muslim Tatar women’s ideas 
about gender within the local context. Next, by analyzing excerpts from the “Women in 
Islam” class discussions at a local medrese, I demonstrate that the students, young 
practicing Muslim Tatar women, do not passively learn gender roles and norms that are 
associated with the Muslim norm, but also challenge them. Finally, I analyze a piety story 
of Amina apa, a practicing Muslim Tatar woman who compared her roles as a woman 
during the Soviet era, the post-Soviet transitions, and after becoming a practicing Muslim 
woman. Her narrative illustrates that Muslim Tatar women find a clear delineation of 
gender roles and rights in Islam liberating.  
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Framing My Query into Gender 
I argue for the need for a critical approach in analyzing Muslim Tatar women’s 
gendered desires based on my own struggles to make sense of them. At the beginning of 
my fieldwork, I often felt irritated by what seemed to me to be the narrow-mindedness 
and passivity of practicing Muslim Tatar women, particularly the younger generation. For 
example, when I asked Muslim Tatar women what it meant for each of them to be a 
woman, they saw themselves, first and foremost, as mothers, educators to their children, 
and homemakers. Dina, a young practicing Muslim Tatar woman in her late teens, for 
example, told me that she enrolled in the Russian Islamic University in Kazan after 
having her son because she realized that it was her duty to provide her children with 
moral guidance through knowledge. I was not disappointed by the fact that Dina wanted 
to be a good mother and educator to her son but rather by what I perceived as her lack of 
any aspirations outside her domestic roles.  
When I asked the Mukhammadiia medrese female students about the purpose of 
their education and how they intended to use it, the women almost unanimously 
responded that they planned to use religious knowledge obtained at the medrese first and 
foremost at home, as future mothers and thus first educators to their children. While 
many also envisioned teaching at a local medrese or giving Arabic lessons in an 
educational setting, I was disappointed by what I perceived as the narrow window of 
opportunities that they saw for themselves. For me, in contrast, educational and 
professional aspirations had brought me far from the domestic space of Tatarstan, to the 
United States for graduate degrees, which has been challenging, but also empowering in 
many ways. When I asked if the women also planned to obtain secular education in order 
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to pursue other career opportunities, I was taken aback when their response was: “Only if 
my husband approves of it.”  
As a female Muslim Tatar myself, I had been convinced that I would understand 
these women and their desires and aspirations right from the start. The fact that I was 
repeatedly confused by what appeared to be their passivity led me to examine the 
perspectives from which I was seeing and evaluating these women. This was the 
perspective of a graduate of a Russian university with a strong legacy of the Soviet 
educational system and a U.S.-trained scholar and long-term resident. This chapter is my 
earnest attempt to overcome limitations of this perspective and analyze practicing 
Muslim Tatar women’s gendered desires and perceptions of gender within the local 
contexts that contributed to their development.   
In my analysis of Muslim Tatar women’s ideas about gender roles and norms, I 
follow a critical approach to gender. This approach challenges a monolithic assumption 
that all women inherently want the same type of equality with men and must fight for 
their freedom and be helped along the way. Such an assumption is disproportionally 
applied to contexts where individual freedom (understood in a liberal, progressive sense) 
has not played a defining role in the socio-historic development. For example, in her 
famous article “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” Abu-Lughod (2002) questions 
the discourse of those who demand that Muslim Afghan women be saved from 
oppressive forces that are traced to Islam. Abu-Lughod illustrates that the liberatory 
discourse, underlying the political and military action, resonates with colonial and 
missionary rhetoric that rests on cultural reification and difference.   
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Mahmood (2005) further explains that the liberatory rhetoric is rooted in the 
normative ideas of resistance/subversion as the only response to domination (and thus 
acts of agency) and of freedom as individual (personal) autonomy. The problem with 
such a stance, as Peshkova (2013) argues, is that it is rooted in the “tradition vs. 
modernity” dichotomy that leaves no room for exploring “the questions about the nature 
of discourses articulating non-liberatory desires” (Historically situated desires, para. 1).  
 
Gender Discussion Within the Russian Context 
One way to contextualize my analysis of gender roles and norms embraced by 
Muslim Tatar women is to locate them within a mainstream gender discourse of present-
day Russia and to examine its socio-historic origins. To illustrate a popular view on 
gender, I cite a Youtube video that I came across while browsing a Russian social 
networking site and that features the popular Russian light fiction writer Daria Dontsova. 
This “advice column”-type video, which was shared by a former high school classmate of 
mine, was entitled “Why do husbands leave for mistresses?” and was “liked” by a few 
thousand female users. Curious to find out what my former high school classmate 
Marina, an ethnic Russian woman in her early thirties who was happily married and 
enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle as a stay-home-mom, found interesting about the video, I 
watched it. A partial transcript of it appears below: 176 
So, you are going to live with a guy, but you are not satisfied by the fact that 
when he walks in the door, he kicks off his shoes wherever. He hangs his socks on 
a couch in the living room. [. . .] Please forgive all this to him. You need to 
understand one simple thing: if you are going to get on his back every day with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 The video was originally shot by a Russian website Sovet.ru, which describes itself as “A cute internet-site, where 
movie, TV, show-business, sports, and other stars share with us their experience about how to achieve success in 
career, love, family life, financial sphere, how to achieve personal harmony” (my translation from 
http://www.sovet.tv/contacts).  
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“Sasha, put your shoes away!” he will eventually take those shoes and leave you. 
He will not put his shoes away: take them and put them away yourself. And don’t 
whine: “Why do I have to do everything myself?” Because you are a baba [Ru. 
woman]!177 It’s in your blood to clean the house, to make soup, to fry potatoes, 
right? A woman who, by the age of 30, cannot cook, needs to shoot herself, in my 
opinion. Because it’s an abnormal situation. (Dontsova, 2012)   
 
While this gendered rhetoric of the popular Russian writer Daria Dontsova may 
come across as sexist and patriarchal, I argue that it both reflects and plays into popular 
sentiments—about social order, the role of family, and gender roles—that are being 
cultivated, circulated, and embraced not only by men, but also by women in the post-
Soviet space.  
Kuehnast and Nechemias (2004) observe that “neofamilial ideologies that sharply 
criticize Soviet-style emancipation and advocate a return to ‘traditional families’” are 
prevalent in the post-Soviet society (p. 2). This is happening in conjunction with the 
increased separation of the public and private spheres and relegation of women from the 
public sphere into the private space (a deviation from the Communist ideology that at 
least in theory encouraged equal participation of men and women in the workforce while 
preserving the gendered division of labor). At the same time, as the paternalistic role of 
the Soviet state began to diminish, so did social services provided by the state. Instead, 
the neoliberal programs encouraged citizens to take personal responsibility for their own 
basic needs, such as provision of food, health care, and childcare. As a result, women had 
to find ways to provide for their families by working at the local markets, small shops, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Dontsova uses the Russia word baba, which is emotionally and culturally charged and does not have an English 
equivalent. It has a variety of connotations, such as “a peasant (uneducated, tough) woman,” an elderly woman, a wimp 
(when referring to a man), and so on. While it indexes the female sex, it is an absolute antonym to the word “lady” in 
the type of character it implies (uneducated, butch-like). The word usually carries derogatory undertones, which are 
also present in this particular instance. Dontsova’s phrase “because you are baba” could be best translated as “know 
your place, woman!”	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and the service sector, while simultaneously being ideologically encouraged to assume 
the traditional female role of the main caregiver to the family.  
This women’s doubled responsibility of taking care of household work and 
providing for the family—while their spouses were often unemployed and did not share 
responsibilities at home—is not strictly Russian, but a post-Soviet phenomenon, as 
Ghodsee (2004) and Peshkova (2013) illustrate. Further, Rivkin-Fish (2010) argues that 
the recent attempts by the Russian government178 to support women are not aimed at 
ensuring gender equality, which has been shown to benefit women. Rather, they are a 
continuation of the Soviet government’s pronatalist logic (albeit different in form) 
designed to address a demographic crisis. She concludes that the ultimate goal of the 
Russian government’s family policies is the legitimization of its own power by restoring 
the public’s faith in the country’s leadership and the role of the state—the faith that has 
all but disappeared following the time of painful post-Soviet transitions. Based on this 
discussion, I argue that culturally (locally) formed notions of family and gender roles and 
norms in the post-Soviet space must be analyzed against the backdrop of the Soviet 
gender legacy, post-Soviet transitions, the current government’s neofamilial rhetoric, as 
well as local (Tatar) beliefs on gender roles and norms. 
 
Tatar Sociohistorical Gender Legacy 
A brief overview of gender roles and norms traditionally (pre-1917) espoused by 
the Tatars points to a complex legacy of beliefs when it comes to gender. This legacy 
informs present-day Tatars’ sentiments and attitudes about women. The Jadids, the Tatar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Rivkin-Fish (2010) closely examines the Putin administration’s establishment of the “maternity capital” program, 
initiated in 2007, which would entitle women who have 2 or more children to a credit of 250,000 rubles (roughly 
$10,000 at the time). 
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Muslim intellectuals, who, in the middle of the 19th century, initiated a debate over the 
role and identity of Muslims in the Russian Empire played a central part in the Tatar 
historical debate over gender and the role of women.179 The debate resulted in a cultural 
reformist movement whose goal was national renaissance and progress. When it came to 
the question of women, the Jadids were particularly critical of polygyny and the lack of 
educational opportunities for women and advocated for the expansion of women’s rights 
(Khalid 1998; Rorlich 1986). Many Tatars today take pride in the Jadids’ progressive 
ideas and credit them with the educational and social advancement of Tatar women over 
the past century. However, examining the Jadid movement’s efforts, Kandiyoti (2007) 
observes that “[t]he modern identities of the Muslim peoples of the empire were partly 
forged in an endeavor to respond to Russian representations of their societies and cultures 
from the middle of the 18th to the early 20th century” (p. 603). Furthermore, she points out 
that the Bolsheviks piggybacked on the Jadids’ ideas of the emancipation of women, but 
for very different goals.180  
A closer investigation into the role and position of Tatar women reveals a more 
complex picture than the Jadids’ perception reveals. Kefeli (2001), for example, argues 
that, despite the eighteen-century claims of both the Russian Orthodox missionaries and 
the Jadids about the oppression of Tatar women, Tatar and Kriashen181 women played a 
key role in the spread of Islamic knowledge and thus literacy. She suggests that Tatar 
women drew on earlier (twelfth century) positive portrayals of women in the Sufi oral 
tradition. In it, equally with men, women were represented as role models on the path to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 The Jadid movement was not exclusive to the Volga Tatars, but also had a significant presence in Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan, see for example, Khalid (1998).   
180 Kandiyoti’s overview of the interpretations of the Bolsheviks’ ideas and actions when it came to the notions of 
gender, family, and women, further points to the complexity of the issue within the Russian/Soviet/post-soviet context.	  	  	  
181 Kriashen Tatars (or Kriashens) are “the descendants of the Muslim and animistic Tatars who had been baptized from 
the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries” (Kefeli, 2001, p. 250).  
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piety, emphasizing their role as mothers and thus guardians of faith and social values. 
Kefeli (2001) concludes that in their attempts to preserve Islam and pass on religious 
education, women in fact took advantage of the separation of the sexes (by keeping out 
male Orthodox missionaries) and gainfully utilized kinship, economic, and educational 
networks, thereby exhibiting agency.   
The lasting impact of Tatars’ historical gender legacy can still be seen today. For 
example, Wertheim (2012) analyzes the role of gender in the way young Tatar 
nationalists use the Tatar language as a political tool.  She concludes that, while both 
Tatar men and women engaged in the active promotion of Tatar as a way to preserve the 
Tatar nation, men often did so in an explicitly confrontational manner, refusing to 
accommodate non-Tatar speakers in both public and private domains. Women, on the 
other hand, engaged in what Wertheim (2012) defines as “’appropriately’ feminine 
promotive Tatar practices,” which were non-confrontational, accommodative, and 
restricted to private and educational set-ups (p. 278). In one particular instance Wertheim 
describes, a young Tatar male comments on a young Tatar woman’s “very business-like” 
personality and assertive language use as de-feminizing and thus unattractive. While 
Wertheim notes that a similar language use pattern has been observed among other ethnic 
minorities concerned with their rights, I claim that in the Tatar context it also reflects 
traditionally expected gender roles and norms: that women be modest and polite in the 
public arena, but “experts” in the private and educational spheres (at home, in the 
community).  
It is important to note that there are a fair number of Tatars—both men and 
women—who consider themselves modern, secular, cosmopolitan citizens. They are not 
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actively concerned with the fate of the Tatar language, nation, or religion and would 
question the legitimacy of traditional Tatar gender roles and their manifestations (such as 
gender-marked discursive expressions, as illustrated by Wertheim (2012)). It is further 
important to note that it would be a mistake to conclude that the Tatar women’s interest 
in the private domain is exclusively a result of the Tatars’ general growing interest in 
Islam, and therefore, their desire to conform to what could be perceived as traditional 
Muslim gender roles and norms. My discussion of the gender-related norms historically 
espoused by Tatars supports that point. Rather, I argue that the Tatar women’s interest in 
traditionally female roles is a combination of (a) the post-Soviet neo-familial ideology 
that advocates for the return of all (not just Tatar) women to their traditional roles 
(Kuehnast & Nechemias, 2004), (b) the Tatarstan government’s attempts to “re-
traditionalize gender roles among ethnic Tatar women”182 as the biological preservers of 
the Tatar nation (Graney, 2004, p. 50), and (c) the Tatars’ post-Soviet interest in ethnic 
and religious revitalization. The first two factors refer to both the Russian and Tatarstan 
governments’ attempts—although for different ends—at employing women in aiding 
with the nation (re)building in the absence of the (Communist) state, a subject well-
researched, but outside of this chapter’s immediate scope.183 I further argue that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Graney (2004) emphasizes that, unlike in other post-Soviet states, such as Hungary, Poland, or Ukraine, where the 
governments enacted “draconian and coercive types of neofamilialist legislation” geared towards actively employing 
the women and their bodies in the nation-building, the Tatarstan government’s attitude toward women and family 
issues remained more paternalistic (and only subtly patriarchal), and thus continuing the legacy of the Soviet state’s 
gender policy (p. 53). 
183 For studies on nationalism and gender in the Post-Soviet space, see Deniz Kandiyoti, “The Politics of Gender and 
the Soviet Paradox: neither Colonized, nor Modern?”, Central Asian Survey, 26(4), 2007, pp. 601-632; (2007), 
Kathleen Kuehnast & Carol Nechemias, eds., Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition (2004); Hilary Pilkington, 
ed, Gender, Generation, and Identity in Contemporary Russia (London, Routlegde, 1996); Katherine Verdery, What 
was Socialism and What Comes Next? For key theoretical studies on nationalism and gender, see Partha Chatterjee, 
“The Nationalist Resolution of the Woman Question,” in K. Sangari and S. Vaid, eds, Recasting Women: Essays in 
Indian Colonial History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Lila Abu-Lughod, ed, Remaking 
Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Joane Nagel 
“Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21, 1998, 
pp. 242-69. 
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analysis of the practicing Muslim Tatar women’s ideas about gender roles and norms 
must be positioned within the larger post-Soviet society that they inhabit, which the 
previous section aimed to outline. 
 
Medrese Lessons: Creating Muslim Women Out of Tatar Girls? 
My exploration of the question of what it means to be a Muslim woman—as 
understood by practicing Muslim Tatar women today—led me to sit in on “the Woman in 
Islam” class at the Mukhammadiia medrese.184 The class was one-semester long and was 
taught to second year full-time female students (there were about 15 students in the 
course that I attended, ranging from 16 to 26 years in age). The class met twice a week 
for a 45-minute long session that was mostly in the form of an informal lecture,185 with 
occasional questions from the teacher to the class and students to the teacher. The limited 
amount of time allocated to the course in the medrese’s curriculum was certainly not 
enough to provide any kind of an in-depth historical perspective and to cover 
religious/secular debates on the subject. The majority of the students in the class were 
first-generation observant Muslims who did not grow up with the knowledge or 
experience of ritual/daily practices expected of practicing Muslims. These women were 
only at the beginning of their course of study at the medrese and their lives as practicing 
Muslims. Therefore, the purpose of the class was purely instructive: to introduce the 
young women to the basic set of roles and norms expected of a Muslim woman in 
accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative conduct based on the Prophet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 A somewhat similar class is taught at the Russian Islamic University.   
185 A traditional format of learning/teaching in higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union, which remains 
dominant in post-Soviet Russia.	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Muhammad’s example’]. An overview of the course’s weekly themes, as presented 
weekly by the teacher, gives a general idea of what types of subjects were covered:186 
• Woman’s character in the Qur’an 
• Moral qualities of a Muslim woman 
• Norms of behavior between the sexes 
• Clothing requirements (both sexes)  
• Engagement (in preparation for marriage) 
• Video about Bahrain  
• Video about the Sahara desert (an episode from “Man vs. Wild” dubbed in 
Russian) 
• Types of contraception (allowed, prohibited) 
• Rights to make oneself look beautiful (allowed, prohibited) 
• Qualities of a good wife 
• Polygyny  
• Rights to an intimate relationship 
• Norms of an intimate relationship 
 
The information that the teacher presented was often supported with quotes from 
the Qur’an or ahadith [Ar. ‘accounts of exemplary sayings and deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad’]. When I asked the teacher where the class material came from, she 
explained that she mostly relied on former teachers and students’ notes from the same 
course. The teacher, a married Muslim Tatar woman in her late twenties (also a 
Mukhammadiia graduate whose piety story, shared during a class break, was analyzed in 
chapter 4) also augmented the material with her own observations and personal life 
experience. There was some formal distance between her and the students. However, the 
fact that there were no male students present and that the teacher was also a graduate of 
the medrese who was relatively close in age to her students, made the atmosphere in the 
class less formal than the one I observed in other classes. The atmosphere allowed the 
young women to speak more freely about gender-specific issues that would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 I documented the subjects discussed in this course by taking notes during class sessions and by comparing my notes 
with notes taken by other students.  
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inappropriate to discuss in front of the opposite sex (especially questions related to 
spousal intimacy, and birth control, for example).  
Based on my analysis of the course content and the format of the class, I conclude 
that the nature of the course was introductory and lecture-oriented, as opposed to in-depth 
and critical-thinking-oriented. This is the result of both the time limitations of the 
curriculum and the legacy of the Soviet higher educational system that placed an 
emphasis on lectures, when knowledge was passed to the students in a uni-directional 
fashion. However, it is also due to the embodied nature of Muslim piety, as Mahmood 
(2005) emphasizes, which was the subject matter of this class. In other words, to be a 
good Muslim, a good Muslim woman in particular, is to carry out one’s mundane daily 
activities in accordance with the way prescribed by the Qur’an and Sunnah, which was 
what the course briefly covered. While there is no way to measure the effectiveness of the 
course in producing a certain kind of female subject, the students’ responses to the 
teacher’s questions and the information provided in class sheds light on their opinions 
about what it means to be a Muslim woman in present-day Russia.  
In one such instance, reflected in the excerpt below, the teacher began the first 
class of the semester by asking her students about a Muslim woman’s moral qualities. 
Her question resulted in an exchange where students suggested qualities that the teacher 
then qualified with her follow up questions. In the excerpt below, the teacher’s words are 
marked by the capital “T,” and those of two students whom I could identify from the 
audiotape are marked by their initials, “D” (for Dina) and “O” (for Olima). I marked the 
instances when several students spoke simultaneously and I could not identify them by 
the word “Class” in parenthesis. Because I was sitting in the class, the teacher expected 
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my full participation in the class and also solicited a response from me. My answers to 
the teacher’s questions are marked by the capital “L” (for Liliya): 
“Woman in Islam” class discussion – segment #1: 
T: 
 
 
T: 
 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
D: 
 
T: 
 
 
T: 
D: 
T: 
L: 
T: 
 
T: 
L: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
O: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
The next subject is moral qualities of a Muslim woman. Let’s all think about 
which moral qualities a Muslim woman has- 
(Class): Modesty, humbleness- 
Wait, wait a minute, don’t rush. Let’s start from the right. Every person names 
one quality of a Muslim woman.   
(Class): Modesty, fear of God, justice, respect ((long pause)) 
More? ((long pause)) 
(Class): Faithfulness- 
Faithfulness. Faithfulness to whom?  
(Class): to the husband, to Allah. 
Yes, to the husband, and to Allah, and so on. Next? 
(Class): Faithfulness in general. ((long pause)) 
(Class): Was modesty mentioned? 
Yes, it was. ((long pause)) Should she be kind? 
(Class): Yes, of course! Loving. 
To everyone? 
(Class): Of course not! ((loud laughter)). To the husband. 
To children, right?  
(Class): humbleness, obedience, sincerity, patience.   
Correct. Dina? ((calling on a student)) 
Everything has been named already… 
(Class): sociability  
Does sociability apply here? 
(Class): Yes, no, I don’t know, probably not. Yes, if the woman is sociable 
while she is doing a call [inviting someone to Islam]. 
Dina, what quality did you come up with? 
Self-command.  
Self-command, that’s correct. Next? 
I also wanted to say self-command. 
Come up with something else, then.  
(Class): Smart, clean. 
Is smart appropriate? 
Eagerness for knowledge, can it be considered a quality? Curiosity, but for 
good knowledge.  
Yes, it is a quality. (To the class): Do you agree? 
(Class): Yes, of course! 
Yes, of course, you are also students, Masha’Allah [Ar. ‘God has willed it’],187 
who are looking for knowledge. Next? ((long pause)) 
Cooking well ((loud laughter from class)). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 In everyday speech the phrase is used to mean “Thank God.”  
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T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
 
T: 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50: 
51: 
52: 
53: 
54: 
55: 
56: 
57: 
58: 
59: 
60: 
61: 
62: 
It is a moral quality, but to an extent.  
(Class): It is very important for a man. True! 
So? ((long pause)). What about neatness? 
(Class): Of course! 
Next? 
(Class): Hardworking, merciful.  
Correct, hardworking. Next? 
(Class): Adab [Ar/Tat. Decency]188  
Adab, propriety, right? 
(Class): Cleanliness. 
Cleanliness, right, good job! Let’s now write- 
(Class): Do we really have to write all this down? 
Not everything, your notebooks are not big enough to fit everything. ((Dictates)) “A 
Muslim woman is distinguished by her moral qualities: modesty.” We are only 
going write down the main ones. ((Dictates)) “Fear of God, chastity- 
(Class): That’s right! 
-honesty 
(Class): Uhum, but it applies not only to women, right? 
-humbleness, obedience- 
(Class): Obedience is very important; it’s a key to heaven-  
-patience,  
(Class): Softness of character 
Uhum, understanding, and so on. 
 
As indicated in the transcript above, students did not hesitate to name a set of 
qualities that they believed should define a Muslim woman. Qualities such as modesty, 
humbleness, fear of God, justice, and respect were named quickly and were met with the 
teacher’s approval. However, long pauses in lines 6, 7, 12, 14, 17 indicate that students 
quickly ran out of ideas. This could be due to the fact that their imagination was affected 
by the teacher’s presence, who, as a medrese graduate, a practicing Muslim for over a 
decade, and a teacher in the medrese educational setting, was a figure of authority. She 
met each answer with an approval by repeating it out-loud189 or by qualifying a student’s 
response. For example, in lines 9 and 16, she invited students to clarify to whom a 
Muslim woman should exhibit faithfulness and love. In line 23, she further invited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 The Arabic term, which is also present in Tatar, refers to a certain set of norms of behavior. 
189 I did not reflect it in the transcript for the sake of saving space.	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students to question “sociability” as it applied to a moral quality of a Muslim woman. 
Sitting at a desk next to another girl, I myself felt like a high school student in the 
classroom, even though I was several years older than the teacher. So, when it was my 
turn to name a quality, I found myself at a loss, struggling to come up with an answer that 
would fit the teacher’s expectations, as lines 29-34 indicate. I argue that the students (and 
I) had trouble coming up with responses because they were trying to meet the teacher’s 
expectations and define a perfect Muslim woman, an ideal that is not easy to come by or 
live up to. This is supported by the teacher’s assumption that “A Muslim woman is 
distinguished by her moral qualities” (lines 52-53), her suggestion (in line 50-54) that 
students write them down, and their unenthusiastic response to it (line 51). 
Mahmood (2005) refers to Muslim piety as “embodied ethics,” suggesting that it 
is grounded in the regulation of daily (bodily) practices and that one’s adherence thereto 
cultivates the moral ethos of a Muslim. Because the majority of students in the class were 
first-generation observant Muslims, they did not grow up with the knowledge or 
experience of ritual/daily practices expected of practicing Muslims. Therefore, a primary 
purpose of the course was to introduce the young women to a set of such practices, 
essential for women. Often times, students actively sought out knowledge/information on 
how to perform a certain activity in a proper way. For example, when the teacher was 
lecturing on the norms of Muslim women’s clothing, she suggested that women were not 
supposed to wear perfume when going outside because the nice smell might attract 
unnecessary attention from the opposite sex. The students then sought clarification on 
what to do about lotions or deodorants with strong sweet smells or what to do about a 
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laundry detergent that had perfume in it and that would make their clothes smell like 
perfume.  
When it came to the issue of the headscarf, the teacher provided specific 
instructions on the proper way to tie it. All of the female teachers at the medrese, as well 
as all of the full-time female students wore their headscarves tied in the front, carefully 
covering their heads and necks. My observation indicates that, in general, the older 
generation of practicing Muslim Tatar women (both the “in-between” generation of 
women in their thirties and forties, as well as older retirees) were less concerned with the 
way they tied their scarves and some wore the headscarves only in religious contexts such 
as mosques and private religious gatherings. Moreover, the oldest generation—retirees 
who lived most of their lives under the Soviet Union—often questioned the way younger 
women tied their scarves in the “Arab” way, arguing that Tatar women never wore their 
scarves that way.190  
For the “Women in Islam” students, a carefully tied headscarf was not an optional 
practice. In fact, in the female dormitory, where the students lived and classes took place, 
I spotted a mirror with a note handwritten in Russian above it, which read: “Look at 
yourself! Think about your physical appearance. Is Allah pleased with you? Does He 
accept your cover?”191 Nevertheless, the teacher felt compelled to comment on the 
particularities of a properly tied scarf, while cautioning the students against potential 
mistakes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Sabirova (2006) makes a similar observation in regards to generational differences among practicing Muslim Tatar 
women in Moscow.  
191 The Arabic word used in the Qur’an to refer to covering literally means “curtain” or “cover.” Therefore, the author 
of the note also used the word “cover” (written in Russian), as opposed to the word “scarf.”	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For example, the teacher suggested that collecting hair in a big, high knot with а 
thick hair band under the scarf was not desirable. The teacher explained that the purpose 
of the headscarf was to protect one’s beauty from onlookers. Therefore, collecting hair in 
such a way might attract attention by making a (false) impression of a bush of thick, 
beautiful hair, which would be considered a physically attractive attribute in the local 
context and thus something to be avoided. In response, the students wanted to know 
acceptable ways of collecting one’s hair under the scarf—a detail that would most likely 
escape the older women’s attention, but was very important for these young students and 
their performance of piety. In another instance, when the teacher was discussing the 
norms of behavior between the sexes, students wanted to know if it was okay to shake 
hands with men in the process of greeting, if wearing gloves would make a difference, 
and how to pay for something with change without touching the hand of a male cashier. 
Yet, it would be incorrect to conclude that gender-specific norms and roles were 
strictly and unequivocally defined by the medrese teachers and that students blindly 
followed them—an argument often made about gender roles in Islam. While, as an 
authority figure, the teacher often responded to students’ numerous questions regarding 
normative conduct, there were times when she invited students to use their own 
judgment. In one such instance, when the teacher opened the subject of norms (of 
behavior) during a meeting between a man and a woman, a student asked if a Muslim 
woman had to verbally respond to a verbal greeting by a Muslim man. Muslims 
traditionally greet one another with the Arabic phrase “Assalyamu aleikum”192 (literal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 The greeting varies in spelling and pronunciation from country to country. In my spelling, I tried to reflect the way 
most Tatars pronounce it. Having said that, during my fieldwork, I witnessed that younger practicing Tatar Muslims 
with more extensive knowledge of Arabic would sometimes correct those whose pronunciation of the greeting they 
found erroneous.  
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meaning is “May peace be upon you”) and respond with “Wa aleikum assalyam” 
(meaning “and upon you too”). So the student wondered if a woman should display 
modesty by keeping silent, rather than responding to the greeting. The student’s question 
resulted in the teacher’s suggestion to use one’s own judgment. I marked the teacher’s 
words with the capital “T,” and students’ questions and responses with the capital “S” 
followed by a number because I was not able to identify students’ identities based on 
their voices on the recording: 
“Woman in Islam” class discussion – segment #2: 
T: 
 
 
S1: 
 
T: 
 
S1: 
T: 
 
S1: 
 
 
T: 
 
S2: 
 
S3: 
S4: 
 
S4: 
T: 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Equal norms [of behavior] apply to men and women during a meeting. It’s an 
important subject, right?  
(Class): Yes.  
By the way, may I ask you a question? If a man greets you out loud, and you 
respond silently, it won’t be considered a sin, will it? 
No, it won’t. If a man greets you, and you don’t respond out loud, but only 
silently, it is not considered a sin for a woman.  
So, it is permissible? 
Yes, it is permissible. But if a woman greets you, you must respond out loud 
because a greeting must be met with a greeting.  
I was told that it’s not desirable for a woman to keep silent, that it’s better to 
respond out loud.  
(Class): Out loud? Nooo… 
Hmm, if you want, I can find out the exact hukm [Ar. ‘Islamic ruling’]. I will try 
to find out if I don’t forget, insha’Allah [Ar. ‘God willing’].  
I’ve heard that a woman’s voice is ‘awrat [Ar. ‘parts of the body that should be 
covered from the eyes of others’].193 
The voice is not ‘awrat, chill.  
Is it ok for a woman to greet a man first?  
(Class): Yes! No! O, my God!  
For example, if a male teacher walks by you… 
You see, there are- Well, you have to determine yourself. Islam does not 
concretely say that “this is haram” [Ar. ‘forbidden’], and “this is halal” [Ar. 
‘permissible’], for example, right? You yourselves have to decide. For example, 
if out of respect for teachers, you can greet [them] first. Or, your uncle, for 
example, or your relatives. If you and relatives visit often, then yes. Or out of 
respect. For example, Yusuf ustaz [Ar. ‘teacher’] walks by, will you not greet him? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Literally, “nakedness,” “shame.” The term does not refer to parts of the human body that must be covered by 
everyone at all times. What constitutes ‘awrat is situational and also depends on the madhhab [Ar. Muslim school of 
law’]. 
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28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
 
Of course, you will greet him out of respect because he is your ustaz. Maybe 
even with title, for example: “Salyam aleikum, Yusuf ustaz.” Because in some 
Arab countries, one’s social status is binding. It is a sign of respect. It will be 
even more polite to say “ustaz Yusuf”; it will be even better. 
(Class): We’ll try to remember. 
As the exchange above illustrates, even though the teacher often provided instructive 
information that outlined a set of specific norms (lines 6-7), she also called on the 
students to exercise their own judgment while applying these practices to real-life 
situations and expressing her points of view (lines 22-31).       
Furthermore, on another occasion, I witnessed the students question the 
information provided by the teacher. In one instance, for example, the teacher suggested 
that women should be careful while admiring one another’s looks, so as not to incite 
physical attraction to their own sex. During a break that followed, I overheard one student 
ask another if she agreed with the teacher’s warning that women should be careful while 
complimenting one another on their looks. “So, I can’t say to another girl: ‘I like your 
hair today’?” she questioned. The other student responded with “Well, I think it’s a bit 
over the top,” implying that she found the teacher’s comment to be too restrictive. The 
other student agreed. In another instance, I observed students wear colorful outfits or 
adorn their headscarves with colorful ribbons and beads, despite the fact that one of the 
subjects the teacher covered was norms of female clothing, where she called for 
moderation and suggested that it was best to stay away from bright “in your face”-type of 
colors.  
My observations indicate that a younger generation of pious Muslim Tatar women 
is more likely to seek out knowledge on gender-specific Muslim practices than the older 
generations that already have set, life-experience-based, ideas about what it means to be a 
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(Muslim) woman. The younger women are also more likely to accept—at least in 
theory—what could be referred to as “traditional” female roles inside the home (such as 
housewives, mothers, caregivers) and outside of the home (such as teachers and social 
workers), as their responses to my questions about their future plans indicated. My 
participation in and analysis of the “Women In Islam” class at the medrese indicates that 
its primary goal was focused on exactly that: to introduce young female students to a 
basic set of gender-specific qualities and practices that could serve as a guide to their 
lives as practicing Muslim women. However, as I spent more time with the students and 
other young practicing Muslim women who attended the “Woman in Islam” class or a 
similar class offered at the Russian Islamic University, a mosque, or a Muslim center,194 I 
concluded that while younger women were interested in learning about these norms and 
practices, they did not always follow them unquestionably.  
As my discussion above illustrates, sometimes women questioned or chose not to 
follow suggested rules,195 thereby engaging into their own interpretation of them and 
exhibiting a sense of agency. On the basis of that, I argue that while the medrese or 
another Islamic educational entity may contribute to the production of a certain type of a 
female subject (and female subjectivity, for that matter), it is not a mechanistic, “one-
size-fits-all” process. A practicing Muslim woman’s ideas about gender roles and norms 
are also shaped by micro-level factors, such as the peculiarities of her individual life 
experience, and by the macro-level context, such as the Russian state’s neo-familial 
stance that encourages women to return to traditional family roles. As my next data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 A number of classes similar to the “Woman in Islam” were being offered in Kazan at a variety of Muslim facilities 
during my fieldwork.  
195 I have also heard of instances of the medrese graduates abandoning certain Muslim practices that would qualify 
them as pious Muslims, although I have not had a chance to speak with one. 
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segments illustrate, the older generation’s ideas about womanhood are further shaped by 
their experience of living in the Soviet paternalistic state with its emphasis on female 
emancipation196 and gender equality in the workplace—something that the younger 
generation of women did not get to experience first-hand.  
 
Amina apa’s Piety Story: From a Soviet Worker to a Muslim Woman  
 Older women’s generations’ experience of balancing work outside the home—an 
almost mandatory activity in the Soviet Union197—and family came across in their 
conversations about faith and piety without my solicitation of the subject. In fact, their 
piety stories often contained narratives about their professional success or failures and 
how their life outside the home contributed to their perception of themselves and their 
roles as (Muslim) women. I did not interview a single woman of the middle or older 
generation who did not have some sort of professional/work experience outside her 
home. Those women who reached a degree of success in their careers often proudly 
talked about it, and those who did not, often talked about how balancing family life and 
work made them stronger women. In other words, the “Soviet” generation of practicing 
Muslim Tatar women often found pride in “making it” through the years of mandatory 
work, while managing to build and raise families at the same time.  
Unlike the Soviet generation, many women of the younger generation expressed a 
clear preference for staying at home to raise children, and then, if time and circumstances 
allowed, trying out the workplace. While embracing a Muslim lifestyle may have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 With regards to the Soviet government’s ideas on women’s emancipation, Rivkin-Fish (2010) observes: “although 
the Soviet state touted its commitment to ‘women’s emancipation,’ institutionalized equality meant women’s full 
participation in the labor force, not freedom” (p. 706, note 14). 
197 While there was no law that required Soviet citizens to work, a citizen who was not formally employed could be 
administratively reprimanded for tuneiadstvo, literally translated from Russian as “idleness,” and referring to one’s 
failure to work and thus build one’s moral character and contribute to the common good of the Soviet people.	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contributed to the younger women’s perception of certain gender roles, I argue that their 
preferences for what could be considered a “traditional” role for a woman reflect, first 
and foremost, a generational difference and are shared by other (non-practicing Muslim 
Tatars or non-Muslims and non-Tatars) women of similar age. For example, several high 
school and college classmates of mine in their late twenties and early thirties (including 
Marina who posted Dontsova’s video about women on her page) chose to stay home after 
having children. These were both ethnic Russian and ethnic Tatar women who were not 
religiously observant. Despite having obtained higher education, they resolved to devote 
themselves to their children at least until their children were old enough to go to school. I 
further argue that this generational difference toward gender roles, manifested in attitudes 
toward work/family life, is itself a product of the social, historic, and economic realities 
that define each generation of women. As the narrative below illustrates, during the 
Soviet Union, staying at home was not an option for the older generation of women. But 
even after post-Soviet reforms made work a personal choice (as opposed to a state 
required activity), many women were forced to continue working for economic reasons 
and often were the sole providers for their families. Amina apa is a case in point. 
 I include Amina apa’s story in my discussion of gender roles and norms because 
in her story about her path to Muslim piety she persistently commented on her multiple 
roles as a woman. Moreover, as was the case with the “Women in Islam” class, where the 
most interesting material surfaced during “gray” areas of the class when the teacher was 
not simply lecturing, but asking questions (or responding to students’ questions), it is 
women who did not easily fit into a certain category that contributed valuable insights 
towards better understanding of a phenomenon. Making a case for examining culture at 
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the level of individual lives, Okely argues that “‘cracks of resistance’ to dominant 
ideologies [. . .] are often more visible when we look at the lives of and listen to the 
stories of unusual individuals” (as cited in Flueckiger, 2006, p. 24). Amina apa “failed” 
to fit neatly into either side of the generational divide and was in the “gray” area 
generationally. That is why her story provides a productive vantage point for discussing 
gender roles and norms. In her mid-forties at the time of our interview, Amina apa was 
part of the “in-between” generation of those who were born and raised as Soviet citizens, 
but witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union—and everything that it stood for, 
including both its socio-economic structure and value system—at the beginning of their 
adult lives (in their early- to mid- twenties). Amina apa’s generation lived the majority of 
their adult lives during the period of Russia’s painful economic and social transitions. 
This is somewhat similar to another “in-between” generation that came right after it but 
was young enough to adapt more quickly to post-Soviet realities. I observed the fewest 
number of practicing Muslim Tatar women (and men) among the representatives of both 
of these in-between generations. Unlike the younger generation of Muslim women, they 
considered themselves too mature to embrace a new set of values (Muslim or not) easily 
and irreversibly. On the other hand, they were too young to fit neatly within the older 
generation of practicing Muslims, whose interest in Islam, which coincided with and was 
bolstered by the recent Muslim revival, was perceived as “natural” because it often 
accompanied retirement and the end of life cycle.  
 I met Amina apa at an informal lesson at the Nurulla mosque. She joined the 
mosque lessons several years prior to our meeting, studied there for two years, and then 
continued her religious education at the Mukhammadiia medrese as an extra-mural 
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student.198 She continued to drop by the mosque every once in a while because of a high 
respect for abïstay, the Tatar female religious teacher at the mosque. Dressed in a long 
loose dress and wearing a headscarf that was carefully tied in the front, Amina apa stood 
out among her peers and in her group of students. The other women, most of whom were 
older than her, were dressed in “regular” clothes that met the expected length 
requirements. But what actually attracted my attention to Amina apa was the kinds of 
questions she asked abïstay.  
I observed that usually women asked very practical questions, such as how to 
perform a certain ritual, or how to act in a Muslim way in a certain situation. Amina apa, 
however, often asked questions that had to do with broad social issues. For example, in 
one instance Amina apa recounted a recent conversation she had had with some Tatar 
women and wanted to know abïstay’s opinion of it. According to Amina apa, the women 
were discussing high divorce rates among young Tatars. The discussants blamed young 
Tatar women for initiating divorce, for being too demanding or lacking sabïr [Tat/Ar. 
‘patience’] because they simply wanted to run away from marital problems, as opposed to 
solving them. According to Amina apa, the women were further concerned that young 
Tatar girls often preferred foreign men to Tatar men, even if it meant being a second or a 
third wife. When I followed up with Amina apa on this issue during our conversation, 
she adamantly protested that young Tatar women should take responsibility for failed 
marriages. Using her own marriage as an example, Amina apa questioned what she 
believed to be older Tatar women’s conviction that women were stronger and that women 
were the ones who should keep the family together by taking care of it and by being the 
breadwinners, if need be.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 A form of study where students attend classes at night and on the weekends.  
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An ethnic Tatar, Amina apa was born and raised in Central Asia. According to 
her, men there were the head of the family and, as such, took care of it even when the 
Soviet ideology encouraged women’s equal participation in the work force, thereby 
neutralizing men’s significance as heads of their families. She objected to her Tatar 
husband’s and mother-in-law’s position that forced her to be the breadwinner for herself, 
her husband, and their two children. She adamantly protested the notion that women and 
men were created equal and that women can be equal to men: “How can a woman say ‘I 
can compete with a man’? No. He is built differently, he has a different mentality and 
outlook, he is of a different proportion!” Similarly to the students in the “Women in 
Islam” class, Amina apa found appealing a position that women were a weaker sex and 
should not be primary breadwinners for the family, as she shared with me: 
Amina apa’s story – segment #1: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
 
I argued with one Muslim man. I told him: “We, women, are weak.” But he says: 
“No, you, women, are strong.” “We carry the load because we have to, because 
you dumped it on our shoulders. We would gladly give it back to you. Take your 
rights.” They scream that we took away something from them. We did not take 
anything away. I, for example, did not take anything away, I was dumped on. 
Because try to make hungry children fall asleep! There is a hadith that one 
woman made her hungry children fall sleep. You can’t make hungry children 
sleep! I know it from my own experience! And if you ask your husband, but he 
left the house and all of his problems behind, he is having fun! And you fill the 
hungry kids’ mouths with whatever you want! Where will you go? You will go to 
search [for food], to earn. You have to raise children. If he doesn’t want to, who 
will? And they know it, they know it too well that we are the ones who will raise 
them! 
 
In the excerpt above, by using her own family as an example, Amina apa 
challenged а gender stereotype she found popular among older Tatars: that women are 
spiritually strong(er) and therefore responsible for their families in multiple ways. She 
confronted the stereotype by arguing that women had to be strong because they had no 
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choice. She further disputed what she believed to be men’s claim that women took 
something away from them (line 4-5), most likely referring to work, social status as 
breadwinners, and, as a result, their masculinity. As Amina apa explained in lines 6-13, 
she had to find ways to support her children because her husband failed to do so.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Amina apa’s narrative on Russian (meaning former 
Soviet, now Russian citizens, not ethnic Russians) men’s failure to live up to women’s—
such as herself—expectations of proper male roles reflects what Rivkin-Fish (2010) 
identifies as “the crisis of masculinity” critique of Soviet/Russian government’s family 
policies, a critique shared by Russian scholars. Using Russia’s recent demographic crisis 
and Russian government’s family policies geared to address it as an example, Rivkin-
Fish (2010) explains that unlike western feminist paradigms that focus on “the 
incomplete implementation of gender equality—or, stated otherwise, on men’s failures to 
do their fair share of housework and caregiving,” Russian critics “trace the demographic 
crisis to both Soviet policies and current neoliberal conditions that have left men unable 
to fulfill the role of breadwinner and therefore robbed them of an authoritative role in the 
family” (p. 719).  
Therefore, Amina apa’s narrative on men’s failure to live up to the expected 
gender role as a breadwinner—and thus a man—reflects a broader social trend when it 
comes to issue of gender roles and norms in contemporary Russia, as opposed to a 
perspective exclusively informed by an Islamic view and practice. Kay (2006) in her 
study of men in contemporary Russia also comments on the pervasiveness of belief in 
present-day Russian society that healthy families and marriages are produced by a clear 
separation of gender roles where the man’s chief role is the breadwinner. It is this very 
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belief that is reflected in the popular fiction writer Daria Dontsova’s quote at the 
beginning of this chapter when she urges women to take good care of their men when 
they come home from work. Furthermore, this sentiment is not limited to Russia-only and 
resonates with women in the post-Soviet space. As Peshkova (2013) illustrates in her 
analysis of an Uzbek woman’s understanding of gender roles, women’s freedom is 
understood “not in terms of liberal equality but as gendered complementarity; women did 
not have to be just like men in order to be equal with them” (Hafiza-opa’s terms of 
change, para. 3). 
My conversations with some married young practicing Muslim Tatar women who 
aspired to build a career or expand their education illustrates the complexity of the issue. 
On the one hand, the women shared the idea of “gendered complementarity” (Peshkova, 
2013, Hafiza-opa’s terms of change, para. 3). On the other hand, they observed that their 
husbands were not objecting to the women’s working and/or studying outside the home, 
as long as the women met gender-specific expectations at home (such as taking care of 
the house and family). While the majority of these young women did not yet have 
children and/or aging parents to take care of, their willingness to take on a double-burden 
of family care and work/study further reflects a culturally specific notion of gender norms 
and roles that excluded the expectation that men do their fair share of housework and 
caregiving, as long as they provide for their family. This is why Amina apa’s narrative 
was so focused on her husband’s—and other men’s—expectation that she provide for the 
family, while taking care of the children and housework. I argue that this is also the 
reason Amina apa welcomed a gendered separation of duties believed to be prescribed by 
Islam, which would relieve her of the responsibility of being the breadwinner. 
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At some point in our conversation Amina apa further told me how, during “the 
difficult Yeltsin-era years,” as she referred to them, she had to work for ten hours a day 
without weekends and sick days in order to support her family. Furthermore, she began 
her story about her road to piety with what she referred to as a “dissonance” between her 
abilities and the responsibilities that were put on her—both at home and outside the 
home—which forced her to think about an alternative way of life: 
Amina apa’s story – segment #2: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
 
Well. What can I say? I came here [the mosque] because I had all these questions 
in my mind, a dissonance of the world, of the situation. And I felt that I was 
created- that all those directives that are given by the government, the social 
structure; there was a dissonance. I mean they set forth enormous requirements 
from a woman, but give nothing in return. The demand from her is huge, but she 
is not created for such demand. [ . . . ]. The first question I had was: “Why am I 
responsible for my child if it was taken away from me as soon as it was born?” 
They took it away from me and sent me off to work. I could not work because my 
heart was aching for my child. [. . .]. I always had this question of why children 
are taken to school—taken away—and we are sent off to work, but we are told 
that we are responsible for the upbringing of our children? When I come home 
[from work], all I have left after the state takes my strength away, is enough 
energy to prepare a meal, to clean the house quickly, and to put children to bed 
quickly. Do I see them? Do I spend time with them? Do I devote my energy to 
them? How could I be responsible for them? In other words, I had a lot of 
questions.  
Amina apa’s statements above are more than an expression of her personal point 
of view based on an individual experience: in some ways it represents a generation of 
women (many of whom were mothers and close to Amina apa in age) who, during the 
last years of the Soviet Union and later during the economic, political, and social chaos 
following its collapse, were often forced to provide for their families and young children 
because men were left without work and were not able to adapt to the new realities as 
quickly as women. Examining the way women and men in Russia adapted to the new 
labor market, Ashwin (2006), for example, suggests that men were less flexible than 
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women about working outside their chosen profession. Unlike women, they were less 
willing to take jobs that were considered traditionally female or low-status, which often 
led to men’s depression and alcoholism. 199  
While the Soviet Union encouraged equal participation of men and women in the 
workplace, it also created conditions for it, such as guaranteed employment, state-
sponsored healthcare and childcare. Where does, then, Amina apa’s criticism of the role 
and expectations of women during the Soviet and post-Soviet period stem from? Why 
does Amina apa refer to the state-provided child-care as “taking away” her children from 
her (lines 6-11)? Amina apa’s critique of the position of women and expectations from 
them (lines 1-6) are once again a reflection of the dominant Russian master narrative of 
the masculinity crisis. According to Russian sociologist Svetlana Aivazova (quoted in 
Rivkin-Fish 2010, p. 719), the Soviet state’s paternalistic role resulted in a close mother-
state-child relationship, thereby making the father irrelevant at work and at home. Upon 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, the role of the state was entrusted to the private sphere, 
which failed to step in, as did the fathers, which led to their continued de-
masculinization. While Rivkin-Fish (2010) is critical of the dominant discourse on the 
masculinity crisis for its reductionist premise that the future of a healthy family—and the 
nation—depends on the well-being of its men, Amina apa’s narrative illustrates that it is 
dominant and thus culturally meaningful.  
Furthermore, while Amina apa referred to herself as “a person of the Soviet 
period”200 and got to experience some social benefits provided by the state (such as free 
education and free childcare), she is critical of some aspects of it. Amina apa’s critique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 I thank Lauren McCarthy for suggesting this source.	  	  
200 “Ya zhe chelovek Sovetskoi vlasti” was the exact phrase Amina apa used.  
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(lines 6-16) of the Soviet system that demanded that women participate in the workforce 
by “taking away” children (lines 7-8) is resonant with what Zhurzhenko identifies as one 
of the six characteristics of the neotraditional stance on family and gender politics, 
dominant in present-day Russia: “Soviet family and gender politics, which dissolved the 
family’s moral autonomy by collectivizing children’s socialization, are adamantly 
rejected. This collectivized socialization in turn allowed contradictions to emerge 
between maternal and paternal practices, which neotraditionalists blamed for the rise in 
juvenile delinquency and other social problems” (as cited in Rivkin-Fish, 2010, p. 711). 
Therefore, I suggest that Amina apa’s—and other practicing Muslim Tatar women’s—
desire to trade their roles as workers for mothers and housewives is not necessarily and 
exclusively a consequence of adopting a Muslim life style, but a reflection of a broader 
socio-historical trend.  
As Amina apa’s discourse illustrates, the neotraditionalist/neofamilial paradigm 
dominant in present-day Russia is critical of the Soviet gender and family policies. 
Nevertheless, it is the post-Soviet withdrawal of the state that contributed to a deep socio-
economic and moral crisis and resulted in a search for an alternative system of values in 
post-Soviet Russia, contributing to the rise in Muslim piety. Analyzing a similar situation 
in post-Soviet Bulgaria, Ghodsee (2010) makes a convincing argument that the reason 
why many Bulgarian Muslims, including women, find conservative trends of Islam 
appealing is because of their appeal to the issues of social justice and economic equality 
that people enjoyed during socialism and that were wiped out by post-Soviet reforms. 
Amina apa explained why she found a Muslim lifestyle to be a better alternative for a 
woman when I asked her how Islam changed her life:  
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Amina apa’s story – segment #3: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
I simply became happy in Islam. Do you know what an oppressed woman I was 
in Jahilliyah [Ar. ‘ignorance’].201 I was treated like dirt. Islam elevated me.  
When I read about my rights- I did not know about them throughout my life, 
especially when it comes to family; all I had was responsibilities. I wasn’t even a 
slave—a slave is at least dressed and fed—I was worse than that. When I started 
speaking with my husband, he said: “If this is what Islam teaches you, I prefer the 
Codex202.” “A set of rules from Allah, it has my rights that you never practiced, 
never acknowledged.” I made a lot of discoveries for myself, but the first one, of 
course, is that He understood me. I felt myself like a woman, I realized that I am 
a woman, and that I need to be treated as a woman.   
 
According to Amina apa, she found Islam appealing because it provided her with 
a clear understanding of not only her responsibilities as a woman, but also her rights at 
home, with her husband and family. She explained: “Even ahadith [Ar. ‘accounts of 
exemplary sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad’] say that if a woman is 
oppressed, she has a right to go to kazïy [Tat. ‘Muslim judge’]. An oppressed woman 
does not exist in Islam. There is no such thing as oppression in Islam!” Later on in our 
conversation, Amina apa provided another example of how her life would have been 
different had she known her rights. She admitted that she married into a Tatar family that 
lacked äkhliak’’ [Tat. ‘ethics’]—a type of Muslim upbringing and comportment 
associated with such character qualities as respect for women, the elderly, responsibility 
for one’s family, honesty, and so on. She married her Tatar husband upon her parents’ 
suggestion, who believed the couple would make a good match. Amina apa admitted that 
she did not want to get married, and that had she known about her right, as a Muslim 
woman, to refuse the marriage even by going against her parents’ will, she would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 While this Arabic word literally means “ignorance,” metaphorically and in stories the word is used to refer to the 
time of “not-knowing,” the pre-Islamic period in the history of Arabia, before the revelation of the Qur’an. Therefore, it 
refers to a certain type of ignorance.  
202 Amina apa’s husband refers to a secular civil law.	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done so. “I knew nothing about my rights then,” she regretted. Thus, Amina apa’s view 
of Islam as an empowering force and a source of agency challenges the liberatory rhetoric 
of those who, according to Abu-Lughod (2002), uncritically and univocally advocate for 
the need to save Muslim women from Islam-dictated oppression.   
 
Making Sense Out of Gender(ed) Narratives  
 Amina apa’s story is extraordinary in that it reveals challenges that many women 
of her generation faced and struggled with—as daughters, wives, and mothers—but 
rarely talked about, as something perceived as a “norm.” One of the biggest challenges 
that Amina apa and other women of her generation faced was being away from family 
and children in an attempt to make a living when her husband could not and the state no 
longer provided support. Should it be surprising, then, that Amina apa talked about Islam 
as an empowering force that, compared with the load she had been carrying, limited her 
responsibilities and granted her rights? Liberatory rhetoric often criticizes Islam for what 
is believed to be its strict gender-based division of roles that necessarily oppresses 
women. While such rhetoric itself is rooted in the philosophy of liberalism where equality 
and individual freedom are paramount, it often disregards local contexts where it wishes 
to enter. As Amina apa’s story illustrates, in a post-Soviet society that has gone through 
painful changes, women find Islam’s protection of their rights and freedoms appealing.  
Toward the end of my conversation with Amina apa, she tried to reason why 
many Tatar men—of her husband’s and younger generations—failed to meet what she 
believed to be their obligations as breadwinners and protectors of families. When I 
proposed the possibility of larger social and historic events, such as the Second World 
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War,203 affecting the family structure and gender roles, Amina apa agreed, regretting that 
polygyny was not allowed then. “Women had to carry the load, and it became a custom,” 
she bemoaned. “If polygyny had been possible then, there wouldn't have been orphans. 
Every orphan would have a family—this is what Islam is all about. Taking care of 
everyone!” Amina apa concluded. Furthermore, when it comes to the younger generation 
of practicing Muslim Tatar women, their desire to focus on the family and be wives and 
mothers first, goes hand-in-hand with the present-day neotraditional/neofamilial rhetoric 
of the Russian state. However, unlike the state, which encourages women to resume 
“traditional” roles without providing them with structural opportunities to do so (as 
correctly noted by Kuehnast & Nechemias 2004), Islamic lifestyle requires—even if only 
rhetorically and morally—that men and women take seriously obligations required of 
them by the Qur’an.  
While the popular Russian writer and advice columnist Daria Dontsova’s opinion 
on gender roles in present-day Russia—that women must do housework and caregiving 
because they are women—may come across as too sexist to advocates of western 
feminist theories, it reflects culturally shared norms that have been engendered by Soviet 
family policies and the post-Soviet government’s neofamilial and neotraditionalist stance. 
Therefore, practicing Muslim Tatar women’s ideas about what it means to be a (Muslim) 
woman must be understood vis-à-vis the larger socio-historical context of which they are 
part. My analysis of the “Woman in Islam” class session and Amina apa’s story reveals 
that embracing a Muslim lifestyle contributes to women’s reflexivity about what it means 
to be a Muslim woman. However, Muslim Tatar women’s perceptions of gender roles 
and norms are shaped not only by an interpretation of Muslim theology. They are also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Known in the former Soviet Union as “the Great Patriotic War,” as I referred to it. 
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reflective of the individual circumstances of the women’s spiritual journeys and life 
experiences that are part of the social order that the women inhabit. 
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CHAPTER 8  
PIETY STORIES AS SITES OF STRUGGLE OVER THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN 
TATARS’ IDENTITY AND FUTURE 
 In this chapter, I use three Muslim Tatar women’ piety stories to explore Tatars’ 
search for—and negotiation of—an identity in light of the post-Soviet ethnic and Muslim 
revival. Working from the position that discourse both reflects and constitutes social 
reality, I argue that the women’s piety stories can serve as one site, a discursive one, 
where Tatars’ identity struggle takes place and where the women exercise their agency. 
Based on the women’s narratives and my ethnographic observations, I identified two 
socio-cultural trends at the heart of Tatars’ search for identity, summarized in the 
following questions: (a) to what extent should Islam define Tatar identity? and (b) what 
type of Islam should Tatars follow? 
The first trend suggests that Tatars no longer conflate their ethnic and religious 
identities, as was recently the case during the sovereignty movement of the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Today, the Tatars’ interest in revitalizing their language and building a 
sovereign nation is also accompanied by a growing interest in Islam, which is no longer 
treated merely as a marker of ethnic identity, but as a powerful force in its own right.204 
An increasing number of Tatars perceive Islam—and not the Tatar language or an 
independent Tatar state—as a moral imperative for personal change and, therefore, social 
transformation.205 This trend has a generational dimension to it. Unlike the younger 
generation of Tatars, the older generation still considers the ethnic element of Tatar 
identity, exemplified in the Tatar language, an important feature of Tatars’ identity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Ibrahimpasic (2012) makes a similar observation about Bosnian Muslim women. 
205 Peshkova (2009) traces a similar trend among Uzbek women in post-Soviet Uzbekistan.	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their future survival as an ethnicity. This is particularly evident in the way the 
sovereignty movement’s activists talk about Islam as a defining feature of Tatars identity, 
as one of the women’s stories analyzed here illustrates.   
The second trend, prompted by Tatar’s recent interest in Islam, is an ongoing 
debate over what kind of Islam should be part of Tatars’ identity. This debate occurs 
among non-Muslims, non-observant Muslim Tatars, as well as practicing Muslim Tatars 
who do not posses sufficient theological knowledge for interpreting differences within 
normative Islam. It often treats sources of Islamic knowledge as a direct reliable indicator 
of one’s Muslim identity, with variation by gender and generation.  
In addition, the Tatars’ debate over the kind of Islam they should practice—and 
thus what should or should not be part of their identity and religious norm—is often 
focused on the personal level of physical (bodily) practices and religious rituals, as 
opposed to more abstract normative underpinnings of a certain Islamic tradition. This is, 
in great part, due to the fact that Muslim piety is grounded in quotidian physical 
practices, such as the five daily prayers. As a result, practical Islamic knowledge (and its 
application) is inseparable from less practical (theological) knowledge, and the practice is 
taken to serve as a direct indicator of a certain kind of Islam. To put it simply, the way 
one recites the five daily prayers is popularly believed to be indicative of what kind of 
madhhab [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’], if any, one embraces.206 My ethnographic 
observations and interviews indicate that, contrary to popular belief, both sources of 
Islamic knowledge and physical expressions of piety are unreliable markers of an average 
Muslim Tatar’s identity. This is due to the fact that there are too many ways of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Sabirova (2011) stresses the importance of Islamic knowledge for young Muslim Tatar women attending medrese 
lessons in Moscow (p. 333).  
	   211 
interpreting original sources of Islamic knowledge (such as the Qur’an and Sunnah) and 
the majority of people (among them, Muslims and non-Muslims alike) do not have 
sufficient theological knowledge and training to correctly identify a physical practice as 
part of a certain branch of Islam.  
These stereotypes persist, however, and I argue that practicing Muslims are not 
only aware of stereotypical perceptions formed on the basis of one’s sources of religious 
knowledge or physical practices, but actively seek communicative strategies to deal with 
such perceptions. One such strategy is (re)negotiating and legitimizing their religious 
identities at the discursive level, in a personal narrative such as piety story, an act that 
constitutes agency. Finally, I conclude that however inaccurate and stereotypical such 
perceptions might be—when, for example, a long beard or a loose long dress is 
associated with conservative (often called Wahhabi or Salafi) Islam—they are part of the 
Tatars’ struggle in search of identity in light of post-Soviet religious revival in Russia.  
In this chapter, I first discuss how Tatars’ interest in ethno-national aspects of 
their identity, of which religion was considered an inseparable part, is moving toward 
acknowledging Islam as a force in its own right, with some variation by generation. By 
analyzing an older practicing Muslim Tatar woman’s piety story, I illustrate that the older 
generation still consider ethnic elements of Tatar identity, language in particular, 
important for securing the Tatars survival. The younger generation, on the other hand, 
places a bigger emphasis on Islam. The next section outlines the recent socio-historic 
context, such as post-Soviet religious freedom and the Russian government’s recent 
attempts to cultivate an “official Islam.” It is within this context that Tatars debate the 
kind of Islam they should practice. I further discuss why few women rarely openly 
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identified a specific religious tradition that they observed despite the fact that the matter 
of madhhabs, Muslim schools of law, is at the center of Tatars’ Islamic revival. I proceed 
to analyze two practicing Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories to demonstrate that one’s 
sources of religious knowledge, as well as physical manifestations of piety, are often 
treated as direct markers of one’s religious identity. Based on the women’s stories and 
my ethnographic observations, I argue that practicing Muslim Tatar women are aware of 
others’ (often false) perceptions of them on the basis of their religious education or 
physical practices. I demonstrate that one way the women address such perceptions, and 
thereby negotiate and legitimize their own ideas about Islam and their religious identities, 
is at the discursive level in a piety story. I conclude that piety stories represent discursive 
sites where Tatars struggle over identity and women’s agency take place. 
 
From Tatar Ethno-nationalism to Islam?  
Previous research on Tatar identity politics (Faller 2000, 2002, 2007; Wertheim 
2003b, 2005) suggests that, in the context of Tatars’ post-Soviet ethnic revival and quest 
for independence, Tatars’ sense of identity was shaped by an orientation away or toward 
the Russian language and culture, which, for instance, manifested itself in Tatars’ explicit 
calls and attempts to avoid speaking Russian when possible. Wertheim (2005), for 
example, points to “a conflation by some of Tatar and Muslim identity” (p. 118), in 
which the Tatar language could serve as an equal marker of both ethnic-national (Tatar) 
and religious (Muslim) identity. Such close association between ethno-national and 
religious aspects of the Tatar identity traces its roots to the Russian conquest of 1552, 
imperial policies toward the Volga Tatar population, and the Soviet nationality policies. 
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As Mukhametshin (2009) explains, the destruction of Tatar traditional social structures 
after the Russian conquest led to Tatars’ turning to Islam as a unifying source for their 
national identity (p. 35)207. The Soviet state’s policy of atheism further pushed Islam into 
the realm of cultural traditions and rituals, leading to its vernacularization. Finally, the 
Soviet nationality policies, which artificially placed people into nations and used 
language as the main marker of a nation, resulted in people’s perception of language as 
the constitutive of their identity (Hirsch, 2005; Faller 2011).      
Today, however, the Islamic revival overlaps less categorically with Tatars’ ethno-
nationalist sentiments. My research points to a shift from once dominant ethno-nationalist 
foundations of Tatar identity (sustained by post-Soviet Tatar ethno-nationalist 
movements of the late 1980s-early 1990s) to a more pronounced religious component. 
For many practicing Muslim Tatar women, being a Muslim and being a Tatar are no 
longer synonymous. According to my interviewees, what marks one as Muslim is no 
longer (Tatar) ethnicity, (Tatar) language, or aspirations to a (Tatar) nation-state, but 
one’s recognition and knowledge of Islam and adherence to practices associated with the 
Muslim way of life, in other words, observable commitment to Muslim piety. Even 
though Tatarstan’s prominent scholar and historian Iskhakov (2010) points to a rise of 
“religious consciousness” among all peoples of post-Soviet Russia, I attribute Tatars’ 
increasing interest in Islam in great part to the Tatar ethno-nationalist movement’s stifled 
efforts to realize its aspirations for political sovereignty and long-term Tatar language 
revitalization programs (Karimova, 2010).208 This is not to say that ethno-national aspects 
of Tatar identity, especially the Tatar language, have completely lost their relevance for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Rorlich (1986) credits the Tatar reformist movement of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries with 
creating “a religious-secular symbiosis” that helped mobilized the Tatar national consciousness (p. 65). 
208 Faller (2011) makes a similar observation (p. 297). 
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Tatars today. Rather, Islam is taking a more prominent place in the way Tatars see their 
collective and individual identities: it is no longer easily equated with ethnicity.  
The growing interest in Islam is particularly evident in the way the former 
sovereignty movement activists talk about Islam, as Taskira apa’s narrative below 
demonstrates. I met Taskira apa and spoke with her on multiple occasions at the 
Mukhammadiia medrese where she taught at the time. Taskira apa was in her late sixties 
and a practicing Muslim. Born and raised in a Tatar village, Taskira apa shared her own 
and her generation’s struggles over preserving the Tatar language and identity in the 
context of the Soviet nationality policies. Despite a Soviet-era requirement that higher 
education be conducted in Russian-only,209 which put native speakers of ethnic languages 
at a disadvantage, Taskira apa was a university graduate and worked as a school teacher 
all her life, teaching various subjects, from math and physics to the Tatar language and 
literature.  
A die-hard activist of the sovereignty movement, Taskira apa gradually became a 
practicing Muslim in the 1990s as Kazan’s mosques re-opened their doors following the 
Soviet-era religious hiatus. As someone who became a practicing Muslim later in life, but 
before retirement, Taskira apa was critical of the average Tatar’s belief that one can wait 
until retirement to become interested in religion. This criticism set her apart from the 
majority of Tatars of her generation and betrayed her interest in Islam. During my second 
conversation with Taskira apa upon her return from hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca, she spoke of Islam as an important unifying force for Tatars. She noted that it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 To-date, all higher educational institutions in Tatarstan conduct instruction in Russian only. In her conversation with 
me, Taskira apa regretfully admitted that despite the efforts of the sovereignty movement that she was part of, Tatars 
were not able to secure “continuous education” in Tatar, which would allow Tatar-speaking high-school students to 
continue their higher education in Tatar.  
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sad for her to observe that the majority of pilgrims from Tatarstan were people of an 
older generation, retirees. In her reflections on the fate of the Tatar nation, she 
emphasized the supremacy of faith in preserving the Tatar ethnicity. Such a stance 
signifies a move from the sovereignty movement’s ideology that envisioned the Tatar 
national (political) independence and the revival of the Tatar language as key conditions 
for Tatars’ survival and their future.  
 
Taskira apa’s story - segment # 1 
 
 
Т: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
[portion omitted] 
Indeed, Islam is a pillar around which we should hold on to.210 Because the loss 
of our nation211—when there was a sharp drop in the Tatar population in 
Tatarstan and the [Soviet] Union—coincides with our turning away from our 
religion in the 60s and 70s. Meaning, without acknowledging Allah or the 
Qur’an, people developed some sort of irresponsibility, some sort of “anything 
goes” attitude, talïmsïzlïk [Tat. ‘recklessness’], a mess. The people did not 
understand. And so the fall of the national consciousness, national pride, 
happens to take place at a moment when my nation turned away from religion. 
First, [it was] ignorance: we were torn away from our history by the decree of 
1944. Stalin’s decree prohibited minorities from studying their history. 
Naturally, we no longer had the national consciousness, which contributed to 
the fall of the national pride. Without knowing who you are, without knowing 
what to be proud of when it comes to your nation, the national pride cannot be 
cultivated. And so our generation, the children of the postwar period,212 it is like 
that. And one more thing caught my attention: the pilgrims from Russia were 
much older than the pilgrims from other countries. This is because our people, 
people today—when you approach them with däg’’vat [Tat. ‘call to Islam’], 
when you make a call, when you begin to talk [about Islam]—[they say] ‘We 
are not retired yet.’ ‘When we retire, we shall see, maybe we will come to 
Islam.’ Even though they admit that Allah exists, that Allah is one, that they are 
Muslim. Every Tatar calls himself213 a Muslim. If not everyone, maybe 99 or 95 
percent will say that he is a Muslim. But he does not live in accordance with 
Islam, in accordance with Shariah. He considers himself a Muslim just because 
he is a Tatar. How is that? We know that it is impossible, right?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Speaking in Russian, which was a second language for her, Taskira apa, sometimes conjugated her prepositions in 
non-standard ways, as in this case. Discussing Soviet ethnic language policies and their effects on ethnic minorities, 
Taskira apa reflected on her own language skills, acknowledging difficulty with communicating in Russian sometimes.     
211 Taskira apa use the Russian word “natsia.” 
212 Taskira apa refers here to the post WWII period.	  	  
213 Taskira apa uses masculine in accordance with the formal style of speech in Russian; it does not imply her 
preference of one gender over the other.  
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Speaking in a collective voice by using “we”—and thus on behalf of Tatars—
Taskira apa refers to Islam as a “pillar,” a foundation for building and securing the future 
of Tatars (line 1). She directly links the loss of the Tatar people to their “turning away 
from” their religion, from “Allah” and “the Qur’an” (lines 2-6). Furthermore, in lines 7-8 
Taskira apa attributes the loss of Tatars’ national consciousness and pride—factors that 
she also considers crucial for a people’s survival—to a moment in history when Tatars 
“turned away from religion.” The degree of importance that Taskira apa assigns to Islam 
in securing the Tatars’ future is further illustrated by her criticism of the majority of 
Tatars’ disinterest in practicing their religion (lines 16-20).  
Taskira apa’s criticism of the fact that the majority of Tatars call themselves 
Muslim and believe in Allah, but do not live in accordance with Islam, illustrates that she 
is aware of the common perception of Islam among Tatars, a perception that equates 
ethnic and religious aspects of identity. It also speaks to the fact that for Taskira apa 
herself being Tatar and being Muslim is no longer synonymous, which is evident in her 
voicing of the popular assumption and then questioning it (lines 23-24). Finally, I argue 
that by using the collective “we” in challenging the common belief that being a Tatar 
means being a Muslim (lines 23-24), Taskira apa resumes a collective, not just her 
personal stance and invites me, a Tatar, to attest to such belief. The fact that she questions 
the popular assumption on behalf of other Tatars reflects a shift in the way Tatars 
perceive Islam today—with growing importance—even if the majority remains non-
observant. 
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Generational Differences in Tatars’ Orientation to Ethnicity Versus Islam as Basis 
of Identity 
Even though Taskira apa referred to Islam as central for uniting Tatars (line 1) and 
challenged the majority of Tatars’ conflation of ethnic and religious identities (lines 16-
24), she did not completely dismiss the importance of ethno-national aspects of Tatar 
identity. This is particularly evident in lines 9-15, above, where Taskira apa attributed 
Tatars’ lack of national pride, consciousness, and identity to Stalin’s prohibition of ethnic 
history. For Taskira apa, then, Islam was not the only important aspect of Tatar identity, 
even if a central one. As someone who closely worked with the medrese students of all 
ages and walks of life, Taskira apa was able to describe the generational difference she 
observed when it came to the issue of Tatar identity.  
The difference was in the fact that the younger generation of Tatars no longer 
considered the knowledge of the Tatar language and history as important markers of 
Tatar identity. Furthermore, even though Taskira apa acknowledged historical reasons 
that contributed to the older generation of Tatars’ loss of national consciousness, she held 
the older generation responsible for the younger generation’s loss of interest in their 
language and history. Using her own evening and extramural students, most of whom 
were Tatars in their fifties and older, as an example, Taskira apa expressed her frustration 
over the older generation’s ignorance and failure to raise ethnically-conscious children 
interested in their own language and culture:  
Taskira apa’s story - segment # 2 
 
Т: 
 
 
 
 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
[portion omitted] 
The young generation, some are russified already, even if in Islam, in religion. The 
young generation is not in a hurry to learn its native language and to finally realize 
that one is a Tatar—to realize and to reflect about one’s national pride, about one’s 
history—not in a hurry. The older generation is in a hurry, but they are late: their 
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29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
time has passed. They say: “ There are mixed marriages in our family. Our children 
and grandchildren do not speak the language. What can we do? What can we do? 
We are too late.” The older are too late. [long pause]. These [the younger] don’t 
want to, but the older are too late. This is the problem.  
 
By stating in line 25 that the younger generation of Tatars is “russified already, 
even if in Islam,” Taskira apa refers to a new way of being a Tatar, a new 
conceptualization of Tatar identity. When applied to Tatars, the Russian version of the 
word “russified” [obrusevshie] refers to cultural assimilation, language use in particular, 
with the Russian language and culture. Until recently, it also simultaneously implied 
religious assimilation evident in one’s way of life. In chapter 5, for example, Madina apa 
attributed Tatars’ alcohol and pork consumption (both are prohibited in Islam) to 
russification. In other words, “to be russified” was to be like a Russian in all aspects of 
one’s identity: language use, cultural traditions, religion. That is why, Taskira apa points 
out the new way of being a Tatar, embraced by some young people, when one is russified 
in all other aspects except for religion. I argue that the fact that Taskira apa uses the 
phrase “even if” in her statement “russified already, even if in Islam, in religion” (line 25) 
signals her perception of such an identity as contradictory and possibly disappointing. 
This disappointment, I suggest, does not come from the younger generation’s interest in 
Islam, but from their willingness to remain “russified” in other aspects of their identities. 
This is evident from lines 26 and 27, where Taskira apa links being a Tatar with knowing 
the Tatar language.  
In the excerpt above, Taskira apa summarized the difference between the older and 
younger generations’ attitudes toward the “native language” (line 26), “national pride” 
(line 27), and “history” (line 28): the older generation’s interest in the above came too 
late to ignite it in their children and grandchildren. Malika, a younger practicing Muslim 
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Tatar woman whose story is presented in the second part of this chapter, made a similar 
observation on a separate occasion. According to Malika, Tatars needed to focus on 
reviving Islam because they had lost their chance at securing political independence and 
cultural sustainability (such as the Tatar language).  
For Taskira apa, however, preserving the Tatar language remained as crucial as 
reviving Islam. In the excerpt below, she spoke about Tatar religious institutions as the 
last bastions for saving the Tatar language. Taskira apa supported her reasoning by the 
fact that, since its original arrival in Volga Bulgaria in 922,214 Islam has been observed by 
Tatars in Tatar and Arabic only. Furthermore, Taskira apa referred to protecting the Tatar 
language as a farz [Tat. ‘mandatory religious act’], an act of piety binding on every 
Muslim (such as the five daily prayers) and thus binding on Tatars: 
Taskira apa’s story - segment # 3:  
 
 
Т: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L: 
T: 
L: 
T: 
 
 
 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
[portion omitted] 
A mosque and mädräsä215 are the only places today where our language can be 
preserved and by preserving our language, our nation can be saved. But no one is 
working on it. [ . . .] I subscribe to the following principle: only two languages 
should function at Mökhämmädia216 and all other mädräsä: Tatar and Arabic. 
Tatar—because since 922, since the moment of accepting Islam, Islam has been 
here in the Tatar language first, and our forefathers, all of them observed in 
Tatar, the Hanafi mäzhäb217 [Tat. ‘Muslim school of law’]. And the second 
language, Arabic—because it is the language of the Qur’an. [. . . ]. But here at 
Mökhämmädia all subjects are taught in Russian! 
But they say that what’s more important is- 
-not the language, but Islam!  
Not the language, but Islam. 
Not the language. They also say: ‘we live in Russia, so for Russia Russian is its 
official language.’ [ . . .] And this: ‘Islam is for all nationalities, so if you are in 
Islam, it’s not necessary to know the language,’ they say. But Allah tägalä [Tat. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Historians had considered the year of 922 as the year of official conversion to Islam by Volga Bulgarians. However, 
some evidence suggests that Islam had penetrated the region earlier through trade with Central Asia (Mukhametshin 
2009). 
215 Throughout her narrative, Taskira apa used the Tatar version of the word medrese. 
216 Throughout her narrative, Taskira apa used the Tatar pronunciation of the medrese’s name, reflected in the way it’s 
spelled in the transcript. 	  
217 Taskira apa uses the Tatar version of the Arabic term madhhab.	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48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
‘God, the Exalted’] created us by tribes, and gave every tribe its own language. 
And Allah tägalä’s gift is farzgyna [Tat. ‘nothing, but the mandatory’], we have 
to accept it. Meaning, without knowing our own language, we go against Allah 
tägalä, we do not fulfill the farz [Tat. ‘the mandatory’]. [ . . .] Our youth lacks 
historic and national consciousness; this is the reason. 
  
The equal importance of ethnic and religious aspects of Tatar identity, typical for 
the older generation, comes through at the beginning of Taskira apa’s narrative above 
(lines 33-34). In it, she identifies religious institutions as the only places where the Tatar 
language and thus the nation can be preserved. When in line 42, I tried to voice the 
younger generation’s reason for the use of Russian, Taskira apa repeated it without my 
having a chance to finish the sentiment. This demonstrates her familiarity with the 
younger generation’s disinterest in the ethnic element of Tatar identity such as the Tatar 
language. In lines 45-46, she continued quoting what she believed to be a common 
indifferent attitude toward the Tatar language (line 45) and the younger generation’s 
separation of religious and ethnic identities (lines 44-45). Finally, by treating one’s 
knowledge of a native language as a farz, a religious duty (lines 47-51), Taskira apa 
provided a powerful counter-argument to the attitudes she did not share. The fact that 
Taskira apa provided theological evidence in support of her argument for preserving the 
Tatar language speaks to her familiarity with the younger generation’s “favoring” of 
Islam over ethnic traditions and her attempt to build a line of argument that the younger 
generation will consider valid.  
Taskira apa’s conviction that one’s ability to speak and thus preserve one’s native 
language was an act of piety binding on Muslim Tatars was shared by other Muslim Tatar 
women of her age. For example, Malika, the younger Tatar woman mentioned above, 
told me that her mother-in-law, a Muslim Tatar woman in her late sixties, scolded 
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Malika’s children for speaking Russian because the older woman considered it a sinful 
act. However, an ethnic Tatar and a fluent Tatar speaker herself, Malika did not approve 
of her mother-in-law’s conflation of the ethnic and religious elements of Tatar identity. 
Malika had appreciation for the Tatar language and made every effort to speak to her 
children in Tatar. However, she was critical of what she perceived as her mother-in-law’s 
inability to separate Islam from an ethnic tradition. Such generational difference in the 
role of religious and ethnic elements in defining the Tatar identity, represented by Taskira 
apa’s narrative, is a phenomenon that is becoming more pronounced in present day 
Tatarstan.  
However, the older and younger generations’ ideas about what makes one a 
proper Tatar or Muslim are not absolute. A practicing Muslim in her late sixties, Taskira 
apa was a staunch advocate for preserving the Tatar language as a necessary requirement 
for saving the Tatar nation. At the same time, she was highly critical of her own—the 
older—generation’s view that one does not have to become an observing Muslim until 
later in life, until after retirement. A former sovereignty movement activist, Taskira apa 
remained committed to preserving the Tatar language, history, and cultural heritage. 
Nonetheless, throughout her narrative she identified Islam as the main “pillar” that should 
unite Tatars. Taskira apa’s position on the importance of Islam in securing Tatars’ future 
and identity symbolizes their growing interest in Islam, which many perceive as a moral 
imperative for personal and social transformation.     
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What Kind of Muslim? 
The question of the degree to which Islam should be part of Tatars’ identity and 
their future is not the only issue at the center of Tatars’ public and personal debates. 
Another important dilemma that Tatars are currently grappling with is what kind of Islam 
should be part of their identity, and this is reflected in Muslim Tatar women’s piety 
stories. This question subtly came through in Taskira apa’s narrative above (lines 37-40). 
When talking about the theological importance of Tatar, Taskira apa stated: “Tatar—
because since 922, since the moment of accepting Islam, Islam has been here in the Tatar 
language first, and our forefathers, all of them observed in Tatar, the Hanafi mäzhäb218 
[Tat. ‘Muslim school of law’].” In the second part of the sentence, Taskira apa identifies 
not only the language in which Tatars historically worshiped—Tatar—but what kind of 
mäzhäb, a Muslim school of law they observed: the Hanafi. Therefore, while providing 
the reason for using Tatar and Arabic as the only legitimate sacred languages, Taskira 
apa, in passing, also identifies what kind of Muslims Tatars should be: the ones 
practicing the Hanafi madhhab.  
As the opening chapter of this dissertation discussed, the Volga Tatars have 
historically practiced the Hanafi legal school of Sunni Islam, which is the oldest and 
typically perceived as the most liberal of the four Sunni theological schools of law.219 
Some scholars,220 clergy,221 and public figures222 are concerned over the fact that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Taskira apa uses the Tatar version of the Arabic term madhhab.  
219 The other three are Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi’i.  
220 See, for example, Emelianova (2003), Iskhakov (2010). 
221 Former Tatarstan’s chief Mufti [Ru. ‘religious leader’] Ildus Faizov, elected in April 2010, at the outset publicly 
declared his support for the Hanafi madhhab as the only religious school of legal thought endorsed by the Muslim 
Spiritual Board of Tatarstan, which he presided over.  
222 Rais Suleimanov, head of the Volga branch of the Russian Institute of Strategic Research, makes such claims on a 
regular basis in local and national media (particularly the news website Regnum) and public forums. See, for example, 
his interview in the Kazan edition of the federal newspaper Argumenty i Fakty [Ru. 'Arguments and Facts'] (Shtele, 
2013). Suleimanov’s claims about the threat of radical Islam in the Volga region and about Tatarstan’s ethnic policies 
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opening of borders after the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly-acquired religious 
freedom, and lack of control over religious activities and institutions resulted in radical, 
especially Wahhabi/Salafi, forms of Islam spreading among post-Soviet Muslims.223 At 
the root of this fear is the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” paradigm, manifested in today’s 
“Culture Talk,” a popular discourse that views culture (understood as modernity) or its 
absence as the dividing line between those who value civic coexistence and those who 
espouse violence (Mamdani, 2004). This paradigm treats modern political movements 
that capitalize on Islam (such as Islamists) as primordial cultural or religious entities, 
which are inherently opposed to what’s believed to be progressive, secular values. Such a 
paradigm requires that a judgment value be placed on Muslims on the basis of 
compatibility of their form of Islam (manifested in their actions) with those values. 
Against this backdrop, some Tatars, the older generation in particular, are concerned not 
only about Tatars’ loss of their ethnic identity (manifested in the language loss), but also 
their traditional religious identity, which is associated with the Hanafi madhhab 
exclusively.  
In this context, one’s sources of religious knowledge and physical manifestations 
of piety—such as the way one performs the five daily prayers, dresses, eats—are treated 
as transparent markers of one’s religious identity, whether or not they can legitimately be 
treated as such. Based on that, I argue that practicing Muslims are not only aware of 
stereotypical perceptions formed on the basis of one’s sources of religious knowledge or 
physical practices, but find communicative strategies to deal with such perceptions. One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have been openly questioned by academics specializing in research on present-day Islam and ethno-religious relations 
in Russia/Tatarstan (see, for example, Iskhakov (2013b); Titova (2012); Isaev, n.d.). 
223 The purpose of this chapter is not to address the veracity of this claim. I would suggest, however, that a more 
productive approach to understanding the dynamics of different forms of Islam present in Tatarstan is to start by asking 
what practicing a certain kind of Islam means for a Muslim at the individual level in the context of the everyday life. In 
other words, the focus, I believe, should be on understanding what one does with a certain type of religious knowledge.  	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such strategy is (re)negotiating their religious identities at the discursive level, in a 
personal narrative by commenting on the theological or moral legitimacy of one’s sources 
of religious knowledge or one’s physical practices, as two piety stories analyzed below 
illustrate.  
 
(Not) Talking About Sources of Religious Knowledge  
 During my field research, few women explicitly mentioned a specific branch of 
Islam as a key element in their religious identity or explained why they practiced a 
certain Islamic tradition. This could be due to their and my initial assumption that as 
Tatars they were Hanafi. It could be due to the relative unimportance of the issue for 
(those) women: a recent survey-based sociological study224 illustrates that practicing 
Muslim Tatar women tend to be more tolerant, compared to men, when it comes to 
people with alternative religious, ethnic, and political affiliations. But it could also point 
to the women’s desire to avoid the potentially sensitive subject altogether and leave it to 
men who, as imams, make theological decisions. However, when I asked women about 
the way they came to Islam, their piety stories often began with a narrative about their 
original teachers and sources of Islamic knowledge. In their narratives, women did not 
simply name those sources and move on to the next subject, but painstakingly 
commented on the quality and nature of their sources of Islam as something that would 
reflect on the kind of Muslims they are. I argue that such a narrative move reflects 
practicing Muslim Tatar women’s awareness of the fact that one’s sources of religious 
knowledge are treated as true indicators of one’s faith. But more importantly, such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Nurullina (2010), p. 134. 
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communicative move gives women an opportunity to negotiate their own religious 
identities by identifying as morally or theologically legitimate those sources of religious 
knowledge that set them on the way to piety. Malika’s story is a case in point.     
I met Malika in the summer of 2009 through her husband, an imam of a small town 
in the suburbs of Kazan. I asked him to introduce me to Malika because I was intrigued 
by her combination of education (multilingual university graduate) and age (early 
thirties). As mentioned above, I had observed that, compared to practicing Muslim Tatar 
women in their mid teens and twenties on the one hand, and those in their late fifties and 
older on the other, there were fewer practicing Muslim Tatar women in their thirties and 
forties. Malika and her contemporaries had come of age during the 1990s when the 
former Soviet Union was at the peak of political, economic, and social transitions, as well 
as at a crisis of the existing system of values. While it was then that the Tatars enjoyed a 
vigorous ethnic revival, Muslim revival was one part of it, and not the powerful force in 
its own right that it has become over the past decade.  
On her suggestion, I interviewed Malika at a local medrese where she taught 
weekend classes. The conversation took place in Russian (with Malika’s occasional 
insertions of Arabic and Tatar). Throughout her narrative about her path to Islam, Malika 
did not address the question of madhhabs—Muslim schools of law—directly. Rather, she 
strove to present herself, her sources of religious knowledge, and generally, people who 
contributed to her road to piety—her Tatar mother and her Arab teachers—as proper, 
reasonable, trustworthy, and moral individuals. Doing so enabled Malika to position her 
teachers as morally or theologically legitimate sources of her Muslim knowledge, which 
also reflected on the kind of Islam she embraced: legitimate.  
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I identify Malika’s husband’s religious education as a reason for her need to 
legitimize the kind of Islam that they, as a family, practice. An ethnic Tatar, he received 
his theological education in the Middle East where she accompanied him after their 
marriage. In the context of present-day claims that Tatars (or other Muslims living in 
Russia) bring radical Islam from studying abroad (the Middle East in particular), a 
Muslim’s foreign theological education could serve as grounds for questioning his or her 
loyalty to what’s considered the legitimate form of Islam, associated with the Hanafi 
school of Muslim law. I further suggest that Malika is aware of—and thus feels the need 
to dispel—common Tatar stereotypes associated with Islam today, as Tatars debate over 
the extent and type of Islam that should be part of their lives. In her story below, Malika 
first talks about her mother as her first religious teacher and describes her mother’s 
attempt to teach Malika how to pray. She then recounts her experience of continuing her 
religious education at a Kazan mosque and explains what Islam is. Finally, Malika recalls 
her participation in a summer camp organized by Arab students as a definitive moment 
on her road to piety.    
Malika’s story: 
M: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Well, of course, Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] gave me Islam from pure 
hands after all, I think, because um gradually, when äni [Tat. ‘Mom’]—I am still 
little—I don’t know, I am maybe fifteen, my mom [stands] me for namaz225 
[Tat. ‘ritual prayer’]: “Let’s, namazga bas” [Tat. ‘stand for namaz’]. I stand for 
namaz next to her; I don’t understand anything, but I obey her...out of respect 
for my parent, I obey her. I don’t need all that; my thoughts are far away; I was 
probably watching a movie then, right? I am simply repeating like a robot; I 
don’t even understand what a rakagat [Ru. ‘unit of namaz’] is, like a brick in 
namaz, and she is scolding me, I recall, for not understanding such a simple 
thing ((smiling)). Well, this is how it all was. Then I started going to a mosque, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 A set expression in both Russian and Tatar to indicate that someone encouraged a Muslim to begin performing 
namaz, which is often considered a turning point toward piety.  
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L: 
M: 
L: 
M: 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
to Märjani.226 Back then, Märjani was the only functioning mosque [in Kazan], 
and when I was a college student, it was, I’ll tell you ninety-, no I was in high 
school then, it was ninety…three, they began to rebuild Nurulla, the Nurulla 
mosque;227 it’s a Hay mosque228 at the corner, across from the Kamal Theater.229 
So and they quickly-quickly built mosques in Kazan for the [next] ten years. But 
before then, when I was little, Märjani was the only functioning mosque. And 
there they began to give active lessons in the nineties, at the beginning of the 
nineties. I used to travel there; I had an abïstay [Tat. ‘female religious 
authority’] with whom I studied, but it didn’t particularly touch me that deeply=  
=What were you taught [there]? 
((Sigh)) Well, namaz, specifically= 
=Arabic?  
No, why? Islam is not Arabic. Islam is knowledge about the Creator, in general, 
how to understand Him. Submission to Him, how to submit to Him. And 
specifically, namaz, taharät [Tat. ‘ablution’], namaz. And there are lot of subtle 
moments that each Muslim studies, and having studied them, performs them, 
and it all eas- becomes easy for him.230 So, and in ninety-two in Kazan, students, 
Arabs, organized—well religious Arabs—because later I graduated from the 
foreign languages department in Kazan=  
=What university? 
the X University. 
the X University? 
Yes, the Y department, and there was a lot of contacts with Arabs. They are 
actually very different,231 and the religious ones among them—the ones who 
really—the ones who happened to find themselves in the Russian realities and 
they keep Islam, there are very few of those, actually. They get lost here, they 
begin to get into all sins, get into all heavy sins here ((smiling)). But these ones 
were students from another [Russian] city, and they studied to be medical 
doctors, so they were respectable, good people, rational.  
[portion omitted] 
So these Arabs, Muslims, in the summer of ninety-two organized a summer 
camp for kids, for those interested, and äni somehow learned about it and signed 
me up there. I really liked it there, of course; there were very interesting lectures 
[there]. I was a rational girl, and I liked listening to all that. And ((smiling)) 
basically, you can ask anyone, they often say that [it is] like a flash, it really is, 
faith, Allah tägalä opens [it] in [one’s] heart. So, it’s like something, you can 
even pinpoint a fraction of a second when you became a Muslim, you see? It’s a 
very interesting state. A lecture is taking place; the lecture is given by this Arab, 
and he says: “For example, there is one person who worked all his life and made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Name of Kazan’s chief mosque, titled after a prominent Tatar thinker of the 18th century, the only mosque allowed 
to function during the Soviet era. 
227 Another old prominent mosque in Kazan. 
228 The Nurulla mosque is referred to as the “hay mosque” because of a once-adjacent hay market.  
229 Professional Tatar Theater in Kazan. 
230 Malika most likely uses a third person masculine pronoun to convey an abstract, formal style. The usage is not 
politically incorrect.   
231 Malika means here that not all Arabs are pious Muslims, as many Tatars tend to think.	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57. 
savings, and another robbed him. The thief was not caught, but...um the hard 
worker lives in poverty until his death, while the other one [is] in luxury all his 
life until his death So there is a lot of injustice... in this world...And there will, of 
course, be the Judgment day.” He says that there will be the Judgment day 
where Allah tägalä will restore all rights and will punish...all, and there will be 
an absolute justice. And all of a sudden, a realization comes that indeed, such 
great creations like the Earth, the human being, the human community – all of 
this is not a toy, it’s not for games, it’s not for fun, it’s not for merry-making, 
that we’ll be responsible for all of this, and that...I, too, must be in it.  
 
Malika begins her story by identifying her mother as her first religious teacher and 
recollecting memories about her first experience with namaz, the ritual prayer (lines 1-
10). I argue that at the beginning of her narrative, Malika does not simply identify her 
first religious teacher—her mother—but also comments on the qualities of the teacher 
and her Islam as an indicator of the kind of Islam Malika inherited from her mother and 
practices today. She does this by saying that, without a doubt, “Allah tägalä” [Tat. ‘God, 
the Exalted’], gave her Islam from “pure hands” (lines 1-2), the hands of äni, her Tatar 
mother who, when she was fifteen or so, encouraged her to stand next to her for namaz. 
By referring to her mother in Tatar (line 2) and by invoking in Tatar her mother’s request 
that Malika stand for prayer (lines 3-4), Malika creates an association between her 
mother’s Islam and Tatar identity. Thus, without identifying a specific school of Muslim 
law, Malika creates an impression that her Tatar mother practiced the kind of Islam that 
could not possibly be considered foreign vis-a-vis her Tatar identity (such as Wahabi or 
Salafi Islam), thereby legitimizing her mother’s faith from the theological point of view. 
Malika further legitimizes her mother’s—and thus her own—faith by metaphorically 
describing her mother’s hands as “pure” (line 1). Malika uses the metaphor to comment 
on her mother’s character. If then, her Tatar mother was a “pure” woman, the kind of 
Islam she practiced and passed on to Malika could not have been immoral. Finally, by 
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stating in the very first sentence that “Allah tägalä” gave her Islam (from her mother’s 
pure hands), Malika identifies God himself as the ultimate source of her faith. Thus, the 
faith that she practices is divine and pure by definition.      
Malika continues her story by talking about a Kazan mosque where she attended 
informal religious lessons taught by an abïstay, a Tatar female religious teacher (lines 10-
19). Malika noted that she originally learned how to pray more out of respect for her 
mother than her own interest in religion (lines 5-6); neither was she “touched” by the 
mosque lessons, as she put it (line 19). It was at a summer camp organized by Arab 
students studying in Kazan where Malika’s formative religious experience—a revelation 
of faith—took place. Before describing that moment (lines 54-57), Malika makes an 
effort to comment on the camp organizers—the Arabs who organized and taught at the 
camp (lines 33-39). 
Malika makes sure to describe the “Arabs” that set up the camp and were her 
religious teachers as “respectable, good people, rational” (line 39). However, Malika does 
not simply refer to her Arab teachers as such; she goes into two digressions to explain 
what those qualities actually mean. In the first instance, Malika directly links the meaning 
of those adjectives to piety when she describes them as “religious ones…the ones who 
happened to find themselves in the Russian realities and they keep Islam” (lines 33-36). 
In the second instance, Malika assigns meaning to her understanding of “respectable,” 
“good,” and “rational” in a more subtle way. She does it in lines 48-54 by evoking one of 
her Arab teacher’s lectures on “absolute justice” (line 54). I argue that the Arab’s 
message of a possibility of such justice would resonate with many in the post-Soviet 
context, as it did with Malika herself who identified the lecture as a key moment in her 
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spiritual development (lines 54-57). By crediting her Arab teacher with her sense of 
renewed personal responsibility for “the human community” (lines 54-57), Malika 
implies that to be “respectable,” “good,” and “rational” is to be, first and foremost, moral, 
and as such, a source of legitimate religious knowledge, legitimate Islam.  
Malika’s evaluation of her camp teachers was directly linked to her evaluation of 
herself when she said that she liked her Arab teachers’ lectures because she was “a 
rational girl” (lines 42-43). By saying that, like her teachers, Malika was “rational,” she 
implies that she shared in her teacher’s moral values of justice and responsibility. 
Therefore, as someone who could not possibly embrace a faith that was morally 
questionable, Malika signals her own sense of morality. Finally, I argue that, by 
providing the listener with enough evidence to conclude that the kind of Islam she 
practices is based on the kind of people it came from—“respectable,” “good,” “rational” 
and thus moral—Malika asserts a sense of agency.   
Malika’s attempt to create a positive image of the kind of Islam she embraced was 
tied to stereotypes that co-exist among both practicing and non-practicing Muslim Tatars 
today, the stereotypes that Malika was trying to dispel. Both stereotypes are associated 
with “Arabs,” the way I observed Tatars to routinely refer to people from what they 
perceive to be “the Arab world.” When during my fieldwork I probed several Tatars who 
used the term to explain to me what they mean by “the Arab world,” the Middle East was 
a frequent response.232 Therefore, the term “Arabs” signifies a collective identity of sorts, 
which, I argue, can be better understood through the stereotypes Malika evokes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 According to historian Allen Frank (A. Frank, personal communication, May 12, 2013), pre-revolutionary sources 
indicate that at the time, Tatars used the term “Garabstan” (the same term that some of my interviewees used to refer to 
the “Arab world”) to refer to the Hijaz province. Geographically, the Hijaz province coincided with a region that is now 
in the west of Saudi Arabia and contains Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Present-day use of the term 
“Garabstan” to refer to the “Arab world” as in “the Middle East” may reflect the development of Arab nationalism.  
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One such belief suggests that all Arabs are proper Muslims and thus all Arabs are 
an authority when it comes to Islam. This view also comes through in the narrative of 
Farida, another young practicing Muslim woman whose story is analyzed below. Malika 
breaks this stereotype by establishing a distinction between her pious teachers and other 
non-pious Arabs she met while in school. Another stereotype, particularly shared by 
younger Tatars who consider themselves secular, older observant Tatars, and some non-
Tatars, suggests that Muslim foreign nationals who come to Russia to study, work, or for 
other reasons, introduce to the Tatars radical, foreign Islam (routinely referred to as 
Wahhabi or Salafi, regardless of one’s actual madhhab).233 Just like Tatars who received 
their theological education in the Middle East, these foreign nationals are often blamed 
for adulterating and destroying the Hanafi school of law, traditionally espoused by the 
Tatars. For Malika, whose husband studied in the Middle East and whose spiritual 
teachers were Arabs, this stereotype could translate into some Tatars’ questioning of her 
“Tatarness” and loyalty to Hanafi Islam.  
Moreover, popular (non-expert) understandings of different types of Islam are 
often based on physical manifestations of piety that are often compared against what’s 
believed to “the norm” (an issue I discuss at length below). One example is a popular 
sentiment that Tatar women never covered their hair unless for prayer, or if they did, they 
tied their scarves in the back, showing their necks. This type of image-based tension over 
a Tatar woman’s identity has been a recurring theme among many of my interviewees. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 For example, in 2001-2003 the Russian government started closing “Turetskie Litsei” [Ru. ‘Turkish Schools’], 
secondary schools founded and taught throughout the former Soviet Union in the 1990s by Turkish nationals. In 
Tatarstan, these schools were closed down in 2007-2008, and all Turkish and other foreign nationals working at the 
schools were sent out of the country. While the official version of the closedown was often related to violations of labor 
law, Mukhariamova and Andreeva (2008) suggest that Russia’s national security officials claimed that the schools were 
spreading ideas of pan-Turkism and extremist Islam via religious education, and thus were a threat to Russia’s national 
security. 	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also personally experienced it on a number of occasions in the field while wearing a 
headscarf that carefully covered my hair and neck. In one instance, an older Tatar woman 
with whom I shared public space pointed at me and regretted out loud that young Tatar 
women preferred to tie their scarves “the Arab way.”  
Finally, a recent wave of local authorities’ bans on headscarves in Russia’s public 
schools generated lawsuits and a heated public discussion.234 It prompted Russia’s 
President Vladimir Putin to make the following public statement in a recent press 
conference: “When it comes to hijabs: you know that in our culture (when I say - “our,” I 
mean traditional Islam) hijabs don’t exist. . . . And we are going to implement traditions 
that are foreign to us – why? And, of course, we all have to pay attention to this, and talk 
about it directly, and refer, in this case of course, to the representatives of traditional 
Islam.”235 In this context, one must perform a tough balancing act to appear as a Muslim 
who is pious enough, but not fanatically religious as to be accused of being “radical” and 
thus potentially dangerous. Malika, whose husband studied in the Middle East, whose 
own spiritual teachers were Arabs, and who wore long skirts and carefully covered her 
head and neck with a headscarf, used her piety story to qualify her sources of religious 
knowledge—as indicators of her Islam—as morally and theologically legitimate.    
 
Embodied Practices as Markers of One’s Religious Identity 
Malika was not unique in elaborating on the sources and teachers of her religious 
knowledge while sharing her story with me. Farida, a second-generation practicing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 For specific cases, see footnote 53. 
235 My translation from Russian. The exact words are as follows: “Что касается хиджабов: Вы знаете, ведь в нашей 
культуре (когда я говорю – нашей, я имею в виду традиционный ислам) никаких хиджабов нет. [. . .] А мы у 
себя будем внедрять чуждые нам традиции – зачем? И конечно, мы все должны на это обращать внимание, и 
прямо об этом говорить, и опираться в данном случае, конечно, на представителей традиционного ислама” 
(Official website of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, http://президент.рф/news/17173).	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woman in her early twenties, felt compelled to explain to me her parents’ choice of 
religious teachers as indicators of their and her religious identity—an identity that she 
had adopted at an early age as part of her family’s religious practice. Unlike Malika, 
Farida belonged to a younger generation of practicing Muslims who were either raised by 
observant parents or have become pious in light of the recent Islamic revival. I met and 
interviewed Farida in the fall of 2009 at the Russian Islamic University (RIU) in Kazan236 
where at the time she was a student and employee. Unlike Malika, who first became 
interested in religion during her adolescent years, Farida had been wearing a headscarf by 
the age of ten when she and her practicing Muslim Tatar mother moved to Tatarstan from 
the Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan) to join her maternal grandmother upon her father’s early 
death. While Farida indicated that she had been interested in religion since early 
childhood, she did not pinpoint a single moment of revelation like Malika did. Given the 
fact that Farida was raised by a practicing mother and, later, a practicing Muslim Tatar 
stepfather, Farida was not “newly” pious. Her parents, however, became practicing 
Muslims as adults, and Farida spoke about their religious teachers as an indicator of the 
kind of Islam the family practiced. 
Similarly to Malika’s narrative, Farida’s story illustrates Tatars’ concern over the 
role of Islam as part of their identity and future. Using her parents and a young imam at a 
local mosque as examples, Farida shows that the general public often perceives sources 
and teachers of Islamic knowledge as true indicators of one’s Muslim identity—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Founded in 1998, RIU is another Kazan higher educational institution popular among Russia’s Muslims. Indirectly 
supported by the Tatarstan and Federal governments (mostly through grants), RIU offers degrees in both secular and 
religious disciplines. RIU is also believed to serve as a moderating force to alternative forms of Islam taking a foothold 
in Russia. For example, its website states that Hanafi is the dominant religious school adopted by the university. Many 
of my interviewees were simultaneously enrolled at the Mukhammadiia madrasa and RIU to be able to get “solid” 
religious knowledge from the former and a state-certified diploma of higher education from the latter, as they would 
often explain it to me.  
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something about which Malika also indirectly spoke. Farida’s account of her family’s and 
local youth’s religious practices demonstrates that for many Tatars, struggle over the kind 
of Islam they should embrace rests largely at the personal level of everyday embodied 
(physical) practices and religious rituals, as opposed to more abstract theological 
underpinnings of different Islamic traditions.  
This is not only due to the highly prescribed, ritualistic nature of Muslim piety, 
which ties the theological knowledge to physical practice (Mahmood, 2005), but also due 
to the Russian imperial and later soviet religious policies. They stripped Islam of its 
theological essence and forced it out of the fabric of everyday life into the realm of ethnic 
customs and rituals that marked life-changing occasions. Therefore, for the majority of 
post-Soviet Muslims embodied practices associated with life-changing events—not 
theological knowledge itself, or theological knowledge embodied in the daily 
observance—represent the realm of the familiar, the religious “norm.” As Farida’s 
narrative illustrates, the general public, and even Muslims themselves, rely on the 
physical manifestations of Muslim piety to determine one’s religious—and by default 
other—loyalties.  
After collecting some basic demographic information, I began my interview by 
asking Farida to share her path to Muslim piety with me. I spoke with Farida for over 
three hours. I analyze part of her story, which I broke down into segments for ease of 
comprehension. In the first data segment below, Farida opens her story by recalling the 
earliest religious experiences she could remember and links it to her mother’s religious 
transformation:   
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Farida’s story – segment # 1 
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Since childhood, I longed for religion…and since childhood I searched…one 
can say, I was in search for religion. My parents were not pious then, but now 
they are pious, Alhamdulillah [Ar. ‘Thank God’],237 Muslims. And I always 
was in search for…the Truth.238 So, there was a feeling…eh…when He, God, is 
near you, you don’t see Him, but you always feel Him and start looking for 
Him. Start looking for a way to communicate with Him, a way to worship Him, 
a:::nd you want Him to answer you…you want to ask Him questions= 
=When did this need emerge? 
It was when I was five already. 
Already? Uhum. 
So, it started at five…and I asked my mom to buy me a Bible= 
= Why a Bible?  
Because I didn’t know that there was…Well, our Tatars are such an 
ethnicity239... secular; they are not interested in their own religion, unlike 
Russians. Russians, they always know that [there is] bozhen’ka [Ru. ‘dear 
Lord’],“ Christ, and all that; they know all this.  
[portion omitted] 
So. I had asked for a Bible, and I had a Bible. [. . .]  Then I asked my mom to 
buy me a cross, all that, I wanted to have some religious relics at home. 
[portion omitted] 
So, a:::nd my mom gave it to me because I myself wanted it…I wore it…, but 
then my mom began searching ((laughs)). So, it was somehow a parallel process 
between us, and in a year, she studied all all all, many religions, [to find what’s] 
suitable, and she didn’t pay attention to her own religion, maybe because [she 
had] originally [assumed that] a Tatar – means being a Muslim, right? And then 
she started studying Islam, and that was it; she definitely came to Islam within a 
year. She began, she already was going to a madrasa, studied there, and then a 
take-off began.  
It was there, where you lived? 
Yes. Then she left for Moscow, studied with Arabs…for half a year, [she] put 
on her headscarf. That was it, she became a serious Muslim. 
 
Similarly to Malika, Farida began her story by going back to her younger years 
when she felt the need to have a religious experience (lines 1-7). Unlike Malika, 
however, who attributed her path to Muslim piety at least in part to her Tatar mother, 
Farida at the outset questioned Tatars’ interest in their religion. In response to my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Literal translation from Arabic is “Praise be to God/Allah,” but in everyday life Muslim use the phrase as “Thank 
God,” which is considered an act of piety.   
238 I capitalize the word throughout when Farida uses it in connection with religious experience, as opposed to a 
reference to a fact of life. 
239 Farida uses the term “natsia.” 
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question why she asked her Tatar mother to buy her a Bible, Farida did not attribute her 
own lack of knowledge about other religions, including Islam, to her mother, but, 
indirectly, to the fact that her mother was a Tatar, and “Tatars are such an ethnicity, 
secular; they are not interested in their own religion, unlike Russians” (lines 13-14). 
Using her Tatar mother as an example, Farida further clarified what she perceived as an 
average Tatar’s lack of interest in religion: “she didn’t pay attention to her own religion, 
maybe because [she had] originally [assumed that] a Tatar – means being a Muslim, 
right?” (lines 22-23).  
Farida’s questioning of an average Tatar’s conflation of ethnic and religious 
identity is illustrative of a recent trend among the growing number of practicing Muslim 
Tatars, particularly the younger generation, to differentiate ethnic and religious elements 
of their identity. Similarly to Malika, Farida explained her need to have religious 
experience as an internal, deeply personal, and thus divine, call. However, in contrast to 
Malika, Farida used her Tatar mother as an example to question Tatars’ legitimacy as 
“serious” Muslims. It was not, after all, until after Farida’s mother travelled to Moscow 
to study with Arabs for half-a-year that she became “a serious Muslim,” an indication of 
which was her putting on the headscarf (lines 28-29).  
There are certain parallels between Malika’s and Farida’s narratives. However, 
unlike Malika who directly linked her faith to the “pure” hands of her Tatar mother, 
Farida expresses doubt about Tatars’ relationship to their religion. This is not to say that 
Farida does not identify as Tatar altogether. Born in Central Asia to a Tatar mother and a 
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father who belonged to one the Pamir region’s ethnic groups,240 Farida moved to 
Tatarstan with her mother at the age of ten, following her father’s death, to join her Tatar 
grandmother and other Tatar family members. A fluent Tatar speaker, she graduated 
among the top of her class from a Tatar school. Her mother transferred Farida from a 
regular Russian school at the suggestion of the Russian-school principal who believed 
that, as the only child wearing a headscarf, Farida would feel more comfortable in the 
Tatar school. Farida said she was grateful to the principal for the suggestion, as she did 
feel more comfortable in the Tatar school. Furthermore, Farida had a lot of respect for her 
Tatar stepfather and his family, as she conveyed to me. When at the beginning of our 
conversation I asked Farida if she was a Tatar, her response was: “Um, yes, well, not a 
full-blooded Tatar, half-Tatar; my mom is a Tatar, and my dad is a Pamiri.” Her 
connection to Tatar ethnicity is also seen in line 13, where Farida refers to Tatars as “our 
Tatars.” Therefore, while Farida questions the way Tatars relate to their religion, her own 
relationship to “Tatarness” is not an uncomplicated one. This relationship illustrates 
separation of religious and ethnic aspects of identity, a recent phenomenon.  
Farida continued her narrative by commenting on how the way she and her family 
practice Islam daily might set them apart from the majority of Tatars. Her focus on the 
daily practices underscores my earlier observation that one’s religious affiliation is often 
judged on the basis of one’s physical manifestations of Muslim piety. In the following 
excerpt, Farida first identifies her family as “very religious” and then explains which 
specific practices make others perceive the family as “vakhabity” [Ru. ‘Wahhabi’]:241 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 The Pamir region is inhabited by ethnic groups who share the Indo-Iranian origin. The majority practice Ismailism 
(a branch of Shia Islam); some practice Sunni Islam. In her story, Farida did not identify her father’s religious identity 
or whether her father was religious altogether. 	  
241 Throughout her narrative, Farida used the word “vakhabity,” the Russian version of the word “Wahhabi.” For more 
on the meaning of the word “Wahhabi,” see footnote 50. 
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[portion omitted] 
Well, our family is very religious, Alhamdulillyah [Ar. ‘Thank God’]. So that 
there are even people, there are even people who call us Wahhabi ((lower 
voice)), but we are not Wahhabi, we don’t think we are Wahhabi, we are not 
terrorists, we are nobody= 
Why do [they] call [you] so? 
Because of the strict attitude toward religion, because of the strict attitude toward 
all the forbidden, to all that is allowed. So, all matters, for- there is no “this is 
allowed, this is easy, this can be skipped.” For them everything is strict.  
Can you [explain with] specific examples?      
Sure. For example, Tatars have such concept as ashlar ütkärü [Tat. ‘carrying out 
religious dinners’],242 right? And, alar [Tat. ‘they’] are not against ashlar 
ütkärü, but alar against men and women sitting, kind of together, kind of in one 
room. Or nikakhlar ütkärü bergä243 [Tat. ‘performing Muslim marriages 
ceremonies jointly’]. They believe that men should be sitting apart from women; 
it’s in accordance with the Shariah [Ar. ‘Muslim normative law’]. So, um, there 
are these kinds of nuances, with which they do not agree; they don’t do them= 
=Can you give more examples? 
Um, there are people, let’s say, who, if there is wine in a cake, say that, “it does 
not,” like, “intoxicate, why?” But my parents will never eat such cake, never 
ever. Or, they are even scrupulous when it comes to such things, as…gelatin,244 
for example, is present in food […] We:::ll, even for such basic things, [they] tell 
my mom: “why do you wear245 your scarf in front; wear [it] in the back,” or= 
=Does she tie it in the front? 
Yes. Or, she is very, well, she always wears a very loose hijab, so she, she 
doesn’t have tight clothes, she does not allow [herself to wear] such kind of 
clothes. As I remember since childhood, she has always had a loose dress, so it 
stayed the way it always has been, she tekterä [Tat. ‘sews’] only loose [clothes], 
so and she even scolds me, say, if my blouses, say, a bit deviate from the 
Shariah norm, and if I, say, wear pants with a tunic, she says that my tunics 
should be below my knees. She has very, has always been very strict when it 
comes to my clothes. A:::nd the fact that I use mascara, so that, well…to hide 
some imperfections [...] 
[portion omitted] 
[…] a:::nd my mom has been strict even when it comes to things like that 
((quieter voice)), like, “it’s forbidden”= 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 This Tatar phrase literally translates as “carrying out dinners/meals” and refers to a Tatar tradition of a religious 
gathering at a dinner table with the purpose of reciting of the Qur’an, saying prayers, socializing, and enjoying the 
meal. 
243 This Tatar phrase literally translates as “carrying out joint Muslim marriages” and refers to a Muslim marriage 
ceremony where male and female guests are present in the same room.  
244 Because gelatin can contain pig elements, some Muslims exclude it from their diets. 
245 Meaning “tie.”	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=Make up is forbidden, right?= 
=Yes, “make up is forbidden; beauty is only for [one’s] husband,” and all that. 
My dad…is even stricter ((smiling)). 
Unlike Malika, Farida was unusually explicit in discussing the kind of Islam she 
and her family practice. As I mentioned earlier, most women I interviewed about their 
path to Muslim piety did not engage in the issue of madhhabs directly, even though it is 
at the center of the current Muslim revival. Farida, however, openly admitted that some 
call her family “Wahhabi” and quickly countered the claim (lines 31-33). This indicates 
that Farida is well aware of the stereotype-based discourse around—and labels attached 
to—those who exhibit “the strict attitude toward religion” (line 35).  
To give a sense of the meaning and usage behind the term “Wahhabi” (or 
“Wahhabism”) in the post-Soviet discursive space, I refer to Emelianova (2003), who, 
while pointing out that theologically speaking, it is incorrect to apply the term 
“Wahhabism” to what she calls “post-Soviet Islamic fundamentalism,” uses the term 
“due to the term’s wide acceptance by politicians and journalists” (p. 245). My own field 
observations indicate that the term “Wahhabi” (or “Wahhabism”) is often used by the 
general public to refer to a range of Muslim practices that deviate from what they believe 
to be a religious “norm.” At best, the term can refer to what’s believed to be a very 
conservative form of Islam, characterized by literal interpretation of and blind obedience 
in the following of the Qur’an and ahadith [Ar. accounts of exemplary sayings and deeds 
of the Prophet Muhammad’], while dismissing the theological legitimacy of the 
madhhabs. At worst, the term can be associated with terrorism and applied by the 
government to those Muslims it wishes to suppress (A. Altstadt, personal communication, 
May 29, 2013). In either case, Islamic practices associated with Wahhabism are marked 
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by their departure from the local norm. In present-day Tatarstan, where non-practicing 
Tatars still constitute a majority, such a norm is largely limited to Muslim religious 
rituals observed only at special occasions, such as births, weddings, and deaths. Anything 
more than that may be treated as “too conservative,” “too strict,” and thus a deviation. 
Furthermore, because Muslim piety is enacted through gender-specific practices, gender 
is at the center of the discourse on what constitutes religious norms.    
As someone who likely dealt with this issue in the past, Farida did not hesitate to 
give examples of what can constitute such a norm, and what can be considered “foreign” 
and thus “Wahhabi.” She began by saying that what made her family “Wahhabi” in the 
eyes of some was their strict attitude “toward all the forbidden, all that is allowed” as 
opposed to “this is allowed, this is easy, this can be skipped” (lines 35-37). By 
juxtaposing the two attitudes and by using double-voicing (citing the words of others in 
lines 36-37), Farida implies that “the norm” is such an attitude toward religion where “this 
is allowed, this is easy, this can be skipped.” Furthermore, in lines 39-45, using nikakh 
[Tat. ‘Muslim marriage ceremony’], and the Tatar religious tradition of ashlar ütkärü 
[Tat. ‘carrying out of religious social gatherings accompanied by a formal meal, prayers, 
and Qur’an recitations’], Farida more specifically explained that her family’s preference, 
“in accordance with the Shariah,” that men and women sit in separate spaces was 
considered outside the norm. The fact that Farida refers to these Tatar traditions in Tatar 
indicates her familiarity with them, as well as her ability to separate the cultural (Tatar) 
component from the religious (Muslim) one.  
In the course of my fieldwork, I attended about a dozen Muslim public and 
private events where space was divided along gender lines in one way or another. One 
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such private event was a female-only iftar [Ar. ‘fast-breaking dinner during Ramadan’] 
organized by Rufina, a practicing Tatar woman, a university student in her early twenties, 
in her Kazan rental apartment in the summer of 2009.246 The majority of Kazan’s mosques 
also held iftar dinners in separate rooms for men and women. Several of Kazan’s higher 
educational institutions allowed their students to organize iftar dinners on the premises (a 
tradition that has continued to take place every year), and since situating men and women 
in separate dining areas would be logistically difficult in those secular public institutions, 
young men and women sat in the same dining hall but at separate tables. In that case, the 
division along gender lines was less obvious but still present since no men and women 
were sitting at the same table.  
I also attended about half a dozen ashlar [Tat. religious social gatherings 
accompanied by a formal meal, prayers, and Qur’an recitations’] organized by older 
(fifties and up) Tatar women I had met while sitting in at informal mosque lessons at two 
different Kazan mosques. In one instance, a dinner was held at the same mosque where 
lessons took place; like the lessons, it was female-only. In another instance, a dinner was 
organized by a sixty-year-old female, a mosque-lessons student, at a café where she 
worked and her family owned. The division along gender lines was marked by men and 
women sitting at the different ends of one long table. While these examples illustrate that 
space division along gender lines is becoming more commonplace among practicing 
Muslim Tatars, it is still a rarity for the majority of the population.247  
In a recent interview, Gamil Nur, a Tatar activist and a showman who specializes 
in providing entertainment for observant Muslim Tatars’ weddings, suggested that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 In chapter 4 that introduced piety stories, I analyze an excerpt of interaction that took place during that dinner.	  	  
247 Peshkova (2009) provides an insightful discussion on Uzbek Muslim women’s use of domestic space.  
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alcohol-free weddings with some form of division along gender lines were becoming a 
norm (Nur, 2012). However, he noted that in his estimation they constituted only one-to-
two percent of all large-scale weddings taking place in Tatarstan. Based on my field 
observations, I suggest that such a small number can be explained, among other factors, 
by the fact that observant Muslim Tatars often prefer to hold small wedding ceremonies at 
home. The estimate, nonetheless, demonstrates that the division of space along gender 
lines is a rarity, at least when it comes to large-scale private events such as weddings. It is 
no wonder, then, that Farida’s parents’ preference to hold social—even if religious—
gatherings in separate spaces was considered outside the norm and an indication of their 
“radical” religious identity. 
Farida’s parents’ diligence with alcohol- and gelatin-containing products (47-50) 
and her mother’s choice of loose, long dresses along with the headscarves tied in the front 
(50-60) can also be considered practices that, for many Tatars, deviate from what’s 
believed to be “the norm.” As I have mentioned in my analysis of Malika’s story, in the 
course of my field work, I became aware that it was common to hear among Tatars, 
particularly an older generation, the sentiment that Tatar women never covered their heads 
and/or necks or that Tatars never gathered in separate spaces along gender lines. However, 
ethnographic research indicates that, historically, Muslim Tatars practiced separate 
festivities for men and women and that the practice began to disappear only after the 
Bolshevik Revolution.248 Similarly, Suslova249 suggests that Tatar women historically 
covered their heads and that changes to the tradition began taking place only in the mid-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 R. Mukhamedova, “Pischa i domashniaia utvar’” in D. Iskhakov (Ed.) Etnografiia tatarskogo naroda, (Kazan: 
Magarif, 2004), 103-109; Raufa Urazmanova, “Semeinye obychai i obriady” in D. Iskhakov (Ed.) Etnografiia 
tatarskogo naroda, (Kazan: Magarif, 2004), 127-140. 
249 S. Suslova, “Narodnaia odezhda” in D. Iskhakov (Ed.) Etnografiia tatarskogo naroda (Kazan: Magarif, 2004), 88-
103. 
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1800s, while Tatar religious reformers did not engage in public discussions concerning 
the legality of the veil until after 1910.250  
Based on my field observations, I suggest that present-day Tatar popular beliefs 
regarding gender and women issues are largely based on artifacts (such as photographs or 
family portraits), observed family practices and/or on popular discourses generated by the 
collective memories of the large group of people (an oral tradition of sorts)251 that can 
only go back a generation or two.252 This limited collective memory span is in great part 
due to the legacy of the Soviet state that prohibited both religious and ethnic education 
that would preserve and pass on cultural and religious knowledge. As illustrated in 
Farida’s narrative above, they are, however, a reflection of an ongoing quest of what kind 
of Islam should define Tatar identity.  
Farida’s own religious identity is also complicated and reflects the intricacy of the 
present-day Muslim revival in Tatarstan. While she explains her mother’s clothing choice 
as one of the reasons behind some people’s assumptions that Farida’s mother is a 
“Wahhabi,” in lines 57-60 Farida simultaneously reveals both her mother’s adherence to 
and her own occasional deviation from “the Shariah norm” when it comes to clothing. 
Similarly, in lines 60-63 Farida describes her use of make-up as a potential point of 
disagreement with her parents. When I met Farida, her own appearance did not easily 
match the stereotype associated with someone who is a ‘Wahhabi.” While she was 
modestly dressed, wearing a headscarf, a long skirt, and a long-sleeve top, she did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Azade-Ayse Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 
63. 
251 See Eviatar Zerubavel. Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past (University of Chicago 
Press, 2004).	  
252 A recent wave of ban of headscarves in public schools and Putin’s response to the issue (both discussed earlier in 
this chapter) prompted a Muslim Tatar theologian and public figure Rustam Batrov to write an internet article on the 
issue. In it, he summarizes popular views on headscarves and deconstructs them based on facts from the Tatar history 
and Muslim theology (Batrov, 2013). 	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wear a long loose dress like the one her mother prefers. Combined with a hint of make-
up, her clothing style projected an image that did not set her apart from other practicing 
Muslim Tatar women her age, who always carefully covered their heads and body, but 
left some room for variation in style and make up.  
As evident from Farida’s story, Tatars’ struggle over what kind of Islam they 
should practice rests largely at the personal level of bodily practices and rituals, as 
opposed to more abstract theological understandings of different Islamic traditions. While 
women are often at the center of the debate, men are not immune from gender-based 
stereotypes that simultaneously reflect and fuel the ongoing public and private discourses 
on what kind of Islam Tatars should practice. In the next data segment Farida continued 
to explain her family’s religious practices, focusing this time on her stepfather’s 
appearance as both an indicator of his strong faith and others’ perception of the family’s 
faith being outside the norm:  
 
Farida’s story – segment # 3 
 
F: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
[portion omitted] 
A:::nd, so, my dad is very strict now. For example they say, “Why do you wear a 
beard?” He wears a beard, meaning it’s Sunnah [Ar. ‘normative conduct based 
on Muhammad’s example’]253 of the Prophet; he will never give it up. There was 
even a time when, um, Muslims were incarcerated in our town, a:::nd, so, 
everyone was afraid to wear a beard, everyone was afraid to act as Muslims; they 
became like little mice. Even at such a moment he said: “Tawakal Allahu” [Ar. 
‘Trust God’],254 a:::nd he did not shave off his beard then, he kept wearing it, and 
he still wears it255 ((quiet voice)).  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 This word of Arabic origin today is widely used in both Tatar and Russian. Here, Farida uses Russian pronunciation 
of the word. 
254 The Online Oxford Dictionary of Islam explains that the Arabic word “Tawakkul” translates as “trust” and “refers to 
the Sufi practice of complete self-abandonment in God in order to do His will. Also indicates the Sufi's total reliance on 
God to provide for daily needs” (“Tawakkul,” 2003). 
255 As a point of comparison, in early modern Russia, beards functioned as indicators of traditional, backwards versus 
progressive, modern identity, as indicated by Peter the Great’s requirement, as part of his modernizing reforms, that all 
Russian (Christian) men in his day shave their beards.	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Farida’s discussion of her stepfather’s practice of wearing a beard (lines 67-74) 
illuminates how a common perception of a gender-specific practice of wearing a beard 
reflects what is considered a norm, as well as a deviation from it. For Farida, her 
stepfather’s decision to wear a beard was an act of piety: in their daily lives, Muslims are 
encouraged to emulate the actions of their Prophet (what is called “Sunnah”) who wore a 
beard. Therefore, to wear a beard is to act like a Muslim. However, her father’s decision 
to keep the beard even at a time when “Muslims were incarcerated” in their town (line 
70) and when “everyone was afraid to wear a beard, everyone was afraid to act as 
Muslims” (line 71) also sets him apart as too strict—a “Wahhabi” in the eyes of others.  
On a number of occasions during fieldwork, I witnessed Tatars discuss a man’s 
skullcap and slightly rolled up trousers, combined with a longer beard, as indicators of his 
“foreign” religious identity. The fact that gender-specific physical manifestations of piety 
continue to serve as markers of a certain Islamic tradition is supported by a recent article 
on the website of Umma, the Tatarstan Spiritual Muslim Board-endorsed newspaper. The 
article talked about the presence of Tablighi Jamaat, an Indian reform movement banned 
in Russia as an international extremist organization, in Tatarstan among the local Tatars. 
The article caught my attention because it began with a physical description of a typical 
male representative of the organization:256 
Today one can frequently see them in Tatarstan’s mosques: dressed in typical 
Pakistani clothes, with odd-looking beards at least four fingers long, they often 
spend the night at the mosques. Just from their peculiar appearance, it is possible 
to understand that in front of you are the adherents of what for the Tatars is a 
foreign, non-traditional form of Islam such as “Tablighi Jamaat.” (Nurly, 2011a)    
 
The article was accompanied by a photograph of five bearded men dressed in this 
clothing who were standing in front of what looked like one of Kazan’s mosques. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 My translation from Russian.	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addition to the physical description of the organization’s male members, the article also 
cited the group’s insistence on strict division of space along gender lines (such as during 
a nikakh, a marriage ceremony) and women’s conservative clothing style, as something 
“wild” [Ru. ‘diko’] for traditionally Hanafi Tatars. The fact that the article was re-posted 
on the Tatarstan Spiritual Muslim Board’s website257 indicates that non-practicing and 
practicing Muslims alike rely on gender-specific outward expressions of faith to 
determine one’s religious affiliation. Such attention to the question of the kind of Islam 
one espouses reflects both the Tatars’ newfound interest in their religion and their anxiety 
“to get it right.” As a result, one must often perform a tough balancing act to appear as a 
Muslim who is pious enough, but not fanatically religious as to be accused of being 
radical.  
While religious practices often serve as indicators of one’s religious identity, 
sources of religious knowledge—in other words, whom a Muslim considers religious 
authority—are also frequently treated as reliable markers of one’s faith. When later in the 
conversation Farida described her stepfather as “very strict in the questions of aqida”—
an Arabic term for Muslim articles of faith258—and as someone who “understands all 
that,” I asked her where he had studied. Farida did not give a simple answer, but 
elaborated instead: 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Nurly (2011b). 
258 This word of Arabic origin is becoming widely used by practicing Muslims in both Russian and Tatar. Here, even 
though Farida pronounces the word with Arabic accent, she conjugates the word in accordance with the Russian 
grammar (“v voprosakh akydy”).   
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Farida’s story – segment # 4 
 
F: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
[portion omitted] 
He’s self-taught. He didn’t study anywhere, but he completed a hajj [Ar. 
‘Muslim pilgrimage’].259 He…he traveled to Turkey, for example, to study, not 
to study per se, to take some courses, he was taught by Turks. His first teachers 
of Islam were Turks. And then he sort of gradually switched to Arabs, so to 
speak, because the source is the Arabs. The source is the Arabs. The Prophet 
himself was an Arab. So, how can we think that Turks have more knowledge 
when the source of knowledge, those to whom the knowledge came, were the 
Arabs, they are the bearers of it. In other words, no one, other than them, can 
better know their religion, meaning from ‘alim [Ar. ‘educated, 
knowledgeable’],260 from knowledgeable people.  
 
Farida’s description of her step father’s religious teachers in ethno-racial, and 
even geographic, terms reflects the fact that in the context of the post-Soviet Muslim 
revival, various Muslim countries came to be associated with certain forms of Islam, and 
one’s religious identity with the country where one studied or where one’s religious 
teachers came from. My analysis of Malika’s narrative above reveals some stereotypes 
that are associated with “Arabs.” Commenting on the post-Soviet opening of the borders, 
Emelianova (2005), suggests that “Among the controversial implications of the 
reintegration of Russian Muslims into the Islamic world has been their wider exposure to 
transnational forms of Islam, associated mainly with Salafism (Islam of ancestors), or 
Wahhabism,” at the expense of local Muslim traditions (p. 245). Providing a list of 
specific countries, Emelianova further points out that such exposure happens through 
rigorous teaching and associated missionary activity.  
My fieldwork indicates that average Tatars generally associate Turkey, for 
instance, with “moderate,” more “Tatar-like”261 Islam, while they associate Saudi Arabia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 A pilgrimage to Mecca that, which takes place in the last month of the year and which is mandatory for all able 
Muslims at least once in their life time. This word of Arabic origin is becoming widely used by practicing Muslims in 
both Russian and Tatar. Here, Farida uses the Russian version of the word (“hadzh”).   
260 Farida pronounces the word with Arabic accent, but conjugate the word in accordance with the Russian grammar 
(“iz ‘alimov”).	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and other Middle Eastern countries with “foreign,” or radical Islam. This could be due to 
the fact that Tatars and Turks of Turkey share a historical connection grounded, at 
various points in time, in a common ethno-cultural and linguistic heritage (both speak a 
Turkic language) and Sunni-Hanafi legal tradition. Both groups originated from Central 
Asia. However, as my earlier discussion of the closure of Turkish schools throughout 
Russia (and Tatarstan) illustrates, an average Tatar’s perception of a certain nationality 
may not be shared by government officials. This ultimately points out the unstable, yet 
complex, nature of these identities, as well as stereotypes and perceptions that they reflect 
and generate.   
Farida’s description of her stepfather’s religious education further reflects the 
complexity of the relationship drawn between one’s religious identity and sources of 
religious knowledge. Farida’s initial reaction that her stepfather was “self-taught” and 
“did not study anywhere” could indicate that she understood my question as implying a 
religious educational institution, such as a medrese. It may also point to her hesitation to 
comment on the question because the fact that Farida’s stepfather “gradually switched” 
from Turkish to Arab teachers could be perceived as “radicalization” of his religious 
views. This is why—without my asking for it—Farida felt the need to defend her 
stepfather’s ultimate choice of religious teachers. Furthermore, Farida’s juxtaposing of 
the two countries reflects the Tatars’ struggles to locate the kind of Islam that they should 
practice, as well as debates surrounding it: “So, how can we think that the Turks have 
more knowledge when the source of knowledge, those to whom the knowledge came, 
were the Arabs” (lines 80-82). In her question, Farida simultaneously enacted two 
discourses prevalent among the Tatars today: (a) Turkish Islam is more “Tatar”-like and 
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that is where the Tatars should seek their religious knowledge, and (b) “only” Arabs or 
“all” Arabs are true Muslims and the ultimate source of knowledge on Islam. On the 
other hand, similar to Malika, by clarifying that she referred to “the ‘alim,” or religiously 
“knowledgeable” Arabs, not all Arabs, Farida emphasized the (“good”) quality of 
religious knowledge that her stepfather received. Through describing her stepfather’s 
religious teachers Farida indirectly commented on the kind of Islam her stepfather 
practiced. 
The generational dimension in Tatars’ debate over which Islamic tradition(s) 
should define their future identity and the role of religious authority and daily practices in 
this debate is also illustrated in Farida’s story as she continued her narrative. When, 
referring to her earlier statement (lines 65-66), I asked her why Muslims were 
incarcerated in her town in the past, Farida told a story about a conflict that took place 
between younger and older Muslims. According to Farida, when a younger generation of 
Muslim men began performing namaz, the daily prayer, in accordance with the Shafii 
(non-Hanafi) madhhab, “the old men said: ‘You either recite namaz the way we do, or 
you leave, and we won’t let you into the mosque.’ And the next time they didn’t let them 
in.”  
Such attention to the style of the formal prayer could be explained by the fact that, 
as I witnessed on multiple occasions during my fieldwork, it is perceived as the easiest, 
however imprecise, way to determine what kind of Muslim one is. In one particular 
instance I observed, an older Tatar woman who conducted informal religious education 
among female university students corrected one of them when she saw the girl perform 
the prayer the way Farida described it in her narrative, which slightly deviated from the 
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Hanafi prayer style. The girl came to Kazan to attend a university and learned the formal 
prayer in her hometown outside Kazan. When the girl unassumingly asked why she was 
being corrected, the teacher’s response was: “We don’t do it this way here.”  
As Farida continued her narrative, she suggested that a younger imam was 
removed from his position by the older generation because “they didn’t like that he did 
everything in accordance with Sunnah; they didn’t like that he studied in Medina. They 
were not satisfied with that; they needed babaiskii [Ru./Tat. ‘old-Tatar-men-like’] 
Islam.262 They did not need the Truth.” The Tatar word “babay” refers to an old man, 
grandfather. But in a religious context of the Soviet era, it also referred to an unofficial 
male Muslim religious authority, a person who possessed some, often limited, religious 
knowledge. It was usually an older retiree, and a small number of these men are still 
around today. Similarly to an older generation of Tatar women (represented by Taskira 
apa at the beginning of this chapter), this generation of Muslim Tatar men are advocates 
of “traditional Tatar Islam” associated with the Hanafi school of law in Sunni Islam.263  
By using the term “babaiskii,” Farida signals that at the heart of the conflict 
between the older and younger generation of Muslims was the nature of Islam that should 
define the mosque’s parishioners’ religious identities. In this struggle, the older 
generation’s interpretation of the religious identities of the imam and his supporters was 
based on the source of his religious knowledge (Medina), the way he recited the formal 
prayer (Shafi’i madhhab) and how he manifested his piety (in accordance with Sunnah). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Farida uses the word “babaiskii” an adjective, with the Tatar root “babai” (“an old man”) and a Russian adjective 
morpheme “skii.” 
263 Mukhametshin (2009) also points out to the role of younger imam’s foreign-based Islamic education in this 
generational conflict. He suggests that the younger “imams used to their advantage their educational superiority over 
unofficial Soviet-era mullahs [Tat. ‘Muslim clergy’] who did not have any structured Islamic education and could not 
argumentatively defend their positions. Their main argument in the debate wit their younger counterparts was: ‘This 
was how our ancestors did’.”(p. 39). 
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On the other hand, Farida’s assertion that the older men “did not need the Truth” points 
to the younger generation’s perception of “the old-Tatar-men-like” Islam as Soviet-era, 
and thus ethnic- and custom-based, far from the Sunnah and true religious knowledge.  
Such perception of religion in generational terms is further supported by my 
experience in the field. During my visits with Malika throughout the course of the 
fieldwork, she often expressed her and her husband’s frustration over the fact that his 
parishioners, the majority of whom were Tatars in their late forties and older, continued 
to practice Islam in their old, “Tatar,” way. What Malika and her husband meant was that 
the older generation’s perception of Islam was often shaped by the Soviet-era religious 
traditions and knowledge.  
On one occasion, Malika and I attended an ash, a Tatar religious gathering with 
the purpose of Qur’an recitations and prayers, accompanied by a sit-down meal. The ash 
was hosted by a practicing Tatar woman in her sixties who became observant upon 
retirement. The hostess had invited about eight other women of the same age and an 
abïstay, a Tatar woman in her seventies who was considered the best at Qur’an 
recitations and a local religious authority of sorts. The gathering began with Qur’an 
recitations by the abïstay, followed by Malika’s reciting of a few short surah (Qur’anic 
chapters) at the hostess’ request. Once the recitations ended and prayers were said, the 
women exchanged small gifts and small amounts of cash among themselves as sadakah, 
a form of alms giving. Malika quickly excused herself and left the table right before the 
exchange began. When I later asked her why she did not participate in the exchange, she 
explained that in Islam sadakah was meant for the needy and the poor, which made the 
ritual a local (Tatar) cultural tradition in her eyes because the women were not needy.  
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Farida’s description of the mosque conflict as a generational one—between “the 
old men” and “the young men,” “boys”— can be challenged based on the fact that her 
parents, who are generationally “in between,” supported the younger group. Therefore, it 
would be wrong to define Tatars’ search for the “right” kind of religious identity strictly 
in generational terms. Rather, in Tatars’ varying perceptions of Islam age is a 
contributing factor. Finally, I argue that, on the one hand, in her story Farida voiced and 
debunked some common perceptions and stereotypes that are formed on the basis of 
physical manifestations of piety (especially those that constitute a religious “norm”). On 
the other hand, however, Farida also drew on these common perceptions (such as one’s 
sources of Islamic knowledge as a true indicator of religious identity) to position her 
family and her own religious identities as religiously “knowledgeable” (and, therefore, 
considered outside the “norm”) and thus legitimate. Farida’s story, therefore, was a 
discursive site where, simultaneously, Tatars’ struggle over religious identity was 
reflected and where Farida constituted her family’s identity as legitimate, thereby 
asserting her agency.   
 
In Search of Identity in a Piety Story 
The recent Muslim revival expanded the Tatar sovereignty movement’s goals that 
were focused on reviving the Tatar language and obtaining political independence. 
Today, the Tatars’ interest in revitalizing their language and building a sovereign nation 
is also accompanied by a growing interest in Islam, which is no longer treated as a 
marker of ethnic identity, but a powerful force in its own right. An increasing number of 
Tatars perceive Islam—and not the Tatar language or an independent Tatar state—as a 
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moral imperative for personal change and, therefore, social transformation. As Taskira 
apa’s story demonstrated, this development is particularly evident in the way the 
sovereignty movement’s activists talk about Islam as a defining feature of Tatars’ 
identity. 
Present-day Tatars, however, debate not only the extent to which Islam, and not 
only ethnicity, should define their identities, but also about what kind of Islam should be 
part of their lives. This debate—among non-Muslims, non-observant Muslim Tatars, as 
well as practicing Muslim Tatars who do not posses sufficient knowledge for interpreting 
differences within normative Islam—is often focused on sources of Islamic knowledge as 
a true indicator of one’s religious identity. In addition, physical manifestations of Muslim 
piety are also treated as reliable markers of what kind of Islam one practices and 
constitute a religious “norm.”  
These debates on the “right” kind of identity have a generational dimension to 
them. As Taskira apa’s narrative illustrated, the older generation of Tatars often conflate 
ethnic and religious elements of an identity, manifested, for example, in their treatment of 
the Tatar language use as a religious duty. On the other hand, the younger generation is 
increasingly interested in religious knowledge and practice that are independent of the 
Tatar component, demonstrated by Malika’s and Farida’s hesitance to rely on local Tatar 
elders for religious knowledge. The women’s attempts to go beyond Soviet-era religious 
knowledge, which is closely tied to Tatar ethnic traditions, are reflective of the Tatars’ 
increasing introspection about Muslim religious knowledge and practices they seek to 
cultivate. This is despite the fact that practicing Muslims are aware of stereotypical 
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perceptions formed on the basis of one’s sources of religious knowledge and outward 
manifestations of piety that are perceived to deviate from the accepted religious norm.  
 I conclude that one specific way Taskira apa, Malika, Farida, and other 
practicing Muslim women I got to know deal with such perceptions is in their piety 
stories by employing various discursive strategies. Taskira apa referred to her rich life 
experience and religious authority (the Qur’an) to make a case for preservation of the 
Tatar language as an element of Tatars’ identity important to her. Malika presented the 
sources of her religious knowledge as theologically or morally sound and thus legitimate. 
All three women, including Farida, acknowledged and deconstructed stereotypes and 
“norms” associated with certain beliefs or practices, while also drawing on them to make 
their case. As such, the women’s stories served as discursive sites that reflected the 
Tatars’ struggle over religious identities. Ultimately, piety stories were also the sites 
where the women simultaneously constituted and legitimized their own religious 
identities and ideas about Islam, thereby exerting their agency.  
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I analyzed piety stories, a culturally specific mode of 
communication by practicing Muslim Tatar women in the central Russian republic of 
Tatarstan. Centered on women’s paths to Muslim piety, which is grounded in physical 
observation of daily religious practices, these stories are an inseparable part of the 
women’s iman [Tat./Ar. ‘faith’], identity, the local Muslim discursive community, and 
the Tatars’ religious revival. The process of continuously striving to be a pious Muslim 
woman, which is at the heart of these stories, is also one’s continuous quest for identity 
and meaning and quest to make sense of the world and, ultimately, a difference in it. I see 
this dissertation as an extension of my own return to Tatarstan for fieldwork after a 
decade in the U.S. Being immersed in my community of origin set me on an intellectual 
path to recognizing the personal and social value behind piety stories, listening to them 
carefully, wrestling to make sense of them, and learning to write about them in such a 
way that would allow these stories and their tellers to come alive, highlighting the 
vulnerability but, ultimately, resilience of the human potential. It is the women’s ability 
to do things with words—despite the lack of or in the presence of other resources—and 
thereby to bring about personal and social transformation that this dissertation is about.  
My primary goal in this dissertation was to understand what practicing Muslim 
Tatars women do when they tell or hear a piety story and what rhetorical and social 
effects story-sharing has on both the narrator and the audience, and, possibly, beyond. On 
one level, the purpose of my research and analysis was to contribute to our 
understandings of ways identities are enacted, re-created, performed, and negotiated via 
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specific (localized) communicative practices (such as piety stories). On another level, I 
hoped to shed light on what Muslim Tatar women’s stories, as social practices, could tell 
us about the current Muslim revival taking place among Tatars and about the impetus 
behind choosing Islam as a way of life.  
Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrated how women use piety stories to 
perform their identities, negotiate group memberships, and provide a discursive way for 
the speaker to practice being a Muslim and for the audience, a blueprint for becoming 
one. I analyzed how, by creating continuity and coherence in their piety stories, women 
achieve moral standing and authority that allows them to invite listeners to step onto a 
similar path—a path to Muslim piety. I showed that women use storytelling as a form of 
da’wah, a Muslim’s duty to invite others to Islam. I explained some of the ways women, 
through the act of storytelling, challenge or embrace certain gender roles, (re)produce 
their understanding of Islam and, thereby normalize or question certain interpretations of 
what it means to be a (Muslim) woman. My ultimate goal was to explain that, as 
communicative means for (re)producing and legitimizing certain, often alternative to 
secular, ways of being, piety stories serve as sources of agency, and their sharing is an 
empowering experience that carries the potential for both personal and social 
transformation.   
  In this final chapter, I first outline research questions and goals at the heart of this 
dissertation, and explain my methodological choices of ethnography and discourse 
analysis, and my theoretical focus on agency. I then describe how my own journey, as a 
researcher but also a human being, contributed to and ultimately framed this 
dissertation’s questions and conclusions. I proceed with a discussion of theoretical 
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implications of this dissertation, stressing the need to expand modes of inquiry that 
question normative critiques of unfamiliar peoples and contexts, and the need to account 
of researcher’s own beliefs and assumptions. Finally, I propose a number of ways this 
dissertation’s research could be capitalized on in order to explore issues that remained 
outside of the scope of this work. 
 
Historical Legacy and Social Context 
My inquiry into Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories was an inquiry into identities 
of women living in a specific place at a specific point in time. These women’s stories, 
desires, and worldviews could be understood only if located within the multiple contexts 
and complex historical legacies that contributed to these women’s identities and stories. 
Among them are a complicated history of an ethnic and religious minority status within 
imperial Russia and the Soviet Union; ethnic revival and promises of sovereignty upon 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, combined with painful socio-economic transitions; present-
day Russia’s attempts to curb its Muslim minorities’ ethnic and religious aspirations by 
centralizing political power in the federal center and forging a state-supported version of 
Islam. The Tatars’ complex historical legacy, present-day status within Russia, and 
aspirations to be part of the global Ummah, necessitated an approach and theoretical 
frameworks that, while allowing me to focus on the communicative practice of sharing 
piety stories, would also enable me to position these stories within the larger socio-
historical milieu. A methodological approach of in-depth ethnographic research and 
discourse analysis with attention to historical legacy and insights from Muslim feminist 
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studies allowed me to focus on piety stories within the larger political and historical 
context.  
 
Language Use  
Locally situated language use and its analysis were central to my inquiry, as both 
subject and analytical tool, not only because I chose to focus on Muslim Tatar women’s 
discursive practices such as piety stories. The focus on language was necessitated by the 
fact that language is what makes us human because to have a language is “to be part of a 
community of people who engage in joint, common activities through the use of a 
largely, but never completely, shared range of communicative resources [. . .] being part 
of a tradition sharing a history, and hence access to a collective memory, full of stories, 
innuendoes, opinions, recipes, and other things that make us human” (Duranti 1997, p. 
334).  
My discourse analysis of Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories approaches 
discourse as an observable performance (Goffman, 1981) of a transformative experience 
that takes place in the moment of storytelling (not a verbal account of the “original” 
conversion event) (Stromberg, 1993). This approach does not take away from the 
exploration of the significance behind the religious experience itself because “in order to 
tell the stories of their conversions, believers must talk about aspects of their experience 
that have profound meanings for them” (Stromberg, 1993, p. 15).  
Assuming a performative approach to language (Austin, 1961, 1962), and 
drawing on conversion narratives (Stromberg 1993) and life stories (Linde, 1993), I 
conducted discourse analysis to understand what Muslim Tatar women, as social agents, 
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do when they share their stories. I discovered that Muslim Tatar women agentively use 
piety stories to negotiate their identities, gain group membership, re-affirm their 
commitment to Islam, legitimize their visions of it, and provide the audience with a 
sample path to Muslim piety, which they regard as a means to personal and social 
transformation. The concept of agency, therefore, as an ability to act, to make choices, 
and thereby, impact the environment (Giddens 1984) was central to this dissertation.  
 
Muslim Feminist Understanding of Agency  
While in my analysis, I drew on the concept of agency that underscores one’s 
ability to act and therefore effect change, I also had to account for ways agency takes 
alternative forms within a specific context (Ortner 2006). In the case of practicing 
Muslim Tatar women whose understanding of Muslim piety is rooted in the correct 
performance of physical observances (the five daily prayers, the veil, the diet), such 
alternative understanding of agency implies one’s submission to and enactment of the 
highly prescribed religious norms (Mahmood 2005). It is the synthesis of (a) an 
ethnographic approach, (b) discourse analysis situated within the local socio-historic 
realities, and (c) the two notions of agency that informed my analysis and enabled me to 
explore the ways practicing Muslim Tatar women use piety stories creatively, 
strategically, and agentively, as a venue for personal and social transformation.  
 
The Researcher’s Journey 
Marranci (2008) argues that an inquiry into Muslim lives and identities should go 
beyond focusing on Islam as a single defining factor in determining all facets of 
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Muslims’ identities and lives. Instead, he proposes to focus ethnographically on 
“observing the dynamics of Muslim lives expressed through their ideological and 
rhetorical understanding of their surrounding (social, natural, virtual) environment” 
(Marranci: Kindle Locations 1410-1411).264  
It was Muslim Tatar women’s—including my own mother’s—interest in and turn 
to Islam that had originally set me on a journey to learning more about these women’s 
identities and stories. The driving question of my research project, fueled by my personal 
curiosity, was to find out why these women chose Islam as a way of life despite potential 
difficulties associated with living as a practicing Muslim in a secular, increasingly 
nationalist, Russian state. This was also the very first question that many people, 
academics and non-academics alike, have asked me about my dissertation research. 
While this, from one perspective, was a reasonable question to ask, its underlining 
assumption was that there was something about Islam that made one’s interest in it “not 
normal” and in need of explanation.   
As I began my work in the field, I realized that it was a common practice among 
non-practicing Muslim Tatars and non-Tatars alike to attribute practicing Tatar women’s 
interest in Islam to a narrow choice of reasons that were routinely applied to these 
women’s diverse experiences. These assumed explanations included a traumatic event in 
life (personal drama), a romantic interest in a Muslim man, or a nod to fashion (as a 
collective trend to observe Islam and women’s interest in Muslim fashion). Yet, none of 
the women I met and spoke with in the course of my research directly and decisively 
attributed their turn to Muslim piety to any of these three phenomena. Moreover, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Marranci (2008) clarifies that by “ideological” he means “as a set of beliefs structuring a personal discourse”  
(Kindle Location 1452).  
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Muslim Tatar women solicited their stories, they did not ask one another about what 
made them turn to Islam. Rather, the question that they used to solicit one another’s 
stories—“How did you come to Islam?”—implied a journey, not a single cause. Often 
times, the cause was known, shared, and accepted as a culturally meaningful given. It was 
Allah tägalä [Tat. ‘God, the Exalted’] who was the reason behind a woman’s iman [Tat. 
‘faith’], who set her onto the road to piety. However, each woman’s journey was unique 
and deeply personal and thus worth sharing.    
These observations—and women’s stories—made me question my own 
assumptions about studying Muslim women and trying to find causes behind their turn to 
piety. They ultimately made me expand the framework of my inquiry and analysis to shift 
the focus from causes to meaning. Instead of probing why Muslim Tatar women turn to 
Islam, I began asking what piety stories reveal about what it means to be a practicing 
Muslim woman living in Russia today. I wanted to know what it meant to grow up in a 
practicing Muslim family, or to become a practicing Muslim woman early in life. Or 
what does it mean to step onto the road to piety in the middle of one’s life, against the 
local cultural expectations? I hoped to understand what it meant to be an older practicing 
Muslim Tatar woman, such as my mother, who lived most of her life during the Soviet 
era and became observant later in life.  
In some ways, my own mother’s path to Muslim piety and the way she goes about 
her life as a practicing Muslim woman speaks to the complexities of being a practicing 
Muslim woman her age, living in the present-day secular Russian state. Today, I observe 
her being very strict about performing the five-daily prayers on time, fasting during 
Ramadan, eating only halal [Tat./Ar. ‘permissible under Islamic normative law’] food, 
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dressing modestly, and asking forgiveness for sins at the end of the day after the night 
prayer. At the same time, she is not dogmatic in her practice. On occasion, I also observe 
her shake hands with men whom she has met for the first time, who extended their hand 
to her in an act of greeting, and whom she deemed unaware of her Muslim identity and 
Muslim practices. I sometimes hear her question out loud certain practices (normative 
Muslim or local customary, which she treats as Muslim) that she finds unreasonable or 
hard to understand for a person with limited theological knowledge, such as the 
possibility of polygyny (predicated upon certain conditions), or encouragement (based on 
the Prophet Muhammad’s example) to recite the entire Qur’an in the course of the holy 
month of Ramadan. But I would also argue that my mother’s understanding and practice 
of Muslim piety ultimately symbolize the resilience and complexity of human nature and 
human experience that can never be fully explained and understood by simple theories of 
cause and effect or general sociological patterns. This dissertation is my earnest attempt 
to add to the body of knowledge on what it means to be a practicing Muslim Tatar 
woman living in present-day Russia, which can contribute to our understanding of what it 
means to be a human being. 
 
Theoretical Implications of Research  
While this dissertation highlights the locally-informed ways Muslim Tatar women 
use piety stories, I would like to suggest that the dissertation’s conclusions have 
relevance beyond the immediate context at hand. In particular, I hope that my research 
will contribute, to borrow Mahmood’s (2005) words, to the “expansion of the normative 
understanding of critique” (p. 36) when it comes to contexts that we find less “familiar.” 
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Such an expansion is predicated on “a mode of encountering the Other which does not 
assume that in the process of culturally translating other lifeworlds one’s own certainty 
about how the world should proceed can remain stable” (Mahmood, 2005, p. 199).  
Specifically, in relation to critiques of people and movements that do not always 
share the liberal/progressivist notions of individual freedom, resistance, power, and 
agency, the expansion of the normative understanding of critiques is necessary if we are 
to understand why certain people embrace and operate on ideas, discourses, and practices 
that we, as Western academics, might find repugnant. Such a mode of inquiry requires 
more than scientific knowledge, training, and commitment. It requires “the virtue of 
humility: a sense that one does not always know what one opposes and that a political 
vision at times has to admit its own finitude in order to even comprehend what it has 
sought to oppose (Mahmood, 2005, p. 199). I can only hope that my analysis of 
practicing Muslim Tatar women’s piety stories demonstrates such humility on some level 
and to some extent. I also hope that this dissertation encourages other scholars to consider 
their own assumptions and beliefs when embarking on a research project, because no 
scholar can be neutral and work entirely outside their own cultural frameworks.  
 
Looking Forward: Implications for Future Research 
There are, of course, questions that I was not able to address, and that await to be 
answered. While some of the stories I analyzed in this dissertation briefly touch on this 
subject, it would be productive to explore further the interplay among various kinds of 
Muslim authorities (and discursive strategies that they employ) that impact Muslim Tatar 
women, such as (a) official local Muslim clergy (exclusively male), (b) abïstaylar [Tat. 
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‘female figures of religious authority’] who give informal lessons at home and local 
mosques, (c) religious institutions (such as medrese) and their teachers, (d) religious 
media (books, websites, TV), and (e) fellow practicing women. A study on identity and 
discourse that does not focus on Muslim Tatar women exclusively, but includes men 
could further highlight the role of gender in shaping discursive strategies as ways of 
doing.265 Finally, a longitudinal study, which would investigate the trajectories of Muslim 
Tatar women’s lives and pieties vis-à-vis discursive practices (such as piety stories) over 
time, would provide a better understanding of specific modes of Muslim piety, discourse, 
agency, and their social significance overtime.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Marranci (2008) points out the need to conduct studies that include Muslim men and sexual minorities.  
	   265 
APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS266 
 
Questions related to choosing a Muslim way of life 
 
1. How long have you been practicing Islam?  
2. Tell me about your path to Islam 
3. Was your family (parents, siblings, grandparents) religious? 
4. Do you remember what was the prevalent attitude toward religion, Islam in particular, 
in society when you started practicing? Has it changed?  
5. What was the reaction of your family and friends when you started observing Islam, 
for example, when you started wearing your headscarf? 
6. Did you feel a need for support and where did you find it? 
7. What were your sources of knowledge about Islam when you started observing it? 
What are they today? 
Questions related to Islamic living 
 
8. Give specific examples of how your life has changed since you started practicing 
Islam (such as daily routine, relations with family and friends, work situation, 
hobbies/interests). 
9. Can you give me examples of what “being a Muslim” means to you?  
10. What rituals do you perform daily? 
11. Are there other ways in which you practice your faith daily? 
12. From your experience, has it become easier to live Islamic life in Tatarstan, compared 
to ten years ago? 
13. Are there any challenges that you personally (or Muslim women you know) face in 
their everyday life today? For example, do you feel comfortable wearing your 
headscarf, praying in public, or asking for halal food? 
14. Are you able to realize your educational or career goals? 
15. How do you perceive the role of a woman in a society? 
16. How do you see the future of Russia and Tatarstan in the next five years? 
17. What kind of a society would you like to live in or wish for your children to live in? 
 
Questions related to ethnic (Tatar) vs. religious (Muslim) identity 
 
18. Do you consider all ethnic Tatars Muslims?  
19. Is it as important for you to know your ethnic heritage (Tatar language, culture) as to 
know Islam? 
20. Do you find more in common with an ethnic non-practicing Tatar or with a practicing 
Muslim who is not Tatar? 
21. What are your criteria for choosing a future spouse (for yourself or your children)? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 The original set of my interview questions was built around Glock and Starks’s (1966) five dimensions of 
religiosity: belief, ritual, experience, knowledge, and consequences (as cited in Burwell, R. (1999). Dimensions of 
religious commitment. In Hill & Hood (Eds.) Measures of Religiosity, (pp. 279-281). Birmingham: Religious 
Education Press). I further revised those questions based on the feedback I received during my research.   
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Questions related to religious identity 
 
22. Do you have any knowledge of foreign languages? 
23. Have you considered/started/considering studying Turkish or Arabic? For what 
purposes?  
24. (Younger person): Have you ever considered (or would you consider) studying 
outside Russia? Where and why? 
25. Older person: would you consider letting your children or grandchildren study outside 
Russia? Where and why? 
26. Have you had any contact with Tatar diasporic or Muslim communities abroad? If so, 
can you tell me more about that experience (how it was initiated, how long it lasted, 
how it impacted your perception about living in Tatartsan)? 
27. Is there anything else you would like to add or share with me? 
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APPENDIX B 
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
 
Bold face  Arabic words or recent Arabic borrowings that are only 
making their way into both Russian and Tatar.267   
Bold underlined italics  Tatar words or older Persian/Arabic borrowings that have 
become an integral part of the Tatar language.  
Italics  Russian words or morphemes in Tatar/Arabic words  
[Ar. faith]  English translation of Arabic, Tatar, or Russian words 
((softer voice))   description of non-verbal behavior or comment on 
transcript 
( )     an unsure transcription 
“the day has come”   direct speech 
‘I came to Islam’  direct speech within someone else’s direct speech 
[…]  omission of some part of the interview data that was 
deemed less relevant to the subject matter at hand  
[him] word(s) in brackets were not present in the original 
interview, but had to be inserted for the translation to make 
sense 
[     overlapping utterance 
=    latching of utterances 
…    pause in speech 
a:::nd    lengthening of the sound 
boys    speaker’s emphasis 
op- opened   broken off word 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 I used standard English spellings for common Arabic words found in English-language dictionaries (such as “hijab” 
or “Muhammad”).  
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APPENDIX C 
TRANSLITERATION CONVENTIONS 
 
 
Tatar 
 
Presently, no unified transliteration system exists for modern-day Tatar. Therefore, in this 
dissertation I utilized Tatar transliteration conventions offered by Suzanne Wertheim 
(2003a, p. 355), which, I believe reflects the specificity of the Tatar language phonic 
system well.  
 
 
 
Transliteration Cyrillic  Transliteration Cyrillic  
a а l л 
ä əә m м 
b б n  н 
ch ч ng ӊ 
d д o o 
e е ö ө 
f ф p п 
g г r р 
g’’ гъ s с 
h h sh ш 
i и t т 
ia я u у 
iu ю ü ү 
ï ы v в 
j җ w в 
k к y й 
k’’ къ z з 
kh х ' (soft sign) ь 
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Russian 
 
I adapted (with slight modifications) the Library of Congress’ transliteration system, 
which can be accessed at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf 
 
 
Transliteration Cyrillic  Transliteration Cyrillic  
a а o o 
b б p п 
ch ч r р 
d д s с 
e е / ë / э sh ш 
f ф shch щ 
g г t т 
i и / й ts ц 
ia я u у 
iu ю v в 
k к y ы 
kh х z з 
l л zh ж 
m м ' (soft sign) ь 
n н '' (hard sign) ъ 
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APPENDIX D  
GLOSSARY OF TERMS268 
adab (Ar.) / ädäb (Tat.) – manners, conduct, behavior in accordance with prescribed 
Muslim etiquette. 
 
abïstay (pl. abïstaylar) (Tat.) – a Tatar female religious authority, a woman who can 
recite the Qur’an and is knowledgeable about the basic tenants/rituals of Islam; a 
wife of an imam (male religious authority).    
 
Alhamdulillah or Al-hamdu li’Llah (Ar.) – literally, “praise be to God”; in daily speech 
used as “Thank God!” 
 
Allah (Ar/Tat.) – God; Lord 
 
Allah birsa (Tat.) – “God willing”  
 
Allah subhana wa ta’ala (Ar.) / Allah subhana wa tägalä (Tat.) – “God, May He be 
Glorified and Exalted”; the phrase is used to refer to God in a pious manner; 
given spelling reflects the way the phrases are pronounced among Tatars. “Allah 
subhanahu wa ta’ala” is considered a more correct pronunciation.  
 
Allah tägalä / Allahï tägalä (Tat.) / Allah ta’ala (Ar.) – a short version of “Allah 
subhanu wa ta’ala”; can be translated as “God, the Exalted” 
 
Amin! (Tat.) – ‘Amen!’ 
 
apa (Tat.) – aunt; a respectful form of address to a woman who is older than the 
addressee 
 
Assalyamu aleikum (Ar.) – literally, “May peace be upon you,” a greeting used by 
Muslims to greet one another; pronunciation and transliteration of the phrase 
differes from country to country. 
 
ash (ashlar – pl.) (Tat.) – a Tatar tradition of a religious gathering (usually in honor of an  
important event) at a dinner table with the purpose of reciting of the Qur’an, 
saying prayers, socializing, and enjoying the meal. 
 
Astaghfirullah (Ar.) – literally, “I seek forgiveness from God”; in daily life, the phrase is 
used by Muslims to express their wish to abstain from doing something wrong or 
to ask forgiveness for an improper action or feeling. A Muslim is also encouraged 
to recite the phrase after every ritual prayer.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 In the process of compiling this glossary, I consulted with the following sources: Esposito (2003), Safiullina (2005), 
Peshkova (2006). 	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‘alim (Ar.) – knowledgeable, educated, especially in relation to Islam 
 
‘awrat (Ar.) – literally, “nakedness,” “shame.” Parts of the human body that should be 
covered from the eyes of others. The term does not refer to parts of the human 
body that must be covered by everyone at all times. What constitutes ‘awrat is 
situational and also depends on the madhhab [Ar. ‘Muslim school of law’]. 
 
äbi (äbilär - pl.) (Tat.) – grandmother, older woman 
 
äkhliak’’ (Tat.) – Muslim ethics; a set of norms of behavior considered appropriate for a  
Muslim 
 
baba (Ru.) – woman (conversational) 
 
babay (Tat.) – old man, grandfather 
 
cherti (Ru.) – demons 
 
dagvat (Ru.) / däg’’vat (Tat.) / da’wah/dawah/dawa (Ar.) – an invitation or call to Islam 
 
da’iya / da’iyah (Ar.) – the one who undertakes dagvat/da’wah 
 
da’wah/dawah/dawa (Ar.) – an invitation or call to Islam 
 
doga (Tat.) – a non-ritual prayer; a request, a form of direct address to God. 
 
Evroislam (Ru.) – Euroislam; an interpretation of Islam advanced by the Tatar historian  
Rafael Khakimov 
 
farz (Tat.) / fardh (Ar.) – mandatory religious duty, binding on every able Muslim, such 
as five daily prayers, fast during Ramadan, etc. 
 
glasnost (Ru.) – openness 
 
hadith (ahadith - pl.) (Ar.) / hädis (Tat.) / hadis (Ru.) – an account of exemplary sayings 
and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, or his approval of certain behavior, put 
together in collections in accordance with certain denominations within Islam and 
studied by Muslims in addition to the Qur’an itself. 
 
hajj (Ar.) – a pilgrimage to Mecca that, which takes place in the last month of the year 
and which is mandatory for all able Muslims at least once in their life time. 
 
halal (Ar./Tat.) – that which is permissible under Islamic law 
 
Hanafi (Ar.) – one of the four schools of law in Sunni Islam 
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haram (Ar./Tat.) – that which is forbidden under Islamic law (for example, alcohol) 
 
hijab (Ar.) – a general term for traditional Muslim women’s covering of the body, head, 
and sometimes face, or variations thereof, also known as “veil.” The original 
Arabic word refers to a physical curtain or screen, or, metaphorically to 
something that protects, or separates in two parts.  
 
hukm (Ar.) – Islamic ruling 
 
iftar (Tat.) / iftaar (Ar.) – a fast-breaking dinner during the Muslim holy month of  
Ramadan. 
 
iman (Tat./Ar.) – faith 
 
Imam (Tat./Ar.) – literally, the person who stands in front, a role model; prayer leader. In 
Tatarstan: Muslim clergy who serves as a designated religious authority in a 
mosque. The term is applied to a younger generation of Muslim clergy who are 
believed to be more competent and educated than an older generation of mullahs.   
 
Insha’Allah (Ar.) – literally, “God willing.” The phrase is used by Muslims with respect 
to future events.  
 
isem kushu (Tat.) – a Tatar term for the Muslim name-giving ceremony performed shortly 
after a child’s birth. 
 
“Islam traditsii” (Ru.) – Islam of tradition 
 
Jadids (Tat.) / (Ar.) – Muslim modernist reformists in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in the Russian Empire and Central Asia 
 
Jadidism (Tat.) – Muslim modernist reformist movement in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in the Russian Empire and Central Asia 
 
jahilliyah (Ar.) – literally, “ignorance,” “not-knowing,” “unaware.” Metaphorically and 
in stories the word is used to refer to the time of “not-knowing,” the pre-Islamic 
period in the history of Arabia, before the revelation of the Qur’an.  
 
kazïy (Tat.) – Muslim judge. 
 
khanïm (khanïmnar – pl.) (Tat.) – lady, madam; a formal form of address to a woman. 
 
Khater Kone (Tat.) – “Memory Day”; a day observed by Tatars on the second Sunday in 
October to commemorate the fall of Kazan in 1552. 
 
khäer (Tat). – alms 
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khäzrät (Tat./Ar.) – literally “your honor”/ “your majesty”; in Tatarstan used as a polite 
and respectful way to address a Muslim clergy or someone whose activity directly 
relates to Islam (for example, a head of a madrasah or Islamic university).  
 
khutba (Ar.) / khötbä (Tat.) / khutba (Ru.) – weekly sermon, message; mosque sermon 
before the collective Friday prayer. Tatars (particularly the older generation) also 
use the Tatar synonym “vägaz’.” 
 
kïybla (Tat.) / qibla (Ar.) / kibla (Ru.) – the direction of Muslim ritual prayer 
 
kïz (kïzlar – pl.) (Tat.) – girl, young woman 
 
kïzïm (Tat.) – “my daughter”; “my girl”; a common way to address one’s daughter or a 
friendly way to address a girl 
 
korenizatsiia (Ru.) – indigenization 
 
Korban bäyräm (Tat.) / Eid-ul-Adha (Ar.) – a Muslim holiday of the sacrifice that 
celebrates Abraham’s obedience to God  
 
krai (Ru.) – region 
 
kumgan (Tat.) – pitcher for ritual ablution. 
 
La ilaha illa’Llah, Muhammadur rasulu l-Lah (Ar.) – the words of the Shahadah, the 
declaration of faith in Islam, which translate as “There is no god but Allah, and 
Muhammad is His messenger.” 
 
madhhab (Ar.) / mäzhäb (Tat.) – one of four schools of law in Sunni Islam (Hanafi,  
Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i) 
 
mähällä (Tat.) – a local Muslim community usually defined by an association with the 
neighborhood mosque.  
 
Masha’Allah! (Ar.) – literally “God has willed it”; used to express praise to Allah and 
appreciation for an event or person. 
 
medrese (Ru.) / mädräsä (Tat.) / madrasah (Ar.) – the original Arabic word refers to any 
place of learning, religious or secular; in the Tatar context: Islamic secondary 
school, a place of secondary and higher Islamic education. 
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mudjahid (mudjahideen – pl.) (Ar.) / modzhakhed (modzhakhedy – pl.) (Ru.) – the 
original Arabic word refers to the one who struggles on the path to Allah. The 
present-day Russian calque of the Arabic word is most likely associated with the 
Soviet military campaign against the Afghan opposition fighters. Thus, a present-
day Russian calque has a negative, derogatory connotation and refers to a Muslim 
militant, terrorist, or someone who is believed to have radical views in Islam. 
 
mufti (Ru.) – an official Muslim religious leader (often endorsed by the state and acting in 
a professional capacity) 
 
mullah (Tat./Ar) – Muslim clergy, figure of authority (in present-day Tatarstan mostly 
applied to an older generation of Muslim clergy (60 and up) whose religious 
education was limited due to the Soviet era’s policy of atheism, which contributed 
to the development of vernacular forms of Islam, informed by Tatar ethnic 
traditions).  
 
nadan (Tat.) – uneducated, illiterate, ignorant  
 
namaz (Tat.) – Muslim ritual prayer performed five times a day 
 
namazlyk (Tat.) – prayer rug to be used for performing the Muslim ritual prayer, in order 
to ensure that the surface where the prayer is being performed is clean. 
 
nikakh (Tat.) / nikah (Ar.) – Muslim marriage ceremony; solemnization of marriage  
 
nikakhlar ütkärü bergä (Tat.) – performing Muslim marriages ceremonies jointly 
 
ostaz (Tat.) / ustath (Ar.) / ustaz (Ru.) – male teacher, mentor 
 
ostaza (Tat.) / ustatha (Ar.) / ustaza (Ru.) – female teacher, mentor 
 
perestroika (Ru.) – restructuring 
 
Ploshchad’ Svobody (Ru.) – “Freedom Square,” the name of one of Kazan’s squares 
 
prichitanie (Ru.) – loud weeping during a funeral, customary among ethnic Russian 
women 
 
rakagat (Ru.) / räkägat (Tat.) / raka’ah (Ar.) – unit of the Muslim ritual prayer 
 
Ramazan (Tat.) / Ramadan (Ar.) – the holy month of fasting; the month of the Muslim 
lunar calendar. 
 
qadar (Ar.) / kader (Tat.) – divine destiny  
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Qur’an ash (Qur’an ashlar – pl.) (Tat.) – religious gathering with the purpose of reciting 
the Qur’an, usually accompanied by a meal. 
 
sabïr (Tat.) / sobr (Ar.) – patience, a quality encouraged in a Muslim  
 
savab (Tat.) – an act of good deed; an act of Muslim piety to be rewarded by God; God’s 
reward for good deeds. 
 
shahadah (Ar.) – declaration of faith in Islam. 
 
shahid (Tat.) / shaheed (Ar.) – the original Arabic word refers to honor a Muslim who 
died defending their faith, country, or family. The meaning is not limited to acts 
of fighting in the military sense, as a woman who dies during childbirth, for 
example, can also be referred to as “shaheed.”  
 
shahkidka (Ru. female) – the Russian version of the word “shaheed” usually refers to 
Muslim female suicide bombers or women who are believed to hold radical 
Muslim views. 
 
shaitan (Ar.) / shäytan (Tat.) – satan 
 
Shari’ah (Ar.) – Islamic normative law, expressed in the Qur’an and Sunnah  
 
Shia / Shi’ah Islam (Ar.) – the second largest denomination of Islam (after Sunni) 
 
Subhan Allah (Ar. ) – literally, “Praise be to God.” The phrase is used in the ritual of 
tasbih (verbal glorification of God through a sequence of repeated phrases), as 
well as in daily life to express an admiration for something good.  
 
Sunnah (Ar.) – normative conduct based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example.  
 
Sunni (Islam) (Ar.) – the largest denomination of Islam  
 
surah (Ar.) – one of 114 chapters of the Qur’an. 
 
taharät (Tat.) – a ritual of ablution 
 
tajwid (Ar.) – rules of Qur’anic recitation. 
 
talïmsïzlïk (Tat.) – recklessness, carelessness  
 
tarï iarmasï  (Tat.) – millet porridge  
 
tasbih (Ar.) – verbal glorification of God through a sequence of repeated phrases 
 
Tawakal Allahu (Ar.) – “Trust God” 
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Tatarskii Obshchestvennyi Tsentr (Ru.) – “The Tatar Public Center,” the name of a Tatar 
nationalist organization founded in 1988. 
 
tuneiadstvo (Ru.) – literally translated from Russian as “idleness”; in the Soviet context, 
referrers to one’s failure to work and thus build one’s moral character and 
contribute to the common good of the Soviet people. 
 
ummah (Ar.) – Muslim religious community around the globe, united by the faith.  
 
Uraza bäyräm (Tat.) / Eid-ul-Fitr (Ar.) – a Muslim holiday that marks the end of the 
Muslim holy month of Ramadan. 
 
ustaz (Ar./Ru.) / ostaz (Tat.) – male teacher 
 
ustaza (Ar.) – female teacher 
 
vasïiat  (Tat.) – covenant 
 
Wa aleikum assalyam (Ar.) – “upon you, too”; a response to the greeting “Assalyamu  
aleikum” used among Muslims; pronunciation and transliteration of the phrase 
differs from country to country. 
 
Yasin (Tat.) / Ya’sin (Ar.) – the 36th surah of the Qur’an, which is believed to alleviate  
the process of dying and is recited before one’s death.  
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APPENDIX E 
MAPS 
 
Map of Tatarstan’s location within Russia 
 
 
 
http://www.onislam.net/english/oimedia/onislamen/images/Politics/2013/02/RussiaMap-
Tatarstan.gif 
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Map of Autonomous Areas of the Russian Federation 
 
 
 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/russia_auton96.jpg 
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APPENDIX F  
PHOTOGRAPHS FROM THE FIELDSITE269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            The Kol-Shärif mosque: opened in the territory of the Kazan Kremlin in 2005 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The Suleiman mosque: first opened in a working-class suburb of Kazan in 1994  
  (the pictured building opened in 2004) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 All photographs were taken by the author during fieldwork.  
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         A mosque under construction in the town of Zelenodolsk (just west of Kazan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Nurulla mosque: opened in Kazan              Prayer area in one of Kazan’s new                   
in 1845                                                                mosques 
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         Men listen to a Friday sermon at the Kol-Shärif mosque 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
        Young couple observes the name-giving ceremony of their infant, performed  
        by an imam at the Kol-Shärif mosque 
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      An informal mosque lesson at the Nurulla mosque 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Class session at the Mukhammadiia medrese 
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Practicing Muslim Tatar women at an ash in one of Kazan’s mosques (two older women 
in the center of the top row and the ones sitting down feature elements of traditional 
formal Tatar dress; two younger women on either side of the top row have their scarves 
tied “the Arab way”; the girl on the right tied her scarf temporarily for the event, showing 
hair)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
          
 
Older (center) and younger (off center, to the right) practicing Muslim Tatar women     
leaving the Kol-Shärif mosque 
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